

**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention  
on the Prohibition of the Development,  
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological  
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their  
Destruction**

4 December 2017

English only

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**Geneva, 4-8 December 2017**

Item 6 of the provisional agenda

**Issues of substance and process for the period  
before the next Review Conference, with a view  
to reaching consensus on an intersessional process**

## **Aide Memoire**

### **Submitted by the Chairperson of the 2017 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. This Aide Memoire presented by the Chairperson under his own responsibility highlights key proposals made by States Parties in the 83 Working Papers that were submitted to the Eighth Review Conference including its preceding Preparatory Committee. For ease of reference it clusters them into the following seven thematic areas:

- (a) Institutional Strengthening;
- (b) Science & Technology Review;
- (c) National Implementation;
- (d) International Cooperation and Exchange for Peaceful Purposes;
- (e) Assistance in case of use, investigation, consultations regarding an allegation;
- (f) Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures;
- (g) Others.

2. This compilation does not purport to be exhaustive nor does it imply agreement on any particular proposal. It is simply an aid to memory with a view to facilitating discussion on Item 6 of the agenda.

#### **II. Key Proposals made by States Parties**

##### **A. Institutional Strengthening**

###### **Intersessional Process**

- More in-depth substantive process, more action orientated annual meetings, and a strengthened ISU;
- Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the implementation of all the provisions of the Convention on a voluntary basis; necessity to deal with all elements of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner; facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials



and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of bacteriological agents and toxins; a balanced approach of conducting Annual Meetings in order to converge political and technical follow up of the Convection;

- Two open ended working groups (one to focus specifically on “reassurance” that the BWC is being implemented, notably through confidence-building measures and evidence of implementation of international cooperation (Article X); and the second an annual review of advances in S&T relevant to the BWC and education/awareness-raising on dual use issues);
- Three interlinked meetings per year: a one-week group of governmental experts in the Spring to address science and technology, a one-week working group in the Summer on cooperation and assistance, and a two-week Annual Meeting of States Parties in the Autumn to consider overall operation of the Convention, delegation of discrete and well-defined decision-making powers to the MSP;
- Working group-focussed Meeting of Experts to examine in depth key developments in the Convention, followed by a three-day Meeting of States Parties that would seek to build common understandings, develop clear recommendations to the next Review Conference and set the agenda for the next year’s intersessional meetings; intersessional Chair and Vice-Chairs should be nominated for the entire 2017-2020 intersessional period; The Chair and Vice Chairs would serve as coordinators for each working group on a rotating basis during the Meeting of Experts. The coordinator’s responsibility would be to chair meetings, lead discussions, and produce reports.

#### **Institutional Measures**

- Formalize the functional structures of the BWC (Review Conference, Meeting of States Parties, subsidiary intersessional meetings (Meetings of Experts and open-ended working groups) and the ISU);
- Creation of a steering group to support the Chairman in order to provide oversight and coordination in light of these changes and to help identify and prepare issues for consideration at the annual meetings;
- Transfer of mandates from the Review Conference to the MSP;
- ISU - strengthen staffing and mandate, 5 years planning for funding;
- Establish mobile biomedical units, against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use and contribute to the suppression of epidemics of various origin;
- Adoption of a legally binding instrument, non-discriminatory including all articles of the Convention which is to be negotiated and agreed by the States Parties, as a priority, during the next intersessional period;
- Strengthen the implementation of all provisions of the Convention in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner.

## **B. Science and Technology Review**

#### **Structure**

- Variety of options – political, technical and hybrid - considered for group composition, for costs, and for guiding and coordinating the review;
- Suggestion of a core group of national experts to balance needs of continuity and flexibility and provides options for a reliable reporting mechanism to feed the output of the experts work into the policy process;
- Establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee (20-25 members appointed by regional groups, Draft terms of reference of the Scientific Advisory Committee and Draft rules of procedure of the Scientific Advisory Committee and its temporary working groups);
- A Science and Technology Committee to review topics of relevance to the Convention;
- Group of government experts that meets one week annually producing reports that provide a technical basis to inform political deliberations of other intersessional meetings;
- Structured scientific open-ended group with nominations of national experts by States Parties (open-ended group administered by the ISU);
- Invitation of experts from relevant international organizations such as WHO, OIE and FAO to participate in future S&T review processes and make recommendations to States Parties;

- Proposal for the group's chair, a scientific officer in the ISU and the establishment of an electronic communication system for the experts; draft mandate for a science and technology body prepared.

### **Principles**

- S&T body should be purely technical, independent, both functionally and politically;
- Need for flexibility in terms of format, scope and methods;
- Allow consideration of any newly-emerging enabling technologies, especially those with game-changing potential, which may bring both benefits and challenges requiring action by States Parties;
- Diverse and representative body that has the necessary technical expertise and includes a technical specialist as part of the ISU;
- Preparation of factual reports focused on areas decided in advance by the States Parties based on their needs;
- States Parties driven; link to policy considerations.

### **Potential issues for consideration by the S&T review process**

- Developments derived from the convergence of biology, chemistry and other scientific disciplines;
- Developments in technologies of relevance to distinguish between natural and deliberate disease outbreaks;
- Advances in enabling technologies (particularly CRISPR gene editing system, gene drives, continuing progress in synthetic biology, and bioinformatics and high-throughput sequencing and associated applications thereof);
- Advances in biological production, dispersal and delivery technologies including unmanned systems and their implications for the Convention;
- Biological risk management.

*Note:* BWC/MSP/2017/WP.2 summarizes the state of play on S&T review proposals.

## **C. National Implementation**

- Designate a National Authority for BWC implementation and communication with other States Parties and notify the ISU accordingly;
- Adopt further specific decisions and recommendations on measures to promote and strengthen the implementation of Article III;
- Need to establish frameworks for effective oversight, guidance and/or training, to ensure that these pursuits are conducted in a culture of safety, security, and compliance with national and international law;
- Development of a template for a code of conduct for scientists in the fields relevant to the Convention for preventing the misuse of dual-use research while ensuring that research for peaceful purpose is not hampered;
- Establishment of an OEWG for the development of a code of conduct with full representation of States Parties along with bio-scientists and researchers to participate in the drafting process;
- Raise awareness on dual-use research and technologies among scientists;
- Biosecurity education and awareness-raising in achieving effective implementation of the Convention;
- Encouragement and support for the implementation of the National CBRN Action Plans to enhancing bio-risk mitigation;
- Set of different reassurance initiatives among States Parties regarding their commitment to the full and effective national implementation of the Convention provisions (i.a. comprehensive reports on domestic legislation, regulations on the transfer of BWC relevant materials, equipment and legislation and national biosecurity measures);
- Greater sharing of experiences to ensure that national implementation initiatives are effective and visible.

## **D. International Cooperation and Exchange for Peaceful Purposes**

- Promote the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and not to hamper economic and technological development;
- implement an action plan for the fullest, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X, without conditions or subjection to the implementation of another article, which guarantees the end of unilateral restrictions imposed by other State Party and establishes a mechanism for resolving disputes;
- establishment of a Standing Committee with a specific mandate and modalities to follow up and review the effective and full implementation of the transfer-related-issues;
- establishment of a co-operation committee (by the Review Conference) as a forum for consultation aimed at promoting the effective, full and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X provisions of the Convention among the States Parties;
- Establishment of a “non-proliferation export control and international cooperation regime”;
- Identification of a set of concrete, practical measures to encourage partnerships with the Private Sector in support of fulfilling the Article X commitment;
- Set of concrete proposals to improve the cooperation and assistance database;
- Regular submission of Article X reports by States Parties.

## **E. Assistance in case of Use, Investigation, Consultations regarding an Allegation**

### **Assistance**

- Development of a set of guidelines to aid a State Party for implementation of assistance in case of alleged use of biological weapons against it;
- Establishment of a working group – or similar working process – to examine effective Article VII procedures and develop and agree on practical actions to build a response capacity;
- Proposal for a working group on cooperation and assistance in which issues relating to Articles VII and X will be discussed;
- Strengthen collaboration between the BWC and international organizations such as the WHO, OIE and FAO;
- Create a mechanism to facilitate close communication between the BWC States Parties and relevant international organizations to facilitate the swift exchange of information in the event of a public, animal or plant health emergency;
- Strengthen the mandate and capacity of the ISU to facilitate coordination and cooperation among States Parties and relevant international organizations to effectively respond to public health emergencies caused by violation of the Convention;
- Address challenges and gaps in the current international response system and to prepare States Parties, international organizations and NGOs to respond effectively to a deliberate use event (including establishment of a multilateral response framework and templates for national preparedness and response plans);
- Establishment of a database for assistance/Article VII that includes information on expertise, protection, detection, decontamination prophylactic and medical and other equipment.

### **Investigations**

- Take steps to enhance national and international capabilities to detect, investigate, and respond to the use of biological weapons;
- Strengthen UN Secretary General’s Mechanism capability to rapidly and effectively investigate allegations, clarify the relationship between the BWC and the Mechanism, States Parties to commit in advance to cooperate with an investigation by providing access to an investigation team;
- Need to address several procedural and semantic deficiencies of the UNSGM within the context of the Convention and clarify definitions and scopes of Article VI and VII in the Convention;
- Need to create an investigation mechanism within a strengthened Convention and avoid current gaps and anomalies with regard to the UNSGM.

### **Consultations**

- Strengthen implementation of the consultative provisions of Article V by establishing a range of bilateral and multilateral options for undertaking Article V consultation and tools for States Parties seeking clarification.

## **F. Confidence-Building and Transparency**

### **Confidence Building Measures**

- Step by step approach to CBM participation;
- Establishment of a CBM assistance network to be coordinated by the ISU;
- Transition to a fully electronic CBM system;
- Translation of CBM returns;
- Further technical refinement of CBMs, in particular revisions to CBM form A part 2 (i) and Form E (to include information on the export control of genetically modified organisms and specific genetic elements linked to export controlled microorganisms and toxins; amend CBM reporting requirements on national implementation measures, with greater specificity than is provided under current Form E);
- Introduction of a new CBM form entitled “Military biomedical activity conducted by a reporting State on the territory of other States”;
- Supplementing Form G’s information on human vaccine production facilities with similar data on animal vaccine production facilities.

### **Peer Review Activities and similar conceptual initiatives**

- Underlined the value of peer review exercises including flexibility in terms of format, scope and methods to bolster mutual confidence in compliance within the framework of the BWC;
- Conduct of voluntary visits among States Parties aimed at strengthening and to building confidence in compliance with the BWC;
- Establishing a voluntary fund to provide support for developing countries wishing to participate in/organizing a voluntary transparency exercise;
- BWC implementation review initiative for transparency and to promote cooperation at regional and international levels (including sharing best practices in national implementation).

## **G. Others**

- Amending the Convention to incorporate therein the explicit “prohibition of the use of biological weapons;
- Encourage States Parties that have not yet ratified the BWC to do so and to strengthen the plan of action to facilitate the universalization of the BWC;
- Call on all BWC States Parties that have not already done so to join both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to urge States to withdraw all reservations made to the 1925 Geneva Protocol;
- Call on all BWC States Parties to join the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

## Annex

### Working Papers submitted to the Eighth Review Conference including its preceding Preparatory Committee

#### A. Working Papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.1 [English only]	Operationalising mobile biomedical units to deliver protection against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use, and to suppress epidemics of various etiology. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.1/Rev.1 [English only]	Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Operationalising mobile biomedical units to deliver protection against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use, and to suppress epidemics of various etiology. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.1/Rev.2 and Add.1 [English only]	Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Operationalising mobile biomedical units to deliver protection against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use, and to suppress epidemics of various etiology. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.2 [English only]	Proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.2/Rev.1 [English only]	Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.2/Rev.2 [English only]	Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.3 [English only]	Science and technology review for the BWC: Features of an effective process. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.4 [English only]	A future science and technology review process. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.5 [English only]	Position of the European Union relating to the Eighth Review Conference of the BWC. Submitted by the European Union
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.6 [English only]	Strengthening confidence building and consultative mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.6/Rev.1 [English only]	Strengthening confidence building and consultative mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.7 [English only]	Elements on science and technology for the 2016 Review Conference: The importance of an active review process. Submitted by Finland, Norway and Sweden
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.8 [English only]	Strengthening the BWC science and technology review process. Submitted by Switzerland
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.9 [English only]	Strengthening the ability to take action: An essential agenda for the Eighth Review Conference. Submitted by the United States of America

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.10 [English only]	Possibilities for strengthening the international community's ability to investigate alleged use. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.11 [French only]	90th anniversary of the signature of the Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Submitted by France
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.12 [English only]	Specificities of the response to natural and intentional disease outbreaks. Submitted by France
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.13 [English only]	Peer review: An innovative way to strengthen the BWC. Submitted by Belgium, France, Luxemburg and Netherlands
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.14 [English only]	Articles VII and X: The importance of synergy. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.15 [English only]	Eighth BWC Review Conference: New intersessional work programme. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.16 [English only]	Strengthening the BWC science and technology review process: Considerations regarding the composition of an S&T review body. Submitted by Switzerland
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.17 [English only]	"Investigation" under the framework of BWC. Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.18 [English only]	New scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention: Some examples. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.19 [Russian only]	The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.20 [English only]	Implementation of Article X of the BTWC by the European Union Institutions and the European Union Member States. Submitted by the European Union
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.21 [English only]	Functional structures of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Submitted by South Africa
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.22 [English only]	Implementation of Article VII. Submitted by South Africa
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.23 [English only]	Future planning for the Implementation Support Unit. Submitted by South Africa
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.24 [English only]	The 2017-2020 intersessional process. Submitted by Canada
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.25 [English only]	Frameworks for effective oversight of scientific research facilities and awareness of dual-use risks. Submitted by Canada
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.26 [English only]	Strengthening the BTWC: Reflecting on the peer review concept. Submitted by Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.27 [Spanish only]	Reviewing science and technology within the BWC: Elements for a politically independent process. Submitted by Spain
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.28 [Spanish only]	Voluntary visits for the BWC: A concept paper. Submitted by Chile and Spain

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.29 [English only]	Strengthening cooperation with international organisations. Submitted by Japan
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.30 [English only]	Implementation of national CBRN action plans: Facilitating cooperation to strengthen capacities against bio-risks. Submitted by Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Montenegro, Philippines and Uganda
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.31 [English only]	Proposal for the development of the template of biological scientist code of conduct under the framework of Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by China and Pakistan
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.32 [English only]	Establishing a non-proliferation export control and international cooperation regime under the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by China and Pakistan
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.33 [English only]	"Transfers" under the Framework of BTWC: Challenges and opportunities. Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.34 [English only]	Providing reassurance on Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) implementation. Submitted by Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Thailand
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.35 [English only]	Strengthening confidence-building measures in regard to dual use materials. Submitted by Germany
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.36 [English only].	Step-by-step approach in CBM participation (2016). Submitted by Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, and Switzerland
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.37 [English only]	New ideas for the intersessional programme. Submitted by Australia and Japan
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.38 [English only]	Proposal for establishment of a database for assistance in the framework of Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by France and India
BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.39 [English only]	Humanitarian response to the use of biological weapons: Lessons from the naturally occurring Ebola outbreak of 2014-2016 Submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

## B. Working Papers submitted to the Review Conference

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.1 – English only	Strengthening Implementation of Article III of the BTWC. Submitted by India and the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.2 – Spanish only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Código sobre la ética profesional de los trabajadores de la ciencia en Cuba. Presentado por Cuba
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.3 – Spanish only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Nuevo programa de trabajo para el periodo hasta la IX conferencia de examen: propuesta de directrices. Presentado por Cuba
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.4 – Spanish only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas



<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
annexed]	Biológicas. Presentado por Cuba
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.5 – Spanish only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Ofrecimientos y solicitudes de Cooperación internacional y Asistencia a la Base de Datos de Cooperación Internacional para el Artículo X de la Convención. Presentado por Cuba
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.6 – Spanish only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Implementación del Artículo X de la convención sobre armas biológicas. Presentado por Cuba
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.7 – English only	Report on implementation of Article X of the Convention. Submitted by India
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.8 – Russian only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Draft decision on the establishment of a Temporary Working Group on Mobile Biomedical Units. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.9 – Russian only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Proposal to enhance the format of confidence-building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.10 – English only	Awareness raising, education and outreach: An example of best practice. Submitted by Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11 – English only	Confidence in compliance: Peer review visit exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich, Germany. Submitted by Germany, co-sponsored by Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11/Corr.1 – English only	Confidence in compliance: Peer review visit exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich, Germany. Submitted by Germany, co-sponsored by Austria, Belgium, France, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yemen
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.12 – English only	The BTWC Review Process of Science and Technology. Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.13 – English only	A proposal for amending the Convention to incorporate therein the explicit "Prohibition of the Use of Biological Weapons". Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.14 – English only	Article I: Reinforcing the Core Prohibition of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.15 – English only	Facilitating the Fullest Possible Exchange of Science and Technology under Article X. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.16 – English only	Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Consultative Provisions of Article V of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Submitted by the European Union
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.17 – English only	Review of developments in science and technology: Key points from the 2012-2015 BTWC intersessional programme. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
	Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.18 – English only	BWC implementation review initiative: Report by the United States of America on the visit to Washington, DC. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.19 – English only	Acquisition and Use of Biological and Toxin Weapons: Addressing the Threat. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.20 – English only	Technological developments for the decoding of new, old and ancient infectious disease outbreaks and incidents – lessons for the BTWC. Submitted by Sweden
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.20/Corr.1 – English only	Technological developments for the decoding of new, old and ancient infectious disease outbreaks and incidents – lessons for the BTWC. Submitted by Finland, Norway and Sweden
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.21 – English/Spanish only	International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Submitted by: Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.21/Add.1 – English only	International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Addendum. Submitted by Italy
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.21/Corr.1 – English/Spanish only	International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Corrigendum
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.22 – English only	BWC Implementation Review Initiative. Submitted by: Canada, Chile, Ghana, Mexico, and the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.23 – English only	BTWC Article X Compliance Mechanism for the 8th Review Conference. Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.24 – English only	Proposals for the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC): Article by Article. Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.25 – English only	Proposals for the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC): Intersessional Programme, Implementation Support Unit and Science and Technology. Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.26 – English only	Proposals for the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC): Intersessional Programme, Implementation Support Unit and Science and Technology.

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
	Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.27 – English only	BWC Implementation Review Initiative – Canada’s report of the visit to Ottawa. Submitted by Canada
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.28 – Spanish only	Convención sobre la Prohibición del Desarrollo, Producción y el Almacenamiento de Armas Bacteriológicas (Biológicas) y Tóxicas y sobre su Destrucción. Presentada por México
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.29 – English only	Peer review visit exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich, Germany: Civil society observer report. Submitted by Germany
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.30* - Chinese only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Proposal for the development of a model code of conduct for biological scientists under the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by China and Pakistan
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.31* - Chinese only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Establishing a Non-proliferation Export Control and International Cooperation Regime under the Framework of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by China and Pakistan
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.32 – English only	A coordinated approach to enhancing bio-risk mitigation: National CBRN Action Plans. Submitted by Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Montenegro and Uganda
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.32/Corr.1 – English only	A coordinated approach to enhancing bio-risk mitigation: National CBRN Action Plans - Corrigendum. Submitted by Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Georgia, Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, Philippines, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Senegal and Uganda
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.33 – English only	Ghana's Report on the BWC Implementation Review Exercise held in Accra, 19-20 October 2016. Submitted by Ghana
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.34 – English only	Implementation of Article VII. Submitted by South Africa
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.35 – English only	Building confidence through voluntary transparency exercises. Submitted by Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Ghana, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.36 – English only	Proposals for the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC): Strengthening Cooperation with International Organizations. Submitted by Japan: Co-sponsored by Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.37 – Russian only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Russia's Implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.38 – English only	Preparing for and Responding to Deliberate Events: Specific Proposals for Work Under Article VII Based on Examining Lessons Learned From the International

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
	Response to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.39 – English only	Select International Developments Relevant to Article VII of the BWC. Submitted by United States of America
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.40 – Spanish only	Taller Nacional Multisectorial Sobre Medidas De Fomento De La Confianza: Llenado Del Informe. Presentado por el Gobierno de los estados Unidos Mexicanos
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.41 – Spanish only [unofficial English translation annexed]	Ejercicio de Revisión de la Implementacion Informe de Visita a Santiago de Chile. Presentado por Chile
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.42 – English only	Committee of the Whole: Proposal on Article IV. Submitted by Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Georgia, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.43 – Spanish only	Universalizacion. Presentado por Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, México, Nicaragua, Panamá y Perú
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.44 – English only	Outcome of International Workshop "The Eighth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference: Promoting BWC Implementation & Enhancing Global Biosecurity Governance". Submitted by Canada and China