IED COMPONENTS AND THEIR PROLIFERATION IN WEST AFRICA: Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso

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Small Arms Survey
Origins and aims of the project

• German Federal Foreign Office funding

• Following from the 2018 SAS study on Mapping Illicit Flows in West Africa and discussion with ECOWAS member states

• Responding to mandate limitations by key stakeholders. 71 UN Peacekeepers killed and approximately 400 seriously wounded in Mali by IEDs 2013-2019: 60% of those killed by malicious acts during that period.

• Rate of peacekeeping casualties diminishing, but increasing amongst national defence and security forces and civilians.
Origins and aims of the project

• Observed lack of information and analysis of cross-border procurement/diversion and distribution of IED components => mapping

• Observed a lack of dialogue and exchange between key stakeholders => improve information sharing nationally and regionally

• Need to develop policy recommendations => cooperation with States, UN and regional bodies, including analysis of second-order effects
Development of policy recommendations

- UNIDIR – SAS Cooperation

  - Collaboration to support States’ efforts to address IED proliferation through best practices checklist

  - SAS examining diversion and trafficking dynamics through fieldwork: Phase 1 in Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso
Three main areas of research

I. Explosives – Diversion and trafficking of commercial explosives

II. PRB M3 mines – Definition

III. Transmitters / Receivers – Control on exports/imports
Explosives: potential occurrences of diversion?

- Explosives: Detonators, detonating cord and ammonium nitrate
- Commercial explosives vs fertilisers used in HME?
- Theft or Diversion: domestically or trafficked across borders, at which point in supply chain?
- Linkages with demand from artisanal gold mining sector?
PRB M3: AV mines, AP mines and/or IEDs?

- Origins – limited documentation for tracing
- Recovered and trafficked or diversion from stockpiles
- AV mines, modified as AP mines and/or IED components?
- Evolution (technical and geographical): used differently in different areas by different groups
RCIED Transmitters / Receivers: Control on imports/exports

- Evolution of models over time
- Difficulties:
  - Origins/sourcing
  - Dual use products
  - Regional approach required
  - Global cooperation: WCO, INTERPOL

The IED project: Components and Diversion in West Africa
2018 SAS study on mapping illicit flows

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2015 - 2018

The IED project: Components and Diversion in West Africa
Next steps, outputs and (possible) next phase

- *Presentation of findings to key partners (finances permitting) to stimulate policy responses and collaboration by end 2019*

- *'Phase 2’ 2020 options– (Finances permitting)*
  1. Expand research to additional countries adjacent to Mali
  2. Compare ‘Mali cluster’ against Lake Chad Basin and Libya IED component trafficking dynamics
  3. Scientific analysis of HME
Thank you.
Questions?

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