Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Geneva 2016

Item 5(b) of the agenda
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: recommendations on other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Increasing transparency, reducing risk and raising awareness: the role of non-nuclear-weapon States

Submitted by Grupo de Práticas em Direitos Humanos e Direito Internacional

1. The mandate of the Open-ended Working Group includes substantively addressing recommendations on (a) transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and (c) additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon detonations. This working paper discusses these issues.

2. At the February session of the working group, discussion on agenda item 5(b) focused on the measures that nuclear-armed States should pursue. This discussion reinforced similar discussions in other forums. We believe that, for the May session, it would be beneficial to focus less on the role of nuclear-armed States and more on the role of non-nuclear-weapon States in increasing transparency, reducing risk and raising awareness. This dimension, in our view, has been under-explored in disarmament debates to date.

Increasing transparency

3. The working group should recommend to the United Nations General Assembly that non-nuclear-weapon States, where applicable, report periodically to the Secretariat on the following:

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1. Established pursuant to resolution 70/33 of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(a) The number, type, status and location of any nuclear warheads deployed on their territory;

(b) The number and type of any delivery vehicles associated with nuclear weapons deployed on their territory;

(c) The number and type of any nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems removed from deployment on their territory and/or dismantled as part of nuclear disarmament efforts;

(d) The amount of any fissile material produced;

(e) Any measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

(f) Details relating to any transit of nuclear weapons through their territory, including through their airspace and territorial waters.

Reducing risk

4. As the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons demonstrated, the risk of nuclear weapon detonations – whether in nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States – appears to be higher today than in the past. The working group should recommend that non-nuclear-weapon States take measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional detonation of any nuclear weapons that are deployed on their territory or transiting through their territory.

5. Non-nuclear-weapon States that host nuclear weapons on their territory should provide information concerning any recent security breaches at the facilities where these nuclear weapons are deployed, including incursions by citizens who oppose the presence of such weapons. These States should, moreover, inform the international community of any security upgrades that have recently been made, or are currently being made, at these facilities, as well as the safety precautions that have been taken to reduce the risk of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear weapon detonation.

6. We note that an internal US Air Force investigation, partially released to the public in February 2008, determined that most sites in Europe where USA nuclear weapons are deployed did not meet the security requirements of the US Department of Defense. The report noted “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation” and areas “in need of repair”, such as “buildings, fencing, lighting and security systems”. The host States should provide information concerning the risk posed by these security problems.

7. In addition, host States should endeavour to answer the following questions: What would be the potential humanitarian consequences of an attack on the bases at which nuclear weapons are deployed? What would be the potential impact on neighbouring States? What is the risk that such an attack would result in a nuclear detonation or the theft of a nuclear weapon? Are the nuclear weapons at these bases ever transported along public roads and, if so, does that heighten the risk of a nuclear detonation? What safeguards are in place to prevent an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized launch? What level of control do host States have over the bases and the nuclear weapons?

Raising awareness

8. We note that more than two dozen non-nuclear-weapon States claim a security benefit from the nuclear weapons of an allied State. Under the doctrine of “extended
nuclear deterrence”, the nuclear-armed ally would, in certain circumstances, use its nuclear forces on behalf of one of more of these non-nuclear-weapon States. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon such States to examine the humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons carried out on their behalf, and to provide details of any studies that they have conducted in this regard.

9. We note that nuclear test explosions have been carried out on the territory of a number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Some such States have presented detailed information on the long-term and widespread humanitarian impact of these tests, including at the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014. This information has greatly enhanced our common understanding of the impact of nuclear detonations more generally. We encourage non-nuclear-weapon States affected by nuclear testing that have not yet done so to provide similar information.