THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS

Geneva, 7-17 November 2006
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Submission of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts

PROCEDURAL REPORT

GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS

Fifteenth Session

Addendum

REPORT OF THE WORK IN 2006 ON MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

GE.06-64586
REPORT ON THE WORK IN 2006 ON MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

Prepared by the Coordinator on MOTAPM
and the Chairperson of the Meetings of Military Experts

1. The present report on the results of the work carried out by the Coordinator on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) during the three Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the CCW held throughout 2006, is presented to the President-designate of the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to CCW

2. The 2005 Meeting of the States Parties appointed a Coordinator of the Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines, and decided that the Group should continue its work in the year 2006 with the following mandate:

   “a) To continue to consider all proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts with the aim of elaborating appropriate recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines for submission to the Third Review Conference in 2006.

   b) Meetings of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these activities.”

3. In discharging his duties, the Coordinator on MOTAPM relied on the invaluable contributions of Brig.-Gen. Gerson Menandro Garcia de Freitas, who acted as an advisor to the Coordinator and chaired the Meetings of Military Experts on MOTAPM held during the 2006 GGE Sessions, and whose report is enclose to this document.

4. In the Thirteenth Session, held between March 6th and 10th, the Coordinator indicated to delegations that, despite the strenuous efforts by the GGE on MOTAPM throughout the last four years, it was yet not possible to eliminate a number of divergences, in particular as regards the most controversial issues of “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM. In light of this, the Coordinator asked delegations to present a frank assessment of the current status of debates, and requested indications of alternatives for future work of the GGE on the issue. The Coordinator also announced his intention to conduct informal consultations with all interested delegations, with a view to identify room for manoeuvre in the discussions throughout 2006.

5. Prior to the Fourteenth Session, the Coordinator has circulated a “Questionnaire on issues that might enhance the level of understanding on the question of responsible use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)” . The Questionnaire was presented in the format of new language that might be considered for addressing the topics identified as most contentious, as follows: “perimeter marked areas” (PMA); “active life of MOTAPM”; “production and transfer of MOTAPM”; and “detectability of MOTAPM”. It also provided for the submission of additional

1 CCW/MSP/2005/2.
comments on other issues that may be deemed relevant. Delegations were requested to comment the proposed language (and ideas and/or concepts related to), on the basis of relevance, acceptance, possibility of being incorporated to or of replacing the conceptual framework under discussion.

6. During the Fourteenth Session, held between June 19th and 23rd, discussions were based on the possibilities identified by the abovementioned questionnaire. A new round of informal consultations in various settings also took place.

7. In the intersessional period prior to the Fifteenth Session of the GGE, the Coordinator has decided to circulate a document entitled “Set Of Provisions On The Use of MOTAPM/AVM - A Compilation of Provisions that could Command Consensus In The Group Of Governmental Expert (GGE)”\(^2\), which in his opinion encompasses all the areas that command consensus in the discussions held on MOTAPM. The text builds upon all previous papers, including the Set of Recommendations prepared by the previous Coordinator on MOTAPM, Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland (CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2, dated 22 November 2005), and was presented as a basis for a possible consensus during discussions that were to be held in the first days of the Fifteenth Session.

8. In addition to the most controversial issues of “detectability” and “active life”, some other questions have also been identified as inspiring divergences among delegations, and were modified in relation to the previous Coordinator’s text, in an attempt to identify consensus language: among the modifications, the expression “Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines/Anti-Vehicle Mines” (MOTAPM/AVM) was introduced as a means to address concerns raised by some delegations in relation to what they perceive as “excessive breadth” and “subjective character” of the previous definition of MOTAPM. A general reorganization of articles and paragraphs was also performed, in order to bring together provisions on a single subject and to arrange them in a coherent, logical manner.

9. As regards the most contentious issues of “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM, once no possible consensus solution had yet been identified, they were not included in the first version of my Set of Provisions. In its introduction, the Coordinator has outlined three possibilities as to the inclusion of those two pending issues on a possible future protocol on MOTAPM, namely: a) the insertion of legally binding language on the two issues in the main text; b) dealing with the issues of “detectability” and “active life” in a way which would allow States-Parties the option to accept or reject obligations on those two issues; c) place those two issues as non-binding best practices in a technical annex.

10. In the Fifteenth and final Session of the GGE prior to the Third Review Conference, held between August 28th and September 6th, discussions on MOTAPM were based on the abovementioned Set of Provisions. Many comments have been presented during plenary sessions, and a number of informal consultations have taken place, with a view to allowing delegations to present comments and proposals, and hence explore all possibilities of language that could lead to a consensus on how to move forward towards the Third Review Conference.

\(^2\) CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1.
11. As regards to the issues of “detectability” and “active life”, many delegations indicated that they continue to support the adoption of legally-binding provisions on both pending issues, along the lines of chapters III and IV of the Set of Recommendations by the previous Coordinator, Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland.

12. One delegation, after consultations with a wide spectrum of other delegations, has prepared a proposal of language on “detectability” and “active life” that follows the second approach suggested in the introduction of the first version of the Set of Provisions, i.e., the inclusion of both issues as optional legally-binding commitments. According to the proposal, a State that adheres to a possible future Protocol on MOTAPM may indicate, at the time of the submission of the instrument of ratification, that it agrees to be bound by one or both of such provisions, by means of a written declaration to the Depositary. At any time after the entry into force of the future Protocol for a given State, the State concerned may submit written declarations to the Depositary expressing consent to be bound by one or both of such provisions. While some delegations expressed discomfort with the idea of introducing optional provisions in an optional Protocol, as well as with the possibility of creating obligations that would bind some States Parties while not binding others, a number of delegations have indicated this approach as a promising possible way of reconciling humanitarian concerns with the requirements related to national security and defence doctrines and needs.

13. Other delegations retained their reservations as to the adoption of legally-binding commitments on “detectability” and “active life”, on the grounds that such commitments may impinge upon essential capabilities related to national defence, in exchange of what they perceived as merely marginal returns in terms of minimisation of an already limited humanitarian impact of MOTAPM. Against such background, those delegations expressed their preference for the inclusion of both pending issues on a non-binding “best-practices” annex to a possible future Protocol on MOTAPM.

14. Some delegations have also indicated that, in considering any restrictions on “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM (both under the legally-binding and the optional approach), a transitional period was needed in order to allow for adaptation of existing stocks and/or military procedures.

15. In addition to the debate on the pending issues, substantive discussions were held on other subjects such as the definition of “MOTAPM/AVM” and “perimeter-marked areas”, the “scope of application”, restrictions on “transfers”, as well as on “fuse design and sensors”.

16. In particular, it became clear that, for a considerable number of delegations, the issues of “transfers” and the definition of “PMA” were intrinsically connected to the pending issues of detectability and active life, and consequently could not be analyzed separately. Additionally, while some delegations insisted upon the prohibition of transfers of non-detectable, persistent MOTAPM (except for the purposes of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, mine

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3 CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2.
clearance, or mine destruction techniques), other delegations have questioned such prohibition, on
the grounds that the Set of Provisions allowed the operational use of such persistent, non-detectable
mines inside PMA.

17. One delegation has re-introduced a proposal on MOTAPM, according to which all the
provisions being discussed would be substituted by a prohibition of the use of MOTAPM by a State
outside its national territory. Another delegation has introduced a new proposal containing what it
regards as the “main features that could form the basis of future deliberations in the GGE on the
issue of anti-vehicle mines”.

18. After the extensive debate on all three approaches on “detectability” and “active life”, as
well as on other yet controversial issues mentioned above, the Coordinator has decided to revise his
Set of Provisions so as to include all alternative languages pertaining to each of the three
approaches, which may help to command consensus during discussions at the Third Review
Conference, if States Parties agree to demonstrate political will and flexibility to cope with all
sensitive issues.

19. The Coordinator has enclosed the last version of the document to the present report.
Alternative texts on controversial issues other than “detectability” and “active life” were also
included. All modifications in relation to the previous version are displayed in the text in italics.
Alternative language is displayed between brackets.

20. It is the understanding of the Coordinator that, upon discretion of delegations that have
introduced proposals during the Fifteenth Session, in case such proposals are timely handed to the
Secretariat, they will be circulated as official documents of the Third Review Conference.

Conclusions

21. In light of the above, the Coordinator has the honour to submit to the consideration of the
Third Review Conference of the CCW, to be held between November 7th and 17th, 2006, the revised
version of his “Set of Provisions on the Use of MOTAPM/AVM – A Compilation of Provisions that
Could Command Consensus in the Group of Governmental Experts”, as contained in the annex II to
this report.

22. It is the understanding of the Coordinator that all other formal proposals put forward to the
consideration of the Group of Governmental Experts since its establishment – a list of which shall
also be enclosed to this report as annex III - will be considered by the Third Review Conference, in
accordance with the mandate bestowed upon the Group by the 2005 Meeting of States Parties.
Report of the Chairperson of the Meetings of Military Experts on MOTAPM in 2006

1. In the light of the three sessions held in 2006, this appraisal of the situation provides an overview on the work performed by the Military Experts on MOTAPM. As a reminder, the overall mandate of the GGE on MOTAPM states: “… Meeting of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these activities.”

2. At the opening meeting of the XIII Session, was realized that the persisting divergences in views - which had undermined any possible progress on this issue – were still strong.

3. The Coordination was also aware that CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2 was presented but not thoroughly discussed at the XII Session of GGE in November 2005. Although not a consensual text, it was officially submitted by the former coordinator and reflected positions expressed by many State Parties on a wide range of subjects.

4. It was therefore necessary, before moving forward in a search of common grounds, to assess the positions of States Parties on the issues contained in that specific paper and, as contained in our mandate, in all proposals put forward since the establishment of this Group.

5. During the Thirteenth Session, one formal Meeting of Military Experts was held. This group also participated in two plenary meetings conducted by the Coordinator on MOTAPM. However, the most useful and productive events were the seven informal meetings, in both formats: bilateral and plurilateral. In those sessions the Coordinator had direct contact with 16 State Parties and International Organizations. As preliminary results, were improved the conditions to a frank and constructive dialogue, mandatory step towards a mutual understanding.

6. As some discussions have clearly highlighted key controversial issues, under the guidance of the Coordinator a questionnaire was circulated, focusing on the following topics: Perimeter Marked-Areas (PMA) to emplace MOTAPM; Active Life; Transfer; and Detectability of MOTAPM. In addition, the delegations were requested to make further comments or suggestions on possible ways to address the mentioned items.

7. The responses to the questionnaire were helpful and oriented the organization of the Fourteenth Session, which was intended to deepen the examination of the issues raised in that document.

8. In the Fourteenth Session another Meeting of the Military Experts took place, along with the two formal sessions conducted by Coordinator on MOTAPM. Eleven informal consultations were conducted, in different settings, in search of possibilities for mutual understanding and a concrete breakthrough.
9. Although it was clear that significant divergences still remained, the informal and formal works during that Session have provided the coordination on MOTAPM valuable tools for building confidence and orienting new possibilities to broker consensus in the elaboration of recommendations on MOTAPM.

10. At that time, during the intersessional period, the Coordination team on MOTAPM has decided to submit a comprehensive text, encompassing all the areas that command consensus and which required an analysis in its entirety.

11. This paper, entitled “Set of Provisions”, was aimed to facilitate more focused discussions, to help in assessing the level of acceptance of some key issues and, hopefully, to pave the way for successful outcome of the Group’s work.

12. The Last Preparatory Session for the 3rd Review Conference hosted intensive formal consultations among military experts, in three plenary meetings and one specific technical-military meeting. In the same session eighteen informal meetings were held in different settings, leading to more focused and fruitful discussions. It should be mentioned that nine delegations presented proposals and comments, which greatly helped the Coordinator in his efforts towards the refinement of the Set of Provisions. In terms of tangible and recent outcomes, such consultations and exchanges of views led to the elaboration of two revised versions of CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, both introduced during the Fifteenth Session.

13. The last version of the abovementioned document incorporates new approaches, from different perspectives, on issues that proved to remain controversial, such as the definition of MOTAPM/AVM, transfers, detectability, active life, and fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM. It was also consolidated a consensual definition and additional remarks on perimeter marked-area. Moreover, innovative language was introduced on the humanitarian aspects related to responsible use of mines.
ANNEX II

SET OF PROVISIONS ON THE USE OF MOTAPM/AVM –
A Compilation of Provisions that Could Command Consensus

Presented by the Coordinator

Article 1

General provision and scope of application

1. This set of provisions applies to the use on land or the transfer of MOTAPM/AVM, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.

2. This set of provisions shall apply to situations referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, as amended on 21 December 2001.

3. This document is without prejudice to the existing international humanitarian law, provisions of the Convention of 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects or other international instruments and decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations which provide for more strict obligations or have wider application.

Article 2

Definitions

1. For the purpose of this set of provisions:

   (a) "Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.

   (b) "MOTAPM/AVM” means a mine which cannot be defined as an anti-personnel mine. An anti-personnel mine is a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. A MOTAPM/AVM is primarily designed to be exploded by the...
presence, proximity or contact of armored or transportation vehicles and that will damage, incapacitate or destroy one or more of such vehicles.

(c) "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the MOTAPM/AVM and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the MOTAPM/AVM.

(d) "Minefield" is a defined area in which mines have been emplaced and "mined area" is an area which is dangerous due to the presence of mines. "Phoney minefield" means an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term "minefield" includes phoney minefields.

(e) "Perimeter-marked area" is an area which, in order to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, is monitored by military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means.

(f) "Recording" means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in official records, all available information facilitating the location of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas.

(g) "Remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM means those not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. MOTAPM/AVM delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 meters are not considered to be "remotely delivered".

(h) "Self-deactivation" means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition.

(i) "Self-destruction mechanism" means an incorporated or externally attached automatically-functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached.

(j) "Self-neutralization mechanism" means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.

(k) "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of MOTAPM/AVM into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the MOTAPM/AVM, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced MOTAPM/AVM.
Article 3

Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM²

Article 4

Active life of MOTAPM/AVM³

Article 5

Measures on the Restriction of Irresponsible Use of MOTAPM/AVM

1. Each State or party to a conflict is, in accordance with this set of provisions, responsible for all MOTAPM/AVM employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain them as specified in the relevant articles of this document.

2. Each State shall take action with a view to limiting the irresponsible use of MOTAPM/AVM, which may include:

   (a) establishment of adequate national systems and corresponding documentation;

   (b) effective export and import control measures relating to MOTAPM/AVM;

   (c) effective management and security of stockpiles and transport of MOTAPM/AVM;

   (d) adoption of such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress activities prohibited by this set of provisions;

   (e) suppression of activities related to the production of MOTAPM/AVM under invalid or expired licenses; and

   (f) strengthening cooperation with the purpose of implementation of this set of provisions.

3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any MOTAPM/AVM which is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

² Three possible courses of action are envisaged for this article, as described in the appendix that follows this set of provisions.

³ Three possible courses of action are envisaged for this article, as described in the appendix that follows this set of provisions.
4. It is prohibited to use a MOTAPM/AVM which employs a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection operations.

5. It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating MOTAPM/AVM equipped with an anti-handling device that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after the MOTAPM/AVM has ceased to be capable of functioning.

6. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct any MOTAPM/AVM, either in offence or defense, or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians or civilian objects, as defined by paragraph 7 of article 2 of Amended Protocol II.

7. The indiscriminate use of MOTAPM/AVM is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of MOTAPM/AVM:

   (a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective, as defined in the Protocol on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II). In case of doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used; or

   (b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

   (c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

8. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single military objective.

9. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. These circumstances include, but are not limited to:

   (a) the short- and long-term effect of MOTAPM/AVM upon the local civilian population for the duration of the minefield;

   (b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);
(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and

(d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.

10. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of a MOTAPM/AVM which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

11. States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations in order to prohibit and sanction the production, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer or use of MOTAPM/AVM by any unauthorized individual or entity, as well as participating in any of the abovementioned actions as an accomplice, or providing them with assistance or finance.

12. States shall adopt and enforce effective national measures with a view to preventing illicit circulation and trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, including the following:

(a) oversight and control over the production, storage or transportation of MOTAPM/AVM; and

(b) physical protection of stockpiles.

13. States shall cooperate among themselves in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, in accordance with national legislation and pursuant to international law.

Article 6

Recording of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas

1. It is prohibited to use any MOTAPM/AVM unless all information concerning MOTAPM/AVM minefields and mined areas is recorded in accordance with paragraph 1 of Technical Annex A. All such records shall be retained by the parties to a conflict, who shall, without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such information, to protect civilians from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas, in areas under their control.

2. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, the parties to a conflict shall also make available to the other party or parties to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all such information in their possession concerning MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas, laid by them in areas no longer under their control.

3. However, subject to reciprocity, where the forces of a party to a conflict are in the territory of an adverse party, either party may withhold such information from the Secretary-General and the
other party, to the extent that security interests require such withholding, until neither party is in the territory of the other. Any information so withheld shall be disclosed as soon as those security interests permit.

4. Wherever possible, the parties to the conflict shall seek, by mutual agreement, to provide for the release of such information at the earliest possible time in a manner consistent with the security interests of each party.

**Article 7**

**Removal of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields, and mined areas**

1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all MOTAPM/AVM, and minefields and mined areas shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in accordance with the provisions of this set of provisions.

2. States and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with respect to MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas, in areas under their control.

3. With respect to MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas laid by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide to the party in control of the area, pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article, to the extent agreed by the parties concerned, technical and material assistance necessary to fulfill such responsibility, without prejudice to the obligations set by paragraph 1 Article 5.

4. At all times necessary, the parties to a conflict shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the provisions of technical and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfill such responsibilities.

**Article 8**

**Protection from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields, and mined areas**

1. Each Party to this set of provisions shall be bound by the provisions in Article 12 of Amended Protocol II, regardless of whether that State is a Party to Amended Protocol II. Such provisions include the Scope of application; Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions; Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the UN system; Missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry; Confidentiality; and Respect for laws and regulations.
Article 9

Transfers

1. Each State shall not transfer any MOTAPM/AVM:

   (a) to any recipient other than a State or State agency authorized to receive it;

   (b) which does not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVM, except for the use in perimeter marked area, or for the purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining, or mine destruction techniques;\(^4\)

   [alternative language for subparagraph “b”:

   (b) which does not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVM, except for the purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining, or mine destruction techniques;\(^5\) ]

   (c) without an end-user certificate, which, in the case of mines that do not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life, shall include an explicit commitment to abide by the restrictions mentioned in subparagraph “b” above; and

   (d) to States that are not bound by this set of provisions, unless the recipient formally agrees to apply its provisions.

2. In order to prevent illicit trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, States shall establish or improve effective national controls.

3. Each State undertakes to exercise restraint in the transfer of any MOTAPM/AVM with a Category One fusing system, as described in Technical Annex B, paragraph 5 (b), except for the purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining, or mine destruction techniques.

4. Pending the entry into force of this set of provisions, all States will refrain from any actions which would be inconsistent with this Article.

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\(^4\) Language retained pending an agreement on Article 3 “Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM” and Article 4 “Active life of MOTAPM/AVM”.

\(^5\) Language retained pending an agreement on Article 3 “Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM” and Article 4 “Active life of MOTAPM/AVM”.
Article 10

Transparency and other confidence-building measures

1. Each State shall provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate to the other States, information on the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions. This information should include the following elements:

   (a) an initial report, to be provided upon the entry into force of this set of provisions for each State; and

   (b) periodic updating of the report.

2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 may include, information on:

   (a) dissemination of the provisions of this set of provisions to their armed forces and to the civilian population;

   (b) demining and rehabilitation programmes;

   (c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the provisions of this set of provisions and any other relevant information pertaining thereto, other than that relating to weapons technology;

   (d) legislative and other measures taken for the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions;

   (e) measures taken on cooperation and assistance provided under Article 11 of this set of provisions; and

   (f) general information on the national rules and requirements for transfers of MOTAPM/AVM, and information on these transfers.

Article 11

Cooperation and assistance

1. Each State in a position to do so shall enhance cooperation and assistance at bilateral, regional and international levels aimed at assisting the other States in the fulfillment of their obligations in respect of MOTAPM/AVM. Cooperation and assistance may be provided through humanitarian organizations. Such cooperation and assistance may include the following:

   (a) Provision of technical and financial assistance, including exchange of experience, technology other than weapons technology, and information, in order to facilitate the
implementation of necessary modifications to improve the reliability of, and minimize the humanitarian risks posed by, existing and future MOTAPM/AVM. Provision of such assistance may be used to facilitate the development, if feasible, of advanced mine detection equipment and to make such equipment readily available.

(b) Cooperation and assistance in the destruction of stockpiles of MOTAPM/AVM that do not meet and cannot be modified to meet the requirements of this set of provisions.

(c) Cooperation and technical, material and human assistance for the rapid and effective demining, removal or destruction of MOTAPM/AVM.

(d) The timely provision of geographic and technical information on MOTAPM/AVM to relevant humanitarian missions and to the database on mine action maintained within the United Nations System.

(e) Cooperation and assistance on the provision of risk education for civilian populations.

(f) Cooperation and assistance for the care and rehabilitation and the social and economic reintegration of victims of MOTAPM/AVM.

(g) Cooperation and assistance in the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions.

Article 12

Fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM

1. The States should, to the extent feasible, follow the best practices on fuse design stipulated in paragraph 5 of Technical Annex B.

[alternative approach:

1. The States, to the extent feasible, in the future production of MOTAPM/AVM, shall follow the best practices in relation to the fuse and sensors production to design them to minimize the possibility of involuntary or accidental activation of a mine by a person.]
2. In the future production of fuses the States, to the extent feasible, shall strive to apply modern, including multi-sensor, technology to develop them based on technology factors, life environment factors."\(^6\)

\[\text{Article 13}\]^7

Transition Period

1. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with the requirements of articles 3 and 4 of this Set of Provisions, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this set of Provisions that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed [XX] years from the entry into force of this Set of Provisions for that State.]

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\(^6\) This alternative language is based in a generic approach to fuse design, as opposed to the specific approach of the current text, which makes reference to a list of fuses and sensors categorized according to sensitivity (in terms of the risk of involuntary activation by a person), as included in Technical Annex B. In case the generic approach prevails, subsection 5 of Technical Annex B should be deleted.

\(^7\) The inclusion of this article will depend on the decision on how to address the issues of “detectability” and “active life”. See also Appendix I (I. First Option: Article 3 paragraph 7 and Article 4 paragraph 4).
Technical Annex A

1. Minefield Recording

(a) Recording of the location of MOTAPM/AVM other than remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM shall be carried out in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) the location of the minefields and mined areas shall be specified accurately by relation to the coordinates of at least two reference points and the estimated dimensions of the area containing these weapons in relation to those reference points;

(ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to indicate the location of minefields and mined areas in relation to reference points, and these records shall also indicate their perimeters and extent; and

(iii) for the purposes of detection and clearance of MOTAPM/AVM, maps, diagrams or other records shall contain complete information on the type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and life time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices (if any) and any other relevant information on all of these weapons laid. Whenever feasible the minefield record shall show the exact location of every MOTAPM/AVM, except in row minefields where the row location is sufficient.

(b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM shall be specified by coordinates of reference points (normally corner points) and shall be ascertained and when feasible marked on the ground at the earliest opportunity. The total number and types of MOTAPM/AVM laid, the date and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be recorded.

(c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to guarantee their safety as far as possible.

(d) All MOTAPM/AVM produced after entry into force of this set of provisions shall be marked in English or in the respective national language or languages with the following information:

(i) Name of the country of origin; and

(ii) Month and year of production; and

(iii) Serial number or lot number.
2. **Marking of Perimeter-marked area**

(a) A perimeter-marked area shall be marked by appropriate signage in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Technical Annex, except during periods of active hostilities. The marking shall be of a distinct and durable character and shall at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area;

(b) the marking shall be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects, as far as possible; and

(c) during periods of active hostilities, a perimeter-marked area should, to the extent feasible, be appropriately marked. After the cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible, the area shall be marked in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.

3. **International signs for Minefields and Mined Areas**

(a) Signs similar to those specified within Amended Protocol II and detailed below shall be utilized in the marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their visibility and recognition by the civilian populations:

(i) **Size and shape**: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres (11 inches) by 20 centimetres (7.9 inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres (6 inches) per side for a square;

(ii) **Colour**: red or orange with a yellow reflecting border;

(iii) **Symbol**: the symbol illustrated in the attachment, or an alternative readily recognizable in the area in which the sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area;

(iv) **Language**: the sign shall contain the word “mines” in one of the six official languages of the convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) and the language or languages prevalent in the area;

(v) **Spacing**: signs shall be placed around the minefield at a distance to ensure their visibility at any point by a civilian approaching the area.
Technical Annex B

This Annex contains best practices for achieving the objectives of this set of provisions. This Annex will be implemented by States on a voluntary basis.

1. Control Measures

(a) Prior to Commencement of Active Hostilities
All minefields, within the territory controlled by the party concerned, should be monitored by military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area.

(b) During Active Hostilities
Parties to a conflict should ensure, to the extent feasible, that all minefields known to them at the time and within territory under their control are either monitored by military or other authorized personnel or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. Remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM and nuisance minefields may be emplaced as required during active hostilities noting the recording requirements detailed in Technical Annex A.

(c) After the Cessation of Active Hostilities

(i) All parties to a conflict should be encouraged to cooperate in order to facilitate, to the extent feasible, the exchange to the other parties concerned of all information in their possession concerning minefields, mined areas, and MOTAPM/AVM laid by them in areas no longer under their control.

(ii) At the earliest opportunity and to the extent feasible all minefields within the territory controlled by the party concerned, are to be secured and monitored by military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. If fencing or other marking means have been removed from minefields during the conflict they should be restored at the earliest opportunity in order to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area.

(iii) At the earliest opportunity and to the extent feasible, all remotely-delivered and nuisance minefields emplaced during active hostilities, and within the territory controlled by the party concerned, should be appropriately recorded in accordance with Technical Annex A. In addition and to the extent feasible, they should be secured and monitored by military or other qualified personnel, or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area.
2. **Common Warning Measures Required At All Times**

To the extent feasible, and as soon as practicable after MOTAPM/AVM are laid, signposted or other warning measures should be provided on all primary traffic routes into the mined area to ensure the effective warning of civilians. A primary traffic route is one over which most population movement occurs between population centres. When providing these warning measures parties should be mindful of prevailing local environmental factors, such as regular flooding, which could contribute to the natural but unintended movement of MOTAPM/AVM over time.

3. **Marking Systems**

Marking systems are utilized to effectively and efficiently identify the perimeter or boundary between mined and unmined areas. They can include natural or artificial features or a combination thereof but to the extent feasible they will be enhanced through the inclusion of warning signs, as described in Technical Annex A. Notwithstanding the potential removal of these measures (fencing or other means) at the onset of active hostilities and the ongoing requirement in these circumstances for parties to ensure, to the extent feasible, that all minefields are monitored by military or other qualified personnel, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area, the following guidelines are provided for marking at all other times:

(a) **Immediate Warning Markers.** Immediate warning markers are used to expediently mark hazards encountered by military or civilian personnel until a long-term or more permanent marker can be established. The basic pre-requisites for these markers are:

(i) any marking means capable of identifying the hazardous areas as quickly as possible;

(ii) visibility at not less than 50 m indicating the location, direction and type of hazard;

(iii) the marking material(s) have a lifespan of at least 180 days; and

(iv) the marking means used should be readily recognizable in the area in which they are displayed as identifying a hazardous area.

Immediate markers could include but should not be limited to:

(i) mine marking tape; or

(ii) wire, pickets (iron, timber, concrete, plastic or other) and signage; or

(iii) painting of natural features such as trees and rocks in hazard recognition colours; or
(iv) any other locally or otherwise available and accepted hazard recognition materials;

(v) sign should be robustly emplaced and difficult to remove.
To the extent feasible, the location of the hazard and its marking details such as the marking systems employed should be promulgated in general terms to the civil population as soon as is practicable to ensure their effective exclusion from the area. To the extent feasible they should be enhanced through the inclusion of warning signs, as described in Technical Annex A.

(b) Long-Term Warning Markers. Long-term warning markers are to be used if the hazard is likely to remain in location for a protracted duration or when immediate hazard markers need to be replaced and upgraded. Long-term markers represent an improvement on an immediate warning system and the minimum standard of a long term warning sign could include but should not be limited to:

(i) A fence (minimum single strand of barb wire) to waist height with appropriate military mine hazard recognition markers as detailed in Technical Annex A at intervals appropriate to the terrain and vegetation;

(ii) Permanent signage, visible to the extent feasible by day and by night, both proximate to the hazard itself and on all identifiable primary traffic routes into the area in which the hazard is contained;

(iii) A permanent cyclone wire type fence reinforced with barbed wire and anti-climbing measures inclusive with mine hazard markers at specified minimum intervals and type;

(iv) Concertina wire and pickets;

(v) Concrete barricades; or

(vi) Other locally or otherwise available material enhancements.

4. Specifications on Self-destruction, Self-neutralization and Self-deactivation

(a) MOTAPM/AVM that are designed to self-destruct or self-neutralize should do so within 45 days after arming. Self-deactivation of MOTAPM/AVM that fail to self-destruct or self-neutralize should take place within 120 days after arming.

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1 The assessment of the reliability rate of the SD/SDA or SN/SDA is left to the discretion of each State.
(b) Each State should take the measures necessary to ensure that no more than 10 percent (with a 90 percent confidence level) of activated MOTAPM/AVM will fail to self-destruct or self-neutralize after 45 days.

(c) Each State should take the measures necessary to ensure that in combination with self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanisms, no more than one in a thousand of activated MOTAPM/AVM will function as a mine after 120 days.

5. Fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM

(a) Based on information and data provided by States the following broadly available fuses and sensors should be considered as relevant: acoustic sensors; break wires; fiber-optic wires; infra-red-sensors; magnetic sensors; pressure sensors; roller arms; scratch wire sensors; seismic/vibration sensors; tilt rods; trip wires.

(b) The broadly available fuses and sensors referred to in the previous paragraph should be graded into the following categories:

**Category One:** Fusing systems that cannot be designed not to be excessively sensitive.

(i) Break wires and trip wires do not appear to be a recommended method of activation, as it does not seem possible to design them in such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the mine.

(ii) Tilt rods do not appear to be recommended method of activation, if they cannot be designed in such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the mine.

**Category Two:** Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, but are best used in conjunction with other sensors.

(i) Acoustically activated fuses use electronic sensors to react to acoustic pressure and recognize the acoustic signature. Use in conjunction with other sensors is preferable.

(ii) Infrared activated fuses should be designed so as not to be activated in the presence of a person. The sensor should be able to match detected heat signatures to the intended target preferably in conjunction with other sensors.

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2 As mentioned in the footnote to article 12, this subsection of Technical Annex B should not be included in case the generic approach to fuze and sensor design is chosen.

3 The sequence of the fuses and sensors is strictly alphabetical and does not entail an assessment of their availability, distribution or use.
(iii) Seismic/Vibration sensors cannot currently locate their targets precisely; their use in conjunction with other sensors appears therefore to be indispensable. The sensor should be capable to match a seismic signature to the intended target.

**Category Three:** Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, that can be designed to operate satisfactorily without other sensors and which fulfill the best practice safety guidelines of this Technical Annex.

(i) The pressure required to break the fiber-optic signal should be appropriate for the intended target.

(ii) To enhance military utility, magnetically activated mines should be capable of matching a magnetic signature to the intended target.

(iii) Pressure sensors, pressure activated mechanisms, should, where possible, be subject to a minimum pressure force appropriate for the intended target. Pressure should preferably be exerted over a significant area (equal to that of a vehicle) rather than a single point.

(iv) The number of turns required to initiate the roller arm fuse should be matched to the intended target.

(v) The scratch wire sensor should be designed for specific targets by optimizing the scratch time, frequency and amplitude required to initiate the sensor by the intended target.

(c) All MOTAPM/AVM, with the exception of those fitted with Category Three fuses, should incorporate in future production, to the extent feasible, multi-sensor fuses technology in order to reduce the possibility of inadvertent or accidental activation by a person taking into account operational, life cycle, environmental and climate factors.

(d) The influence of environmental factors, particularly:

(i) of weather and climate;

(ii) of storage, handling and other external conditions should be taken into account when selecting the types of fuses and determining the sensitivity of fuses; and

(e) Considerations and proposals of technical measures should take into account operational, procurement as well as life cycle factors; they should address clearly identified humanitarian issues.
Appendix

Three possible options on how to address the issues of “detectability” and “active life” are envisaged:

I. **First option** – Insertion of legally-binding language on “detectability” and “active life”.

**Article 3**

**Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM**

1. It is prohibited to use a non-detectable MOTAPM/AVM, subject to the exclusions specified below.

2. A MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement:

   (a) it provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass buried five centimetres beneath the ground and can be detected by commonly available mine detection equipment; or

   (b) it can be reliably and effectively detected through the use of alternative methods and equipment that reflect developments in detection methodologies, and if the States, taking into account testing and evaluation by relevant institutions, have decided by a four-fifths majority of the States present and voting that such alternative methods and equipment are effective and commonly available.

3. A MOTAPM/AVM is also detectable if it can be reliably and effectively detected through the use of methods and equipment that are not commonly available but are readily available to a State, provided that:

   (a) the State in question has, before the use of such MOTAPM/AVM, demonstrated to the other States that the MOTAPM/AVM can be reliably and effectively detected through the use of such readily available methods or equipment; and

   (b) it is not used outside perimeter-marked areas located on the territory of the State in question.

4. A MOTAPM/AVM emplaced in a perimeter-marked area is excluded from the detectability requirement of this chapter.

5. It is prohibited to produce, after the entry into force of this set of recommendations, any MOTAPM that is not detectable.
6. All MOTAPM/AVM from existing stocks shall meet the detectability requirement of this chapter prior to their emplacement, except in the case referred to in paragraph 4.

7. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with the requirements of this chapter, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this set of recommendations that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed 12 years from the entry into force of this set of recommendations. In the meantime that State shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of any MOTAPM/AVM that does not meet the detectability requirement of this chapter.¹

Article 4

Active life of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use a remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM which does not incorporate a self-destruction mechanism or a self-neutralization mechanism with, in either case, a back-up self-deactivation feature (hereinafter referred to as "SD/SDA or SN/SDA"), whereby the MOTAPM/AVM will no longer function as a mine when it no longer serves the military purpose for which it was emplaced.

2. States shall not deliver a MOTAPM/AVM from a land-based system from less than 500 meters, nor shall they hand-emplace a MOTAPM/AVM, which does not incorporate a SD/SDA or SN/SDA, outside a perimeter marked area.

3. When implementing the recommendations of this chapter the States shall take all measures stipulated in Technical Annex A and should follow the best practices stipulated in Technical Annex B.

4. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with paragraphs 1 and 2, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this set of recommendations that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed 12 years from the entry into force of this set of recommendations. In the meantime that State shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of any MOTAPM/AVM that does not so comply.²

II. Second option – Inclusion of Provisions on Detectability and Active Life as two optional, legally-binding Annexes.

In this case, provisions on detectability and active life would be incorporated into the text as two separate optional annexes, and an article disciplining the entry into force of such annexes for States Parties would be inserted on the main text.

¹ See also Article 13 / Set of Provisions.
² See also Article 13 / Set of Provisions.
Article 3

Detectability and Active Life of MOTAPM/AVM

1. At the time of submittal to the Depositary of its instrument expressing its consent to be bound to this set of provisions, a State may submit a written declaration agreeing to be bound by Optional Annex A on detectability or Optional Annex B on active life, or agreeing to be bound by both.

2. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 may also be submitted to the Depositary by a State that has previously expressed consent to be bound by this set of provisions at any time after the entry into force of this set of provisions for that State.

3. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 may stipulate that it is effective immediately or may stipulate a specific date upon which it shall be effective.

Optional Annex A

Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM which are not detectable.

2. A MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement, it provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass buried five centimeters beneath the ground and can be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment.

3. MOTAPM/AVM used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded from the detectability requirement of this Annex.

Optional Annex B

Active Life of MOTAPM/AVM

1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM that do not incorporate a self-destruction mechanism or a mechanism for self-neutralization designed and constructed so that no more than ten percent of activated mines will fail to self-destruct within forty-five days after arming.

2. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM that do not incorporate a back-up self-deactivation feature that is designed and constructed so that, in combination with the mechanism referred to in
paragraph 1, no more than one in one thousand activated mines will function as a mine one hundred twenty days after arming.

3. MOTAPM/AVM used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded from the requirements of this Annex.

III. Third option – Inclusion of detectability and active life in the form of “best practices” in a technical annex.

Some general ideas and proposals have been discussed as regards the inclusion of provisions on detectability and active life as best practices in a technical, non-binding annex.

The adoption of a “best practices” approach to theses issues would necessarily imply changes both in the main text of a possible understanding on MOTAPM/AVM and in the provisions of a new binding technical annex.
### Annex III

**LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON THE ISSUE OF MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES**

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<td>CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/WP.1</td>
<td>Detectability of Anti-Vehicle Mines</td>
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<td>CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.1</td>
<td>(English only) Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to provide a basis for further work</td>
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<td>CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2</td>
<td>Revised Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to provide a basis for further work – Set of recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)</td>
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<td>Comments on the paper prepared for the twelfth session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the CCW by the Coordinator on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM), as contained in CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1, dated 17 October 2005</td>
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