

REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 10 March 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. VAERNØ

(Norway)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII

(a) GENERAL DEBATE (continued) (BWC/CONF.I/3 to 6)

1. Mr. SUJKA (Poland) said that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction had made an important contribution to international security. By outlawing an entire category of particularly horrible weapons, it had resulted in their removal from the arsenals of States, thus proving that multilateral efforts based on real political will could lead to genuine disarmament measures. Document BWC/CONF.I/4 made it plain that States parties had fully complied with their obligations, either by destroying their stocks and directing their research to peaceful purposes or by declaring that they did not possess, never had possessed and did not intend to possess, bacteriological or toxin weapons. He drew attention to paragraph 46 of that document, which gave an excerpt from Poland's communication on the subject.

2. Another proof of the efficacy of the Convention was the fact that States parties had at no time failed in their obligations and that consequently none of them had been obliged to invoke its consultation procedures or to lodge a complaint before the Security Council. Furthermore, it should be noted that far from hampering bacteriological research for peaceful purposes, the Convention had encouraged international co-operation in biological research programmes for medical, prophylactic or protective purposes. Poland participated in those activities, pursuant to article X.

3. Nearly 90 States had become parties to the Convention and 34 had become signatories. Those were encouraging figures, but it was Poland's view that only full universality, and particularly the accession to it of all the permanent members of the Security Council, would render that agreement wholly effective. That would make it possible to consolidate the existing system of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements and above all to halt the arms race and create a climate of confidence.

4. At the present Conference, many speakers had stressed the importance of article IX and the need to reach an early agreement on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Poland, like the other socialist States, favoured the production of an instrument covering both bacteriological and chemical weapons. It was prepared to participate in every effort to prohibit chemical weapons, the elimination and destruction of which would greatly enhance the credibility of the Convention. The entry into force of the Convention had created the necessary preconditions for the prohibition of chemical weapons. That objective was far from being achieved, but the concerted efforts currently being pursued bilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States of America and multilaterally by the Committee on Disarmament gave grounds for great hope.

5. It would be inappropriate to ask the Conference to fix a date for another review of the Convention. The scientific and technical findings in document BWC/CONF.I/5 made it clear that newly developed techniques were fully covered by the provisions of the Convention. On the other hand, the Conference must draw the proper practical conclusions from the recommendation of the experts of the three Depositary Governments, in the same document, that developments in the ability to manipulate genetic material intentionally should be followed closely and periodically re-evaluated.

6. Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary) pointed out that his country, which had from the outset attached great importance to the principle of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons, had as far back as 1966 taken the initiative of submitting to the General Assembly a resolution aimed at strengthening the 1925 Protocol and at completely prohibiting those weapons. Together with other socialist countries, Hungary had participated actively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and was one of the sponsors of the Convention. It had strictly abided by its obligations under the Convention, especially since it considered the latter to be the first genuine agreement to be concluded in the matter of disarmament and the first stage in a process aimed at the prohibition of all bacteriological and chemical weapons.

7. His delegation welcomed the fact that the Convention had proved to be an effective instrument of disarmament. According to the documents before the Conference, no breach of its provisions had been observed since its entry into force, and there was reason to hope that that would continue to be the case in the future. The effective operation of the Convention justified the conclusion that there was no need for any amendment to it at present.

8. Document BWC/CONF.I/5, prepared by experts of the Depositary Governments, gave an interesting account of new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. He agreed with the main conclusions formulated in the document, according to which the Convention covered all scientific and technological developments relevant to it and the implementation of the Convention's provisions had not hindered any scientific activities for peaceful purposes. He mentioned in that connexion the conclusion in 1977, under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization, of the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure.

9. The preamble and article IX of the Convention were inseparable from the question of chemical weapons. Hungary was convinced that the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction would be possible only through a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It was imperative that efforts aimed at the elaboration and adoption of such a treaty should be intensified. It was to be hoped that the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, as also the multilateral negotiations under way in the Committee on Disarmament, would produce tangible results. His delegation would do all in its power to achieve that end.

10. Hungary noted with satisfaction that nearly 90 States had ratified the Convention and that more than 30 had signed it. Nevertheless universality, failing which the Convention would remain incomplete, must be the goal. It was especially deplorable that some militarily significant States, including permanent members of the Security Council, were not yet parties to the Convention. He recalled that the General Assembly, in paragraphs 40 and 73 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, called for the universality of disarmament agreements and explicitly requested the countries in question to adhere to the Convention.
11. Mr. EL BARADI (Egypt), referring to paragraph 17 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stressed that it was within the context of that paragraph that the Convention had to be viewed. The Convention was a first step which should be followed by a series of specific measures and a comprehensive disarmament programme. A disarmament measure was all the more valuable in so far as it provided an impetus for further measures in the same direction. It was with that in mind that his delegation wished to refer to the question of another widely spread type of weapon of mass destruction, namely chemical weapons. He recalled that Egypt and the other non-aligned countries had agreed to the regulation of bacteriological weapons separately from chemical weapons on the understanding that negotiations regarding the latter would soon follow. Furthermore, the preamble and two articles of the Convention under consideration, particularly article IX, dealt extensively with the question of chemical weapons.
12. Egypt therefore deplored the fact that eight years after the conclusion of the Convention and five years after its entry into force no progress had been achieved towards the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. It was to be hoped that the bilateral negotiations currently under way between the Soviet Union and the United States of America would soon result in a joint initiative and that the Committee on Disarmament would be enabled to discharge its responsibilities in that regard.
13. He took note of the conclusions in document BWC/CONF.I/5, particularly the conclusion that the implementation of the Covenant's provisions had not hindered activities for peaceful purposes and that the Convention covered all scientific and technical developments which might serve military purposes. In that connexion, he stressed that a faithful implementation of article X, paragraph 1, was imperative.
14. The substantial scientific and technical progress which had been made and the increased possibilities it offered for the production of biological agents and toxins led his delegation to favour a periodic review of the Convention to ensure its adaptation to realities.
15. He noted that since the entry into force of the Convention no State party had found it necessary to lodge a complaint concerning a possible breach of its provisions. That did not necessarily indicate that the control and verification system provided for in the Convention was adequate. Egypt was still convinced that the national means of verification provided for in the Convention should be complemented and enhanced by international procedures which, by reason of their impartiality, would be likely to provide better support for action to promote disarmament.

16. The complaints procedure under article VI of the Convention also seemed inadequate. As the representative of Sweden had pointed out, the veto power which could be exercised by certain States against the initiatives of the Security Council deprived it of much of its effectiveness.
17. In conclusion, he declared that Egypt had never developed, produced, stockpiled, acquired or retained bacteriological and toxin weapons. After the Conference, Egypt would be able to become a party to the Convention if it became universal, and particularly if all the countries of the Middle East acceded to it.
18. Mr. DUMONT (Argentina) said that it was only through general and complete disarmament under international control that peace and security would be ensured; in that context, the Convention, which was the first specific measure in favour of disarmament, since it sought to eliminate an entire category of weapons whose victims would be mainly civilians, was of considerable importance. It constituted a first step towards the elimination of weapons the use of which was prohibited by the Protocol of 1925. True to its pacifist ideals, Argentina was a party to the 1925 Protocol; it had participated actively in the negotiations which had led to the conclusion of the Convention and, at the end of 1979, had ratified it.
19. It was because it had only recently acceded that Argentina had not received the request for information concerning compliance with the obligations assumed under the Convention and that was why its reply did not appear in document BWC/CONF.I/4. To fill that gap, he stated that Argentina had never possessed bacteriological or toxin weapons and that it had no intention of acquiring any. Complying with the provisions of the Convention even before it had become a party to it, Argentina had for the past few years excluded in its scientific and national defence bodies any activity relating to the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) substances and toxins which were not explicitly for peaceful purposes; the same was true with regard to weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
20. It was clear from document BWC/CONF.I/4 that the Convention had so far proved to be an effective instrument for since its entry into force all States parties had fulfilled their obligations and no breach of the Convention had been noted. New causes for concern, however, had appeared since then. On the one hand, rapid scientific and technological progress gave reason to believe that at any moment agents or processes not coming within the framework of the Convention might be developed; hence it was essential to set up a periodic evaluation system, a system which was, moreover, indispensable for any disarmament measure. Furthermore, the increase in world tension made it desirable to seek a means of controlling and verifying the implementation of the Convention at the international level, a means which would not be weakened by the right of veto. At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Argentina had repeatedly mentioned the possibility of dealing with the problem of verification within the framework of separate instruments. It was not a matter of seeking a perfect verification system that would eliminate any possibility of violation; the effectiveness of such a system would depend on its deterrent power. In other words, there must be genuine possibility for the parties to detect breaches of the Convention, even though detailed monitoring of every activity connected with the provisions of the Convention was out of the question.

21. It was regrettable that the States parties had not fulfilled their obligations under article IX and had not reached a consensus on the conclusion of an agreement relating to chemical weapons. It was of course a complex problem, both from the point of view of national security and from that of the technical and economic development of countries, but it should not be forgotten that the existence of such weapons constituted a potential danger for peace and security and for the very existence of man and his environment. The threat was all the more serious in that the technology for the production of chemical agents was not possessed solely by a few great Powers; many countries had the necessary knowledge and agents to provide themselves with chemical weapons quite rapidly. That being the case, it was not surprising that for the past twelve years the General Assembly of the United Nations had reaffirmed each year the priority nature of the question and that for seven years the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had been studying it unremittingly. It was therefore disquieting to note that no tangible result had been obtained and that the bilateral negotiations conducted on the subject by the United States and the Soviet Union since 1976 had not yet come to anything. Argentina therefore urged the States members of the Committee on Disarmament - of which it was itself one - to reach agreement without delay on the establishment of a working group to start negotiations forthwith on the implementation of article IX.
22. Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) said that his country had been among the sponsors of the many draft resolutions submitted on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons and was a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons made a useful and specific contribution to the cause of general and complete disarmament, since it constituted a first genuine and objective disarmament measure. It was to be hoped that the number of States parties would continue to increase in order to ensure the universality of the instrument and to dispel the concern felt by the international community at the constant acceleration of the arms race, which also had the effect of jeopardizing the establishment of a new international economic order. The implementation of the Convention on Bacteriological Weapons would also be strengthened by the accession to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 of the States which had not yet done so.
23. He noted with satisfaction, on the one hand, that no breach of the Convention had been reported, which showed clearly that, given the political will, States were capable of honouring their international obligations and, on the other hand, that the Convention had in no way hampered scientific and technological progress. In that regard, his country attached particular importance to the document submitted by the three depositary Governments on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. The Convention had also shown that it was possible to avoid a biological war; that represented an important step towards preserving the world from monstrous and inhuman wars.
24. With regard to article X, he reviewed Cuban achievements in the field of medicine and stated that, true to its policy of international co-operation and solidarity, Cuba had come to the assistance of countries and peoples, not only of the Latin American continent but also in Africa and Asia, by sending them physicians, medical personnel and medicaments. That utilization for peaceful purposes of scientific and technological developments in the field of bacteriology was something which the international community, and in particular the developing countries, were entitled to demand.

25. Cuba, which had always advocated the absolute prohibition of chemical weapons, welcomed the establishment, within the Committee on Disarmament, of a working group especially entrusted with that question with a view to the early conclusion of a treaty which a great number of States sincerely desired.
26. With the \$300 million that the arms race cost yearly, a great many peaceful projects could be carried out, as had been pointed out by President Fidel Castro at the inaugural meeting of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. The Review Conference coincided with the beginning of a new disarmament decade; it therefore constituted an appropriate occasion to launch an appeal to all States with a role to play in disarmament, and to invite them to bear that fact in mind and to contribute to the realization of the just aspirations of the peoples and countries that wished to live not for war, but for peace.
27. Mr. THOMSON (Australia) said that the Convention on Biological Weapons -- the first instrument since the Second World War to provide for the elimination of an entire category of weapons -- represented an important disarmament measure which helped to create a climate of trust between nations. As the representative of New Zealand had said, one of the main objectives of the Review Conference should be to persuade States which were not yet parties to the Convention to accede to it as soon as possible, particularly since some of them were militarily significant countries.
28. Australia did not possess any of the weapons or delivery systems prohibited under article I of the Convention, and it had no intention of acquiring them. Having signed the Convention on Bacteriological Weapons on the very first day and ratified it on 5 October 1977, Australia had provided itself, on 1 March 1980, through the machinery provisions of the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act of 1976, with the means of giving full effect to its obligations under the Convention. His delegation considered that it would be well if all States made it known, by a formal declaration, that they too had complied with their obligations. Such a step would help to build confidence between States.
29. While the fact that no breach of the Convention had been reported was to be welcomed, his delegation shared the concern expressed by several delegations that the complaints procedure envisaged for breaches of the Convention was not entirely satisfactory. It suggested that consideration should be given to the possibility of remedying that situation and it thought that some suitable reference could well be included in the Final Document of the Conference.
30. Australia attached great importance to article IX, relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons, as the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated the previous year in the Committee on Disarmament. His delegation was glad to note that the Committee on Disarmament was considering the establishment of a working group on chemical weapons in the very near future.
31. Like other delegations, his delegation fully approved of the importance given to the question of the exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes. Besides favouring the exchange of information for the prevention of disease, his delegation wondered whether consideration should not be given to

the possibility of internationalizing research into means of defence against bacteriological weapons. For example, it might be possible to arrange for the exchange of scientists between establishments or to place all research activities under international control. Although there would be practical difficulties in so doing, the Conference could perhaps consider the question.

32. With regard to new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, his delegation endorsed the views expressed by the Depositary States in their background paper on the question and took note of their conclusion that the developments considered were already covered by the provisions of the Convention. His delegation thought it important not to lose sight of that question and it proposed that a second review conference should be held in 1985.

33. Mr. McPHAIL (Canada) said that efforts at the Conference should be concentrated on the search for means to reinforce and improve the implementation of the Convention. One of the most important steps, as had already been suggested, would be to call upon all States not yet parties to the Convention to sign or ratify it. Another means might be to endeavour to build confidence by, for instance, urging all States which had possessed biological weapons to declare that they had been destroyed, and by collecting information between review conferences on scientific and technical innovations bearing upon biological weapons. Lastly, assurance should be sought that the States parties had indeed honoured the obligations they had undertaken under the Convention. The most fundamental of those obligations was the undertaking not to develop, produce or stockpile biological weapons and, where applicable, to destroy them. The question arose whether it was sufficient to accept the statements made by States. He wondered whether the Convention could be relied on as an effective mechanism to deal with possible violations if, for instance, scientific research led to the development of more effective biological weapons. His delegation did not feel that it could.

34. With regard to the other important obligation contracted by States parties, that of negotiating for a ban on chemical weapons, his delegation felt that it would be difficult to be sure that States parties had fulfilled their undertaking to pursue negotiations in good faith, since those negotiations involved the fundamental security interests of the leading military powers. Some progress had been made but there remained large areas of disagreement. The idea of setting up a chemical weapons working group of the Committee on Disarmament was encouraging, but any treaty completely banning chemical weapons must include verification provisions sufficiently stringent to take into account the quantity and lethality of such weapons.

35. If the Convention was to be strengthened, the fundamental need was to make its verification provisions more effective. That was the most important task for the Conference.

36. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that it was urgently necessary to supplement the Convention on Biological Weapons with a convention on chemical weapons. The first draft convention, submitted to the General Assembly on 19 September 1969 by nine socialist countries, had covered both bacteriological (biological) weapons and chemical weapons. In paragraph 6 of its memorandum of 25 August 1970 (CCD/310), the Group of 12, which had later become the Group of 21, had expressed the view of the majority of Members of the United Nations when it had pointed out at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) the need to solve the problems of eliminating

chemical weapons and bacteriological (biological) weapons together. Unfortunately, after two years of discussion in the CCD and the General Assembly, the result was a draft convention referring only to bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons; and that had been achieved only by recognizing in the preambular paragraphs that the Convention was only a first step towards the elimination of chemical weapons and by undertaking in article IX to continue negotiations with a view to eliminating chemical weapons.

37. More than eight years had gone by since the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2826 (XXVI) to which the text of the Convention was annexed, but no agreement had yet been reached on the prohibition of chemical weapons, although the Convention referred to "reaching early agreement". His country therefore felt that it was the inescapable duty of the Conference to urge the members of the Committee on Disarmament, and in particular the Depositary States, to ensure that the Committee decided upon the establishment of a chemical weapons working group to be responsible for bringing to a successful conclusion the negotiations for the elaboration of a convention which would provide for the total elimination of chemical weapons.

38. Mr. TAYLHARTAT (Venezuela) said that the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted in a Security Council resolution in 1948 referred to three types of weapon: nuclear, chemical and biological. To appreciate the significance of that definition, it was sufficient to know that, according to the Institute for Peace Research (Stockholm), the effects of a 10-megaton atomic bomb extended over 300 km², of 15 tons of chemical agents over 60 km² and of 10 tons of bacteriological agents over 100,000 km². Furthermore, the report on chemical and bacteriological weapons submitted by the Secretary-General in 1969 had shown that bacteriological weapons and chemical weapons were among the most odious and most abominable instruments of war conceivable.

39. Among the efforts accomplished by the international community to achieve general and complete disarmament, his Government considered the Convention of outstanding importance. It was in fact the only measure of disarmament adopted up to the present. It had ensured the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. It had prevented the introduction of such weapons into military arsenals and the application of scientific progress in biology to warlike purposes. The preventive character of the Convention was confirmed in the interesting document submitted by the three depositary countries (BWC/CONF.I/5). That document also attested to the constructive co-operation which could be achieved between great Powers for the purpose of disarmament. It was an important contribution to the work of the Conference and his delegation wished to express its appreciation to the three depositary countries.

40. Among the main conclusions in document BWC/CONF.I/5, he drew particular attention to two: the first, in paragraph 10 (b) of section I (Recombinant DNA techniques); which read "developments in the ability to manipulate genetic material intentionally should be followed closely and periodically re-evaluated", and the other, in paragraph 17 of section II (New Infectious Diseases), which read "it may be useful in the future to evaluate the implications of eradication of smallpox and other infectious diseases".

41. His delegation wished also to thank the Secretariat for the document providing up-to-date information on compliance with the provisions of the Convention and the

status of efforts to reach agreement on chemical weapons (BWC/CONF.I/4). His country did not engage in any activity contrary to the provisions of the Convention. It did not possess any of the weapons, equipment or means of delivery referred to in the Convention, never had possessed any and had no intention of acquiring any. The research on biology and bacteriology carried on in its scientific establishments was directed exclusively to peaceful purposes.

42. With regard to the effort to reach agreement on chemical weapons, it must be acknowledged that since the conclusion of the Convention progress in giving effect to the provisions of article IX and the eighth preambular paragraph had been insignificant. His country was one of those which in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Group of 21 had tried to get negotiations under way for the preparation of a convention on chemical weapons. There was some reason to think that those efforts had not been in vain and that during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament the obstacles to the establishment of a working group responsible for such negotiations might be overcome.

43. His delegation shared the concern that others had expressed about the weakness and ambiguity of the rules governing complaints that a State party might place before the Security Council if it considered that another State party was in breach of the provisions of the Convention or evading its obligations thereunder. It would be desirable for the Conference to consider the possibility of improving those rules, taking as its basis the provisions of other more recent international instruments which provided for more effective machinery. The provisions of article VI should be supplemented by some machinery offering greater facility and flexibility in consultation and co-operation between States parties and providing for speedier inquiry into situations and problems connected with the aims and provisions of the Convention.

44. His delegation was ready to consider with interest any proposal submitted in that spirit, and indeed any proposal which might improve the Convention. It noted with regret that many signatory States had not yet ratified the Convention and that some members of the Security Council had not yet signed it. It was nevertheless important for the Convention to be of universal application.

45. Mrs. RAADI-AZARAKHCHI (Iran) said that according to article XIII of the Convention, () the Conference should review the operation of the Convention and inform itself on the status of the negotiations to prepare an agreement prohibiting chemical weapons. With respect to the application of the Convention, her delegation noted with satisfaction that, according to the document submitted by the Secretariat (BWC/CONF.I/4), the provisions of the Convention had in practice been observed. Furthermore, it was clear from the conclusions in document BWC/CONF.I/5 that progress in scientific and technical fields concerning the Convention had had little impact on its effectiveness.

46. It was a matter for satisfaction that the procedure for consideration of complaints concerning any breach of the obligations deriving from the Convention (article VI) had not yet found any practical application. In view, however, of certain problems which possible application of article VI of the Convention might raise, her delegation was prepared to welcome any suggestion designed to improve the operation of the complaints procedure.

47. As far as chemical weapons were concerned, the impact of the Convention was slow in making itself felt, despite the relation between chemical weapons and biological weapons, first set out in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and referred to explicitly in the preamble to the Convention, in which the Convention was described as a first step towards the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in article IX, in which States parties undertook to continue negotiations to reach an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The importance of the matter called for immediate action which should not be confined to the great Powers, since it concerned many countries, industrialized and developing. The negotiations on setting up a working party on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament would undoubtedly enable progress to be made towards the prohibition of such weapons. Those negotiations should be complementary to the initiative of the two major Powers, to which Iran looked to spare no effort to solve the problems still outstanding between them.

48. The Conference should provide for machinery which would make it possible for review conferences to be held at regular intervals or as required; such conferences could not fail to contribute towards the effective operation of the Convention and, where necessary, its adaptation to new conditions.

49. Iran had been one of the first States to sign and ratify the Convention. It had frequently expressed the hope of seeing the efforts made towards general and complete disarmament reach a successful conclusion. The application of the Convention was an important step on the road to international confidence and security, and for that reason Iran hoped that the greatest possible number of States would accede to it.

50. Mr. LIE (Norway) complimented the Preparatory Committee on its work, which, together with the documents prepared by the secretariat and by the depositary States, meant that the Conference was well prepared for its task. His delegation shared the view of the Preparatory Committee that the work of the Conference should result in a final declaration based on consensus and setting out the conclusions which it had reached.

51. The Convention was the first agreement to be reached setting forth specific provisions for disarmament, as in article II. It was also an important step in the direction of a similar ban on chemical weapons. The effect of the Convention was not only to remove biological weapons from arsenals but also to release scientific resources which could be used for peaceful and life-giving purposes. While some 90 States were parties to the Convention, some militarily important States had not yet acceded to it. The States parties should endeavour to secure the accession of all other States to the Convention.

52. His country had never developed, produced or stored any biological weapons or toxins, nor had it ever had any intention of using such weapons in a conflict. All research on micro-organisms and toxins in his country was directed solely to problems of medical treatment and prophylaxis and was under constant supervision by the national health authorities. In accordance with the letter and spirit of article X of the Convention, the research was not secret and its findings were published in scientific literature.

53. Regarding article VI, on the complaints procedure, his delegation felt that the solution offered for that problem was not altogether satisfactory. On the other hand, article V did establish the principle of consultation and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations for solving any problems which might arise.

54. His Government regarded the adoption of international measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as a most urgent and important task. His delegation added its support to the appeals already made for the negotiating parties to reach speedy agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The urgency of the matter was pointed out in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. His delegation also took note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/48) and the undertaking by the United States of America and the Soviet Union to exert their best efforts to be able to present a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament. It was to be hoped that the successful conclusion of the work of the Conference would help to secure a safer world. (1)

55. The CHAIRMAN announced that the general debate had now been completed.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.