
FRANCE

(Working Paper)

Confidence-Building Measures
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

In compliance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and in pursuance of the modalities for the exchange of information adopted by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States Parties held in 1987, France has provided the relevant information each year to the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs.

In order to strengthen the authority and enhance the effectiveness of the Convention, and pending the application of appropriate verification measures, France considers that the confidence-building measures agreed in 1986 should be improved, and that new confidence-building measures should be devised and adopted.

The present paper sets out France's views in this regard. A complementary paper provides examples of the application of some of the new measures proposed.

1. Existing confidence-building measures

In the first place, it is important to reach agreement on the exact meaning of the words "directly related to the Convention". This formulation allows an excessively broad interpretation of the declarations to be made by States parties, and accordingly requires refinement in order to eliminate confusion.

1.1 Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories

The field of application of the declarations should be extended to facilities working with certain types of agents of biological origin (ABOs) at safety level P2. The declarations should be made on the basis of an agreed definition of safety levels, and in such a way as to respect industrial confidentiality.

As far as the activities in these facilities are concerned, the declarations should comprise simply:
A description of the level of containment (cf. attached data sheet)
The nature of the ABOs handled
A general outline of the experimentation conducted.
An illustrative list of ABOs of potential use as warfare agents should be drawn up, containing a limited number of known agents. This list could be regularly updated by an advisory working group, which would at the same time be responsible for monitoring scientific and technological progress of possible relevance to the Convention.

1.2 Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases that seem to deviate from the normal pattern

In the first place, it would appear difficult to draw up universal criteria to identify an "abnormal" epidemic. Consequently, systematic declarations of epidemics caused by the agents referred to in the list mentioned in section 1.1, or belonging to internationally recognized groups of high-risk pathogens, should be drawn up and collected with the help of the World Health Organization. In addition, the field of application could be extended to epizootic diseases, in accordance with criteria to be defined (see below, para. 2.3).

1.3 Publication of research findings

Lists of publications and reports relating to relevant research which are produced in the declared research centres and laboratories (cf. paras. 1.2 and 2.1) should be drawn to the attention of all States parties.

1.4 Active promotion of contacts between scientists

The field of application of this measure should be specified, broadened and based on activities covered by declarations.

2. New confidence building measures

2.1 Declarations concerning national research centres, facilities and programmes related to defence against biological weapons

Simple declarations concerning laboratories engaged in research on defence against biological weapons provide only a fragmented view of the activities of States parties in this field.

Consequently there is a need for States parties to engage in a more comprehensive exchange of information in this regard, comprising in particular:

- Fields of activity
- Aims of the research undertaken
- Numbers and qualifications of staff engaged in such programmes
- Total annual budget of the programmes and sources of finance.
2.2 Reciprocal visits to BW defence research centres

In order to enhance transparency, visits to the research centres and facilities described in the previous paragraph should be organized on a reciprocal basis. A report on these visits could be transmitted to the States parties or to an advisory committee.

These visits, which are not linked to verification measures, should be carried out by the heads of national defence programmes. Exchanges of scientists alone between research centres can give only fragmentary knowledge of the laboratories.

2.3 Exchanges of information on epidemiological surveillance facilities

In order to detect an abnormal epidemic, a country must have epidemiological surveillance facilities which enable it, first, to draw the baseline of morbidity and mortality related to local infectious diseases, and then to identify all abnormal events. States parties should declare the national facilities for gathering epidemiological data that are available to them and the infectious diseases that are regularly monitored.

Such a measure would also enable States parties to cooperate in the development of epidemiological surveillance systems suited to the requirements of each country.

2.4 Exchange of information on past offensive and defensive activities by the States parties

In the interests of the greatest possible transparency and openness, it would be useful if the States parties voluntarily declared the offensive and defensive activities carried out by them before the Convention entered into force in respect of them, starting from a date to be determined (for example 1 January 1946).

2.5 Declarations concerning programmes of military vaccination

All States parties should declare the vaccinations which are compulsory for its military forces in normal times.
ANNEX

DETAILED DATA SHEET FOR DECLARATIONS CONCERNING CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES

This draft is designed to improve the quality of the information gathered in declarations concerning containment laboratories. It forms part of the proposals designed to enhance confidence-building measures.

1. Laboratory
   1.1 Class (under WHO classification)
   1.2 General description
       Area of airlock(s)
       Area of laboratory or laboratories

2. Containment
   2.1 Pressure in airlock(s)
   2.2 Pressure in laboratory or laboratories
   2.3 Air treatment
       - HEPA inlet filters (number)
       - HEPA outlet filters (number, specifications of housings)
       - renewal of laboratory air (partial or total, total, extraction air flow)
   2.4 Entry airlock
       - personnel (number)
       - equipment (number)
       - shower (number)
   2.5 Treatment of liquid effluent
       - water input (number of taps, etc.)
       - pre-discharge sterilization (physical treatment, chemical treatment, brief description)
       - daily treatment capacity
   2.6 Autoclaves
       - double-ended (number, capacities)

3. Equipment
   Numbers, types and brief descriptions of:
   3.1 Microbiologists' stations
   3.2 Bioreactors
   3.3 Centrifuges
   3.4 Restricted areas for special operations (aerosols, animals, etc.)
3.5 Autoclaves (other than double-ended autoclaves)
3.6 Equipment for staff (protective suits, breathing apparatus, etc.)
3.7 Miscellaneous

4. Disinfection of premises
4.1 Equipment (number, brief description)
4.2 Products used
4.3 Method (brief description)

5. Personnel
5.1 Responsible scientists (number, qualifications)
5.2 Engineers (number, qualifications)
5.3 Technicians (number, qualifications)
5.4 Manual workers (number, qualifications)