Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

YEMEN

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This presentation addresses the issue of IEDs in Yemen, who is using them, and how their proliferation can be countered.
Key Points

• Understanding the threat posed by IEDs in Yemen:
  • Command, Victim Operated, Suicide;
  • 3 x more effective per event than air strikes;
  • IEDs in Yemen are 17% of global total since 2016;
  • There have been 48 x suicide attacks in Yemen since 2016;
  • Average of 54 IED events per month (AA, AQAP, ISIL-YP, Criminal);
  • Confidence in Rule of Law is LOW;
  • Poor physical security and stockpile management allows access to reliable explosives and initiation mechanisms.

• Effective Clearance:
  • Making best use of the security force, assessing operational balance, and focusing on what is actually needed;
  • Defining standards and levels of assurance;
  • Synergy with other UN projects and development goals;
  • Embracing technical innovation as well as keeping the old favourites.

• An approach based on institutionalising C-IED within the Rule of Law is being tabled to donors as best practice risk mitigation.
Understanding The Threat (Simple and/or Complex)

Manpower Requirements
QUALIFICATION, COMPETENCE, CURRENCY

Increased Specialist Training

Simple

Complex
The Threat (Yemen) – General Features

• IEDs – The Actors
  • Ansar Allah
  • AQAP and ISIL-YP
  • Criminal
• Type
  • Victim Operated
  • Command
  • Secondary & Tertiary
• Environment
  • Land – offensive and defensive
  • Maritime – offensive and defensive
  • 3-dimensional (UAV and drone use)
• Why?
  • Ingenuity (as opposed to new types of IED)
    • Institutionalising the IED
    • Matching device to specific target – little waste
    • Use of technical innovation
    • Use of available explosives and initiators from military ordnance
The Threat (Land-Based IEDs) Simple and Complex
The Threat (Maritime IEDs) Simple and Complex
Vignette 1 – al-Mocha – 3\textsuperscript{rd} April 2019

- Houthi EFP dual PIR VOIED
- Defensive Role – area denial
- Armed by command
- Disarmed by command
- 1 x YEMAC killed
Vignette 2 – Al-Hadramaut – 3rd May 2019

- AQAP – ‘Come-On’
- 14 x casualties (4 police, 8 civilians)
- RCIED with VOIED backup
- First Responder Response (5C)
- Emergency Services Response
- Public Response
Vignette 3 – Aden – 1st August 2019

- Complex Attack (ISIL-YP)
- 1 x SVBIED (Car)
- 3 x SVBIED (Motorcycle)
- 10 x killed
- 20 x life changing injuries
- Each device had a secondary means of initiation
- Putting to test security weakness following the UAE drawdown
“IEDs are used in Yemen by state, non-state and criminal actors to achieve their objectives without being decisively engaged by the security forces”.

“IEDs cause more death and injury per explosive event in Yemen than airstrikes or mines. They will endure after airstrikes stop”.

“Each IED event is only a single activity within an overall IED system, which enjoys a network of support linked to other criminal or belligerent objectives”.

“Whilst their use by State/Non-State Actors is widely publicised, their use by criminals protects human trafficking, the sexual exploitation of women, smuggling, corruption, murder, narcotic and weapon supply routes, or vital areas of operation”.

So, how can we help Yemen protect its people?
“Defeating the IED system involves close cooperation and coordination between the diplomatic, military, law enforcement, economic and information levers of power. Each is linked to the Rule of Law”.

“The Rule of Law is strengthened by countering IEDs because such activity denies, restricts or undermines the use of IEDs, protects the population, enhances their security freedoms, and restores confidence”.

“Ultimately, the population actively rejects IED use, adversaries become isolated, networks fall apart and belligerent/criminal activities diminish”.

“The ask to donors will not be significant.”

- Legal Frameworks – delineation of responsibility
- Capacity Building – Local Security Forces
- Forensic exploitation – providing the evidential baseline

April 2003 - Saddam Hussein's rule collapses

March 2008 – 4000 coalition and 15,000 civilians killed by an improvised explosive device

March 2011 – Coalition declares formal end to operations

April 2013 - Sunni insurgency intensifies

December 2006 – The US ‘Surge’

August 2003 - A suicide bomber destroys UN compound in Baghdad
Any Questions?