BACKGROUND DOCUMENT ON COMPLIANCE BY STATES PARTIES WITH ALL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Addendum

Australia

Article I

Australia has never developed, produced, stockpiled, or acquired biological weapons or the weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

In view of the situation outlined above, article II does not apply to Australia.

Article III

Australia is fully in compliance with article III.

Article IV

This provision of the Convention is given effect in Australia by the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act of 1976 which was enacted on 27 February 1977 and the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Regulations of 26 February 1980. Pursuant to the decisions of the First Review Conference, copies of the Act and the Regulations were forwarded to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament in December 1980.

Article V

Australia has not formally invoked the provisions of article V, nor have the provisions of article V been invoked against Australia. Australia has, however, been concerned about reports from various sources which raise
questions as to the compliance of other Parties with the provisions of the Convention, and felt a need for mechanisms that would assist in dispelling any uncertainties about compliance by any Party. Australia has held consultations on these issues outside the framework of the Convention with other States Parties from time to time.

Articles VI and VII

Australia has not invoked the provisions of articles VI and VII, nor have the provisions of these articles been invoked against Australia.

Articles VIII and IX

Australia is committed to the early conclusion of a Comprehensive Convention which would ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and which would provide for the destruction of all existing stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities. This is a high priority of the Australian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.

Australia has strongly supported the adoption of interim measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, such as United Nations General Assembly resolutions 37/98D and 39/65E.

Article X

Activities covered by this article to the Convention are carried out by both Government and non-Government organizations in Australia. All research into micro-organisms and toxins is directed solely towards peaceful purposes in accord with both the letter and the spirit of the Convention. The research is unclassified and the results published in the scientific literature.

The Australian Government implements this provision of the Convention through the administration of institutes and facilities such as the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories and the Australian Animal Health Laboratory, which have collaborative research programmes with a number of international research groups and organizations, and through its contributions to the work of a number of international bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) through the provision of data reporting on the status of a wide range of diseases - animal and human - within Australia.

Australia has a number of bilateral and regional arrangements for the exchange of information on communicable diseases. It also assists organizations in the non-government sector in the dissemination of information on communicable diseases, for example, the Virus Information Exchange Newsletter for South East Asia and the Western Pacific published by the Department of Microbiology in the University of Western Australia, is sponsored principally by the Australian Development Assistance Bureau.
United States of America

Article I

The United States is in full compliance with the obligations contained in article I. Facilities previously used for development, production or stockpiling of biological weapons are now devoted to peaceful purposes. The United States biological defence programme is limited to research on strictly defined prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, such as immunization.

Article II

All United States stocks of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery prohibited under article I were destroyed prior to the deadline specified in article II. In January 1976, all heads of federal departments and agencies certified to the President that as of the deadline (26 December 1975), their respective departments and agencies were in full compliance with the Convention.

Article III

The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under article III not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Manufacturing and commerce in biological products are subject to strict governmental scrutiny and regulation.

Extensive existing legislation controls certain private actions concerning items and actions prohibited under articles I and III. Such legislation includes the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Hazardous Material Transportation Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Public Health Service Act, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.

All existing law and regulation are under continual review to ensure the sufficiency of coverage.

Article V

The United States has continued to invoke the consultative process called for in this article with the Soviet Union with regard to the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in 1979, with the Soviet Union concerning their involvement in the production, transfer and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, and with the Soviets on their maintenance of an offensive biological warfare programme. We have also raised concerns with Laos and Viet Nam regarding the use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos and Kampuchea. To date, we have not been provided with any satisfactory responses to our inquiries.
Article IX

The United States has actively undertaken negotiations toward early agreement on effective measures for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

In February 1983, Vice President George Bush announced in his speech to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that the United States would like to see the work of the CD accelerated, and negotiations undertaken on a treaty to eliminate the threat posed by chemical weapons.

In November 1983, the United States sponsored a workshop on potential verification procedures to confirm the destruction of chemical weapons for member and observer nations of the CD.

In April 1984, Vice President Bush returned to Geneva and presented to the CD the United States draft chemical weapons convention which would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons. This convention seeks a complete, effective and verifiable ban on such weapons.

Also in 1984, as a complement to the multilateral negotiations, the United States initiated bilateral discussions with the Soviets to consider how to ensure confidence in each other's compliance with the provisions of the convention. These ad hoc discussions have continued through the 1986 CD summer session.

Pursuant to an agreement between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, delegations of United States and USSR have held three intensified rounds of bilateral discussions since February 1986. The purpose of these discussions has been to assist multilateral efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban.

Additionally, the United States has contributed several working papers to the Conference on Disarmament to help further the discussions on various provisions of a chemical weapons convention.

Article X

The United States has undertaken a number of activities in accordance with the provisions of article X to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. These activities include bilateral co-operative efforts as well as participation in international organizations concerned with the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

The United States currently operates 34 World Health Organization collaborative specialty centres in the United States which participate with public health laboratories and programmes world-wide to deal with various diseases.
The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), a component of the National Institute of Health (NIH), supports research in bacteriologic and other infectious diseases. Funds for this research amounted to $203 million in fiscal year 1985, the most recent year for which full data is available. The major part of this research was conducted in NIAID laboratories, or through grants (1,086 in FY 1985) or contract awards (70 in FY 1985) totalling $168.6 million. While awards are made primarily to United States academic institutions, some awards have also been made to foreign institutions. Extensive international collaboration, however, is undertaken by NIAID staff scientists or awardees to develop new knowledge applicable to the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of tropical, (such as malaria, schistosomiasis, cholera and leprosy) and arboviral diseases. The NIAID laboratories provide research training to non-United States scientists through participation in the NIH Visiting Scientists Program. The NIAID also has developed special emphasis domestic grants to United States institutions to engage in international co-operation in infectious disease research with counterparts in the developing world.

The National Academy of Sciences instituted a programme of exchanges of individual scientists with the Academies of Sciences of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and with the Council of the Academies of Yugoslavia. The programme was initiated in 1959 when the first interacademy agreement was signed with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Since 1981, approximately 300 foreign scientists have visited the United States on the interacademy exchange programme either for short-term survey visits of 1-2 months or for long-term visits of three months or more for the purpose of collaborative research. A slightly higher number of American scientists have made scientific visits of the same type to the USSR and Eastern Europe during the same period of time. The most active areas of scientific exchange of both sides is that of the life sciences, with the narrower field of the biomedical sciences attracting the most activity. About 25 per cent of all visits since 1981 have been concerned with some aspect of biomedical research, such as neuroscience research and a number of collaborative efforts devoted to cancer research, cardiovascular disease and pharmacology.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports a variety of international, infrastructural activities related to biotechnology and basic research related to microbiology, virology, and biochemistry. The NSF provides direct financial support for the Escherichia coli stock centre at Yale University and shares in the support of a European stock centre in Holland. In addition, NSF is the principal supporter for the United States of the International Congress of Scientific Unions which fosters international co-operation between all nations.

The Agency for International Development (AID) sponsored an International Symposium on Vaccine Development and Utilization in June 1986. This conference brought together more than 300 researchers and programme planners and managers from 49 countries to address critical issues in vaccine delivery and strategies for achieving universal immunization. Between 1984 and 1985, AID virtually doubled its budget for basic biomedical research and, in 1986, AID will commit $22 million, roughly 13 per cent of its health budget to biomedical research. As a result of this commitment, two prototype malaria vaccines will be tested on humans this year, and AID is supporting development of a measles vaccine that can be given to children as young as six months of age.
The United States Army Medical Research Institute on Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) publishes the results of research in open literature and, in 1985, contributed over 145 papers which were published in nationally and internationally recognized scientific peer-reviewed and refereed journals. Scientists from other countries have been invited and accepted invitations to visit and work within the Institute and the USAMRIID has hosted numerous visits by representatives of both domestic and foreign press. The USAMRIID hosted major international conferences in 1980, 1981 and 1984 and is currently planning another for April 1987 on "The Pathogenesis of Hemostatic Defects Associated with Haemorrhagic Fevers."