Ammunition Safety and Security in the OSCE Area

OSCE Assistance on Disposal and Stockpile Security and Management

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If you think compliance is expensive, try incompliance
Unplanned explosions at ammunition sites

Since 1998 to 2011:

245 incidents in 62 States worldwide

60 incidents in 15 OSCE participating States

In 2011, ammunition explosions in at least 3 OSCE participating States
Most Active Organizations

Co-ordination is a must! Co-operation is crucial!
Most Wanted Assistance from the OSCE

- Disposal (Destruction & Demilitarization)
- Stockpile management and security (Ammo surplus & poor infrastructure)
- ERW clean up (Technical equipment)
- Training Programmes (EOD, PSSM)
What kind of assistance?

Financial  Technical  Expert
Normative Base of OSCE Assistance

OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition

FSC Decision 11/09 on Expert Advice

FSC Decision 3/11 on Destruction as preferred method of disposal

OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
Where do we provide assistance?
OSCE Projects in…

Albania            Kyrgyzstan
Armenia            Moldova
Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro
Cyprus              Serbia
Georgia             Tajikistan
Kazakhstan          Ukraine
Project Steps

• Assessment
• Planning
• Preparation
• Implementation
• Verification
• Post programme review
Well justified assistance case

Humanitarian threats
Environmental threats
Security concerns
Immediate threat
Proportionate response
Capacity building (no payment of salaries)
No increase of military capacity
# Ammunition Requests – Thematic Scope

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![Image of ammunition]
Key principles of stockpile’s physical security

Plan, programm and budget reduction of surplus ammunition (destruction – preferred method);

Plan, programm, and budget resources to ensure that ammunition in their custody is secure;

Establish procedures to review all military ammunition storage constructions and installations modification projects prior to contract award to ensure they meet the required safety and security criteria;

Consolidate ammunition stocks within operational, safety and mission requirements to reduce security costs.
### Ammunition condition coding

<table>
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<th>Risk</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| High   | ▪ >20 Years old  
       | ▪ Not in original packaging  
       | ▪ Wartime production         |
| Moderate| ▪ >15 Years old  
       | ▪ Returned from the field, incomplete storage history and/or poor storage conditions |
| Low    | ▪ <15 Years old  
       | ▪ In original packaging        |
High-risk storage

Submunitions

Outside storage

Incomplete History

5” rocket motor, 1953

40mm Bofors, 1955

155mm propellant, 1970

90mm recoilless, 1956

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Poor Ammunition Storage Conditions

ASS “Jahorinski Potok” in Pale

ASS “Car Dusan” in Rudo

OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Unsafe handling and transportation practices
I. Assessment - Ammunition destruction

1. Survey the ammunition to be destroyed:
2. Survey available destruction technologies on-site and out of country.
3. Assess and document legal ownership of ammunition to be destroyed.
4. Discussions on the political level; drafting of an MoU/HNA for the destruction to be carried out.
5. Identification of potential partners.

- Quantity and state of ammunition.
- Storage location and safety.
- Type and technical design of ammunition to be destroyed.
Ia. Assessment - Ammo storage upgrades

1. Survey the ammunition in storage:
2. Ammunition safety.
3. Ammunition security.
4. Discussions on the political level; drafting of an MoU/HNA for the destruction to be carried out.
5. Identification of potential partners.
6. Assessing gaps.

- Quantity and condition of ammunition.
- Storage location and safety.
- Types, compatibility, and technical design of ammunition and to be stored.
II. Planning - Ammo storage upgrades

1. Storage of stockpiles: 
   Ammo storage areas. Types and quantity of ammo to be stored. Accounting procedures. Security issues.

2. Safe working areas: 
   Inspection facilities. Secure storage facilities after inspection and verification. Access control.

3. Resources available: 
   Inspection facilities. Secure storage facilities after inspection and verification. Access control.

4. Staffing levels: 
   For safety checks. For completing inspections. For verification. 
   Infrastructure/ building. Transport capacity (to move ammo in and out buildings and site). Equipment and tools.
III. Involvement of Host Nation

Request
- Realistic?
- What can contribute?
- Political will at all levels?

Transparency and openness
- Assessment – access to sites, information provision
- Planning of ammunition needs and management

Active engagement
- MOU/Liabilities/VAT/other legal issues
- Provision of national contribution (proceeds from sale, transport, manpower, funds)
- Provision of POC and critical personnel (MOD working group?)
In conclusion

The OSCE has a solid base for tackling the problem. The main challenge for implementation remains

DONORS FUNDING
Questions?

THANK YOU!

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