NATO and ERW

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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
War is a mere continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz)
North Atlantic Council

- Secretary General
- International Staff

Chairman Military Committee

International Military Staff

SHAPE

Strategic Commands

JFC/CJTF

Euro Atlantic Partnership Council

NATO Russia Council
NATO APPROACH TO SECURITY

Cooperation

- e.g. Arms Control & Disarmament

Dialogue

- e.g. Arms Control & Disarmament

Collective Defence Capability
• NATO is not only a military Organisation
• NATO is not a State Party to Agreements and Treaties
• NATO facilitates decision making by consensus
  - National caveats are taking under consideration
• NATO decisions are political decisions on first hand
• Military Committee provides military expertise
• After political guidance / decision MC gives guidance to SHAPE
• No military action without political guidance
• Seeking for UN Mandate
General targeting approval process

• NAC defines military mission and issues Initial Directive through the MC (Military Committee to the SC (Strategic command)
• SC develops a strategic-level OPLAN
  – Contains target sets by phase
• Plan passed through MC to NAC seeking approval
• After approval SC gives guidance to JFC/CJTF
• Targeting guidance detail commander’s intend on how targets that fall into the approved target sets will be selected for attack.
• (...)
Political Direction

• NAC provides the MC with the overarching military objectives and guidance for a campaign including any constraints and restraints that it wishes to impose.

• NAC should provide the SC with objectives and guidance (O&G) that are clear, comprehensive, and that define ROE and other limitations.

• NAC should unambiguously define restrictions and other limitations that are to be imposed or that other nations participating in a NATO coalition effort or whose sovereign territories may be involved may place on the campaign.
• NAC must address the use of both lethal and non-lethal means;
• NAC must also improve the target set(s) provided by the SC and issue any constraints and restraints that they wish to impose
National Inputs

• National targeting guidance will always remain a sovereign right and should be established before the onset of a crisis.
• Nations may refine their guidance to conform to the exact nature for a specific operation.
No military action without any 
**Explosive Remnants of War**
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
Military Needs vs Humanitarian Factor

- Ammunition is “good”, because it kills the enemy
- Ammunition is “bad”, because it kills people
STANAG

Targeting (Principles)

• NATO operations are controlled by international customary and conventional law and the domestic law of the participating nations, which impose boundaries upon targeting decisions and actions
  – The principle of military necessity authorizes that use of force required to accomplish those actions that have a legitimate military rationale. (...) Military necessity never justifies a breach of the international law.
STANAG (Principles)

• **Humanity**
  – forbids the infliction of unnecessary suffering, injury or distinction not actually necessary for legitimate purposes. It prohibits the intentional causing of unnecessary suffering

• **Distinction**
  – imposes an obligation on all targeting decision makers to distinguish between legitimate targets, and civilian objects and the civilian population. The rule that requires only targeting of military objectives is an expression of this principle.
• **Proportionality**
  – No attack may be launched, and any attack in progress must be stopped, in which the expected collateral damage would, in total, be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (…) The military advantage anticipated refers to the advantage to be gained from the attack considered as a whole, and not from isolated or particular actions. Generally military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to wider strategic goals.

• **Military Objective**
  – Only military objectives may be attacked; as combatants and those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
  – Problem “dual use” facilities
• **Responsibility**
  
  - Rests at a number of levels (e.g. those carrying out the attack, commanders, decision makers) -> need to take all those precautions that were reasonably feasible at the time of their decision or actions and the circumstances at that time.
Post-campaign and Operation activities
• Requirement to collect all available information that enables
  – Evaluation and archiving of the full extend of target physical and functional damage
  – Determining the true effectiveness of employed delivery systems and munitions
  – Critiquing and improving the analysis and reporting process; and
  – Operations analysis and lessons identified
  – Provide EOD teams with the needed information
Post-conflict operations

• An operation does not end with the military action
• Post-conflict operations will take place on certain levels
  – Armed forces might stay for a period to ensure security
  – Political help might be needed
  – Humanitarian help might be needed
    ➢ e.g. build-up civil society
    ➢ cleaning of ERW will be needed
• Information on targets will be provided on request
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

• Assumption
  – Post strike environment is extremely hazardous and will remain until cleared
  – Unexploded ordnance, both malfunctions and delay/influenced fuzed, will be present

• Need to secure terrain to be used by own forces and population
• Use of own specialists
• Use of contractors
Examples
KAIA North (NAMSA)

- Objective: clear area of mines and ERW for ISAF relocation
- Total area: +/- 1 Msqm
- MMR...
- Allocated timeframe: six months
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Most complex task:

- Mine Clearance (Surface to ≤ 30 cm)
- UXO Clearance (mostly surface ≤ 1 m)
- Deep buried UXO’s e.g. aircraft bombs; down to five metres
- Time and cost consuming (approx. USD 300,000 for 20,000 sqm; i.e. 15 USD/sqm)
KAIA North

- VISUAL SEARCH: 588,000 sqm
- SUB-SURFACE SEARCH: 908,000 sqm
- MINE CLEARANCE: 10,500 sqm
Saloglu – General Situation
• Largest Soviet ammunition depot in the Caucasus (approx 220 hectares; 116 ammunition storage bunkers)

• 1991: Series of explosions devastated the depot, scattered ammunition well beyond the depot boundaries
Sloglu – Project Area

Initial area to be cleared = 5,680,000 sqm
Saloglu – Large scale Demolitions

BEFORE:

NOW:
Vectors:

- Bomb
- Rocket
- Howitzer/Mortar

Condition:

- Complete – not armed
- Partial – SM in and out of cluster – armed/not armed…?
- Cluster did work as designed – exploded SM (e.g. craters) / SM blinds – where is the cluster…?
EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group

• Started in 1999

• Emphasis has shifted to SALW

• **Aim:**
  – Promote transparency with Trust Funds
  – Promote Ottawa Convention and UN PoA adherence
  – Provide forum for nations to showcase SALW activities
  – Invite NGOs & IOs to brief group
EAPC AHWG Workshops

- Stockpile Security & Management Workshop
- Destruction Technologies & Techniques Workshop
- MANPADS Workshop
- Regional Synergy Conference
- Illicit Brokering in SALW
- Destruction of Cluster Munition
NATO/PfP Trust Funds

- Voluntary funded by member states & partners
- Host nation contribution maximized
- Build local capacity
- Environmental standards upheld
- Recycling key part of demilitarization
- Transparent and verifiable
Conclusion

• No armed conflict without any ERW
• Use of force politically guided
  – National caveats need to be taken under consideration
• Use of munitions objective oriented, but politically guided
• Post-action operations have to be considered
• Information of targets need to be collected
Thank you for your attention