BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY,
MONGOLIA, POLAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

It is generally recognized that the nuclear-arms race poses an extremely grave danger for mankind, and that it must be halted and reversed to avert the risk of war involving nuclear weapons. That is why the task of starting negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them is at present coming to the fore. The desire of States to conduct such negotiations has found its reflection in the recommendations of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and of the Assembly's thirty-third regular session.

Agreement on this important problem can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of the inviolability of the security of States and the interests of peace throughout the world. The elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

Appropriate negotiations should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States as well as of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. The Committee on Disarmament, in which both nuclear and non-nuclear States are represented, could be a suitable forum for preparing negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them.

Subject of negotiations

The subject of negotiations should be the ending of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. At different stages of the negotiations consideration could be given, for example, to cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Agreement should also be reached on the necessary verification measures.

GE.79-60112
Stages of negotiations

The cessation of the production, the reduction and the destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The content of measures at each stage may be decided by agreement among the participants in the negotiations. The degree of participation of individual nuclear States in measures at each stage should be determined taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.

Preparations for the negotiations

For the purpose of preparing the negotiations, consultations should be held in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. The set of questions to be considered should be determined in the course of these preparatory consultations, during which matters connected with the organizational side of the conduct of the negotiations should also be settled.

Although the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations, alternative methods may be considered.

Timing

The preparatory consultations should be started in the course of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to beginning the negotiations on the substance of the problem in 1979.

Other negotiations

The preparation and conduct of the negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them should not be to the detriment of the current bilateral and multilateral negotiations on various aspects of the limitation of nuclear armaments, including strategic armaments. Nor should they impede the achievement of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the limitation or destruction of any nuclear armaments on a mutually agreed basis.
GROUP OF 21

Working Paper on Cessation of Nuclear
Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

In view of the highest priority expressly attributed by the General Assembly
to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and bearing in
mind the prominent place that this question has in the agenda of the Committee on
Disarmament, the Group of 21 deems it its duty to put on record how it considers
that the matter should be approached in order to get the Committee engaged in
actual negotiation.

The Group of 21 has in this context noted with satisfaction the initiative
of the seven socialist states in CD/4 entitled "Negotiations on ending the
production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles
until they have been completely destroyed". While maintaining their full adherence
to the programme of action outlined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, the
Group believes that such initiative may become a stimulus to begin exploratory
consultations which could lead to effective negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The Group of 21 is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament is the
most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of such negotiations.

The question of the scope of the negotiations in this Committee has to be
solved in preliminary negotiations concerning organizational matters.

Although other negotiations could and should go in parallel with multilateral
negotiations within the CD, thereby complementing each other to the benefit of both,
the Group of 21 believes that negotiations conducted outside the CD should not
in any way hinder negotiations agreed upon to be conducted within the Committee.
The need for undiminished security of States in meaningful disarmament negotiations has been recognized by all States. Agreements and measures included in paragraph 50 as part of the process of nuclear disarmament are closely linked. This relationship together with the inherent complexity of all relevant provisions will undoubtedly make their faithful implementation particularly difficult. Paragraph 50 is, however, one of the key paragraphs of the Programme of Action approved by consensus by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and could not be ignored as unfortunately was the case with all measures of nuclear disarmament in the proceedings of the CCD.

The Group of 21 therefore proposes that the Committee on Disarmament, as a first step to be taken at its present session, endeavour, in informal meetings and consultations, to identify the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to delineate the course of action for the achievement of the objective pursued. On the basis of the progress which may thus be achieved in the Committee, the establishment of a working group for negotiation of agreements and concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament may then be envisaged.
GROUP OF 21

Working Paper on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

At the present stage in the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of 21 finds it necessary to once again underline the urgent need for concrete measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to promote nuclear disarmament.

2. As stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, among all disarmament measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, have the highest priority. The Committee on Disarmament should be enabled to fully discharge its responsibilities in the field of nuclear disarmament and to continue its efforts to undertake negotiations of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in order to achieve the objectives specified in paragraph 50 and other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the special session.

3. The Group of 21 has expressed its view, in a working paper submitted on 12 July, 1979 (CD 36/Rev.1) "that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of such negotiations". Furthermore, the Group of 21, in its statement contained in document CD 64 submitted on 27 February 1980 expressed the view that "working groups are the best available machinery for conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament. Therefore the Group of 21 in principle supports the establishment of Working Groups on the items on its annual agenda".
4. The working paper of the Group of 21, document CD/56/Rev.1, moreover, had suggested that informal meetings and consultations should be held "to identify the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to delineate the course of action for the achievement of the objective pursued."

5. On the basis of the exchange of views held on this subject during the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the Committee, the Group of 21 believes that the following are some of the substantive issues which need to be addressed in negotiations on the item entitled "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" within the Committee on Disarmament:

(i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear weapon states and the role of the non-nuclear weapon states in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;

(ii) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament and in the prevention of nuclear war;

(iii) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;

(iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora.

6. The Group of 21, therefore, proposes that the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad-hoc Working Group to begin negotiations during the current 1980 session of the Committee, with a view to reaching agreement on the above mentioned concrete issues which would contribute to progress towards achievement of the nuclear disarmament measures envisaged in the Final Document of the special session.
STATEMENT BY THE GROUP OF 21 ON ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT ENTITLED:

"CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT"

On the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament engaged, at
the latter part of its 1981 Spring session, in a substantive examination of concrete
issues relating to item 2 of its agenda (cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament). In the course of this process, the Committee concentrated, on
the "pre-conditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as on doctrines
of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons".

In assessing the discussions that took place under that framework, the
Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation
of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, through the adoption of concrete
measures, has been once again amply demonstrated. In the opinion of the Group of 21,
multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and the
fundamental prerequisite for their success is the political will of States,
particularly the nuclear weapon States, to engage in such negotiations.

The discussions, for which Chapters V, VI and the Conclusions of the
Secretary-General's "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" (A/392) provided useful
background material, have confirmed the conviction of the Group of 21 that the nuclear
arms race runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international
tensions; that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be beneficial to
the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of the
international climate, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all
nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear
disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful
of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world.
The promotion of nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by the strict adherence by
all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and in particular by
measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the
peaceful settlement of disputes among States.

The Group of 21 is further convinced, as a result of the discussions, that
doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of
international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of
the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater
insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines,
which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear
weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which
would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation
of nuclear arms by the nuclear weapons States cannot be condoned on grounds that it
is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering
that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of
the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of
the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and
morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend
on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.
In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. That responsibility entails the fulfilment of commitments entered into in international instruments in the field of disarmament, the respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, the refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms race and to the increase of international tensions, and above all the duty to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all nuclear weapon States as well as non-nuclear weapon States participate, must continue and intensify the search for a common approach that will enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In particular, the Group of 21 expects that a growing awareness of the urgency of progress toward nuclear disarmament will facilitate the task of the Committee. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified, but multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

The Group of 21 believes, in accordance with its considered view already expressed in document CD/64, of 1980 that the immediate objective of the considerations of item 2 by the Committee, at the start of the second part of its 1981 session, should be the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116, as follows:

(i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;

(ii) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;

(iii) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;

(iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora.

I have the honour to request you kindly to arrange for the circulation of the enclosed text, entitled "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons", which is the result of the study carried out in October 1981 by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences at the request of His Holiness John Paul II, as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament under the item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Signed) Reinaldo Rodríguez Navarro
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.82-60199
STATEMENT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On 7-8 October 1961, under the Chairmanship of Professor Carlos Chagas,
President of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, at the headquarters of the Academy
(Casina Pius IV, Vatican City), a group of fourteen specialized scientists from
various parts of the world assembled to examine the problem of the consequences of
the use of nuclear weapons on the survival and health of humanity.

Although most of these consequences would appear obvious, it seems that they
are not adequately appreciated. The conditions of life following a nuclear attack
would be so severe that the only hope for humanity is prevention of any form of
nuclear war. Universal dissemination and acceptance of this knowledge would make
it apparent that nuclear weapons must not be used at all in warfare and that their
number should be progressively reduced in a balanced way.

The above-mentioned group discussed and unanimously approved a number of
fundamental points, which have been further developed in the following statement.

Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure
to appreciate a medical reality: any nuclear war would inevitably cause death,
disease and suffering of pandemic proportions and without the possibility of effective
medical intervention. That reality leads to the same conclusion physicians have
reached for life-threatening epidemics throughout history: prevention is essential
for control.

In contrast to widespread belief, much is known about the catastrophe that
would follow the use of nuclear weapons. Much is known too about the limitations
of medical assistance. If this knowledge is presented to people and their leaders
everywhere, it might help interrupt the nuclear arms race. This in turn would help
prevent what could be the last epidemic our civilization will know.

The devastation wrought by an atomic weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provides
direct evidence of the consequences of nuclear warfare, but there are many
theoretical appraisals on which we may also draw. Two years ago, an assessment
undertaken by a responsible official agency described the effect of nuclear attacks
on cities of about 2 million inhabitants. If a one-million-ton nuclear weapon (the
Hiroshima bomb approximated 15,000 tons of explosive power) exploded in the central
area of such cities, it would result, as calculated, in 180 km² of property
destruction, 250,000 fatalities and 500,000 severely injured. These would include
blast injuries, such as fractures and severe lacerations of soft tissues, thermal
injuries such as surface burns, retinal burns and respiratory tract damage and
radiation injuries, both acute radiation syndrome and delayed effects.

/ Carlos Chagas, Rio de Janeiro; E. Amaldi, Rome; N. Bochkov, Moscow;
L. Caldas, Rio de Janeiro; H. Hatt, Boston; R. Latarjet, Paris; A. Leaf, Boston;
J. Lejeune, Paris; L. Leprince-Ringuet, Paris; G.B. Marini-Bettolo, Rome; C. Pavan,
Even under optimal conditions, care of such casualties would present a medical
task of unimaginable magnitude. The study projected that if 10,000 hospital beds
were available in and around one of these cities, no more than 5,000 would remain
relatively undamaged. There would accommodate only 1 per cent of the human beings
injured, but it must be stressed that in any case no one could deliver the medical
service required by even a few of the severely burned, the crushed and the radiated
victims.

The hopelessness of the medical task is readily apparent if we consider what is
required for the care of the severely injured patients. We shall cite one case
history, that of a severely burned twenty-year-old man who was taken to the burn unit
of a Boston hospital after an automobile accident in which the gasoline tank had
exploded. During his hospitalization he received 140 litres of fresh-frozen plasma,
147 litres of fresh-frozen red blood cells, 100 millilitres of platelets and
100 millilitres of albumin. He underwent six operative procedures during which
wounds involving 35 per cent of his body surface were closed with various types of
grafts, including artificial skin. Throughout his hospitalization, he required
mechanical ventilation. Despite these and many other heroic measures, which stretched
the resources of one of the world's most comprehensive institutions, he died on his
thirty-third hospital day. His injuries were likened by the doctor who supervised
his care to those described for many of the victims of Hiroshima. Had twenty score
of such patients been presented at the same time to all of Boston's hospitals the
medical capabilities of the city would have been overwhelmed. Now, consider the
situation if, along with the injuries to many thousands of people, most of the medical
emergency facilities had been destroyed.

A Japanese physician, Professor H. Ichimaru, published an eyewitness account of
the effects of the Nagasaki bomb. He reported: "I tried to go to my medical school
in Urakami which was 500 metres from the hypocentre. I met many people coming back
from Urakami. Their clothes were in rags and shreds of skin hung from their bodies.
They looked like ghosts with vacant stares. The next day I was able to enter Urakami
on foot and all that I knew had disappeared. Only the concrete and iron skeletons of
the buildings remained. There were dead bodies everywhere. On each street corner,
we had tubs of water used for putting out fires after air raids. In one of these
small tubs, scarcely large enough for one person, was the body of a desperate man who
sought cool water. There was foam coming from his mouth, but he was not alive. I
cannot get rid of the sound of the crying women in the destroyed fields. As I got
nearer to the school there were black, charred bodies with the white edges of bones
showing in the arms and legs. When I arrived some were still alive. They were unable
to move their bodies. The strongest were so weak that they were slumped over on the
ground. I talked with them and they thought that they would be O.K. but all of them
would eventually die within two weeks. I cannot forget the way their eyes looked at
me and their voices spoke to me forever ...".

It should be noted that the bomb dropped on Nagasaki had a power of about
20,000 tons of TNT, not much larger than the so-called "tactical bombs" designed
for battlefield use.

But even these grim pictures are inadequate to describe the human disaster that
would result from an attack on a country by today's stockpiles of nuclear weapons,
which contain thousands of bombs with the force of one-million tons of TNT or greater.
The suffering of the surviving population would be without parallel. There would be complete interruption of communications, of food supplies, and of water. Help would be given only at the risk of mortal danger from radiation for those venturing outside of buildings in the first days. The social disruption following such an attack would be unimaginable.

The exposure to large doses of radiation would lower immunity to bacterial and viral infections, and could, therefore, open the way for widespread infection. Radiation would cause irreversible brain damage and mental deficiency in many of the exposed in utero. It would greatly increase the incidence of many forms of cancer in survivors. Genetic damage would be passed on to future generations, should there be any.

In addition, large areas of soil and forests as well as livestock would be contaminated, reducing food resources. Many other harmful biological and even geophysical effects would be likely, but we do not have enough knowledge to predict with confidence what they would be.

Even a nuclear attack directed only at military facilities would be devastating to the country as a whole. This is because military facilities are widespread rather than concentrated at only a few points. Thus, many nuclear weapons would be exploded. Furthermore, the spread of radiation due to the natural winds and atmospheric mixing would kill vast numbers of people and contaminate large areas. The medical facilities of any nation would be inadequate to care for the survivors. An objective examination of the medical situation that would follow a nuclear war leads to but one conclusion: prevention is our only recourse.

The consequences of nuclear war are not, of course, only medical in nature. But those that are compel us to pay heed to the inescapable lesson of contemporary medicine: where treatment of a given disease is ineffective or where costs are insupportable, attention must be turned to prevention. Both conditions apply to the effects of nuclear war. Treatment would be virtually impossible and the costs would be staggering. Can any stronger argument be marshaled for a preventive strategy?

Prevention of any disease requires an effective prescription. We recognize that such a prescription must both prevent nuclear war and safeguard security. Our knowledge and credentials as scientists and physicians do not, of course, permit us to discuss security issues with expertise. However, if political and military leaders have based their strategic planning on mistaken assumptions concerning the medical aspects of a nuclear war, we feel that we do have a responsibility. We must inform them and people everywhere of the full-blown clinical picture that would follow a nuclear attack and of the impotence of the medical community to offer a meaningful response. If we remain silent, we risk betraying ourselves and our civilization.

(Signed) Carlos Chagas
German Democratic Republic and Hungarian People's Republic

Working Paper

NON-STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF STATES WHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS AT PRESENT

1. The German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic, like many other States, give high priority to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Both countries regard the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present as a special element of the process of curbing the nuclear arms race, reducing and eventually completely destroying the nuclear-weapon stockpiles.

This is a timely and urgent task. Already now many States have clearly expressed their intention not to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. At the same time there are plans to build up nuclear weapon arsenals on the territories of other States. The implementation of such plans would not only escalate the nuclear arms race, but also increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war being launched from the territory of countries where nuclear weapons are deployed. In general, the stationing of nuclear weapons on additional territories would have a negative impact on the international situation and further complicate disarmament negotiations. The dangerous implications provoked by such deployment plans are more and more recognized by the peoples of many non-nuclear weapon States demanding to cancel such plans.

It is the considered opinion of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary that the prevention of the further deployment of nuclear weapons would constitute a step to the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other countries. It would contribute to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons thus strengthening the non-proliferation regime, to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to an agreement of effective international assurances for non-nuclear weapon States. It could contribute to the prevention of the destabilization of the existing approximate strategic
balance of power in the nuclear field. International efforts to stop and reverse the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon States would reduce the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Thus, a corresponding agreement would not only increase confidence among States but also serve the main goal of the United Nations Charter — the strengthening of international peace and security.

2. Guided by these considerations the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic were among the co-sponsors of corresponding United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

Resolution 33/91 F appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and all non-nuclear weapon States which do not have such weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories. Resolution 34/87 C called upon all States to examine the possibilities of concluding an international agreement on this question and requested the United Nations Secretary-General to ascertain the views and proposals of States and to transmit them to the General Assembly. The opinions and suggestions of a significant number of States on the subject in the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/35/45) clearly demonstrated the necessity and possibility of such an agreement and the wish to take practical steps to prevent the further stationing of nuclear weapons. In resolutions 35/96 C and 36/97 E the United Nations General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons. Furthermore resolution 36/97 E called upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States.

Despite of the consecutive resolutions of the General Assembly and despite of the efforts made by several delegations the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented so far from dealing with the question of non-stationing in an appropriate manner, not to mention the elaboration of a corresponding international agreement.
3. Under the present circumstances the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary consider it even more urgent and important than before that the Committee on Disarmament take appropriate action. The aim should be an international agreement that would place obligations, on the one hand, on nuclear-weapon States not to station nuclear weapons on territories of countries where there are currently no such weapons and, on the other hand, on non-nuclear weapon States to refrain from measures which might result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

Hereby the German Democratic Republic and Hungary delegations proceed from the fact that it is up to the national authorities of non-nuclear weapon States to take a sovereign decision on whether to accept nuclear weapons on their territories or not. Concrete procedures for verification of compliance with a corresponding non-stationing agreement should be elaborated in the context of the negotiations on such an agreement. There is no justification for the argument that a non-stationing agreement could not be verified. Such an approach would put into doubt all efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones since a basic element of such zones is the obligation not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the States concerned.

Concerning the elaboration of an appropriate draft agreement on non-stationing the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary consider that the establishment of an ad hoc working group or any other subsidiary body in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament could serve the best this goal. At the same time both delegations are ready to take into consideration any proposal which may be submitted by other delegations in this regard.

The delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary consider that such an action of the CD would be a valuable contribution to the implementanion of the relevant resolution of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly bearing in mind that the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly will put on its agenda the item entitled: "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament."
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Working Paper

Draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic supports the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. To promote an early establishment of those ad hoc working groups the delegation proposes the following draft mandates:

1. "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc Working Group of the Committee to negotiate on a Treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The ad hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of its first as well as second parts of its 1982 session".

2. "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session an ad hoc Working Group to elaborate on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First SSOD on the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing appropriate multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The ad hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of its first as well as second parts of its 1982 session".

GE.82-61211
INDIA

DRAFT MANDATE FOR AD-HOC WORKING GROUP ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, UNDER ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Under item 2 of its Agenda, the Committee on Disarmament decides to set up an Ad-Hoc Working Group to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The Ad-Hoc Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament before the end of its 1982 session.
LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT ENTITLED "THE DANGERS
OF NUCLEAR WAR" ISSUED AT THE 32nd PUGWASH CONFERENCE HELD IN
WARSAW, POLAND, FROM 26 TO 31 AUGUST 1982

I permit myself to enclose herewith the text of the Declaration of the
PUGWASH Movement and 97 Nobel Laureates on "The Dangers of Nuclear War" issued at
the 32nd PUGWASH Conference held in Warsaw, Poland, on 26-31 August, 1982, on the
occasion of the XXVth Anniversary of PUGWASH Movement.

May I ask you that this Declaration be circulated as an official document of
the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) Dr. Bogumil Suńka
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.02-66475
THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR: DECLARATION OF THE PUGWASH MOVEMENT

Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, together with nine other eminent scientists, issued in July 1955 a clarion call to the world scientific community. The devastating power of the hydrogen bomb and its evident ability to destroy civilization in the event of a nuclear war was the driving force behind their Manifesto which began: "In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction", and it continued: "We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt ..."

In response to this appeal, the first Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs was held two years later in July 1957, in the Canadian village of Pugwash, Nova Scotia. It heralded the start of a series of meetings of scientists, from all parts of the globe, that is now reaching its XXVth Anniversary.

In the years following the Manifesto, the "cold war" abated and an important start was made in the process of détente. Thus, the achievement of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, the Biological Weapons Ban of 1972, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), including the ban on anti-ballistic missiles (ABM), also in 1972, and its recently negotiated successor (SALT II) of 1978, all stand as milestones to past progress. In these achievements, Pugwash and other scientists played a significant role.

But these steps represent only a small beginning towards the vital goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament under effective international control.

In addition to this modest progress in the realm of nuclear arms control, some useful actions were undertaken by the relatively affluent nations towards narrowing the tragic and unacceptable economic gap between themselves and the less-developed nations, another major cause of the tensions and conflicts that could lead to the world holocaust we are so desperately trying to avert.

In spite of these advances, the dangers to human survival posed by the increased arms race and by the dangerous confrontation between the major antagonists have in recent years grown more ominous. Disarmament seems further away than ever. Indeed, weapons of mass destruction proliferate, and some national leaders seem to accept such dangerous and delusory concepts as "limited" or even "winnable" nuclear wars. The spill-over of the strategic confrontation between the major powers into the Third World, and the endless chain of wars that have taken place among small nations since World War II, add to these dangers. The world continues to head at an ever-accelerating pace towards the ultimate crisis from which there is no return.

* On the occasion of the XXVth Pugwash anniversary Conference in Warsaw, 26-31 August 1972
As long as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals, with the number of nations possessing them threatening to increase greatly in the absence of a more effective world-wide non-proliferation arrangement, we shall continue to live on the brink of global disaster. Pugwash has studied these problems for many years, and we remain convinced that disarmament is technically possible; all that is lacking is political will. Comprehensive nuclear disarmament — and, eventually, disarmament of chemical, "conventional", and other weapons as well — must remain our major goal. In the meantime, however, pending the achievement of this aim we must strive to build an effective barrier, universally accepted and adhered to, against any actual use of nuclear weapons. As our medical colleagues emphasize, casualties resulting from only one large nuclear bomb on one major city could not be effectively dealt with by the medical resources of an entire country. The nations of the world, and especially the so-called nuclear powers, must recognize and accept the fact that nuclear weapons simply cannot be used to resolve any possible issue between them, and that the use of a nuclear weapon in a conflict is suicidal folly that may well spell the extermination of the antagonists, as well as a large portion of the rest of the world.

The current monstrously high levels of deployed nuclear arms must be reduced as soon as possible. To reverse the present arms race we must first stop racing. This calls for a "stand-still freeze" on current nuclear arsenals as an effective way of initiating the essential process of nuclear disarmament. Such a freeze should also include the development of new weapon technologies, a major factor in fueling the runaway competition in modern weapons and systems of mass destruction.

In the circumstances in which mankind now finds itself, the warning sounded so eloquently 27 years ago in the Russell–Einstein Manifesto takes on a new urgency: "There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings to human beings; Remember your humanity and forget the rest."

There is still time to choose, but this time is fast running out.

WE NOW APPEAL:

TO OUR COLLEAGUES OF THE WORLD'S SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY: ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY AND BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ACTIONS TO AVERT NUCLEAR WAR.

TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD: SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AIMED AT ELIMINATING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION INVOLVED IN ANY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

TO ALL PEOPLES: SUPPORT MEASURES TO REMOVE THE NUCLEAR MENACE THAT THREATENS THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND.
LIST OF NOBEL LAUREATES WHO SIGNED THE PUGWASH DECLARATION ON ITS 25th ANNIVERSARY

Australia
Frank MacFarlane Burnet (Physiology or Medicine)

Canada
Gerhard Horr:berg (Chemistry)

France
Jean Dausset (Physiology or Medicine)
Francois Jacob (Physiology or Medicine)
Alfred Kastler (Physics)
André Lwoff (Physiology or Medicine)

Germany
Adolf Butenandt (Chemistry)
Manfred Eigen (Chemistry)
Ernest O. Fischer (Chemistry)
Karl von Frisch (Physiology or Medicine)
Rudolf L. Hössbauer (Physics)

Ireland
Ernest T.S. Walton (Physics)

Netherlands
Nikolaas Tinbergen (Physiology or Medicine)

Pakistan
Abdus Salam (Physics)

Soviet Union
Nikolai Basov (Physics)
Pavel Cherenkov (Physics)
Ilya Frank (Physics)
Peter Kapitza (Physics)
Aleksander Prokhorov (Physics)
Nikolai Semenov (Chemistry)
Sweden
Ulf S. von Euler (Physiology or Medicine)
Ragnar Granit (Physiology or Medicine)
Kai Siegbahn (Physics)
Hugo Theorell (Physiology or Medicine)

Switzerland
Werner Arber (Physiology or Medicine)
Vladimir Prelog (Chemistry)

United Kingdom
Derek Barton (Chemistry)
John Cornforth (Chemistry)
Antony Hewish (Physics)
Alan Hodgkin (Physiology or Medicine)
Dorothy Hodgkin (Chemistry)
Godfrey Hounsfield (Physiology or Medicine)
Brian D. Josephson (Physics)
John Kendrew (Chemistry)
Archer J.P. Martin (Chemistry)
Peter Medawar (Physiology or Medicine)
Peter Mitchell (Chemistry)
Nevill Mott (Physics)
Max Perutz (Chemistry)
George Porter (Chemistry)
Rodney R. Porter (Physiology or Medicine)
Martin Ryle (Physics)
Frederick Sanger (Chemistry)
Richard L.M. Synge (Chemistry)
Alexander Todd (Chemistry)
Maurice Wilkins (Physiology or Medicine)

United States
Philip Anderson (Physics)
Christian B. Anfinsen (Chemistry)
Julius Axelrod (Physiology or Medicine)
David Baltimore (Physiology or Medicine)
Baruj Benacerraf (Physiology or Medicine)
Paul Berg (Chemistry)
Hans A. Bethe (Physics)
Konrad Bloch (Physiology or Medicine)
Nicolaas Bloembergen (Physics)
Baruch Blumberg (Physiology or Medicine)
Harold C. Brown (Chemistry)
Carl F. Cori (Physiology or Medicine)
Allan M. Cormack (Physiology or Medicine)
Andre Courand (Physiology or Medicine)
James W. Cronin (Physics)
Renato Dulbecco (Physiology or Medicine)
John F. Enders (Physiology or Medicine)
Richard P. Feynmann (Physics)
Val L. Fitch (Physics)
Paul J. Flory (Chemistry)
Ivar Giaever (Physics)
Donald A. Glaser (Physics)
Sheldon L. Glashow (Physics)
Roger Guillemin (Physiology or Medicine)
Haldan K. Hartline (Physiology or Medicine)
Alfred D. Hershey (Physiology or Medicine)
Roald Hoffmann (Chemistry)
Robert Hofstadter (Physics)
Robert W. Holley (Physiology or Medicine)
David H. Hubel (Physiology or Medicine)
Har G. Khorana (Physiology or Medicine)
Arthur Kornberg (Physiology or Medicine)
Polykarp Kusch (Physics)
Fritz Lipmann (Physiology or Medicine)
William M. Lipscomb (Chemistry)
Salvador E. Luria (Physiology or Medicine)
Edwin M. McMillan (Chemistry)
Robert S. Mulliken (Chemistry)
Daniel Nathans (Physiology or Medicine)
Severo Ochoa (Physiology or Medicine)
Linus Pauling (Chemistry)
Edward M. Purcell (Physics)
James Rainwater (Physics)
Burton Richter (Physics)
Emilio Segre (Physics)
George D. Snell (Physiology or Medicine)
Roger W. Sperry (Physiology or Medicine)
George Wald (Physiology or Medicine)
Steven Weinberg (Physics)
Thomas H. Weller (Physiology or Medicine)
Torsten N. Wiesel (Physiology or Medicine)
WORKING PAPER OF THE GROUP OF 21
ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

1. The greatest peril facing the world today is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, a war which would have devastating results on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The actions of the nuclear weapon States which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of nuclear arms race and attempts by some nuclear weapon States to promote the highly dangerous concept of a limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, have greatly increased the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines which are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. Concern for common security and global survival should be the basis of international peace rather than the concept of deterrence. International peace must be based on a commitment by all States to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual annihilation.

2. The Group of 21 believes that international relations must be based on strict adherence to and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States. The Group asserts that it is the shared responsibility of all States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war — a nuclear war. The Group of 21 cannot, therefore, accept that the security of their countries and the survival of mankind should be in continual and increasing jeopardy as a result of the actions of a handful of nuclear weapon States. Since a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind, all nations have a vital interest in the urgent negotiations of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is for this reason that the Group of 21 calls for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this subject just as it continues to emphasize the need for multilateral negotiations on item 2 of the Committee's agenda, entitled the "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament".

3. During the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament which was held in June-July 1982, not a single concrete measure for the prevention of nuclear war was adopted despite the growing popular expression of profound disquiet and anxiety all over the world concerning the dangers of nuclear war. This was mainly due to the attitudes of nuclear weapon States which failed to acknowledge that the question of the prevention of nuclear war was not a matter only of their own security concerns but of the survival of mankind as a whole. While the Group of 21 welcomes the adoption of any measures for the reduction of the risks of nuclear war which may be agreed upon by the nuclear weapon States themselves, it asserts that all nations have both the right as well as the obligation to work collectively to dispel the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

GE.83-60243
4. The Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, has and should play its indispensable and unambiguous role in this regard.

5. In draft resolution 37/78-I entitled the "Prevention of Nuclear War", adopted at the recently concluded thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has been requested "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war". In undertaking such negotiations the Committee on Disarmament is requested to take into account the views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war which were submitted to the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament both by nuclear weapon States as well as other States, in response to resolution 36/81B of 19 December 1981, including deliberations on this item during the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament as well as proposals put forward during the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Committee would also take into account other existing proposals and future initiatives.

6. The Group of 21 is of the view that the best means by which the Committee on Disarmament can fulfill its mandate with respect to this acute and urgent task facing mankind today, would be to introduce a new item on its agenda for the 1983 session entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War". In order to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the Group would recommend the setting up of an Ad hoc Working Group on this item at the very beginning of the 1983 session. The draft mandate for the proposed Group as recommended in CD/309 of 11 August 1982, could be the basis for further consultations in this regard.
BELGIUM

THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Confidence-building measures

Many practical measures are conceivable within the framework of the prevention of nuclear war, with a view to increasing confidence between the States participating in them, improving the climate of their relations and thereby reducing the risks of the use of nuclear weapons. Such measures can therefore play a not inconsiderable part in the reduction of international tensions.

They would be based on reciprocity and would in no way affect the security of the States concerned. They thus have the merit of being easily negotiable.

All nuclear-weapon States should take part in the talks leading to such measures, regardless of the views of each on the process of nuclear disarmament.

The measures contemplated also offer great flexibility in the matter of negotiation since they can form the subject of either bilateral or multilateral agreements or of a regional approach. They can also be envisaged both for peaceful situations and for periods of tension or crisis.

The elaboration of such measures should, furthermore, facilitate the process of the negotiation of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. It would, in fact, provide the possibility of contacts during the negotiations and would permit the maintenance of those contacts during the implementation of the measures agreed on.

Lastly, such measures, without taking the place of verification measures, could help to facilitate the supervision of the application of subsequent nuclear disarmament agreements.

A clearer perception of the nuclear arsenals, possibilities and practices of other States could, through eliminating factors of fear and mistrust, help to ensure greater international stability and perhaps thereby put a brake on the nuclear arms race, pending the achievement of genuine nuclear disarmament.

The following is a list — purely illustrative, and not exhaustive — of measures which could form the subject of negotiations in this connection.

1. Measures concerning information on nuclear matters

(a) Exchanges of specific information could be prescribed as an accompaniment to disarmament agreements.

The following may serve as examples:

Likewise, the "memorandum of understanding" attached to the SALT II Treaty containing particulars concerning strategic offensive arms.

The purpose of these exchanges is thus to make it easier for the parties to an agreement to verify compliance with its prohibitions.

(b) However, exchanges of information could be agreed on, quickly, without reference to any nuclear disarmament agreement.

Such exchanges of information between nuclear-weapon States could deal with many subjects, such as budgetary policies in nuclear matters, programmes for exercises involving nuclear weapons; measures for verifying the security of nuclear military sites and data relating to nuclear forces.

A constant exchange of official information would undoubtedly help give a better idea of the defense effort being made by each of the nuclear-weapon States in nuclear matters. Such an exchange could help to moderate the nuclear arms race, again pending real measures of disarmament.

2. Notification measures

Certain activities could form the subject of specific notifications on the part of the nuclear-weapon powers.

This could apply to:

- Manoeuvres involving sizeable nuclear forces;
- Tests of intercontinental missiles.

The agreement concluded between the United States and the USSR on 30 September 1971 in fact provides, in its article 4, for such notification in the event of missile launches extending beyond the national territory of one party in the direction of the other party.

3. Measures to prevent a nuclear accident

A series of precautionary measures and notifications on the part of the nuclear-weapon States could be devised so as to avoid risks of accidents, incidents or misunderstandings. The 1971 Agreement between the United States and the USSR already referred to constituted a first attempt at legislation in this matter.

Another agreement was concluded between the same two States on 25 May 1972 on the prevention of incidents on the high seas.

In addition, France and the USSR (16 July 1976) and the United Kingdom and the USSR (10 October 1976) concluded "nuclear accident agreements".

Notification procedures could also be provided for in the event of a nuclear incident or accident or the detection of an unidentified object.

Undertakings could also be contemplated concerning national measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
4. Measures relating to actions by nuclear-weapon States

Aware of the terrible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States could undertake to avoid actions that might risk unleashing a nuclear conflict. They could also undertake to make the prevention of nuclear war a basic objective of their policies.

That was in fact the purpose of the bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war, concluded on 22 June 1973.

5. Measures providing for consultations in the event of a crisis

Undertakings to consult have already been assumed on a bilateral basis by the United States and the USSR.

This is in particular the spirit of the agreement of 1971 on measures to reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. It is also the precise purpose of article IV of the United States-USSR Agreement of 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war. Article V of the same Agreement provides for certain international authorities to be informed of the outcome of the consultations conducted.

A multilateralization of these consultation procedures could be arranged among all the nuclear-weapon powers (with a system for the information of others of the results of such consultations).

6. Measures relating to communications

In order to make these consultations possible in an atmosphere of nuclear risk, exceptional means for rapid communication are essential.

That was, in fact, the purpose of the United States-USSR "hot-line" agreements of 1963, 1971 and 1975. Special agreements also exist between France and the USSR (9 November 1966) and between the United Kingdom and the USSR (27 October 1967).

Here again, a broadening of the system to include all the nuclear-weapon powers would be a step forward in the effort to prevent nuclear war.

CONCLUSIONS

While it is true that a number of bilateral agreements already exist with respect to these various matters, it would seem to us essential that all the nuclear-weapon States should take part in the elaboration of broader, more precise and more detailed agreements of a multilateral character.

The participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in the elaboration of such agreements -- without prejudice to the positions of each on nuclear disarmament or the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests -- would constitute an important contribution to the prevention of nuclear war and, beyond that, to the effort to halt the nuclear arms race.

The Committee on Disarmament should be made responsible for carrying out, within a framework to be determined by it, the necessary work leading to the elaboration of an international agreement or several international agreements on these matters.
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, INCLUDING ALL RELATED MATTERS.

(Compilation of existing agreements, resolutions of the General Assembly transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament and proposals submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament and to the Committee on Disarmament, prepared by the Secretariat.)

Reissued for technical reasons.
Introduction

1. At its 226th plenary meeting on 19 July 1983, the Committee on Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a compilation listing agreements, resolutions of the General Assembly and other documents relevant to the second part of item 2, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

2. In accordance with that request, the Secretariat has prepared the present compilation. It includes a list of existing agreements, resolutions of the General Assembly transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament and proposals submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the Committee on Disarmament. It may be noted that other documentation relevant to the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, may also be found in the tabulations of proposals on nuclear disarmament prepared by the Secretariat in 1981 and 1982 (CD/171 and CD/293, respectively). In addition, it may be noted that pursuant to resolution 33/91D of 16 December 1978, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" (A/35/390).
I. Existing agreements:

1. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link and Annex 1/

2. Franco-Soviet Communiqué Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link 2/

3. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link Between the Residence of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in London and the Kremlin 3/

4. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the US-Soviet Direct Communications Link and Annex 4/

5. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 5/

6. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War 6/

7. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Amending the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Improve US-Soviet Direct Communications Link 7/

8. Letters Exchanged on 16 July 1976 by Mr. Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, and Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Constituting an Agreement Between France and the Soviet Union on the Prevention of the Accidental or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons 8/


2/ Signed at Paris on 9 November 1966.


7/ Effected by exchange of notes dated at Moscow on 20 March and 29 April 1975.


9/ Signed at Moscow on 10 October 1977. Entered into force on 10 October 1977
II. General Assembly resolutions transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament:

1. Resolution 33/71B, adopted on 14 December 1978
2. Resolution 34/83O, adopted on 11 December 1979
5. Resolution 36/92I, adopted on 9 December 1981
6. Resolution 36/100, adopted on 9 December 1981
7. Resolution 37/78I, adopted on 9 December 1982

III. Proposals submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

1. Views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war, submitted by the following Member States pursuant to General Assembly resolution 36/81B: Argentina, Belgium, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Senegal, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. (A/S-12/11, Add.1 and Corr.1 and Add.2-5)

2. Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General transmitting the text of a message from L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (A/S-12/AC.1/10)

3. Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General submitting the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. (A/S-12/AC.1/13)


7. Draft resolution entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War", submitted by India and Mexico. (A/S-12/AC.1/L.2)


IV. Proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament

1. Letter dated 3 February 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Representative of Venezuela, transmitting the result of the study carried out in October 1981 by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, at the request of His Holiness John Paul II, entitled "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons". (CD/238)

2. Working Paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81B of 9 December 1981. (CD/282)

3. Letter dated 22 July 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva, transmitting the draft of a convention submitted by India at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/295)

4. Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Prevention of Nuclear War, under item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted by India. (CD/309)

5. Letter dated 8 September 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the text entitled "The Dangers of Nuclear War" issued at the 32nd Pugwash Conference held in Warsaw, Poland, from 26-31 August 1982. (CD/327)


*/ Adopted at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly as resolution 37/100C.
7. Proposal entitled "Ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy", submitted by the group of socialist countries. (CD/345)


FRANCE

Freeze on nuclear weapons

Comment published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the proposal made by the USSR on 21 June for a "freeze" on nuclear weapons.

In response to the proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons made by the USSR on 21 June, France reminded Moscow that it had already reacted negatively to a similar proposal discussed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The note transmitted to the Soviet authorities in particular stressed the reasons why such a freeze would not constitute an effective contribution to the effort to secure a reduction in nuclear arsenals, beginning with those of the USSR and the United States.

First, such a freeze would have the effect of maintaining, for a period not necessarily determined in advance, the present imbalances.

This would mean conferring upon any State which had carried out a large-scale arms build-up a lasting advantage at the expense of States which had shown moderati

The States whose security was thereby affected would find themselves prevented from proceeding to the necessary restoration of a balance.

The resulting situation could hardly be considered an encouragement to negotiations towards verifiable and substantial arms reductions between the two most heavily armed nuclear-weapon powers.

Secondly, an undifferentiated and global freeze, as proposed in the above-mentioned memorandum, would be largely unverifiable.

In the view of France, many aspects of such a freeze would not be susceptible of verification by national technical means alone, while others would require very complicated and therefore necessarily lengthy preliminary negotiations with a view to determining what methods, including on-site inspection and international observation, would be the most appropriate. One important aspect of the problem would be that of equality of access to the means of verification.

These necessary discussions on verification would be no less lengthy and complicated than the negotiations concerning the same aspect within the framework of efforts to secure an arms reduction.

Thirdly, in making the participation of the other nuclear-weapon powers the condition for the observance by itself of the freeze it proposes, the USSR appears to be trying to exonerate itself from the special responsibilities which, for it as for the United States, arise from the fact of the present level of its nuclear weapons.

GE.83-62746
France, which hopes that the negotiations now under way will reach a successful conclusion, does not see how the freeze proposed to the other nuclear-weapon powers, the size of whose forces bears no relation to the size of the forces of the two powers at present engaged in the START negotiations, could contribute to the progress of those negotiations.

Furthermore, the various moratoria which have been proposed in the past have never resulted in significant and verifiable arms reductions (in one specific case, it was the USSR itself which took the initiative of ending the moratorium in question).

France is sincerely anxious for dialogue and peace.

It believes that the latter, as history has amply demonstrated, necessitates a balance of forces in Europe as in the rest of the world, and that that balance should be ensured at the lowest possible level.

It is for this reason that the French Government supports the efforts undertaken, beginning with those of the two most heavily armed States, towards the attainment, through negotiations, of such a balance both in conventional weapons and in nuclear weapons. It earnestly hopes that they will succeed.
Committee on Disarmament

Australia, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands

Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters

This paper intends to outline a possible structure for a comprehensive analytical exploration of the subject "Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters" in the course of a clustered series of informal plenary meetings.

In order to identify possible practical and appropriate, negotiable measures for the prevention of nuclear war and armed conflict in general, the Committee should, in the first instance, develop a view of the full scope of the subject matter by considering the following indicative list of subitems:

I. Assessment of the risk of an outbreak of armed conflict in general and Nuclear War in particular.

II. The United Nations Charter and its prohibition of the threat or use of force, nuclear or other; commitments by States to renounce the use or threat of force.

III. Obligation for all States to maintain a policy of restraint.

IV. Military doctrines.

V. Domestic measures of a legal and political nature susceptible of contributing to the preservation of peace and the avoidance of nuclear war.

VI. Security guarantees.

VII. Regional security arrangements.

VIII. Effectiveness of existing commitments to renounce the use or first use of specific types of weapons.

IX. Effectiveness of measures to stop the further development, testing, and deployment of certain weapon categories.

X. Confidence-building measures, in particular those aiming at the prevention of the outbreak of war, including nuclear war, by surprise, accident or miscalculation.

XI. Significance of military balance, stability and undiminished security of all States.

XII. Significance of effective, negotiated, and verifiable reductions of nuclear armament.

XIII. Other appropriate measures.

GE.83-63669
STATEMENT BY THE GROUP OF 21 ON ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ENTITLED "CESSATION" OF THE
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

1. The Group of 21 is convinced of the paramount need for urgent multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through the adoption of concrete measures. The Group of 21 reiterates the views contained in documents CD/116 and CD/180 of 9 July 1980 and 6 August 1980 respectively. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and in any event bilateral negotiations, because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, can never replace or nullify the genuinely multilateral search for concrete disarmament measures. The Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament should play its role in regard to the urgent question of nuclear disarmament.

2. The Group of 21 fully shares the view stated in the Final Document of the SSOD I that the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. In addition, the nuclear arms race thwarts efforts towards a greater relaxation of international tensions. On the other hand progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament would help ensure international peace and security and improve the international climate, which would in turn facilitate further progress. All nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States and the quantitative and qualitative development of such weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike.

3. The Group of 21 is further convinced that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear weapon States.

4. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war. It reiterates the message issued by the VIIth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries held in New Delhi in March 1983 which, inter alia, expressed "the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in
its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Governments therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear weapon States. Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike and ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. They rejected all theories and concepts pertaining to the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any circumstances."

5. The Group of 21 is convinced of the need to take constructive action towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and in this context it recalls once again paragraph 50 of the Final Document which sets out the stages of nuclear disarmament. To this end, as a first step, the Group considers it necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces. In this regard the Group of 21 welcomes the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May 1984 by the Heads of States or Governments of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania as in document CD/502.

6. The Group of 21 believes, in accordance with its considered view already expressed in documents CD/64, CD/116 and CD/180, that the immediate objective of the consideration of item 2 by the Conference, should be the establishment of an ad hoc Committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116 and CD/180.

7. In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21 submits the following mandate: "In the discharge of its responsibility as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD I, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc Committee under agenda item 2.

The Conference requests the ad hoc Committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD I and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate, at the beginning of its 1985 session, multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) Substantial reduction in the existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.

The ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1984 session."
LETTER DATED 14 AUGUST ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA AND THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NEW ZEALAND TRANSMITTING THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

On 7 August the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament was informed of the decision taken on 6 August by Heads of Government of the countries of the South Pacific Forum, at its meeting in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands, to endorse the draft South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

It was indicated at that time that the text would be made available to the Conference.

We now have the honour, on behalf of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, to transmit a copy of the Treaty and associated map. We would be grateful if you would arrange to have these circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed)
Richard Butler
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations for Disarmament Matters
Head of the Australian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed)
B.T. Lineham
Charge d'affaires, a.i., Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty,

United in their commitment to a world at peace;

Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

Believing that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

Determined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security;

Noting, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Noting that the prohibitions of emplacement and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific;

Noting also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific;

Determined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

Guided by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communiqué of that meeting;

Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1

USAGE OF TERMS

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:

(a) "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means the areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex;

(b) "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them;

(c) "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;

(d) "stationing" means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

ARTICLE 2

APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

ARTICLE 3

RENUCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.
ARTICLE 4
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:

(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or

(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;

(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and IAEA safeguards system.

ARTICLE 5
PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

1. Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

2. Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

ARTICLE 6
PREVENTION OF TESTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 7
PREVENTION OF DUMPING

1. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
(b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea;

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(d) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.

2. Paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force.

ARTICLE 8

CONTROL SYSTEM

1. The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

2. The control system shall comprise:

(a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;

(b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);

(c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2;

(d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

ARTICLE 9

REPORTS AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION

1. Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.

2. The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.
3. The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Article 8(2)(d) and 10 and Annex 2(4).

ARTICLE 10

CONSULTATIONS AND REVIEW

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

ARTICLE 11

AMENDMENT

The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptance from all Parties.

ARTICLE 12

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.

3. If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as is required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.
ARTICLE 13

WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

2. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

ARTICLE 14

RESERVATIONS

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 15

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.

2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 16

DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS

The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at , this day of , One thousand nine hundred and eighty five, in a single original in the English language.
ANNEX I

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

A. The area bounded by a line:

(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;

(2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea;

(3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator;

(4) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East;

(5) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North;

(6) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degrees East;

(7) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North;

(8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East;

(9) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West;

(11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North;

(12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West;

(13) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(14) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees West;

(15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 60 degrees South;

(16) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees East;
(17) thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;

(18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;

(19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East;

(20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries;

(21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and

(22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

B. The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 00 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.
ANNEX 2

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for it not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices.

4. Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties.
ANNEX 3

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

1. There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2). The Consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties, Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. The Consultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit.

2. The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required.
ANNEX 4

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.

2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.

3. The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team.

5. In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2 (1). The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of.

6. Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant to enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the Consultative Committee.

7. The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and
immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.

8. The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

9. If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.
PROTOCOL 1

The Parties to this Protocol,

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 3, 5 and 6, in so far as they relate to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8 (2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.
PROTOCOL 2

The Parties to this Protocol

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocols by Parties to them.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party further undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against:

(a) Parties to the Treaty; or

(b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

ARTICLE 3

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five , in a single original in the English language.
PROTOCOL 3

The Parties to this Protocol

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.

I enclose herewith a statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, dated 15 January 1986. I should be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements to have the statement circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan
Member of the Collegium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Representative of the USSR to the Conference on Disarmament
STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

The new year 1986 has started: It will be an important year, one may say
a turning point, in the history of the Soviet State, the year of the
27th Congress of the CPSU. The Congress will chart the guidelines for the
political, social, economic and spiritual development of Soviet society in the
period up to the next millennium. It will adopt a programme for accelerating
our peaceful construction.

All efforts of the CPSU are directed towards ensuring a further improvement
in the life of the Soviet people.

A turn for the better is also needed in the international arena. This is
what the peoples of the Soviet Union, and of the peoples throughout the world,
expect and demand.

Being aware of this, at the start of the new year the Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have decided on a number of
major foreign policy initiatives of a fundamental nature. They are designed to
promote an improvement in the international situation to the greatest possible
extent. They are prompted by the need to overcome the negative, confrontationist
trends that have been growing in recent years and to clear the way for curbing
the nuclear arms race on Earth and preventing it in outer space, generally
reducing the risk of war, and building confidence as an integral part of
relations among States.

I.

The most important of these initiatives is a concrete programme aimed at
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world within a
precisely defined period of time.

The Soviet Union is proposing a step-by-step, coherent process for ridding
the Earth of nuclear weapons, to be implemented and completed within the next
15 years, by the end of this century.

The twentieth century brought mankind the gift of atomic energy. However,
this great achievement of human intelligence may turn into an instrument of
man's self-annihilation.

Is it possible to resolve this contradiction? We are convinced that it is.
Finding effective ways of eliminating nuclear weapons is a feasible task,
provided it is tackled without delay.

The Soviet Union proposes that a programme for ridding mankind of the fear
of a nuclear catastrophe should be launched in 1986. The fact that this year has
been proclaimed the International Year of Peace by the United Nations provides
an additional political and moral incentive for doing so. To this end it is
necessary to rise above national selfishness, tactical calculations, differences
and disputes, whose significance is nothing compared to the preservation of what
is most valuable -- peace and a safe future. The energy of the atom should be placed exclusively at the service of peace, a goal that our socialist State has invariably advocated and continues to pursue.

It was our country that as early as 1946 was the first to raise the question of prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons and devoting atomic energy to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

How does the Soviet Union envisage today, in practical terms, the process of making reductions in nuclear weapons, both delivery vehicles and warheads, leading ultimately to their complete elimination? Our proposals can be summarized as follows.

Stage one: within the next 5-8 years the USSR and the United States will each reduce by one half the nuclear arms that can reach the other's territory. For the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind each side will retain no more than 6,000 warheads.

It stands to reason that such a reduction is possible only if the USSR and the United States mutually renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons. As the Soviet Union has repeatedly warned, the development of space strike weapons will dash the hopes for a reduction of nuclear weapons on Earth.

This first stage will include the adoption and implementation of the decision for the complete elimination of the intermediate-range missiles, both ballistic and cruise missiles, of the USSR and the United States in the European zone, as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the United States should undertake not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear armaments.

The USSR and the United States should agree from the outset to halt all nuclear explosions and call upon other States to join in such a moratorium as soon as possible.

We propose that the first stage of nuclear disarmament should concern the Soviet Union and the United States because it is up to them to set an example for the other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow. We said this very frankly to President Reagan of the United States during our meeting in Geneva.

Stage two: during this stage, which should start no later than 1990 and last for 5-7 years, the other nuclear-weapon Powers will begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin with, they would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to station them in the territories of other countries.

During this period the USSR and the United States will go on with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems.
Following the completion by the USSR and the United States of America of the 50 per cent reduction in the arms concerned in the second stage, another radical step will then be taken: all nuclear-weapon Powers will eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, i.e. weapons having a range (or radius of action) of up to 1,000 km.

During this stage the Soviet-American accord on the prohibition of space strike weapons would have to become multilateral, with the mandatory participation of major industrial Powers.

All nuclear-weapon Powers would cease nuclear-weapon tests.

There would be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction.

Stage three will begin no later than 1995. During this stage the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed. By the end of 1999 there will be no more nuclear weapons on Earth. A universal accord will be drawn up to ensure that such weapons will never again come into being.

We have in mind that special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as the dismantling, re-equipment or destruction of delivery vehicles. In this connection, agreement will be reached on the numbers of weapons to be destroyed at each stage, destruction sites and so on.

Verification of the destruction or limitation of arms would be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.

The adoption of the nuclear disarmament programme that we propose would undoubtedly have a favourable impact on the negotiations conducted in bilateral and multilateral forums. The programme would establish clear schedules and reference points, with a specific time-frame for achieving agreements and implementing them, and would make the negotiations purposeful and goal-oriented. This would break the dangerous trend whereby the momentum of the arms race is greater than the outcome of negotiations.

In short, we propose that we should enter the third millennium without nuclear weapons, on the basis of mutually acceptable and strictly verifiable agreements. If the United States Administration is indeed committed to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere, as it has repeatedly stated, it is being offered a practical opportunity to set about achieving it. Instead of wasting the next 10-15 years by developing new, extremely dangerous weapons in space, allegedly designed to make nuclear arms useless, would it not be more sensible to start eliminating those arms and finally bring them down to zero point? The Soviet Union, I repeat, proposes precisely that.
The Soviet Union calls upon all peoples and States and, naturally, above all nuclear-weapon States, to support the programme of eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It is absolutely clear to any unbiased person that if such a programme is implemented, nobody would lose and everybody stands to gain. This is a problem common to all mankind and it can and must be solved only through common efforts. The sooner this programme is translated into practical deeds, the safer life on our planet will be.

II.

Guided by the same approach, and by the desire to make another practical step within the context of the programme of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union has taken an important decision.

We are extending by three months our unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which expired on 31 December 1985. Such a moratorium will remain in effect even beyond that date if the United States for its part also stops nuclear tests. We propose once again to the United States to join in this initiative whose significance is evident to practically everyone in the world.

Obviously, it was by no means simple for us to adopt such a decision. The Soviet Union cannot indefinitely display unilateral restraint in nuclear testing. But the stakes are too high and the responsibility too great for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of others through the force of example.

All experts, scientists, politicians and military men agree that the cessation of tests would effectively block off the channels for upgrading nuclear weapons. And this is a matter of the utmost priority. A reduction in nuclear arsenals alone, without a prohibition on nuclear-weapons tests, does not offer a way out of the dilemma of the nuclear threat, since the remaining weapons would be modernized and there would still remain the possibility of developing increasingly sophisticated and lethal nuclear weapons and evaluating such new types of weapons at test sites.

The cessation of tests is therefore a practical step towards eliminating nuclear weapons.

I wish at once to say the following. Any reference to verification as an obstacle to the establishment of a moratorium on nuclear explosions is totally groundless. We declare unequivocally that verification is no problem so far as we are concerned. Should the United States agree to stop all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis, appropriate verification of compliance with the moratorium would be fully ensured by national technical means as well as through international procedures - including on-site inspections whenever necessary. We invite the United States to reach agreement to this effect.

The USSR is firmly in favour of the moratorium being first a bilateral and later a multilateral action. We are also in favour of resuming the trilateral negotiations involving the USSR, the United States and Great Britain on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. This could be done immediately, even this month. We are also prepared to begin without delay multilateral test-ban negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, with all nuclear-weapon Powers taking part. The non-aligned countries are proposing consultations with a view to making the 1965 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water apply also to underground tests, which, are not covered by the Treaty. The Soviet Union is agreeable to this measure too.

Since last summer we have been calling upon the United States to follow our example and stop nuclear explosions. Washington has as yet not done so, despite the protests and demands of public opinion, and contrary to the will of most States in the world. By continuing to set off nuclear explosions the United States side continues to pursue its elusive dream of military superiority. This policy is futile and dangerous, and unworthy of the level of civilization that modern society has reached.

In the absence of a positive response from the United States, the Soviet side had every right to resume nuclear tests already on 1 January 1986. If one were to follow the usual "logic" of the arms race, that, presumably, would have been the thing to do.

But the whole point is that it is precisely that logic, if one may call it that, which has to be resolutely repudiated. We are making yet another attempt in this direction. Otherwise the process of military rivalry will become an avalanche and any control over the course of events will be impossible. To submit to the force of the nuclear-arms race is inadmissible. It would mean acting against the voice of reason and the human instinct for self-preservation. What is required are new and bold approaches, new political thinking and a heightened sense of responsibility for the destinies of the people.

The United States Administration once again has more time to weigh our proposals on stopping nuclear explosions and to give a positive answer to them. For that is the response people everywhere in the world will expect from Washington.

The Soviet Union is addressing an appeal to the United States President and Congress, to the American people. There is an opportunity of halting the process of upgrading nuclear arms and developing new nuclear weapons. It must not be missed. The Soviet proposals place the USSR and the United States in an equal position. These proposals do not attempt to outwit or outsmart the other side. We are proposing to follow the road of sensible and responsible decisions.

III.

In order to implement the programme for reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals, the entire existing system of negotiations has to be set in motion and the highest possible efficiency of disarmament machinery ensured.
In a few days the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms will resume in Geneva. When we met with President Reagan last November in Geneva, we had a frank discussion on the whole range of problems that constitute the subject of those negotiations, namely on space, strategic offensive and intermediate-range nuclear systems. It was agreed that the negotiations should be accelerated: that agreement must not remain a mere declaration.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva will be instructed to act in strict compliance with that agreement. We expect the same constructive approach from the United States side, above all on the question of space. Space must remain peaceful, strike weapons should not be deployed there. Neither should they be developed. And there should also be the most rigorous control, including opening up the relevant laboratories for inspection.

Mankind is at a crucial stage of the new space age. And it is time to abandon the thinking of the stone age, when the chief concern was to have a bigger stick or a heavier stone. We are against weapons in space. Our material and intellectual capabilities make it possible for the Soviet Union to develop any weapon if we are compelled to do so. But we are fully aware of our responsibility to the present and future generations. It is our profound conviction that we should enter the third millennium not with the "star wars" programme but with large-scale projects for the peaceful exploration of space by all mankind. We propose starting practical work on such projects and their implementation. This is one of the major ways of ensuring progress throughout our planet and establishing a reliable system of security for all.

To prevent the arms race from extending into space is to remove the obstacle to deep cuts in nuclear weapons. There is on the negotiating table in Geneva a Soviet proposal for halving the relevant nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States, which would be an important step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To reject the possibility of resolving the problem of space means that one does not wish to stop the arms race on Earth. This should be stated in clear and straightforward terms. It is not by chance that the proponents of the nuclear-arms race are also ardent supporters of the "star wars" programme. These are two sides of the same policy, which is hostile to the interests of people.

Let me turn to the European aspect of the nuclear problem. It is a matter of extreme concern that in defiance of reason and contrary to the national interests of the European peoples, United States first-strike missiles continue to be deployed in certain West European countries. This problem has been under discussion for many years now. Meanwhile the security situation in Europe continues steadily to deteriorate.

It is time to put an end to this course of events and cut this Gordian knot. The Soviet Union has long been proposing to rid Europe of both intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons. This proposal remains valid. As a first radical step in this direction we are now proposing, as I have said, that even at the first stage of our programme all intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles of the USSR and the United States in the European area should be eliminated. The achievement of tangible results in the Geneva negotiations would mean giving significant content to the programme we have advanced for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.
IV.

The Soviet Union considers the complete elimination even in this century of such barbaric weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons to be an entirely feasible task.

At the talks on chemical weapons within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament signs of progress have recently appeared. However, these talks have been unreasonably protracted. We are in favour of intensifying the negotiations in order to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles of those weapons, as agreed with President Reagan at Geneva.

With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, as in other disarmament matters, all participants in the talks should take a fresh look at things. I would like to make it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union is in favour of the early and complete elimination of those weapons and of the industrial base for their production. We are prepared for a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and for the cessation of their production and ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the convention enters into force, to the elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections.

A radical solution to this problem would also be facilitated by certain interim steps. For example, agreement could be achieved on a multilateral basis not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them in the territories of other States. As for the Soviet Union it has always strictly abided by those principles in its practical policies. We call upon other States to follow that example and show equal restraint.

V.

Together with the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of States, the Soviet Union proposes that conventional weapons and armed forces be the object of agreed reductions.

Reaching agreement at the Vienna negotiations could signal the beginning of progress in this direction. Today it would seem that a framework is emerging for a possible decision to reduce Soviet and United States troops and subsequently freeze the level of armed forces of the opposing sides in Central Europe. The Soviet Union and our Warsaw Treaty allies are determined to achieve success at the Vienna talks. If the other side also wants this, 1986 could become a landmark for the Vienna talks too. We proceed from the understanding that a possible agreement on troops reductions would naturally require reasonable verification. We are also prepared for that. As for compliance with the commitment to freeze the number of troops, in addition to national technical means permanent verification posts could be established to monitor any military contingents entering the reduction zone.

I should now like to mention that highly important forum, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Its task is to erect barriers against the use of force or covert preparations for war, whether on land, at sea or in the air. The possibilities have now become evident.
In our view, especially in the current situation, it is essential to reduce the numbers of troops participating in major military manoeuvres notifiable under the Helsinki Final Act.

It is time to begin dealing effectively with the problems still outstanding at the Conference. It is well known that the stumbling block there is the issue of notifications regarding major ground force, naval and air force exercises. Of course, those are serious problems and they must be addressed in a serious manner in the interests of building confidence in Europe. However, if their comprehensive solution cannot be achieved at this time, why not explore ways of finding partial solutions, for instance by reaching agreement now on notifications of major ground force and air force exercises, while postponing the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference.

It is not an accident that a considerable part of the new Soviet initiatives is directly addressed to Europe. By achieving a radical shift towards the policy of peace, Europe could have a special role to play: that of rebuilding detente.

For this Europe has the necessary historical experience, which is often unique. Sufficient to recall that the joint efforts of the Europeans, the United States and Canada produced the Helsinki Final Act. If there is a need for a specific and vivid example of new thinking and political psychology in approaching the problems of peace, co-operation and international trust, that historic document could in many ways serve as such an example.

VI.

Ensuring security in Asia is of vital importance to the Soviet Union, as one of the major Asian Powers. The Soviet programme for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the current century is in harmony with the sentiment of the peoples of the Asian continent, for whom the problems of peace and security are no less urgent than for the peoples of Europe. In this context one cannot fail to recall that Japan and its cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the victims of nuclear bombing and Vietnam was the object of the use of chemical weapons.

We highly appreciate the constructive initiatives put forward by the sociali countries of Asia and by India and other members of the non-aligned movement. We consider it highly important that the two Asian nuclear-weapon Powers, the USSR and the People's Republic of China, have both undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The implementation of our programme would fundamentally change the situation in Asia, rid the nations in that part of the globe too of the fear of nuclear and chemical warfare, and bring security in that region to a qualitatively new level.

We regard our programme as a contribution to the search, together with all Asian countries, for an overall comprehensive approach to establishing a system of secure and durable peace in the continent.

VII.

Our new proposals are addressed to the whole world. Initiating active steps to halt the arms race and reduce arms levels is a necessary prerequisite for tackling the increasingly acute global problems: the deteriorating human environment and the need to find new energy sources and combat economic backwardness, hunger and disease. The pattern imposed by militarism -- arms instead of development -- must be replaced by the reverse -- disarmament for development. The moose of the trillion-dollar foreign debt now strangling score
of countries and entire continents is a direct consequence of the arms race.
Over two hundred and fifty billion dollars are annually siphoned out of the
developing countries, an amount practically equal to the size of the mammoth
United States military budget. Indeed, this coincidence is far from accidental.

The Soviet Union wants each measure limiting and reducing arms and each
step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons not only to bring nations greater
security but also to make it possible to allocate more funds for improving
people’s lives. It is natural that the peoples seeking to put an end to
backwardness and attain the level of the industrially developed countries
associate the prospects of freeing themselves from their foreign-debt dependence
on imperialism, which is draining their economies, with the limitation and
elimination of weapons, the reduction of military expenditures and the switching
of resources to the goals of social and economic development. This theme will
undoubtedly figure most prominently at the International Conference on
Disarmament and Development to be held next summer in Paris.

The Soviet Union is opposed to making the implementation of disarmament
measures dependent on the so-called regional conflicts. Behind this lies both
an unwillingness to follow the path of disarmament and a desire to impose upon
sovereign nations something that is alien to them and which would make it
possible to maintain profoundly unfair conditions whereby some countries live at
the expense of others, exploiting their natural, human and spiritual resources
for the selfish imperial purposes of certain States or aggressive alliances. The
Soviet Union, as before, will continue to oppose this. It will continue
consistently to advocate freedom for peoples, peace, security, and a stronger
international legal order. The Soviet Union’s goal is not to whip up regional
conflicts but to eliminate them through collective efforts on a just basis, and
the sooner the better.

Today, there is no shortage of statements professing a commitment to peace.
What is really in short supply is concrete action to strengthen its foundations.

Too often peaceful words conceal war preparations and power politics.
Moreover, some statements made from high rostrums are in fact intended to
eliminate any trace of that new "spirit of Geneva" which is having a salutary
effect on international relations today. Indeed, it is not merely a question of
statements: there are also actions clearly designed to incite animosity and
skepticism and to revive confrontation, which is the antithesis of detente.

We reject this form of acting and thinking. We want 1986 to be not just a
peaceful year but one that would enable us to reach the end of the twentieth century
under the sign of peace and nuclear disarmament. The set of new foreign policy
initiatives that we are proposing is intended to make it possible for mankind to
approach the year 2000 under peaceful skies and peaceful space, without fear of
nuclear, chemical or any other threat of annihilation and fully confident of its
own survival and of the continuation of the human race.

The new resolute measures now taken by the Soviet Union for the sake of
peace and of improving the overall international situation are the expression
of the substance and the spirit of our domestic and foreign policies and their
organic unity. They reflect the fundamental law of history which was emphasized by
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The whole world sees that our country is holding high the
banner of peace, freedom and humanism raised over our planet by the Great October
Revolution.
On the issues of preserving peace and preserving mankind from the threat of nuclear war, no one should remain indifferent or stand aloof. This concerns each and everyone. Each State, large or small, socialist or capitalist, has an important contribution to make. Every responsible political party, every social organization and every person can also make an important contribution.

No task is more urgent, more noble and humane, than uniting all efforts to achieve this lofty goal. This task must be accomplished by our generation -- we cannot shift it onto the shoulders of those who will succeed us. This is the imperative of our time. This, I would say, is the burden of our historic responsibility for our decisions and actions in the time remaining until the beginning of the third millennium.

The course of peace and disarmament will continue to be pivotal to the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. In actively pursuing this course the Soviet Union is prepared to engage in wide-ranging co-operation with all those who adopt a stance of reason, goodwill and awareness of responsibility for assuring mankind a future without wars or weapons.
Working paper on cessation of the nuclear arms race and realization of nuclear disarmament

The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the realization of nuclear disarmament are common desires of the people of the world. The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament pointed out explicitly in its Final Document that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority". It expresses the strong demand of the people for early nuclear disarmament. Resolution 41/59 F adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly once again urged the United States and the Soviet Union to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and to take the lead in this regard. This resolution, enjoying support from all the United Nations Member States, including the Soviet Union and the United States, pointed out the correct and effective way to the realization of nuclear disarmament.

Having declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", the United States and the Soviet Union have each made proposals for a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons and conducted many rounds of bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but so far progress has been slow except on individual issues. The United States and the Soviet Union should, in the light of the desire of the people of the world for peace and disarmament, negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching agreement on nuclear disarmament that is truly conducive to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the relaxation of international tension, and without detriment to the interests of other countries, and should implement the agreement as soon as possible.

Despite the fact that nuclear disarmament has always been placed on its agenda as an important priority item, the Conference on Disarmament has yet to play its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament, as it has been unable to establish an ad hoc committee on this item.
China has all along been opposed to the nuclear arms race, and has advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to promote early achievement of this goal, the Chinese delegation submits its propositions as follows:

1. The nuclear arms race poses a grave threat to world peace and security. Halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament constitute an important task before the people of the world. The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and all nuclear disarmament measures must serve this goal.

2. The United States and the Soviet Union possess the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals in the world, and are still continuing to improve and upgrade the performance of their nuclear weapons. This has resulted in a steady escalation of the nuclear arms race. In view of such a situation, the effective way to the realization of nuclear disarmament is as follows: the United States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing and destroying on the spot all types of nuclear weapons deployed by them at any localities both inside and outside their territories. Following that, a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear States may be convened to discuss steps and measures for further nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union and for participation by other nuclear States in the process of nuclear disarmament, with a view to ultimately eliminating all nuclear weapons.

3. The United States and the Soviet Union, in discharging in real earnest their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, should speed up the peace of their bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament so as to reach as soon as possible agreements truly conducive to the relaxation of international tension, without detriment to the interests of other countries. In their negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union should respect and accept the legitimate proposals and demands of the countries in the regions concerned. The countries and people in Asia, like those in any other region, are concerned about their own security and peace. The security of Europe is important, and the security of Asia is equally important. The medium-range nuclear missiles deployed by the
United States and the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia should be reduced and completely destroyed according to the same principle and in a synchronized and balanced manner.

4. In the issue of disarmament, the security interests of all countries in the world are at stake. Therefore, it must not be monopolized by a few major Powers. All countries have the right to participate, on an equal footing, in the discussion and settlement of the issue of disarmament. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement and promote each other. The role of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament as the single authoritative multilateral negotiating forum should be fully displayed and constantly strengthened instead of being restricted or weakened. Consequently, it is both necessary and useful that States participating in bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations should keep the Conference on Disarmament informed about the progress of their negotiations.

5. Pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-free zones. On this basis, an international convention with the participation of all nuclear States should be concluded to guarantee the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

6. To ensure the smooth realization of nuclear disarmament, any agreement on nuclear disarmament should provide for necessary and effective verification measures including both national and international technical means of verification, and should guarantee equal participation by all the States concerned in international verification.

7. To promote nuclear disarmament, great importance should also be accorded to the following two issues:

(a) Conventional disarmament is closely related to nuclear disarmament, and along with nuclear disarmament it is necessary to pursue conventional disarmament. The two super-Powers, which possess the largest and the most sophisticated conventional arsenals, have also to take the lead in drastically reducing them, and should withdraw all their armed forces and military bases from abroad. Conventional disarmament should result in reducing the conventional armaments of all countries to the lowest level. The military forces of all countries should be used exclusively for the purpose of self-defence;
(b) The development of space weapons has resulted in a qualitative escalation of the arms race, and made the issue of nuclear disarmament even more complicated and difficult. Therefore, the immediate curbing of the arms race in outer space is of great significance. Both the United States and the Soviet Union already possess and are vigorously developing space weapons. They should immediately take action in real earnest to stop all forms of an arms race in outer space. On this basis, negotiations should be held to conclude an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons.

8. The Conference on Disarmament should establish as soon as possible an ad hoc committee on the item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" so as to play its due role in promoting the process of nuclear disarmament.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a document entitled "Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 10 December 1987 at the conclusion of the meeting between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Washington, 7-10 December 1987.

I would request that you make arrangements for the Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT

10 December 1987

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on 7-10 December 1987.

Attending the meeting on the United States side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Jack P. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly P. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.
The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive co-operation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. ARMS CONTROL

The INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This Treaty is historic both for its objective - the complete elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms - and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and space talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50 per cent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50 per cent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6,000 warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 per cent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.
As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total;

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ACLMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area;

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following number of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX): 10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 and SS-N-23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, co-operative measures and on-site inspection;

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force;

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty;

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits;
4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of
critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of
these facilities;

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:
   
   (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed
   limits;

   (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after
   achieving the agreed limits; and

   (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly
   declared facilities);

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures,
short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers
covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic
offensive arms could be occurring;

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities
which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such
provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would
allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during
missile flight;

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National
Technical Means. These would include open displays of
treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine
ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in
Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the
ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development,
and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive
discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years
before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides
have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of
action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar legally binding
agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory
manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a
priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development
of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of
strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
Other arms control issues

The President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

Nuclear testing

The two leaders welcomed the opening on 9 November 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on 17 September 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

The United States and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before 1 December 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the United States-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts' visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the Experiment are set forth in the statement issued on 9 December 1987, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Nuclear non-proliferation

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty, and confirmed their intent to make, together with other States, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.
The President and the General Secretary expressed support for international co-operation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

**Nuclear risk reduction centres**

The leaders welcomed the signing on 15 September 1987, in Washington, of the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

**Chemical weapons**

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable States. The United States and Soviet Union are in favour of greater openness and intensified confidence-building with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

**Conventional forces**

The President and the General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favour of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability, and spoke in favour of continuing and consolidating this process. The President and the General Secretary agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

**Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe**

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the United States-Soviet dialogue.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS

The President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of United States-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and co-operation.

Bilateral negotiations

Having reviewed the state of ongoing United States-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio navigational systems; the United States-USSR maritime boundary; and co-operation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the United States-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the United States-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.

People-to-people contacts and exchanges

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the United States-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the thirtieth anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988.
The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva—a process which has involved tens of thousands of United States and Soviet citizens over the past two years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment further to expand such contacts, including among the young.

Global climate and environmental change initiative

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to co-operate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through co-operation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the United States-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Co-operation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral co-operation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

Co-operative activities

The President and the General Secretary supported further co-operation among scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the United States and the USSR to co-operate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further co-operation in this area.

The President and the General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral co-operation in combating international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective co-operation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and co-operation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional co-operation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including co-ordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.
The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Canada.

Trade

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the United States-USSR Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Co-operation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

Diplomatic missions

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of embassies and consulates general constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. FURTHER MEETINGS

The President and the General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the United States-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.

I have the honour to transmit the document entitled "Joint Soviet-U.S. Summit Statement", dated 10 December 1987, which was published at the conclusion of the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States of America, R. Reagan, held in Washington, from 7 to 10 December 1987.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this Statement to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. NAZARKIN
Representative of the USSR to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The English text of the "Joint Soviet-U.S. Summit Statement" is to be found in CD/797.
Group of 21

Draft mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

1. In the discharge of its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad hoc Committee under item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

2. The Conference requests the Ad hoc Committee, as a first step, to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations as follows:

   (i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;

   (ii) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;

   (iii) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;

   (iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora.

3. The Ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1988 session.
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B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

57. Since the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference has continued the consideration of item 2 of its annual agenda in plenary and informal meetings. Documents pertaining to this item have also been submitted by delegations. 2/

1/ According to the original plan for the technical test submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on 13 August 1984 (CD/534), 27 countries had agreed to take part. These were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia. Following the appeal for wider participation in the test, contained in the Group's progress report on its eighteenth session (CD/535), 10 additional countries indicated their interest in participating: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Pakistan, Thailand, Zimbabwe. In addition, a total of 75 seismograph stations in 37 countries contributed Level I data during the technical test.

2/ The list of documents on the item can be found in the 1982-1987 annual reports of the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly (CD/335, CD/421, CD/540, CD/642, CD/732 and CD/787).
58. During the period, the Conference considered a number of proposals submitted by various delegations and groups of delegations for a decision by the Conference with a view to setting up a subsidiary body on the issue, including those by the Group of 21 (CD/180) and the German Democratic Republic (CD/259) in 1982 and 1983, and by a group of socialist States (CD/523) and the Group of 21 (CD/526) in 1984 and 1985. In addition, in the course of its 1982-1983 sessions, the Conference considered, in the context of its agenda item 2, proposals concerning the establishment of a subsidiary body on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon (CD/219 and CD/344). No consensus, however, could be reached on any of the above-mentioned proposals. The detailed account of their consideration by the Conference can be found in paragraphs 47 and 48 of its report on the 1982 session, paragraphs 36 and 37 of its report on the 1983 session, paragraph 57 of its report on the 1984 session and paragraph 57 of its report on the 1985 session.

59. During its 1986 session, the Conference decided to hold informal meetings on the substance of the agenda item. Some delegations stated that their agreement with that decision should not be construed as representing a change in their position of principle, namely, that an ad hoc committee should be established for the consideration of the item.

60. During its 1987 session, the Conference again decided to hold informal meetings on the substance of the agenda item. It also decided that discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly. To facilitate a structured discussion, the President took the initiative of preparing a list of topics as follows:

- "Interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament;
- Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons;
- Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document;
- Interrelation between measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament measures in other areas;
- Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements;
- Existing proposals."

In that connection, a delegation made a statement on behalf of the group of Western countries noting that the members of the group were ready to play a full part in the informal meetings and noted that, as pointed out by the President, the list of topics as submitted was binding upon no delegation. It also pointed out that this group of delegations did not see, in the presidential statement, any precedent whatsoever for decisions relating to the activities of the Conference. During 1986 and 1987, a total of 15 informal meetings was held. The following States not members of the Conference participated in those meetings at their request: Finland, New Zealand and Norway.
61. At the 451st plenary meeting, on 24 March 1988, after receiving a request from the Group of 21, the President put before the Conference for decision a proposal of that group, contained in document CD/819, on a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 2 of the agenda. In accordance with that proposal, the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee under item 2 of its agenda and would request it, as a first step, to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD I and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations. On behalf of the Group of Western countries, it was stated that although Western delegations were prepared to participate in informal plenary meetings on the subject matter of item 2, they had not been convinced that creation of a subsidiary body would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, were not in a position to join in a consensus with regard to the proposed mandate. The President of the Conference noted that there was no consensus at that time on the draft mandate contained in document CD/819. The delegation of the nuclear-weapon State not belonging to any group stated that it could go along, in principle, with the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21. At the same time, it expressed its willingness to consider other ways and means to enable the Conference to play its role on item 2 and hoped that consultations to that effect would continue. Speaking on behalf of the Group of Socialist States, a delegation expressed the support of that group for the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21. While further expressing its regret that a consensus had not been reached, it advocated, in view of the forthcoming SSOD III, the continuation of consultations in order to find an organizational framework acceptable to all which would allow a substantive discussion on item 2 of the Conference's agenda. The Group of 21 expressed regret that despite the preliminary work carried out on the subject during 1986 and 1987, it had still not been possible to set up a subsidiary body on item 2. It was further stated that the Group of 21 remained firmly committed to the implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD I and that the establishment by the Conference of a subsidiary body on item 2 of its agenda provided the best means to achieve that objective.

62. During the first part of the 1988 session, the documents relating to the Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles were submitted to the Conference by the two major nuclear-weapon States (CD/797, CD/798, CD/799 and CD/800). They were generally welcomed by the members of the Conference. The hope was further expressed for an early conclusion by those States of a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

63. In addition to the documents mentioned above, other documents submitted to the Conference during the first part of its 1988 session in connection with the agenda item include the following:

(a) Document CD/806, dated 16 February 1988, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Indiä, Mexico and Sweden, entitled "Joint message addressed on 6 December 1987 to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev by the six leaders authors of the Initiative for peace and disarmament."

(b) Document CD/807, dated 19 February 1988, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, entitled "The Stockholm Declaration".
(c) Document CD/815, dated 3 March 1988, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Message from A. A. Gromyko, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to the heads of the States Members of the South Pacific Forum in connection with the ratification by the Soviet Union of Protocols 2 and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Rarotonga)."

(d) CD/824, dated 6 April 1988, submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria, entitled "Text of the Communiqué on the session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Sofia on 29 and 30 March 1988, and of the Appeal to NATO Member States, and to all States participating in the CSCE, issued at that session".

64. The substantive positions held by various delegations on the item since the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are summarized as follows. 1/

65. The Group of 21 has consistently reaffirmed its conviction of the paramount need for urgent multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through adoption of concrete measures leading to complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of the Group of 21, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue. While welcoming the developments of the bilateral negotiations, the group reiterated that because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, these could never replace the genuinely multilateral search for nuclear disarmament measures. The Group of 21 fully shared the view stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of security of all States, on the contrary, weakened it, and increased the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. The Group of 21 reaffirmed its position that all nations had a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States and their quantitative and qualitative development directly jeopardized the security of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Further, effective cessation of the nuclear arms race requires participation of all nuclear-weapon States in multilateral negotiations. The disparity that may exist between the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear-weapon States, on the other hand, is a matter that should be dealt with in the process of multilateral negotiations and should not constitute an obstacle to the initiation of a process for the elimination of a fundamental disparity existing between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, the Group of 21 has repeatedly stressed its belief that the Conference on Disarmament, whose members include all the nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, should be allowed to fulfil its designated task in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, which has been entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly, in particular, by the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. The Group of 21 considered that the doctrines of nuclear deterrence which in the ultimate analysis were predicated upon the willingness

1/ Full account of the delegations' positions can be found in the official records of the Conference on Disarmament.
to use nuclear weapons, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lay at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons, and thus explicitly or implicitly admitting the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, were indefensible for it was unacceptable that the prospects of annihilation of human civilization be used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind could not be made hostage to the perceived security requirements of a few nuclear-weapon States. The group reiterated that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter could not be invoked to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence in the case of conventional armed attack. For the above reasons, the Group of 21 has, throughout the period, reiterated its proposal regarding the setting up by the Conference of a subsidiary body entrusted to elaborate on paragraph 50 of that document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiation of agreements, with adequate measures of verification and in appropriate stages, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and the substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. They have maintained in this regard that in the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine is the achievement of collective security through nuclear disarmament. Both individually and collectively they have submitted a number of proposals dealing with the substance of the agenda item. The Group of 21 recalled the declaration of the 8th Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Harare, in particular stressing that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should mutually facilitate and complement and not hinder or preclude, each other. The Conference on Disarmament should therefore be kept informed of all steps in bilateral negotiations and it should be enabled to fulfil its mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and to adopt concrete measures of disarmament, in particular, measures for nuclear disarmament. Many members of the group supported the successive pronouncements of the Six Nations' Initiative in Delhi, Mexico and Stockholm, which contain concrete proposals for dealing with the substance of this agenda item. Some members of the group supported the views expressed by the Heads of State or Government of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation at Dhaka, Bangalore and Kathmandu on the subject of nuclear disarmament.

66. Members of the Group of Socialist States have consistently reiterated the primary importance they attach to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. While stressing the crucial importance of the bilateral efforts to this end, members of the group have at the same time repeatedly pointed out that the total elimination of nuclear weapons they have been seeking can only be achieved through multilateral negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States and that the Conference on Disarmament, owing to its composition, is particularly well suited for this purpose. Consequently, they have themselves proposed and supported proposals by the Group of 21 to establish a subsidiary body of the Conference, inter alia, to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD I. In connection with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process of nuclear disarmament, they suggested the setting up of a sub-committee composed of these five States, having a negotiating mandate,
with a view to contributing to a multilateral consideration of item 2 by the Conference on Disarmament itself. They have also called for an elaboration of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon. Members of the Socialist Group supported the stage-by-stage programme for the achievement of nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 put forward in 1986 by the nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Group. They further stressed a discrepancy between substantial progress, achieved recently in the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations, embodied by the INF Treaty and lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament on the multilateral level. Members of the group deem it necessary for all countries to concentrate their efforts on the following priorities: to ensure the entry into force and the implementation of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles; the conclusion of a treaty in the first half of 1988 between the USSR and the United States on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms, and an agreement on strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, and on non-withdrawal from that Treaty for an agreed period. In the framework of the CSCE process, they proposed to commence separate negotiations on reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual purpose systems, and the ensuing elimination of such weapons. The weapons eliminated in the process of disarmament and arms reductions should not be replaced by others. They have consistently criticized the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and advocated the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Throughout the period, members of the group have submitted a number of proposals on various substantive aspects of the item, inter alia, on the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans, central Europe and in northern Europe, the reduction of armaments and the enhancement of confidence in central Europe, the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor and of a zone of confidence and a reduced level of armaments along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the commencement of the process of restricting military activities and lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe, both north and south, and the turning of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation.

67. The nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Group of Socialist States drew attention to the programme for the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000, contained in the statement of 15 January 1986 of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M. S. Gorbachev, (CD/649). The delegation of this State pointed out that after the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles a prospect had opened up for reaching agreement on a more difficult question: 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms in conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, and non-withdrawal from it for a specified period of time. The same delegation also stressed that bilateral efforts, undertaken through bilateral negotiations, should be complemented by efforts on a multilateral level. Combined efforts should lead to a world free of nuclear weapons. While it realized the need for prior reduction of the arsenals of the two leading nuclear-weapon States, it was still necessary to know when and under what conditions the other nuclear-weapon States would join the process of nuclear disarmament. In the view of the delegation of this State, the real prospect of reducing by half strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States opened up the possibility to start already now the discussion at the Conference on Disarmament of concrete directions for multilateral efforts in the domain of nuclear disarmament. For that reason,
it suggested starting to identify in practice the substance of possible multilateral measures in this field. The delegation concerned also proposed a series of points for the activities of the Conference: establishment of a comprehensive, phased programme with an agreed timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; preparation of principles to serve as a basis for implementing nuclear disarmament; examination of the relationship between nuclear disarmament measures and measures for reducing conventional weapons, of the order in which nuclear arms would be eliminated, of control and verification as well as the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes by proposing to this end to create in the framework of the Conference a group of experts or any other mechanism to study this problem with the participation of all nuclear powers at the stage of complete elimination of their nuclear weapons. On the question of security concepts relating to nuclear arms, the same delegation compared the criterion of a "reasonably sufficient level" with the concept of deterrence based on the threat of use of nuclear weapons, a concept which, in its view, aimed at military superiority, constituted the basis for continuation of the arms race and was dangerous also because it doomed all States to live in constant fear, making them nuclear hostages. It advocated the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security to replace the deterrent role played by nuclear weapons.

68. Members of the Group of Western countries have repeatedly stressed the importance they attach to the subject matter addressed under this agenda item and the importance they attach in particular to substantial and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. In this context, they welcomed the bilateral negotiations in progress between the two major nuclear-weapon States and stated that those negotiations played a vital role in any process for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. They welcomed the successful outcome of the negotiations by the two main Powers for the elimination of their intermediate-range nuclear forces. They also hoped that an agreement could be concluded in the near future for the 50 per cent reduction of the same two States' strategic arsenals and welcomed their commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Delegations of the group considered that the establishment of a subsidiary organ was inappropriate at the present stage and that, under current circumstances, informal and plenary meetings constituted the most suitable framework for the continuation of work on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Members of the group also emphasized that nuclear arms reductions could not be divorced from other disarmament measures and should be pursued so as to enhance international stability and security. In this regard, it was noted that deterrence could not be assigned a purely nuclear status and that there were instances of competition in arms at regional rather than global level, typically in conventional arms, which often were the product of mutual suspicion and military and foreign policies. Furthermore, the continuing importance of nuclear deterrence for security was underscored. A delegation noted that nuclear disarmament, through the negotiation of balanced and verifiable agreements, would reduce and should ultimately remove the necessity for countries to rely on nuclear deterrents.

69. One nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Western Group observed that it did not believe that an arms race could be successfully addressed without taking into account the tensions between States or groups of States that generated an arms race. It stressed that States acquired nuclear weapons for the same reason that they acquired conventional ones, to enhance their
security, and that the destructive power of such weapons, however regrettable, formed an integral part of the military forces of some States, a situation that would continue for the foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons, it reiterated, were an essential component of the strategy of deterrence, which, in its opinion, contributed to preserving peace between the super-Powers and their allies. It stressed that security is paramount, and that preoccupation with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons should not divert attention from the critical steps that must precede this ultimate goal – effective, verifiable arms control agreements that resulted in broad, deep, and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms of the super-Powers and correction of imbalances in conventional armaments, especially in Europe. It drew attention to positive trends in the bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers that might result in deep reductions in the number of their nuclear weapons, but noted the slow pace of negotiations on reductions in conventional forces. This State considered that for obvious reasons deriving from the large size of the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers, the responsibility to hold as a matter of priority negotiations on the limitation or reduction of their nuclear weapons rested with them. It drew attention, furthermore, to the achievements and potential achievements of these bilateral negotiations: the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons by means of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces; the agreement establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, which had a role in reducing conflict of any kind; full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing; and intensive negotiations to conclude a treaty that would reduce the strategic arms of both sides by 50 per cent. It also noted its participation in other multilateral forums in Europe regarding reductions of forces and armaments, conventional stability, and confidence building measures. This State concluded that the establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 2 would not contribute to the process of disarmament.

70. Another nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Western Group stressed that in view of the scale of the threat facing it, its security would depend for the foreseeable future on nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, its aim was to maintain continuing security and peace at lower levels of nuclear forces. Efforts in this direction should be combined with complete elimination of chemical weapons and progress towards conventional stability at lower levels of forces taking into account current imbalances. In view of the overwhelming preponderance (95 per cent) of nuclear weapons held by the two major military Powers, the most realistic way to make progress was through bilateral negotiations between these two countries. It believed that this should be achieved step-by-step through mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable agreements. It welcomed progress in this direction, particularly the complete elimination of INF and the prospect of a 50 per cent cut in strategic arms. Given the minimum nature of its deterrent (less than 3 per cent of the nuclear forces available to the two major nuclear-weapon States), it did not see any scope for making a contribution to any reductions in present circumstances, and would maintain the credibility of its deterrent. It welcomed recognition by both sides that this is legitimate. It pointed out, however, that if there were very substantial reductions in the strategic arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States and there were no significant changes in defensive capabilities, it would be ready to review its position and consider how best to contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.
71. Another nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Western Group observed that nuclear deterrence was a reality and not an ideology or a theory and that it could not be replaced by declarations of intent or political initiatives. It referred in that connection to its experience over the past century: the attempts to institute a new security system had failed to prevent a devastating conflict, and it could not be denied that since then nuclear deterrence had played a decisive role in international security arrangements. Nuclear deterrence should, however, go hand in hand with steadily greater arms control. From that point of view, it could not but condemn the absurd logic of the redundancy of the two main Powers' systems, whereby the number of weapons far exceeded the number of potential targets; that was a serious factor of imbalance and tension and it was up to the two participants in the incessant race to remedy the situation. While recognizing the importance of the Treaty of Washington on the elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, it stressed that nothing should divert now from the priority objective of a 50 per cent reduction of offensive strategic weapons of the two main nuclear-weapon States. It stressed that the INF Treaty stood alone and should not be expected to lead to the denuclearization of Europe, and that the priority in this region was the establishment of conventional stability. While it saw things as they were, that State did not intend to stand aloof from nuclear disarmament; it had already said that it would be willing to take part in the process as soon as three conditions, which were closely linked to the present or future negotiations, were met: a very substantial reduction in the disparity between the two main Powers' and its own nuclear arsenals, the non-deployment of defensive systems, and a return to a balance of conventional forces together with the elimination of chemical weapons.

72. One nuclear-weapon State, not belonging to any group, has repeatedly stated that it opposes and will never take part in an arms race. It has consistently called for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It has reiterated that its limited nuclear force solely serves defence purposes. It has undertaken, since the first day of its possession of nuclear weapons, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and unconditionally pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It has signed Protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). This State has held that the two States possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals in the world have a special responsibility for curbing the nuclear arms race and carrying out nuclear disarmament. It is of the view that the INF Treaty signed by them, a first positive step towards nuclear disarmament, should be followed, inter alia, by an agreement on the 50 per cent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons. It has maintained that to promote nuclear disarmament, great importance should be accorded to the issues of conventional disarmament and curbing the arms race in outer space. The same State has reiterated that the two major nuclear States should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reduce them, so as to create favourable conditions for the convocation of a broadly representative international conference with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States to discuss measures for further nuclear disarmament and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It is of the view that the nuclear arms race should stop, both quantitatively and
It has also agreed that bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement each other and consistently reiterated its support for the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body under item 2 of its agenda.

73. Some delegations noted that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (The Treaty of Tlatelolco) which entered into force in 1967 and its two Protocols constituted an important disarmament measure designed to contribute to the objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

74. Some delegations stated that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, (The Treaty of Rarotonga, contained in CD/633) which entered into force on 11 December 1986 constitutes an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region it covers and that it is a significant nuclear arms limitation and arms control agreement. They also noted that there were three Protocols attached to the treaty which were opened for signature on 1 December 1986 (annexed to CD/633) and expressed the hope that all nuclear-weapon States and States which had territories in the region covered by that zone would adhere to those Protocols without reservation.

75. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew attention to the fact that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has ratified Protocols 2 and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Rarotonga), thereby declaring the intention of the USSR to discharge fully its obligations under those Protocols.

76. Several members of the Group of 21 recalled paragraphs 33 and 60 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stating that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and drew attention to the proposals for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East and South Asia and for the denuclearization of Africa.

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1988, the Foreign Ministers of the five Nordic States, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, made a joint statement, the text of which is annexed to this letter in English. On behalf of the Nordic delegations in Geneva I request that this text be reproduced and distributed as a document of the Conference.

(Signed): Rolf Ekéus
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Sweden
to the Conference on Disarmament
Joint statement by the Nordic Foreign Ministers on the
twentieth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
1 July 1988

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for
signature 20 years ago today. The five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden were among the first to sign and to ratify the
Treaty.

The Nordic Governments consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty a vital
instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure that
nuclear energy is only developed for peaceful purposes. In our view, the
Treaty remains the most important arms control agreement reached
multilaterally so far. The Treaty has made a significant contribution to
international stability and security.

The strong commitment of the five Nordic countries to further
strengthening the non-proliferation régime is reflected in joint Nordic
initiatives and working documents submitted to the United Nations and to the
NPT Review Conferences. Universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance
with the letter and spirit of its obligations are the best approach to
achieving the primary goals of the Treaty: to avert the spread of nuclear
weapons, to promote international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses
of nuclear energy and to limit and reduce nuclear weapons.

The vast majority of States are already parties to the NPT. Close to
140 States have now ratified and adhered to the Treaty. It is regrettable,
however, that some important States have not yet done so. Since its entry
into force, no State party to the Treaty has acquired nuclear weapons. In the
view of the Nordic Governments, the constantly increasing membership as well
as the successful conclusion of the Third Review Conference testify to the
great significance of the Treaty and are an encouraging development in efforts
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

In celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty, the
Nordic Governments urge all States which have not already done so to accede to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I have pleasure in enclosing the text of the statement by the Government of Mexico on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Considering this statement to be of interest for our work, I should be most grateful if you would kindly arrange for it to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Alfonso García Robles
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Mexico
to the Conference on Disarmament
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO ON THE OCCASION OF THE
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Government of Mexico welcomes the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. During the last two decades, the existence of this important international instrument has helped to create a safer world, promoting the principle that nuclear energy should be used above all for peaceful purposes.

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation (NPT) established the legal framework for preventing the destructive power of the atom from spreading out of control and threatening the very survival of mankind. At the same time, in order to give effect to its provisions, the International Atomic Energy Agency was set up, a body which has kept careful watch on the way different countries have used atomic energy for peaceful purposes. By preventing the proliferation of States possessing nuclear weapons and regulating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the NPT has strengthened international peace and security and opened up new development possibilities for all nations.

The Treaty establishes binding obligations of great importance for all States Parties, and in particular those that possess nuclear weapons. Thus the Parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Prominent among these negotiations are those relating to the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, a priority objective of Mexico's disarmament policy.

The Government of Mexico welcomes the progress made in negotiations on nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union and expresses the hope that it will lead to the adoption of new measures to promote general and complete disarmament, to which they committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, the Government of Mexico expresses its concern at the possibility of the two Powers concluding an agreement which by legitimizing the carrying out of nuclear tests would depart from the original spirit of the Treaty.

The celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a proper occasion to reiterate that only faithful fulfilment of their obligations by all States Parties will create the necessary conditions to ensure its success and universal application. In the same way, this is an appropriate moment to appeal to States which are not yet Parties to the Treaty to make their contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system in the near future.

Mexico City, 1 July 1988

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement made by Sir Geoffrey Howe on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Weapons.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the distribution of the text of this statement as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) T.A.H. Solesby

GE.88-62680/5030G
20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, 1 JULY 1988

We celebrate today the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United Kingdom, one of the Treaty's three depositary powers, is proud to have been closely involved in this Treaty enterprise from the very start.

The Treaty has made an inestimable contribution to peace in the world today by containing the spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time encouraging the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is therefore central to the security of each and every one of us. The Treaty is the most widely supported arms control agreement in existence with 136 parties - four-fifths of the total membership of the United Nations. I welcome the recent accession of Spain and Trinidad and Tobago as well as the decision by Saudi Arabia announced earlier this year to accede. On this 20th anniversary, I applaud their example and appeal to all countries who have not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so. It is vital that, at a time when there is significant progress in arms control all governments should play their part in discouraging nuclear proliferation.
LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT ENCLOSING THE TEXT OF ANSWERS GIVEN BY MR. N.I. RYZHKOV,
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, IN REPLY TO
QUESTIONS FROM THE TASS CORRESPONDENT, PUBLISHED IN THE NEWSPAPER
PRAVDA OF 1 JULY 1988

I have the honour to enclose the text of the answers given by
Mr. N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in reply
to questions from a TASS correspondent, published in the newspaper Pravda of
1 July 1988.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this text to be circulated
as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. Nazarkin
Ambassador
Representative of the USSR to
the Conference on Disarmament
ANSWERS GIVEN BY MR. N.I. RYZHKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM A TASS CORRESPONDENT

Question: On 1 July 1988 we celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet Government is, of course, one of the depositaries of this Treaty, together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. What do you see as the basic results of the Treaty over the past twenty years and what is its place in the present system of international relations?

Answer: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was one of the very first international agreements on nuclear arms limitation. It has been an important factor in ensuring international security and strategic stability.

Above all, the conclusion of the Treaty erected a powerful barrier of international law in the way of a very serious potential danger - the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a wide range of States, which would undoubtedly have carried with it a threat of putting excessive strain on the whole structure of international relations and increasing the number of different kinds of crisis situations and incidents, and indeed simply of fatal accidents. Not to mention the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons could be compared to the chain reaction which is the basis for the operation of the weapon itself. And this in circumstances where a large number of countries had reached a level of scientific and technological development enabling them to produce the bomb if they wished.

Mankind recognized that the spread of nuclear weapons was a general threat to everyone and that an adequate collective response had to be found to that threat.

For many countries, this meant weighing on the political scales, with all due seriousness, considerations of national prestige, their strategic interests and ideas and the task of ensuring security.

In his article "Reality and the guarantees of a secure world", Mr. M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, called the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "a unique example of a high sense of responsibility on the part of States".

A high sense of responsibility for the fate of our planet was shown both by the nuclear and by the non-nuclear States; the former by binding themselves not to contribute in any way to the spread of nuclear weapons and to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith; the latter by voluntarily renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any means. The signature of the Treaty containing these commitments was a display of great political realism.

Today the non-proliferation principles established by the Treaty enjoy wide recognition, they have become an integral part of the fundamentals of modern international law. It is no accident that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has the widest range of parties - 136 States - of any international legal instrument in the field of arms limitation.
The history of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons confirms its effectiveness. The international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons established on the basis of the Treaty, including a system of safeguards (verification) by the International Atomic Energy Agency, agreements on the principles governing nuclear exports, and the practice that has grown up of bilateral and multilateral consultations between parties to the Treaty, is convincing evidence of the international community's sincere interest in supporting and strengthening its foundation. The Soviet Union makes a weighty contribution to the process of establishing the non-proliferation régime, strictly fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty and vigorously complying with the relevant rules on nuclear exports.

Particular recognition should be given to the role of IAEA, which is entrusted with verification functions under the Treaty and has developed a system of safeguards for effectively and reliably ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons. This verification is carried out with full respect for States' sovereign rights and without detriment to the development of their peaceful nuclear activities or international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The wide international recognition of the ideas involved in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the fact that countries that are not parties to the Treaty itself do not as a rule object to the principles established in it, but in essence conform with them in their policies and commercial and economic activities. It is thus possible to speak of these principles as being universal in their application.

Admittedly, among those who are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there are also some States which have no particular scruples about openly displaying their nuclear ambitions. These include above all Israel and South Africa, whose position on the matter undoubtedly complicates the already complicated situations in the Middle East and southern Africa. It is high time the Israeli and South African authorities recognized that their countries' welfare does not lie in a nuclear future and that acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the only choice dictated by reason and morality, by any feeling of responsibility to their peoples.

Question: How do you now see the future of the Treaty, particularly in connection with the task of freeing the world completely from nuclear weapons?

Answer: The Treaty already symbolizes for most States the reality of a peaceful alternative to the military use of nuclear energy. What we see as the ultimate aim is that this should become the rule for everyone. Incidentally, one of the arguments often put forward against nuclear disarmament is this: once having invented nuclear weapons, mankind will not be able to forget how to make them. That may be true enough, but after all the Treaty has a whole set of machinery to ensure that nuclear technology does not take practical form in the production of weapons. In particular, we consider that there is every reason to use the experience of the IAEA safeguards to develop a system of verification for future nuclear disarmament measures.
The twentieth anniversary of the Treaty comes at a time of highly important events in the life of the international community. New political thinking reflecting the pressing demands and imperatives of today's world has found specific expression in the programme put forward by the Soviet Union for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. Today we are witnessing the first actual results of its practical implementation. I have in mind first and foremost the conclusion of the INF Treaty, substantial progress in the drafting of an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic strike weapons of the USA and the USSR, and Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and ultimate prohibition of nuclear tests. Positive changes have become evident in many other spheres of international life. And there is a highly contemporary ring now to the commitment entered into by every party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.

One of the prerequisites for a steady and unceasing process of nuclear disarmament such as is now just beginning is without doubt the preservation and strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Soviet Union will continue to come out firmly in support of the Treaty, which should remain in force until such time as a non-nuclear and non-violent peace becomes a reality on earth. The only thing that can replace it is a comprehensive international treaty on the non-resurrection of nuclear weapons after their complete and final elimination.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and the text of a statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations, Marlin Fitzwater, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1988.

I would request that you make arrangements for the texts to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

*/* Re-issued for technical reasons

GE.88-62902/0220p
1 July 1988

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT COMMEMORATING THE
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the international community's most vital instruments for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international peace and stability.

I firmly believe that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. If we are to succeed in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, the nations of the world must continue to work together. I call on all countries that have not yet adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so to demonstrate their commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to strengthening the foundations of peace. I also urge all parties to the Treaty to rededicate themselves to achieving its objective.

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Declaration issued by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Hungarian People's Republic on the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for the circulation of the Declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) David Meiszter
Ambassador
DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Twenty years ago, on 1 July 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature and signed on the very first day by not less than 61 States including the Hungarian People's Republic. During the past two decades the number of States Parties has increased to 136 which has made the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons an arms control agreement with the widest adherence and contributed to averting the danger of nuclear catastrophes threatening the destruction of the entire world.

The Foreign Affairs Committee is convinced that it is expressing the unanimous view of the Hungarian public opinion by reaffirming - after two decades of its operation - continued commitment of Hungary towards the objectives, obligations and measures set forth in the Treaty. It would have a beneficial effect if all the States which for whatever reason have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty would take that step without delay, which is rightly expected from them by the international community. The reality of the nuclear age is that every country of the world has a share of responsibility to discharge in promoting the cause of peace and security, the reduction of international tension, the limitation of armaments and disarmament.

A special responsibility is placed upon the States possessing nuclear weapons. They are expected by the peoples of the world to set an example and to take the lead in the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. The Foreign Affairs Committee therefore welcomes with profound appreciation the ratification of the agreement concluded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of the medium and shorter range missiles as well as the beginning of its implementation. It attaches also great importance to the efforts of the two States aimed at reaching an agreement on the 50 per cent reduction of their strategic offensive armaments. The agreements that may lead to a large-scale reduction in the number and yield of the test explosions by the two States can be welcomed as important intermediate steps on the way to halting the nuclear arms race.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons lays emphasis on the promotion of research and use for peaceful purposes of the nuclear energy and on the international co-operation in this field. The Hungarian People's Republic is particularly interested that various forms of such co-operation should develop unhindered.

In this connection the Foreign Affairs Committee attaches paramount importance to the activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency whose task is to verify compliance with the Treaty, to prevent the misuse of nuclear materials, and to provide for the international co-ordination of measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The security of peaceful applications would be greatly enhanced by the early conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of any attack against nuclear power stations and other nuclear facilities. The Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to stress that the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate forum for bringing the negotiations to a successful end, which in its turn requires constructive efforts and readiness to come to an agreement from all the participants of the negotiations.

I have the honour to transmit a document entitled "Joint Statement at the Moscow Summit", dated 1 June 1988, which was issued following the meeting between M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and R. Reagan, President of the United States of America, held in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June 1988.

I would request that you make arrangements for this Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. Nazarkin
Ambassador
Representative of the USSR
to the Conference on Disarmament

/*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

/**/ The English text of the Joint Soviet-United States Statement is to be found in CD/846.

I have the honour to transmit the text of the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May 1988.

I would request that you make arrangements for the text of this Agreement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. Nazarkin
Ambassador
Representative of the USSR
to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The English text of the Agreement is to be found in CD/847.
LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, USSR - 29 MAY TO 1 JUNE 1988" **/

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a document entitled "Joint Statement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Issued Following Meetings in Moscow, USSR - 29 May-1 June 1988" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 1 June 1988.

I would request that you make arrangements for the Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

**/ The Russian text of the Joint United States-Soviet Statement is to be found in CD/844.

GE.88-63769/5507G
JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, USSR
MAY 29 - JUNE 1, 1988

In accordance with the understanding reached during the
U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, and
confirmed at the Washington summit in December 1987, Ronald W.
Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail
S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Moscow May 29 -

Attending on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George
P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Presidential
Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Assistant to the President
for National Security Colin L. Powell; Ambassador at Large and
Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on
Arms Control Matters, Paul H. Nitze; Special Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters,
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR
Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo
of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet, Andrei A. Gromyko; Member of the Politburo
of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Alexander N. Yakovlev; Alternate Member of the Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR,
Dimitri T. Yazov; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Assistant of the General Secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee, Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Alexander A. Bessmertnykh; and
Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V.
Dubinin.
The President and the General Secretary view the Moscow summit as an important step in the process of putting U.S.-Soviet relations on a more productive and sustainable basis. Their comprehensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues to which the two leaders agreed during their initial meeting in Geneva in November, 1985 -- an agenda encompassing arms control, human rights and humanitarian matters, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. Serious differences remain on important issues; the frank dialogue which has developed between the two countries remains critical to surmounting these differences.

The talks took place in a constructive atmosphere which provided ample opportunity for candid exchange. As a result, the sides achieved a better understanding of each other's positions. The two leaders welcomed the progress achieved in various areas of U.S.-Soviet relations since their last meeting in Washington, notwithstanding the difficulty and complexity of the issues. They noted with satisfaction numerous concrete agreements which have been achieved, and expressed their determination to redouble efforts in the months ahead in areas where work remains to be done. They praised the creative and intensive efforts made by representatives of both sides in recent months to resolve outstanding differences.

Assessing the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the President and the General Secretary underscored the historic importance of their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow in laying the foundation for a realistic approach to the problems of strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict. They reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, their determination to prevent any war between the United States and Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional, and their disavowal of any intention to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimize the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterize the US-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing not only the problems of the present, but of tomorrow and the next century. It is a process which the President and the General Secretary believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union, and can contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.
I. Arms Control

The President and the General Secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

INF

The President and the General Secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the Treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this Treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the Treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated Protocol. In connection with their obligations under the Protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated Protocol.
The Joint Draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4900 on the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft Treaty also records the sides' agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 percent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the Treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the Joint Statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and one warhead against the 6000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared Joint Draft Texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data, which are integral parts of the Treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, at a minimum, include:

A. Data exchanges, to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically.

B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.

C. On-site observation of elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.

D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.
E. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed upon procedures, of locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The Delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the Joint Draft Text of the START Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.
Ronald Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only of the peoples of the USSR and the USA, but of all mankind.

Guided by this fundamental agreement, the U.S. President and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. The Delegations of the two countries have been instructed to return to Geneva on July 12, 1988. It has been agreed as a matter of principle that, once the remaining problems are solved and the Treaty and its associated documents are agreed, they will be signed without delay.

Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the U.S. and the USSR on notifications of launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed during the Moscow summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

Nuclear Testing

The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.—USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agreement upon effective verification measures for the U.S.—USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other’s test sites.
The leaders therefore noted with satisfaction the signing of the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement, the considerable preparation underway for the Experiment, and the positive cooperation being exhibited in particular by the substantial numbers of personnel now engaged in work at each other's test sites: They also noted the substantial progress on a new Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment has been conducted and analyzed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the TTBT will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. They also declared their mutual intention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 Treaties when the corresponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed, and to continue negotiations as agreed in the Washington joint summit statement.

**Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adherents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and security. They expressed the hope that each state not a party to the Treaty will join it, or make an equally binding commitment under international law to forego acquisition of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. This will enhance the possibility of progress toward reducing nuclear armaments and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on non-proliferation and agreed that they should continue.
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington, established in accordance with the U.S.-Soviet agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the Centers can play an important role in the context of a future Treaty on reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders reviewed the status of on-going multilateral negotiations and bilateral U.S.-Soviet consultations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. While noting the progress already achieved in the talks and the difficult problems with regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemicals for chemical weapons purposes, the leaders underlined the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants. They gave instructions to their respective delegations to this effect.

Both sides agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close coordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They stressed the importance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international investigations of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons, the leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.
Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting. The President and the General Secretary also noted that full implementation of the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe can significantly increase openness and mutual confidence.

They also discussed the situation in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE process. The U.S. and USSR will continue to work with the other 33 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly

The President and the General Secretary noted the importance of the ongoing Third Special Session on Disarmament.
II. Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a detailed discussion of human rights and humanitarian concerns. The leaders reviewed the increasingly broad and detailed U.S.-Soviet dialogue in this area and agreed that it should be conducted at all levels in order to achieve sustained, concrete progress. They noted that this dialogue should seek to maximize assurance of the rights, freedoms and human dignity of individuals; promotion of people-to-people communications and contacts; active sharing of spiritual, cultural, historical and other values; and greater mutual understanding and respect between the two countries. Toward this end, they discussed the possible establishment of a forum which, meeting regularly, would bring together participants from across the range of their two societies. They noted steps already taken to establish the exchange of information and contacts between legislative bodies of both countries, as well as discussions between legal experts, physicians and representatives of other professions directly involved in matters pertaining to human rights, and between representatives of non-governmental organizations.

III. Regional Issues

The President and the General Secretary thoroughly discussed a wide range of regional questions, including the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and other issues. They expressed satisfaction with the April, 1988, conclusion in Geneva of accords on an Afghanistan settlement. Although the discussions revealed serious differences both in the assessment of the causes of regional tensions and in the means to overcome them, the leaders agreed that these differences need not be an obstacle to constructive interaction between the U.S. and USSR.

They reaffirmed their intention to continue U.S.-Soviet discussions at all levels aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions which advance their independence, freedom and security. They emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.
IV.

Bilateral Affairs

The President and the General Secretary reviewed progress in further expanding bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation since their meeting in Washington, D.C. in December 1987. They noted the increasingly important role that mutually beneficial interchange between the two countries can play in improving mutual understanding and providing stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They stated their intention to intensify such ties.

They noted with particular satisfaction that concrete agreements had been reached in most of the areas identified at their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington.

Bilateral Agreements and Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary welcomed the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements which open new opportunities for fruitful cooperation in the following fields: cooperation in transportation science and technology; maritime search and rescue; operational coordination between U.S. and Soviet radionavigation systems in the Northern Pacific and Bering Sea; and mutual fisheries relations.

The two leaders welcomed the recent signing of a new Memorandum on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety under the bilateral agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. There was an exchange of notes to extend that Agreement.

They expressed satisfaction with the recent signing of a new protocol under the bilateral Housing Agreement for cooperation in construction research relating to extreme geological and unusual climatic conditions.

They reviewed the status of negotiations between the two countries concerning maritime shipping, the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary, basic scientific research, and emergency pollution clean-up in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. They instructed their negotiators to accelerate efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in these areas at the earliest opportunity.

The two leaders welcomed the start of bilateral discussions on combating narcotics trafficking. They noted with satisfaction ongoing consultations between the two sides concerning law of the sea, air and sea transportation safety, and areas of mutual interest in the field of law.
Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

Noting the expansion of exchanges in the areas of education, science, culture and sports under the General Exchanges Agreement, the two leaders welcomed the signing of a new implementing program for 1989-91 under the Agreement and expressed their intention to continue expansion of such exchanges. During the time in which this program is in force, the two sides, taking into consideration their mutual interest as well as financial and technical conditions, will conduct negotiations on the opening of culture/information centers in the U.S. and the USSR with the aim of signing an appropriate agreement on behalf of the governments of both countries.

They expressed satisfaction that, over the course of their dialogue, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between non-governmental organizations have significantly increased and become one of the most dynamic elements in the bilateral relationship. They reaffirmed their commitment to further growth of such exchanges, which contribute to mutual understanding, and welcomed plans for increased exchanges of young people in the future. In this context, they expressed their readiness to consider in practical terms the idea of further developing exchanges of high school students. They cited recent joint U.S.-Soviet initiatives on culture, theater and the cinema as examples of new opportunities to engage those involved in the creative arts.

Noting the rapidly growing sports ties between the two countries, including their national Olympic committees, the two leaders expressed their support for the International Olympic movement, which promotes international cooperation and understanding through athletic competition.

Other Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary noted the successful expansion of scientific cooperation within the framework of bilateral agreements in Environmental Protection, Medical Science and Public Health, Artificial Heart Research and Development, Agriculture, and Studies of the World Ocean, and expressed their intention to continue to expand activities under these Agreements in areas of mutual benefit to the two sides.
The President and the General Secretary noted with pleasure the commencement of work on a conceptual design of an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, between scientists and experts from the United States, Soviet Union, European Atomic Energy Community, and Japan. The two leaders noted the significance of this next step toward the development of fusion power as a cheap, environmentally sound, and essentially inexhaustible energy source for the benefit of all mankind.

The President and the General Secretary welcomed agreement by representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, Canada and France, to institutionalize in the near future the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based, life-saving global search and rescue system.

Both leaders reaffirmed their support for the WHO/UNICEF goal of reducing the scale of preventable childhood death through the most effective methods of saving children. They urged other countries and the international community to intensify efforts to achieve this goal.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

The two leaders expressed their satisfaction with activities since the Washington summit in expanding cooperation with respect to global climate and environmental change, including in areas of mutual concern relating to environmental protection, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone and a possible global warming trend. They emphasized their desire to make more active use of the unique opportunities afforded by the space programs of the two countries to conduct global monitoring of the environment and the ecology of the Earth's land, oceans and atmosphere. They underscored the need to continue to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this important area in the future.
Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Cooperation

Recognizing the long-standing commitment of both countries to space science and exploration, and noting the progress made under the 1987 U.S.-USSR Cooperative Agreement in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, the two leaders agreed to a new initiative to expand civil space cooperation by exchanging flight opportunities for scientific instruments to fly on each other's spacecraft, and by exchanging results of independent national studies of future unmanned solar system exploration missions as a means of assessing prospects for further U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such missions. They also agreed to expand exchanges of space science data and of scientists, to enhance the scientific benefit that can be derived from the two countries' space research missions. They noted scientific missions to the Moon and Mars as areas of possible bilateral and international cooperation.

Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

Taking into account the unique environmental, demographic and other characteristics of the Arctic, the two leaders reaffirmed their support for expanded bilateral and regional contacts and cooperation in this area. They noted plans and opportunities for increased scientific and environmental cooperation under a number of bilateral agreements as well as within an International Arctic Science Committee of states with interests in the region. They expressed their support for increased people-to-people contacts between the native peoples of Alaska and the Soviet North.

The President and the General Secretary noted the positive role played by the multilateral Antarctic Treaty and emphasized the importance of U.S.-Soviet scientific and environmental cooperation in that region.
Trade and Economic Affairs

The two sides reconfirmed their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations and noted recent activity in this area. They reiterated their belief that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations. They welcomed the results of the meeting of the Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission in April and noted with satisfaction that working groups had been created under the Commission to further the establishment of better conditions under which mutually advantageous trade can develop. Taking note of the 1974 Joint Statement and Protocol amending the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation issued at the conclusion of the Joint Commercial Commission, they agreed that the Commission should continue to meet to build upon the forward momentum which has been generated.

The two leaders cited expanding relations between Aeroflot and Pan American Airlines under the government-to-government Civil Air Transportation Agreement as a positive example of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Consulates Exchange/Diplomatic and Consular Missions

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed their agreement to open Consulates General in Kiev and New York as soon as practicable.

The two leaders discussed questions relating to ensuring adequate and secure conditions for U.S. and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments and their personnel in each other's territory. They agreed on the need to approach problems relating to such matters constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.
V.

Future Meetings

The President and the General Secretary, recognizing the importance of their personal involvement in the development of relations in the months ahead, instructed Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet as necessary and to report to them on ways to ensure continued practical progress across the full range of issues. Expert-level contacts will also continue on an intensified basis.

Moscow,
June 1, 1988

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May 1988.

I would request that you make arrangements for the Agreement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

/*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

**/ The Russian text of the Agreement is to be found in CD/845.

GE.88-63772/5506G
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LOUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
herinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of
outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation,
miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of
nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and
security,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce
the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 30 September 1971, the Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and
over the High Seas of 25 May 1972, and the Agreement between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres of 15 September 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres of the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the
planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic
ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter "ICBM")
or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").

ARTICLE II

A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM shall be valid
for four days counting from the launch date indicated in such a notification.
In case of postponement of the launch date within the indicated four days, or
cancellation of the launch, no notification thereof shall be required.

ARTICLE III

1. For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the notification shall indicate
the area from which the launch is planned to take place.

2. For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the notification shall indicate
the general area from which the missile will be launched. Such notification
shall indicate either the quadrant within the ocean (that is, the 90-degree
sector encompassing approximately one fourth of the area of the ocean) or the
body of water (for example, sea or bay) from which the launch is planned to
take place.
3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification shall indicate the geographic co-ordinates of the planned impact area or areas of the re-entry vehicles. Such an area shall be specified either by indicating the geographic co-ordinates of the boundary points of the area, or by indicating the geographic co-ordinates of the centre of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The size of the impact area shall be determined by the notifying Party at its discretion.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

ARTICLE V

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

DONE at Moscow on 31 May 1988, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

George P. Shultz  E. Shevardnadze

I take pleasure in enclosing the text of a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I request that you kindly arrange for its circulation as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Nabil ELARABY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1 July 1988 is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the opening for signature of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the purpose of which
was to save the world from the calamities of nuclear war and the dangers of
proliferation and escalation in the production of nuclear weapons.
Accordingly, the Treaty constitutes one of the principal achievements of the
United Nations and the international community in the field of nuclear
disarmament and, as such, takes pride of place in this field with other
achievements at the multilateral and bilateral levels. The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has also given greater impetus to efforts
aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the
Middle Eastern and African regions.

In celebrating this anniversary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Arab Republic of Egypt wishes to express Egypt's firm belief in the need to
achieve complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, so that
the world can enjoy undisturbed peace and reassuring security in which
friendly relations among States will flourish, in which resources and energies
will be directed towards the development and welfare of peoples and in which
the use of nuclear energy will be restricted to peaceful purposes, in keeping
with the provisions of article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.

Egypt made a considerable effort to ensure the adoption of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and was eager to be among the first States to sign
it. Accordingly, Egypt realizes the vital importance of extending the scope
of application of the Treaty to all States, and is therefore making a strong
appeal to all countries of the world, and particularly those in the
Middle Eastern and African regions, that have not yet acceded to the Treaty,
to rapidly accede thereto and to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and
subject all their nuclear installations to the system of safeguards of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in order to confirm their good intentions
and contribute to the confidence-building measures, particularly in these two
vital regions to which Egypt belongs.

In conclusion, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to commend
the diligent and positive endeavours that are being made by the International
Atomic Energy Agency in its task of ensuring the application of the system of
safeguards to the States parties to the Treaty and co-operating with them in
the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Attached to this letter is a statement by The Honourable R.J.L. Hawke, AC, Prime Minister of Australia, marking the Twentieth Anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for this statement to be distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Richard Butler, AM
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations for Disarmament Matters,
Head of Delegation

GE.88-63905/57186
STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE R.J.L. HAWKE, AC, PRIME MINISTER
OF AUSTRALIA, ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Today marks the Twentieth Anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The NPT is the basis of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty makes a major contribution to international peace and security and is generally recognized as the single most effective and widely adhered to nuclear arms control agreement in existence. Australia ratified the Treaty on 23 January 1973.

Membership of the Treaty provides reassurance to the international community and neighbouring States of a nation's peaceful nuclear intentions and has become the standard for responsible international nuclear behaviour.

Australia continues to urge universal adherence to the NPT. It is my hope that the Twentieth Anniversary of its opening for signature will act as a spur to those countries which have yet to commit themselves to the Treaty.
Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order

1. Humanity stands at a crossroads of history. The world has lived too long under the sentence of extinction. Nuclear weapons threaten to annihilate human civilization and all that humankind has built through millennia of labour and toil. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike are threatened by such a holocaust. It is imperative that nuclear weapons be eliminated. The recently signed INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is a first major step in this direction. This process must be taken to its logical conclusion by ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The time has also come to consider seriously the changes in doctrines, in policies, in attitudes, and in the institutions required to usher in and manage a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. Peace must be predicated on a basis other than the assurance of global destruction. We need a world order based on non-violence and peaceful coexistence. We need international institutions that will nurture such a world order.

2. We call upon the international community to urgently negotiate a binding commitment to an action plan for ushering in a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons. We suggest the following action plan as a basis for such negotiations:

2.1. STAGE I (duration: 6 years, from 1988 to 1994)

2.1.a. Nuclear disarmament:

2.1.a.i. Elimination of all Soviet and United States land-based medium- and shorter-range missiles (500 to 5,500 kilometres) in accordance with the INF Treaty.

2.1.a.ii. Agreement on a 50 per cent cut in Soviet and United States strategic arsenals (with ranges above 5,500 kilometres).

2.1.a.iii. Agreement on a phased elimination by the year 2000 A.D. of United States and Soviet short-range battlefield and air-launched nuclear weapons.

2.1.a.iv. Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States.

2.1.a.v. Cessation of production of weapon-grade fissionable material by all nuclear-weapon States.

2.1.a.vi. Moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons.

2.1.a.vii. Commencement and conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

GE.88-63966
2.1.b. Measures collateral to nuclear disarmament:

2.1.b.i. Conclusion of a convention to outlaw the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination.

2.1.b.ii. Declaration by the United States and the Soviet Union that the fissile material released under the INF Treaty would be utilized for peaceful purposes only and accordingly be subjected to supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2.1.b.iii. Declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade fissible material.

2.1.b.iv. Cessation of direct or indirect transfer to other States of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and weapon-grade fissionable material.

2.1.b.v. Non-nuclear-weapon Powers to undertake not to cross the threshold into the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

2.1.b.vi. Initiation of multilateral negotiations, to be concluded by 1995, for a new treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2010. This treaty would replace the non-proliferation Treaty, which ends in 1995.

2.1.c. Other weapons of mass destruction:

2.1.c.i. Conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons.

2.1.c.ii. Conclusion of a treaty banning radiological weapons.

2.1.d. Conventional forces:

2.1.d.i. Substantial reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces, especially offensive forces, and of weapon systems in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

2.1.d.ii. Multilateral discussions in the Conference on Disarmament or in the United Nations on military doctrines with a view to working towards the goal of a purely defensive orientation for the armed forces of the world. The discussions would include measures to prevent surprise attacks.

2.1.e. Space weapon systems:

2.1.e.i. A moratorium on the testing and deployment of all space weapon systems.

2.1.e.ii. Expansion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

/...
2.1.f. Control and management of the arms race based on new technologies

2.1.f.i. Arrangements for monitoring and assessing new technologies which have military applications as well as forecasting their implications for international security.

2.1.f.ii. For research in frontier areas of technology where there are potential military applications, new technology projects and technological missions should be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations in order to direct them exclusively to civilian sectors.

2.1.f.iii. Commencement of work, under the aegis of the United Nations, for the formulation of guidelines to be observed by Governments in respect of new technologies with potential military applications.

2.1.f.iv. Commencement of negotiations for banning technological missions designed to develop new weapon systems and means of warfare.

2.1.g. Verification:

2.1.g.i. Acceptance in principle of the need to establish an integrated multilateral verification system under the aegis of the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world.

2.2. STAGE II (duration: 6 years, from 1995 to 2000)

2.2.a. Nuclear disarmament:

2.2.a.i. Completion of Stage I reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union and the induction of all other nuclear-weapon-States into the process of nuclear disarmament.

2.2.a.ii. Elimination of all medium- and short-range, sea-based, land-based and air-launched nuclear missiles by all nuclear-weapon States.

2.2.a.iii. Elimination of all tactical battlefield nuclear weapons (land, sea and air) by all nuclear-weapon States.

2.2.a.iv. Entry into force of the comprehensive test-ban treaty.

2.2.b. Measures collateral to nuclear disarmament:

2.2.b.i. Negotiations on the withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons deployed beyond national boundaries.
2.2.b.ii. Completion of the ratification and entry into force of the convention prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.

2.2.b.iii. Conclusion of the new treaty eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2010 to replace the non-proliferation Treaty.

2.2.c. **Space weapons:**

2.2.c.i. Agreement within a multilateral framework on banning the testing, development, deployment and storage of all space weapons.

2.2.d. **Conventional forces:**

2.2.d.i. Further reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces to minimum defensive levels.

2.2.d.ii. Negotiations under the Conference on Disarmament on global conventional arms reduction.

2.2.d.iii. Removal of all military forces and bases from foreign territories.

2.2.e. **New and emerging technologies:**

2.2.e.i. Completion of negotiations on banning technological missions aimed at the development of new weapon systems.

2.2.e.ii. Completion of negotiations on guidelines in respect of new technologies with potential military applications.

2.2.f. **Comprehensive global security system:**

2.2.f.i. Negotiations on and establishment of a comprehensive global security system to sustain a world without nuclear weapons. This would include institutional steps to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the right of every State to pursue its own path of development.

2.2.f.ii. Arrangements for the release of resources through disarmament for development purposes.

2.2.f.iii. Elimination of non-military threats to security by such measures as the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order.

2.2.f.iv. The strengthening of the United Nations system and related multilateral forums.

2.2.f.v. The commencement of negotiations for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system under the United Nations.
2.3. STAGE III (duration: 10 years, from 2001 to 2010)

2.3.a. Elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world.

2.3.b. Establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system which, inter alia, ensures that no nuclear weapons are produced.

2.3.c. Reduction of all conventional forces to minimum defensive levels.

2.3.d. Effective implementation of arrangements to preclude the emergence of a new arms race.

2.3.e. Universal adherence to the comprehensive global security system.

3.1. There has been a historically unprecedented militarization of international relations during the last four decades. This has not only enhanced the danger of nuclear war but also militated against the emergence of the structure of peace, progress and stability envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

3.2. To end this dangerous militarization of international relations, we must build a structure firmly based on non-violence. It is only in a non-violent democratic world that the sovereignty of nations and the dignity of the individual can be ensured. It is only in a non-violent world that the intellectual and spiritual potential of humankind can be fully realized.

3.3. The prospect of a world free from nuclear weapons should spur us to start building a structure of international security in keeping with the fundamental changes that are taking place in the world political, economic and security environment.

3.4. In a shrinking and interdependent world, such a structure has to be comprehensive, its components supportive of each other, and participation in it universal.

3.5. A world order crafted out of outmoded concepts of the balance of power, of dominance by power blocs, of spheres of influence, and of special rights and privileges for a select group of nations is an unacceptable anachronism. It is out of tune with the democratic temper of our age.

3.6. The new structure of international relations has to be based on scrupulous adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence and the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary to evolve stronger and more binding mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, regional and international. The diversity among nations must be recognized and respected. The right of each nation to choose its own socio-economic system must be assured.
3.7. Concomitant changes will be called for in the international economic order. The interdependence of all the economies of the world makes for a symbiotic relationship between development in the South and stability and growth in the North. In a just and equitable order, access to technology and resources, on fair and reasonable terms, will be assured. The gap between the rich and the poor nations will be bridged.

In connection with document CD/852 of 5 August 1988, I have the honour to enclose the text of a communication sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela to the Foreign Ministers of the depositary countries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, concerning a proposed amendment to the Treaty submitted jointly by the Governments of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

I would be grateful if the present letter, together with its attachments, could be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Adolfo R. Taylhardat
Ambassador
Representative of Venezuela
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.88-64015/5993G
Sir,

In my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of a State party to the Treaty partially banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, I am addressing the present communication to you in your capacity as Secretary of State of one of the depositary Governments of the Treaty. Identical communications have been sent to the other depositary Governments.

In accordance with article II of the Treaty and resolution 42/26 B of the United Nations General Assembly, I formally submit the amendment proposal on behalf of my Government for consideration at a conference of the States parties to the Treaty convened for that purpose. In that regard, I would be grateful if, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, you would circulate copies of the proposed amendment to all the parties and make the necessary arrangements to convene the conference as soon as a third of the States parties so request.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Germán Nava Carrillo
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Venezuela

His Excellency
Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
MOSCOW

(Idential letters have been sent to the other two depositary Governments).
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water shall be amended by the addition of the following article and protocols:

ARTICLE VI

Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

PROTOCOL I

States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, in order to achieve the permanent banning of all nuclear explosions, including all such explosions underground, have agreed that in addition to their undertakings in article I of such Treaty:

1. Each of the Parties of this Protocol undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction and control:

   (a) Underground; or

   (b) In any other environment not described in article I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

2. Each of the Parties to this Protocol undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described in paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

PROTOCOL II

(The precise provisions of this protocol are not included at this time, but will be submitted later for consideration and agreement at the conference. They will deal with all questions of verification, including in particular, the following:

- International co-operation for seismic and atmospheric data acquisition and analysis;

- Installation of special seismic detection networks on the territory of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty;

- Non-interference with national technical means of verification and non-use of concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means;

- On-site inspections;

- A permanent consultative mechanism to consider questions of compliance and ambiguous situations.)
CANADA

Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Ottawa, 28 July 1988

CANADA SUPPORTS THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today strongly reaffirmed Canada's abiding support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He recalled that July 1988 marks the 20th anniversary of the treaty, to which Canada was among the first to accede.

The NPT, said Mr. Clark, is an instrument of major importance in that it provides for legally binding commitments to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitates international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also sets out a guiding framework for the negotiated reduction of nuclear arsenals.

The Minister emphasized that Canada, which supports these fundamental policy objectives, is a major advocate of universal adherence to the NPT. Although the treaty, with 137 States parties, has broad support from all regions, Mr. Clark expressed concern that a number of States with advanced nuclear capabilities might decline to accede to it. He noted that, last month, he had instructed Canadian embassies to inform each country whose Government had not yet ratified the Treaty that Canada attaches particular importance to the need for all States to become full parties to that instrument. Mr. Clark welcomed the recent accession of Spain to the NPT, as well as Saudi Arabia's announced intention to accede. He expressed the hope that other States would follow the example of those two countries.

Mr. Clark pointed with satisfaction to the noteworthy progress that had stemmed from the talks held last year by the USSR and the United States on nuclear arms control and disarmament, in conformity with the objectives set out in the disarmament provisions of the NPT. While recognizing that a sharp reduction in nuclear arsenals remains a central Canadian objective, the Minister reaffirmed that efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons are equally important. Mr. Clark expressed the hope that significant progress toward both of these important goals would be made before the 1990 conference to review the operation of the NPT ahead of its renewal in 1995.

It is Mr. Clark's view that the NPT, which has already made a major contribution to non-proliferation, will always remain a vital factor in strengthening international security and co-operation.
LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1989 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TRANSMITTING TEXTS OF THE
COMMUNIQUE OF THE SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY, THE DECLARATION OF
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND THE APPEAL "FOR A WORLD WITHOUT WARS"

I have the honour to transmit herewith the following texts:

- Communiqué of the Session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the
  States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty;

- Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Tactical
  Nuclear Weapons in Europe;

- Appeal "For a World without Wars"

issued at the Session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States
Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin on 11 and 12 April 1989.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and the
enclosed documents circulated as an official document of the Conference on
Disarmament.

(Signed) Peter Dietze
Ambassador

GE.89-60662/0225a
COMMUNIQUE

ISSUED BY THE SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY:

A regular Session of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held in Berlin on 11 and 12 April 1989.

The Session was attended by: P. Mladenov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, J. Johanes, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, O. Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, P. Varkonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, T. Olechowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, I. Totu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and A.A. Bessmertnych, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

With satisfaction, the Ministers pointed to the progress in consolidating peace and disarmament which creates favourable opportunities for expanding co-operation among States and peoples. At the same time they noted that the situation in the world continues to be complicated and contradictory. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are determined to pursue, also in the future, a policy which is aimed at bringing about a fundamental improvement of the situation in Europe and the world at large. They expect also the other States to display the requisite constructiveness, as well as realism. The participants in the Session came out in favour of further pursuing the political dialogue on the key issues concerning the development of the world. This dialogue is based on a comprehensive approach to the strengthening of international peace and security pursuant to the United Nations Charter, with the role and effectiveness of this universal Organization constantly growing.

The participants in the Session came out in favour of redoubling efforts to continue the process of disarmament. They reaffirmed the position of their States that it is necessary to make considerable reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments coupled with appropriate cuts in military expenditures.

In discussing European affairs, the participants in the Session exchanged views on the results of the Vienna follow-up meeting and noted that its concluding document contains agreements, the realization of which will promote the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, better mutual understanding and the development of co-operation on the continent. It is necessary for all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to implement these accords unilaterally as well as in bilateral and multilateral relations on the basis of broad and mutually beneficial co-operation in the political, military, economic, scientifico-technical, ecological, cultural and humanitarian fields and in the area of the human dimension with due regard for equal rights, independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and for the other purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the other generally recognized norms of international relations. They expressed their States' determination to work in that direction.
The Ministers welcomed the start of the negotiations on conventional armed forces and on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe and underlined the firm resolve of their countries to conduct these negotiations constructively and to seek concrete results in a short time. This resolve was convincingly proved by the allied States' unilateral moves towards the reduction of armed forces, armaments and military budgets.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty call upon the NATO member States, indeed all the European States, to take concrete steps conducive to scaling down the level of military confrontation in Europe. They also call upon them to refrain from any move which could undermine the positive achievements made so far in improving the international situation and which could complicate the negotiations started in Vienna. Currently, the need for establishing relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on a truly non-confrontational basis and for creating the proper conditions for the simultaneous dissolution of both alliances, starting with their military organizations, is becoming more and more obvious.

The Ministers expressed the hope that these considerations will meet with understanding and support.

Underlining the importance of the strict implementation of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, the Ministers pointed to the inadmissibility of any "compensation" measures, including those envisaged under the pretext of modernizing tactical nuclear arms. They adopted a separate declaration on tactical nuclear arms in Europe.

The Session stressed that the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty between the USSR and the United States on halving their strategic offensive weapons, while observing the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, remains a task of paramount importance the solution of which would be a major contribution to creating a nuclear-weapon-free world. At the same time, the participants underlined the need for undertaking efforts towards the complete elimination of nuclear, chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction. The Ministers noted that multilateral, bilateral and unilateral measures towards the reduction of armed forces and armaments put on the agenda the conversion of military production to meet civilian needs. This is an intricate and complex problem which requires both national and common endeavours in order to be solved effectively. In this respect the United Nations Organization can play an important role.

In the interest of further enhancing openness in the military field, the participants in the Session advocated the continuation of efforts to elaborate criteria for a comparison of military budgets, making use of the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditure as adopted by the United Nations Organization.

The participants in the Session underscored particularly that strict respect for the territorial and political realities as they have emerged, for the principles of the inviolability of the existing borders, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, as well as the generally recognized principles and norms of State-to-State relations is a fundamental prerequisite for a stable peace order in Europe and a guarantee for the development and deepening of the CSCE process.
The improvement of the political climate as well as the growing interdependence in the present-day world create favourable conditions for invigorating economic relations between States with different socio-economic systems, which is an essential factor for the development of the CSCE process on a balanced basis. At the Session the need was stressed for expanding trade and for co-operation in the spheres of production, science and technology, for guaranteeing access to modern technologies as well as for removing any kind of restrictions and discriminatory barriers.

In exchanging views on regional conflicts -- in the Middle East, in Asia, Africa and Central America -- the Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their States to actively participate in the search for political solutions to these conflicts with due regard for the legitimate interests of the sides and respect for the right of all peoples to determine their own destinies.

The Ministers pronounced themselves in favour of an independent, non-aligned and democratic Afghanistan, of guaranteeing its free development on the basis of the policy of national reconciliation without any kind of external interference. They stressed that further efforts are needed to bring about a settlement of the Afghanistan problem.

The participants in the Session expressed their satisfaction at the progress achieved with regard to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in some regions, as well as at the endeavours undertaken by the United Nations Organization in that field.

A separate appeal "For a World without Wars" was adopted. The participants expressed the firm intention to develop and deepen the all-round co-operation among the allied socialist States.

The Session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers was marked by an atmosphere of friendship and fraternal accord.

The next session will be held in Warsaw.
DECLARATION
OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSZAWA TREATY ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE

I

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty express their resolve to do everything in their power to achieve progress in the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe that have begun. There can be no doubt that positive results in these negotiations, the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, particularly of the most destabilizing types, will significantly diminish the mutual risk of surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

The allied socialist States are convinced that stability and security in Europe cannot be ensured and the danger of surprise attack cannot be removed for good if tactical nuclear arms continue to exist on the European continent. These weapons constitute an immense destructive potential and may become the trigger of a total nuclear conflict with all ensuing consequences. Any use of nuclear arms in Europe would transform the continent into a radioactive desert. The retention, modernization and, all the more, the further build-up of tactical nuclear arms in Europe would increasingly destabilize the military-strategic situation in Europe, and would be incompatible with the efforts aimed at resolving the disarmament issues on the continent.

Against this background the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty propose to the member States of the North Atlantic alliance to open in the near future separate talks on tactical nuclear arms in Europe, including the nuclear component of dual-capable systems. They are confident that practical measures concerning reductions both in conventional armaments and in tactical nuclear arms would be mutually complementary and mutually reinforcing in the process of lowering the military confrontation between the two alliances.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are positive that along with the elimination of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the phased reduction and eventual elimination of the tactical nuclear arms in Europe would help to lessen the danger of war, to strengthen confidence and to establish a more stable situation on the continent. Accomplishing this task would facilitate progress towards deep cuts in strategic nuclear arms and, in a longer perspective, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere.

II

Matters pertaining to the preparation of the proposed negotiations, their mandate and the scope of participation could be discussed in specific consultations which the allied socialist States are ready to begin without delay. Participants in the consultations could be the nuclear-weapon Powers of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty respectively, as well as all other interested members of these alliances, in particular those possessing nuclear-capable tactical systems and those having tactical nuclear arms deployed in their territory.
It could also be agreed from the outset to implement the reduction of tactical nuclear arms and their elimination in stages. The negotiations would have to consider measures of effective international verification of tactical nuclear arms reduction and elimination and a set of confidence- and security-building measures in regard to such systems and to military activities in which they are involved. They could also examine the possibility of establishing a correspondingly empowered international control commission.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that mutual renunciation by the sides of any modernization of tactical nuclear arms would be conducive to creating a propitious political atmosphere for such negotiations and to strengthening confidence. The sides would, for example, neither perfect nor increase the numbers of nuclear-capable ground-launched tactical missiles, air force missiles and artillery, including the nuclear components of these systems. In this context the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty underline the significance of the statement of the Soviet Union that it does not modernize its tactical nuclear missiles. Other multilateral or unilateral measures based on mutuality could also serve to achieve the aim of reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear arms.

III

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty underscore that a great threat to stability in Europe is caused by the high concentration of tactical nuclear arms in this area, particularly in Central Europe, but also on the southern flank of the line of contact between the two alliances. They believe that the considerable reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe, including the withdrawal from this area and the disbandment of six tank divisions by the Soviet Union, the substantial decrease of armaments and combat equipment, tactical nuclear arms included, as well as the other unilateral moves of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to reduce armed forces and armaments are generating a favourable environment on the continent for implementing the proposals envisaging a zone of diminished armaments and enhanced confidence and nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Europe, the Balkans and other regions of the continent from which all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn.

A régime would be put into place in these zones to provide for mutual verification, including on-site inspections, and for appropriate assurances by the nuclear-weapon States.

IV

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are ready to examine any other possible proposals and measures designed to reduce and eliminate the tactical nuclear arms in Europe and to reinvigorate stability on the continent at ever lower levels of military postures, with due regard paid to the principles of equality and equal security and with allowance made for effective verification of compliance with the agreements reached.
"FOR A WORLD WITHOUT WARS" - APPEAL

ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY:

On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II the Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, who have gathered in Berlin, capital of the German Democratic Republic, deem it necessary to declare the following:

Half a century ago Nazi Germany invaded Poland, thus unleashing what became the most tragic conflict in human history. The war was a result of the aggressive and revanchist policies of conquest, of dividing up and dominating the world practised by the most reactionary imperialist circles. It illustrated the dangerous consequences of the Munich policy of concessions. The war claimed the lives of tens of millions of people. The earth was soaked in the blood of the fallen and the tortured. Victory over fascism was won thanks to the tremendous efforts undertaken by the peoples and States united in the broad anti-Hitler coalition and by the anti-Fascist resistance movements.

People should remember the month of September 1939 and the other tragic events of World War II, but not in order to keep opening up old sores. Memories of that gravest tragedy in the history of mankind should encourage nations to tireless efforts to ensure the right to a life in peace for everyone on this planet.

The lessons of the war confirm that the safeguarding of peace is the foremost task facing humankind. Everything to which people aspire, everything they do must be secondary to that concern. The present and future of the European peoples and their security are inextricably bound up with the preservation of peace on our continent.

Strict respect for the existing territorial and political realities, for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, for the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki and other generally recognized norms of international relations by all States remains a basic prerequisite for the maintenance of a lasting and stable order of peace in Europe. Special importance attaches to the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, drastic cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe, comprehensive security and broader mutually advantageous co-operation between States with a view to resolving the pressing problems facing all peoples of our continent. What has been achieved on this road, including the start of negotiations on conventional armed forces and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, prompts further action to ensure a lasting peace. It is a lesson of the anti-Hitler coalition that it should be possible also today to establish a broad front of co-operation to ensure the peaceful development of Europe.

The Ministers underlined the need for giving a resolute rebuff to all manifestations of revanchism, chauvinism and nationalism, all forms of hostility between peoples and attempts to challenge the territorial integrity of States. They note with special concern that neo-fascism is gaining ground in a number of European countries. Such phenomena, regardless of what form they take or where they appear, are a menace to peace and international
Security. Meeting on German soil, the Foreign Ministers underline that both German States have a responsibility before history to make sure that never again will a war be unleashed from that soil.

Humankind should enter the twenty-first century with the certainty that it will be able to live in peace. To achieve this requires resolute action by all States and peoples, by each and everyone. Joint reflections on what happened in Europe 50 years ago must constantly inspire new, still more effective action towards the creation of a world without weapons and wars. In launching this appeal the Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are urging that every effort should be made for the preservation of peace, for disarmament and mutual understanding, for more co-operation and for safeguarding the economic and social progress of every nation, so that Europe and our entire planet will not experience the horrors of a new world war.

On behalf of those States that belong to the North Atlantic Alliance and are members of the Conference on Disarmament, I have the honour to forward to you the following documents:

- "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 29th - 30th May 1989".

- "A comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 29th and 30th May 1989".

The documents attached are in the official French and English versions. On behalf of the aforementioned States I hereby transmit the request to you to circulate this letter as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament with the two documents adopted by the North Atlantic Council in their original French and English versions attached to it.

(Signed): Robert J van Schaik
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Netherlands
DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATING IN THE
MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS
(29th-30th May 1989)

NATO's 40 Years of Success

1. As our Alliance celebrates its 40th Anniversary, we measure its achievements with pride. Founded in troubled times to safeguard our security, it has withstood the test of four decades, and has allowed our countries to enjoy in freedom one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity in their history. The Alliance has been a fundamental element of stability and co-operation. These are the fruits of a partnership based on enduring common values and interests, and on unity of purpose.

2. Our meeting takes place at a juncture of unprecedented change and opportunities. This is a time to look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for the future.

A Time of Change

3. In our rapidly changing world, where ideas transcend borders ever more easily, the strength and accomplishments of democracy and freedom are increasingly apparent. The inherent inability of oppressive systems to fulfil the aspirations of their citizens has become equally evident.

4. In the Soviet Union, important changes are underway. We welcome the current reforms that have already led to greater openness, improved respect for human rights, active participation of the individual, and new attitudes in foreign policy. But much remains to be done. We still look forward to the full implementation of the announced change in priorities in the allocation of economic resources from the military to the civilian sector. If sustained, the reforms will strengthen prospects for fundamental improvements in East-West relations.
5. We also welcome the marked progress in some countries of Eastern Europe towards establishing more democratic institutions, freer elections and greater political pluralism and economic choice. However, we deplore the fact that certain Eastern European governments have chosen to ignore this reforming trend and continue all too frequently to violate human rights and basic freedoms.

Shaping the Future

6. Our vision of a just, humane and democratic world has always underpinned the policies of this Alliance. The changes that are now taking place are bringing us closer to the realisation of this vision.

7. We want to overcome the painful division of Europe, which we have never accepted. We want to move beyond the post-war period. Based on today's momentum of increased co-operation and tomorrow's common challenges, we seek to shape a new political order of peace in Europe. We will work as Allies to seize all opportunities to achieve this goal. But ultimate success does not depend on us alone.

Our guiding principles in the pursuit of this course will be the policies of the Harmel Report in their two complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches: adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, the search for constructive dialogue and co-operation, including arms control, as a means of bringing about a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

8. The Alliance's long-term objectives are:

- to ensure that wars and intimidation of any kind in Europe and North America are prevented, and that military aggression is an option which no government could rationally contemplate or hope successfully to undertake, and by doing so to lay the foundations for a world where military forces exist solely to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of their countries, as has always been the case for the Allies;

- to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with co-operation, trust and peaceful competition; and in which human rights and political freedoms will be fully guaranteed and enjoyed by all individuals.
9. Within our larger responsibilities as Heads of State or Government, we are also committed to strive for an international community founded on the rule of law, where all nations join together to reduce world tensions, settle disputes peacefully, and search for solutions to those issues of universal concern, including poverty, social injustice and the environment, on which our common fate depends.

II

Maintaining our Defence

10. Peace must be worked for; it can never be taken for granted. The greatly improved East-West political climate offers prospects for a stable and lasting peace, but experience teaches us that we must remain prepared. We can overlook neither the capabilities of the Warsaw Treaty countries for offensive military action, nor the potential hazards resulting from severe political strain and crisis.

11. A strong and united Alliance will remain fundamental not only for the security of our countries but also for our policy of supporting political change. It is the basis for further successful negotiations on arms control and on measures to strengthen mutual confidence through improved transparency and predictability. Military security and policies aimed at reducing tensions as well as resolving underlying political differences are not contradictory but complementary. Credible defence based on the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries will thus continue to be essential to our common endeavour.

12. For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary. We shall ensure the viability and credibility of these forces, while maintaining them at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements.

13. The presence of North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe just as Europe's security is vital to that of North America. Maintenance of this relationship requires that the Allies fulfill their essential commitments in support of the common defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of the risks, roles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership. Growing European political unity can lead to a reinforced
European component of our common security effort and its efficiency. It will be essential to the success of these efforts to make the most effective use of resources made available for our security. To this end, we will seek to maximise the efficiency of our defence programmes and pursue solutions to issues in the area of economic and trade policies as they affect our defence. We will also continue to protect our technological capabilities by effective export controls on essential strategic goods.

Initiatives on Arms Control

14. Arms Control has always been an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and of its overall approach to East-West relations, firmly embedded in the broader political context in which we seek the improvement of those relations.

15. The Allies have consistently taken the lead in developing the conceptual foundations for arms control, identifying areas in which the negotiating partners share an interest in achieving a mutually satisfactory result while safeguarding the legitimate security interests of all.

16. Historic progress has been made in recent years, and we now see prospects for further substantial advances. In our determined effort to reduce the excessive weight of the military factor in the East-West relationship and increasingly to replace confrontation by co-operation, we can now exploit fully the potential of arms control as an agent of change.

17. We challenge the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join us in accelerating efforts to sign and implement an agreement which will enhance security and stability in Europe by reducing conventional armed forces. To seize the unique opportunity at hand, we intend to present a proposal that will amplify and expand on the position we tabled at the opening of the CFE negotiations on 5th March. (*) We will register agreement, based on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna, on tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces held by members of the two Alliances in Europe, with all of the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed. Ceilings on tanks and armoured troop carriers will be based on proposals already tabled in Vienna; definitional questions on artillery pieces remain to be resolved;

(*) France takes this opportunity to recall that, since the mandate for the Vienna negotiations excludes nuclear weapons, it retains complete freedom of judgement and decision regarding the resources contributing to the implementation of its independent nuclear deterrent strategy.
expand our current proposal to include reductions by each side to equal ceilings at the level of percent below current Alliance holdings of helicopters and of all land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, with all the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed;

- propose a 20 percent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces, and a resulting ceiling on US and Soviet ground and air force personnel stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at approximately 275,000. This ceiling would require the Soviet Union to reduce its forces in Eastern Europe by some 325,000. United States and Soviet forces withdrawn will be demobilized;

- seek such an agreement within six months to a year and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Accordingly, we have directed the Alliance's High Level Task Force on conventional arms control to complete the further elaboration of this proposal, including its verification elements, so that it may be tabled at the beginning of the third round of the CFE negotiations, which opens on 7th September 1989.

18. We consider as an important initiative President Bush's call for an "open skies" regime intended to improve confidence among States through reconnaissance flights, and to contribute to the transparency of military activity, to arms control and to public awareness. It will be the subject of careful study and wide-ranging consultations.

19. Consistent with the principles and objectives set out in our Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament which we have adopted at this meeting, we will continue to use arms control as a means to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of armed forces, and to strengthen confidence by further appropriate measures. We have already demonstrated our commitment to these objectives: both by negotiations and by unilateral action, resulting since 1979 in reductions of over one-third of the nuclear holdings assigned to SACEUR in Europe.

Towards an Enhanced Partnership

20. As the Alliance enters its fifth decade we will meet the challenge of shaping our relationship in a way which corresponds to the new political and economic realities of the 1990s. As we do so, we recognize that the basis of our security and prosperity and of our hopes for better East-West
relations - is and will continue to be the close cohesion between the countries of Europe and of North America, bound together by their common values and democratic institutions as much as by their shared security interests.

21. Ours is a living and developing partnership. The strength and stability derived from our transatlantic bond provide a firm foundation for the achievement of our long-term vision, as well as of our goals for the immediate future. We recognize that our common tasks transcend the resources of either Europe or North America alone.

22. We welcome in this regard the evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the security area. The process we are witnessing today provides an example of progressive integration, leaving centuries-old conflicts far behind. It opens the way to a more mature and balanced transatlantic partnership and constitutes one of the foundations of Europe's future structure.

23. To ensure the continuing success of our efforts we have agreed to

- strengthen our process of political consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination, and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to consider methods for its further improvement;

- expand the scope and intensity of our effort to ensure that our respective approaches to problems affecting our common security are complementary and mutually supportive;

- renew our support for our economically less-favoured partners and to reaffirm our goal of improving the present level of co-operation and assistance;

- continue to work in the appropriate fora for more commercial, monetary and technological co-operation, and to see to it that no obstacles impede such co-operation.

Overcoming the Division of Europe

24. Now, more than ever, our efforts to overcome the division of Europe must address its underlying political causes. Therefore all of us will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach encompassing the many dimensions of the East-West agenda. In keeping with our values, we place primary emphasis on basic freedoms for the people in Eastern Europe. These are also key elements for strengthening the stability and security of all states and for guaranteeing lasting peace on the continent.

25. The CSCE process encompasses our vision of a peaceful and more constructive relationship among all participating states. We intend to develop it further, in all its dimensions, and to make the fullest use of it.
We recognize progress in the implementation of CSCE commitments by some Eastern countries. But we call upon all of them to recognize and implement fully the commitments which all CSCE states have accepted. We will invoke the CSCE mechanisms — as most recently adopted in the Vienna Concluding Document — and the provisions of other international agreements, to bring all Eastern countries to:

- enshrine in law and practice the human rights and freedoms agreed in international covenants and in the CSCE documents, thus fostering progress towards the rule of law;

- tear down the walls that separate us physically and politically, simplify the crossing of borders, increase the number of crossing points and allow the free exchange of persons, information and ideas;

- ensure that people are not prevented by armed force from crossing the frontiers and boundaries which we share with Eastern countries, in exercise of their right to leave any country, including their own;

- respect in law and practice the right of all the people in each country to determine freely and periodically the nature of the government they wish to have;

- see to it that their peoples can decide through their elected authorities what form of relations they wish to have with other countries;

- grant the genuine economic freedoms that are linked inherently to the rights of the individual;

- develop transparency, especially in military matters, in pursuit of greater mutual understanding and reassurance.

26. The situation in and around Berlin is an essential element in East-West relations. The Alliance declares its commitment to a free and prosperous Berlin and to achieving improvements for the city especially through the Allied Berlin Initiative. The Wall dividing the city is an unacceptable symbol of the division of Europe. We seek a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

Our Design for Co-operation

27. We, for our part, have today reaffirmed that the Alliance must and will reaftenuze its own efforts to overcome the division of Europe and to explore all available avenues of co-operation and dialogue. We support the opening of Eastern societies and encourage reforms that aim at positive political,
economic and human rights developments. Tangible steps towards genuine political and economic reform improve possibilities for broad co-operation, while a continuing denial of basic freedoms cannot but have a negative effect. Our approach recognizes that each country is unique and must be treated on its own merits. We also recognize that it is essentially incumbent upon the countries of the East to solve their problems by reforms from within. But we can also play a constructive role within the framework of our Alliance as well as in our respective bilateral relations and in international organizations, as appropriate.

28. To that end, we have agreed the following joint agenda for the future:

- as opportunities develop, we will expand the scope of contacts and co-operation to cover a broad range of issues which are important to both East and West. Our goal is a sustained effort geared to specific tasks which will help deepen openness and promote democracy within Eastern countries and thus contribute to the establishment of a more stable peace in Europe;

- we will pursue in particular expanded contacts beyond the realm of government among individuals in East and West. These contacts should include all segments of our societies, but in particular young people, who will carry the responsibility for continuing our common endeavour;

- we will seek expanded economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries on the basis of commercially sound terms, mutual interest and reciprocity. Such relations should also serve as incentives for real economic reform and thus ease the way for increased integration of Eastern countries into the international trading system;

- we intend to demonstrate through increased co-operation that democratic institutions and economic choice create the best possible conditions for economic and social progress. The development of such open systems will facilitate co-operation and, consequently, make its benefits more available;

- an important task of our co-operation will be to explore means to extend Western experience and know-how to Eastern countries in a manner which responds to and promotes positive change. Exchanges in technical and managerial fields, establishment of co-operative training programmes, expansion of educational, scientific and cultural exchanges all offer possibilities which have not yet been exhausted;

- equally important will be to integrate Eastern European countries more fully into efforts to meet the social, environmental and technological challenges of the modern world, where common interests should prevail. In accordance with our concern for global challenges, we will seek to
engage Eastern countries in co-operative strategies in areas such as the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern willingness to participate constructively in dealing with such challenges will help further co-operation in other areas as well;

East-West understanding can be expanded only if our respective societies gain increased knowledge about one another and communicate effectively. To encourage an increase of Soviet and Eastern studies in universities of our countries and of corresponding studies in Eastern countries, we are prepared to establish a Fellowship/Scholarship programme to promote the study of our democratic institutions, with candidates being invited from Eastern as well as Western Europe and North America.

Global Challenges

29. Worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination among us. Our security is to be seen in a context broader than the protection from war alone.

30. Regional conflicts continue to be of major concern. The co-ordinated approach of Alliance members recently has helped toward settling some of the world's most dangerous and long-standing disputes. We hope that the Soviet Union will increasingly work with us in positive and practical steps towards diplomatic solutions to those conflicts that continue to preoccupy the international community.

31. We will seek to contain the newly emerging security threats and destabilizing consequences resulting from the uncontrolled spread and application of modern military technologies.

32. In the spirit of Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, we will increasingly need to address worldwide problems which have a bearing on our security, particularly environmental degradation, resource conflicts and grave economic disparities. We will seek to do so in the appropriate multilateral fora, in the widest possible co-operation with other States.

33. We will each further develop our close co-operation with the other industrial democracies akin to us in their objectives and policies.

34. We will redouble our efforts in a reinvigorated United Nations, strengthening its role in conflict settlement and peacemaking, and in its larger endeavours for world peace.
Our "Third Dimension"

35. Convinced of the vital need for international co-operation in science and technology, and of its beneficial effect on global security, we have for several decades maintained Alliance programmes of scientific co-operation. Recognizing the importance of safeguarding the environment we have also co-operated, in the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, on environmental matters. These activities have demonstrated the broad range of our common pursuits. We intend to give more impact to our programmes with new initiatives in these areas.

The Future of the Alliance

36. We, the leaders of 16 free and democratic countries, have dedicated ourselves to the goals of the Alliance and are committed to work in unison for their continued fulfilment.

37. At this time of unprecedented promise in international affairs, we will respond to the hopes that it offers. The Alliance will continue to serve as the cornerstone of our security, peace and freedom. Secure on this foundation, we will reach out to those who are willing to join us in shaping a more stable and peaceful international environment in the service of our societies.
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A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. At Reykjavik in June 1987, Ministers stated that the arms control problems facing the Alliance raised complex and interrelated issues that needed to be evaluated together, bearing in mind overall progress in arms control negotiations as well as the requirements of Alliance security and of its strategy of deterrence. They therefore directed the Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction with the appropriate military authorities, to "consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament". (1)

2. The attached report, prepared by the Council in response to that mandate, was adopted by Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 29th and 30th May 1989.

(1) For ease of reference, the text of the Reykjavik Communiqué is attached.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The overriding objective of the Alliance is to preserve peace in freedom, to prevent war, and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The Allies' policy to this end was set forth in the Harel Report of 1967. It remains valid. According to the Report, the North Atlantic Alliance's "first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur". On that basis, the Alliance can carry out "its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved". As the Report observed, military security and a policy aimed at reducing tensions are "not contradictory, but complementary". Consistent with these principles, Allied Heads of State and Government have agreed that arms control is an integral part of the Alliance's security policy.

2. The possibilities for fruitful East-West dialogue have significantly improved in recent years. More favourable conditions now exist for progress towards the achievement of the Alliance's objectives. The Allies are resolved to grasp this opportunity. They will continue to address both the symptoms and the causes of political tension in a manner that respects the legitimate security interests of all states concerned.

3. The achievement of the lasting peaceful order which the Allies seek will require that the unnatural division of Europe, and particularly of Germany, be overcome, and that, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and the right of peoples to self-determination be respected and that the rights of all individuals, including their right of political choice, be protected. The members of the Alliance accordingly attach central importance to further progress in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, which serves as a framework for the promotion of peaceful evolution in Europe.
4. The CSCE process provides a means to encourage stable and constructive East-West relations by increasing contacts between people, by seeking to ensure that basic rights and freedoms are respected in law and practice, by furthering political exchanges and mutually beneficial cooperation across a broad range of endeavours, and by enhancing security and openness in the military sphere. The Allies will continue to demand full implementation of all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the Madrid Concluding Document, the Stockholm Document, and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting. The latter document marks a major advance in the CSCE process and should stimulate further beneficial changes in Europe.

5. The basic goal of the Alliance's arms control policy is to enhance security and stability at the lowest balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements of the strategy of deterrence. The Allies are committed to achieving continuing progress towards all their arms control objectives. The further development of the Comprehensive Concept is designed to assist this by ensuring an integrated approach covering both defence policy and arms control policy: these are complementary and interactive. This work also requires full consideration of the interrelationship between arms control objectives and defence requirements and how various arms control measures, separately and in conjunction with each other, can strengthen Alliance security. The guiding principles and basic objectives which have so far governed the arms control policy of the Alliance remain valid. Progress in achieving these objectives is, of course, affected by a number of factors. These include the overall state of East-West relations, the military requirements of the Allies, the progress of existing and future arms control negotiations, and developments in the CSCE process. The further development and implementation of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament will take place against this background.

II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

6. The Alliance continues to seek a just and stable peace in Europe in which all states can enjoy undiminished security at the minimum necessary levels of forces and armaments and all individuals can exercise their basic rights and freedoms. Arms control alone cannot resolve longstanding political differences between East and West nor guarantee a stable peace. Nonetheless, achievement of the Alliance's goal will require substantial advances in arms control, as well as more fundamental changes in political relations. Success in arms control, in addition to enhancing military security, can encourage improvements in the East-West political dialogue and thereby contribute to the achievement of broader Alliance objectives.
7. To increase security and stability in Europe, the Alliance has consistently pursued every opportunity for effective arms control. The Allies are committed to this policy, independent of any changes that may occur in the climate of East-West relations. Success in arms control, however, continues to depend not on our own efforts alone, but also on Eastern and particularly Soviet readiness to work constructively towards mutually beneficial results.

8. The immediate past has witnessed unprecedented progress in the field of arms control. In 1986 the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreement created an innovative system of confidence and security-building measures, designed to promote military transparency and predictability. To date, these have been satisfactorily implemented. The 1987 INF Treaty marked another major step forward because it eliminated a whole class of weapons, it established the principle of asymmetrical reductions, and provided for a stringent verification regime. Other achievements include the establishment in the United States and the Soviet Union of nuclear risk reduction centres, the US/Soviet agreement on prior notification of ballistic missile launches, and the conduct of the Joint Verification Experiment in connection with continued US/Soviet negotiations on nuclear testing.

9. In addition to agreements already reached, there has been substantial progress in the START negotiations which are intended to reduce radically strategic nuclear arsenals and eliminate destabilising offensive capabilities. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has reaffirmed the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and given powerful political impetus to the negotiations in Geneva for a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. New distinct negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process have now begun in Vienna: one on conventional armed forces in Europe between the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and one on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) among all 35 signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

10. There has also been substantial progress on other matters important to the West. Soviet troops have left Afghanistan. There has been movement toward the resolution of some, although not all, of the remaining regional conflicts in which the Soviet Union is involved. The observance of human rights in the Soviet Union and in some of the other WTO countries has significantly improved, even if serious deficiencies remain. The recent Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting succeeded in setting new, higher standards of conduct for participating states and should stimulate further progress in the CSCE process. A new intensity of dialogue, particularly at high-level, between East and West opens new opportunities and testifies to the Allies' commitment to resolve the fundamental problems that remain.
11. The Alliance does not claim exclusive responsibility for this favourable evolution in East-West relations. In recent years, the East has become more responsive and flexible. Nonetheless, the Alliance's contribution has clearly been fundamental. Most of the achievements to date, which have been described above, were inspired by initiatives by the Alliance or its members. The Allies' political solidarity, commitment to defence, patience and creativity in negotiations overcame initial obstacles and brought its efforts to fruition. It was the Alliance that drew up the basic blueprints for East-West progress and has since pushed them forward towards realisation. In particular, the concepts of stability, reasonable sufficiency, asymmetrical reductions, concentration on the most offensive equipment, rigorous verification, transparency, a single zone from the Atlantic to the Ural, and the balanced and comprehensive nature of the CSCE process, are Western-inspired.

12. Prospects are now brighter than ever before for lasting, qualitative improvements in the East-West relationship. There continue to be clear signs of change in the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union and of some of its Allies. The Soviet leadership has stated that ideological competition should play no part in inter-state relations. Soviet acknowledgement of serious shortcomings in its past approaches to international as well as domestic issues creates opportunities for progress on fundamental political problems.

13. At the same time, serious concerns remain. The ambitious Soviet reform programme, which the Allies welcome, will take many years to complete. Its success cannot be taken for granted given the magnitude of the problems it faces and the resistance generated. In Eastern Europe, progress in constructive reform is still uneven and the extent of these reforms remains to be determined. Basic human rights still need to be firmly anchored in law and practice, though in some Warsaw Pact countries improvements are underway. Although the WTO has recently announced and begun unilateral reductions in some of its forces, the Soviet Union continues to deploy military forces and to maintain a pace of military production in excess of legitimate defensive requirements. Moreover, the geo-strategic realities favour the geographically contiguous Soviet-dominated WTO as against the geographically separated democracies of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has long been an objective of the Soviet Union to weaken the links between the European and North American members of the Alliance.
14. We face an immediate future that is promising but still uncertain. The Allies and the East face both a challenge and an opportunity to capitalise on present conditions in order to increase mutual security. The progress recently made in East-West relations has given new impetus to the arms control process and has enhanced the possibilities of achieving the Alliance's arms control objectives, which complement the other elements of the Alliance's security policy.

III. PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE SECURITY

15. Alliance security policy aims to preserve peace in freedom by both political means and the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence. The fact that the Alliance has for forty years safeguarded peace in Europe bears witness to the success of this policy.

16. Improved political relations and the progressive development of cooperative structures between Eastern and Western countries are important components of Alliance policy. They can enhance mutual confidence, reduce the risk of misunderstanding, ensure that there are in place reliable arrangements for crisis management so that tensions can be defused, render the situation in Europe more open and predictable, and encourage the development of wider cooperation in all fields.

17. In underlining the importance of these facts for the formulation of Alliance policy, the Allies reaffirm that, as stated in the Harmel Report, the search for constructive dialogue and cooperation with the countries of the East, including arms control and disarmament, is based on political solidarity and adequate military strength.

18. Solidarity among the Alliance countries is a fundamental principle of their security policy. It reflects the indivisible nature of their security. It is expressed by the willingness of each country to share fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities of the common effort as well as its benefits. In particular, the presence in Europe of the United States' conventional and nuclear forces and of Canadian forces demonstrates that North American and European security interests are inseparably bound together.

19. From its inception the Alliance of Western democracies has been defensive in purpose. This will remain so. None of our weapons will ever be used except in self-defence. The Alliance does not seek military superiority nor will it ever do so. Its aim has always been to prevent war and any form of coercion and intimidation.
20. Consistent with the Alliance's defensive character, its strategy is one of deterrence. Its objective is to convince a potential aggressor before he acts that he is confronted with a risk that outweighs any gain - however great - he might hope to secure from his aggression. The purpose of this strategy defines the means needed for its implementation.

21. In order to fulfill its strategy, the Alliance must be capable of responding appropriately to any aggression and of meeting its commitment to the defence of the frontiers of its members' territory. For the foreseeable future, deterrence requires an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary; for it is only by their evident and perceived capability for effective use that such forces and weapons deter.

22. Conventional forces make an essential contribution to deterrence. The elimination of asymmetries between the conventional forces of East and West in Europe would be a major breakthrough, bringing significant benefits for stability and security. Conventional defence alone cannot, however, ensure deterrence. Only the nuclear element can confront an aggressor with an unacceptable risk and thus plays an indispensable role in our current strategy of war prevention.

23. The fundamental purpose of nuclear forces - both strategic and sub-strategic - is political: to preserve the peace and to prevent any kind of war. Such forces contribute to deterrence by demonstrating that the Allies have the military capability and the political will to use them, if necessary, in response to aggression. Should aggression occur, the aim would be to restore deterrence by inducing the aggressor to reconsider his decision, to terminate his attack and to withdraw and thereby to restore the territorial integrity of the Alliance.

24. Conventional and nuclear forces, therefore, perform different but complementary and mutually reinforcing roles. Any perceived inadequacy in either of these two elements, or the impression that conventional forces could be separated from nuclear, or sub-strategic from strategic nuclear forces, might lead a potential adversary to conclude that the risks of launching aggression might be calculable and acceptable. No single element can, therefore, be regarded as a substitute compensating for deficiencies in any other.

25. For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative strategy for the prevention of war. The implementation of this strategy will continue to ensure that the security interests of all Alliance members are fully safeguarded. The principles
underlying the strategy of deterrence are of enduring validity. Their practical expression in terms of the size, structure and deployment of forces is bound to change. As in the past, these elements will continue to evolve in response to changing international circumstances, technological progress and developments in the scale of the threat—in particular, in the posture and capabilities of the forces of the Warsaw Pact.

26. Within this overall framework, strategic nuclear forces provide the ultimate guarantee of deterrence for the Allies. They must be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on an aggressor state even after it has carried out a first strike. Their number, range, survivability and penetration capability need to ensure that a potential aggressor cannot count on limiting the conflict or regarding his own territory as a sanctuary. The strategic nuclear forces of the United States provide the cornerstone of deterrence for the Alliance as a whole. The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France fulfil a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall deterrence strategy of the Alliance by complicating the planning and risk assessment of a potential aggressor.

27. Nuclear forces below the strategic level provide an essential political and military linkage between conventional and strategic forces and, together with the presence of Canadian and the United States forces in Europe, between the European and North American members of the Alliance. The Allies' sub-strategic nuclear forces are not designed to compensate for conventional imbalances. The levels of such forces in the integrated military structure nevertheless must take into account the threat—both conventional and nuclear—with which the Alliance is faced. Their role is to ensure that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military action. Nuclear forces below the strategic level thus make an essential contribution to deterrence.

28. The wide deployment of such forces among countries participating in the integrated military structure of the Alliance, as well as the arrangements for consultation in the nuclear area among the Allies concerned, demonstrates solidarity and willingness to share nuclear roles and responsibilities. It thereby helps to reinforce deterrence.

29. Conventional forces contribute to deterrence by demonstrating the Allies' will to defend themselves and by minimising the risk that a potential aggressor could anticipate a quick and easy victory or limited territorial gain achieved solely by conventional means.
30. They must thus be able to respond appropriately and to confront the aggressor immediately and as far forward as possible with the necessary resistance to compel him to end the conflict and to withdraw or face possible recourse to the use of nuclear weapons by the Allies. The forces of the Allies must be deployed and equipped so as to enable them to fulfil this role at all times. Moreover, since the Alliance depends on reinforcements from the North American continent, it must be able to keep open sea and air lines of communication between North America and Europe.

31. All member countries of the Alliance strongly favour a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons represent a particular case, since the Alliance's overall strategy of war prevention, as noted earlier, depends on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons. Pending the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, the Alliance recognises the need to implement passive defence measures. A retaliatory capability on a limited scale is retained in view of the Soviet Union's overwhelming chemical weapons capability.

32. The Allies are committed to maintaining only the minimum level of forces necessary for their strategy of deterrence, taking into account the threat. There is, however, a level of forces, both nuclear and conventional, below which the credibility of deterrence cannot be maintained. In particular, the Allies have always recognised that the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe would critically undermine deterrence strategy and impair the security of the Alliance.

33. The Alliance's defence policy and its policy of arms control and disarmament are complementary and have the same goal: to maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces. There is no contradiction between defence policy and arms control policy. It is on the basis of this fundamental consistency of principles and objectives that the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament should be further developed and the appropriate conclusions drawn in each of the areas of arms control.

IV. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

34. Our vision for Europe is that of an undivided continent where military forces only exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, as has always been the case for the Allies, not for the purpose of initiating aggression or for political or military intimidation. Arms control can contribute to the realisation of that vision as an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and of our overall approach to East-West relations.
35. The goal of Alliance arms control policy is to enhance security and stability. To this end, the Allies' arms control initiatives seek a balance at a lower level of forces and armaments through negotiated agreements and, as appropriate, unilateral actions, recognising that arms control agreements are only possible where the negotiating partners share an interest in achieving a mutually satisfactory result. The Allies' arms control policy seeks to remove destabilising asymmetries in forces or equipment. It also pursues measures designed to build mutual confidence and to reduce the risk of conflict by promoting greater transparency and predictability in military matters.

36. In enhancing security and stability, arms control can also bring important additional benefits for the Alliance. Given the dynamic aspects of the arms control process, the principles and results embodied in one agreement may facilitate other arms control steps. In this way arms control can also make possible further reductions in the level of Alliance forces and armaments, consistent with the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter II, arms control can make a significant contribution to the development of more constructive East-West relations and of a framework for further cooperation within a more stable and predictable international environment. Progress in arms control can also enhance public confidence in and promote support for our overall security policy.

**Guiding Principles for Arms Control**

37. The members of the Alliance will be guided by the following principles:

- **Security:** Arms control should enhance the security of all Allies. Both during the implementation period and following implementation, the Allies' strategy of deterrence and their ability to defend themselves, must remain credible and effective. Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security. Arms control measures should respect the legitimate security interests of all states and should not facilitate the transfer or intensification of threats to third party states or regions.

- **Stability:** Arms control measures should yield militarily significant results that enhance stability. To promote stability, arms control measures should reduce or eliminate those capabilities which are most...
threatening to the Alliance. Stability can also be enhanced by steps that promote greater transparency and predictability in military matters. Military stability requires the elimination of options for surprise attack and for large-scale offensive action. Crisis stability requires that no state have forces of a size and configuration which, when compared with those of others, could enable it to calculate that it might gain a decisive advantage by being the first to resort to arms. Stability also requires measures which discourage destabilising attempts to re-establish military advantage through the transfer of resources to other types of armament. Agreements must lead to final results that are both balanced and ensure equality of rights with respect to security.

Verifiability: Effective and reliable verification is a fundamental requirement for arms control agreements. If arms control is to be effective and to build confidence, the verifiability of proposed arms control measures must, therefore, be of central concern for the Alliance. Progress in arms control should be measured against the record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms control measures should exclude opportunities for circumvention.

Alliance Arms Control Objectives

38. In accordance with the above principles, the Allies are pursuing an ambitious arms control agenda for the coming years in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields.

Nuclear Forces

39. The INF Agreement represents a milestone in the Allies' efforts to achieve a more secure peace at lower levels of arms. By 1991, it will lead to the total elimination of all United States and Soviet intermediate range land-based missiles, thereby removing the threat which such Soviet systems presented to the Alliance. Implementation of the agreement, however, will affect only a small proportion of the Soviet nuclear armoury, and the Alliance continues to face a substantial array of modern and effective Soviet systems of all ranges. The full realisation of the Alliance agenda thus requires that further steps be taken.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

40. Soviet strategic systems continue to pose a major threat to the whole of the Alliance. Deep cuts in such systems are in the direct interests of the entire Western Alliance, and therefore their achievement constitutes a priority for the Alliance in the nuclear field.
41. The Allies thus fully support the US objectives of achieving, within the context of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, fifty percent reductions in US and Soviet strategic nuclear arms. US proposals seek to enhance stability by placing specific restrictions on the most destabilising elements of the threat - fast flying ballistic missiles, throw-weight and, in particular, Soviet heavy ICBMs. The proposals are based on the need to maintain the deterrent credibility of the remaining US strategic forces which would continue to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for the Alliance as a whole; and therefore on the necessity to keep such forces effective. Furthermore, the United States is holding talks with the Soviet Union on defence and space matters in order to ensure that strategic stability is enhanced.

Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces

42. The Allies are committed to maintaining only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to support their strategy of deterrence. In line with this commitment, the members of the integrated military structure have already made major unilateral cuts in their sub-strategic nuclear armoury. The number of land-based warheads in Western Europe has been reduced by over one-third since 1979 to its lowest level in over 20 years. Updating where necessary of their sub-strategic systems would result in further reductions.

43. The Allies continue to face the direct threat posed to Europe by the large numbers of shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact territory and which have been substantially upgraded in recent years. Major reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be of overall value to Alliance security. One of the ways to achieve this aim would be by tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range leading to equal ceilings at lower levels.

44. But the sub-strategic nuclear forces deployed by member countries of the Alliance are not principally a counter to similar systems operated by members of the WTO. As is explained in Chapter III, sub-strategic nuclear forces fulfil an essential role in overall Alliance deterrence strategy by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount nuclear retaliation in response to his military action.

45. The Alliance reaffirms its position that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, which is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to data where necessary. Where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in the present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen will be needed in Europe.
46. In view of the huge superiority of the Warsaw Pact in terms of short-range nuclear missiles, the Alliance calls upon the Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its short-range missile systems to the current levels within the integrated military structure.

47. The Alliance reaffirms that at the negotiations on conventional stability it pursues the objectives of:

- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;

- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and

- the elimination as a matter of high priority of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

48. In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the Alliance states that one of its highest priorities in negotiations with the East is reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions which would achieve the objectives above. In this spirit, the Allies will make every effort, as evidenced by the outcome of the May 1989 Summit, to bring these conventional negotiations to an early and satisfactory conclusion. The United States has expressed the hope that this could be achieved within six to twelve months. Once implementation of such an agreement is underway, the United States, in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels. With special reference to the Western proposals on CFE tabled in Vienna, enhanced by the proposals by the United States at the May 1989 Summit, the Allies concerned proceed on the understanding that negotiated reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried out until the results of these negotiations have been implemented. Reductions of Warsaw Pact SNF systems should be carried out before that date.
49. As regards the sub-strategic nuclear forces of the members of the integrated military structure, their level and characteristics must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the Alliance is faced. The question concerning the introduction and deployment of a follow-on system for the Lance will be dealt with in 1992 in the light of overall security developments. While a decision for national authorities, the Allies concerned recognise the value of the continued funding by the United States of research and development of a follow-on for the existing Lance short-range missile, in order to preserve their options in this respect.

Conventional Forces

50. As set out in the March 1988 Summit statement and in the Alliance's November 1988 data initiative, the Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level far in excess of its needs for self-defence, directly challenges our security as well as our aspirations for a peaceful order in Europe. Such excessive force levels create the risk of political intimidation or threatened aggression. As long as they exist, they present an obstacle to better political relations between all states of Europe. The challenge to security is, moreover, not only a matter of the numerical superiority of WTO forces. WTO tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers are concentrated in large formations and deployed in such a way as to give the WTO a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. Despite the recent welcome publication by the WTO of its assessment of the military balance in Europe, there is still considerable secrecy and uncertainty about its actual capabilities and intentions.

51. In addressing these concerns, the Allies' primary objectives are to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels, while at the same time creating greater openness about military organisation and activities in Europe.

52. In the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks between the 23 members of the two alliances, the Allies are proposing:

- reductions to an overall limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe, concentrating on the most threatening systems, i.e. those capable of seizing and holding territory;
- a limit on the proportion of these total holdings belonging to any one country in Europe (since the security and stability of Europe require that no state exceed its legitimate needs for self-defence);

- a limit on stationed forces (thus restricting the forward deployment and concentration of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe); and,

- appropriate numerical sub-limits on forces which will apply simultaneously throughout the Atlantic to the Urals area.

These measures, taken together, will necessitate deep cuts in the WTO conventional forces which most threaten the Alliance. The resulting reductions will have to take place in such a way as to prevent circumvention, e.g. by ensuring that the armaments reduced are destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Verification measures will be required to ensure that all states have confidence that entitlements are not exceeded.

53. These measures alone, however, will not guarantee stability. The regime of reductions will have to be backed up by additional measures which should include measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, storage, movement and levels of readiness and availability of conventional forces.

54. In the CSEM negotiations, the Allies aim to maintain the momentum created by the successful implementation of the Stockholm Document by proposing a comprehensive package of measures to improve:

- transparency about military organisation,

- transparency and predictability of military activities,

- contacts and communication,

and have also proposed an exchange of views on military doctrine in a seminar setting.

55. The implementation of the Allies' proposals in the CFE negotiations and of their proposals for further confidence and security-building measures would achieve a quantum improvement in European security. This would have important and positive consequences for Alliance policy both in the field of defence and arms control. The outcome of the CFE negotiations would provide a framework for determining the future Alliance force structure.
required to perform its fundamental task of preserving peace in freedom. In addition, the Allies would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security if the immediate CFZ objectives are achieved - for example, further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment, or the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further reduce offensive capabilities.

56. The Allies welcome the declared readiness of the Soviet Union and other WTO members to reduce their forces and adjust them towards a defensive posture and await implementation of these measures. This would be a step in the direction of redressing the imbalance in force levels existing in Europe and towards reducing the Warsaw Pact capability for surprise attack. The announced reductions demonstrate the recognition by the Soviet Union and other WTO members of the conventional imbalance, long highlighted by the Allies as a key problem of European security.

Chemical Weapons

57. The Soviet Union's chemical weapons stockpile poses a massive threat. The Allies are committed to conclude, at the earliest date, a worldwide, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

58. All Alliance states subscribe to the prohibitions contained in the Geneva Protocol for the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reaffirmed the importance of the commitments made under the Geneva Protocol and expressed the unanimous will of the international community to eliminate chemical weapons completely at an early date and thereby to prevent any recourse to their use.

59. The Allies wish to prohibit not only the use of these abhorrent weapons, but also their development, production, stockpiling and transfer, and to achieve the destruction of existing chemical weapons and production facilities in such a way as to ensure the undiminished security of all participants at each stage in the process. Those objectives are being pursued in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Pending agreement on a global ban, the Allies will enforce stringent controls on the export of commodities related to chemical weapons production. They will also attempt to stimulate more openness among states about chemical weapons capabilities in order to promote greater confidence in the effectiveness of a global ban.
V. CONCLUSIONS:

Arms Control and Defence Interrelationships

60. The Alliance is committed to pursuing a comprehensive approach to security, embracing both arms control and disarmament, and defence. It is important, therefore, to ensure that interrelationships between arms control issues and defence requirements and amongst the various arms control areas are fully considered. Proposals in any one area of arms control must take account of the implications for Alliance interests in general and for other negotiations. This is a continuing process.

61. It is essential that defence and arms control objectives remain in harmony in order to ensure their complementary contribution to the goal of maintaining security at the lowest balanced level of forces consistent with the requirements of the Alliance strategy of war prevention, acknowledging that changes in the threat, new technologies, and new political opportunities affect options in both fields. Decisions on arms control matters must fully reflect the requirements of the Allies' strategy of deterrence. Equally, progress in arms control is relevant to military plans, which will have to be developed in the full knowledge of the objectives pursued in arms control negotiations and to reflect, as necessary, the results achieved therein.

62. In each area of arms control, the Alliance seeks to enhance stability and security. The current negotiations concerning strategic nuclear systems, conventional forces and chemical weapons are, however, independent of one another: the outcome of any one of these negotiations is not contingent on progress in others. However, they can influence one another: criteria established and agreements achieved in one area of arms control may be relevant in other areas and hence facilitate overall progress. These could affect both arms control possibilities and the forces needed to fulfil Alliance strategy, as well as help to contribute generally to a more predictable military environment.

63. The Allies seek to manage the interaction among different arms control elements by ensuring that the development, pursuit and realisation of their arms control objectives in individual areas are fully consistent both with each other and with the Alliance's guiding principles for effective arms control. For example, the way in which START limits and sub-limits are applied in detail could affect the future flexibility of the sub-strategic nuclear forces of members of the integrated military structure. A CFE agreement would by itself
make a major contribution to stability. This would be significantly further enhanced by the achievement of a global chemical weapons ban. The development of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures could influence the stabilising measures being considered in connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations and vice versa. The removal of the imbalance in conventional forces would provide scope for further reductions in the sub-strategic nuclear forces of members of the integrated military structure, though it would not obviate the need for such forces. Similarly, this might make possible further arms control steps in the conventional field.

64. This report establishes the overall conceptual framework within which the Allies will be seeking progress in each area of arms control. In so doing, their fundamental aim will be enhanced security at lower levels of forces and armaments. Taken as a whole, the Allies' arms control agenda constitutes a coherent and comprehensive approach to the enhancement of security and stability. It is ambitious, but we are confident that - with a constructive response from the WTO states - it can be fully achieved in the coming years. In pursuing this goal, the Alliance recognises that it cannot afford to build its security upon arms control results expected in the future. The Allies will be prepared, however, to draw appropriate consequences for their own military posture as they make concrete progress through arms control towards a significant reduction in the scale and quality of the military threat they face. Accomplishment of the Allies' arms control agenda would not only bring great benefits in itself, but could also lead to the expansion of cooperation with the East in other areas. The arms control process itself is, moreover, dynamic; as and when the Alliance reaches agreement in each of the areas set out above, so further prospects for arms control may be opened up, and further progress made possible.

65. As noted earlier, the Allies' vision for Europe is that of an undivided continent where military forces only exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence; a continent which no longer lives in the shadow of overwhelming military forces and from which the threat of war has been removed; a continent where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states are respected and the rights of all individuals, including their right of political choice, are protected. This goal can only be reached by stages: it will require patient and creative endeavour. The Allies are resolved to continue working towards its attainment. The achievement of the Alliance's arms control objectives would be a major contribution towards the realisation of its vision.
LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1989 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A
COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES TOGETHER WITH THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT
ENTITLED "FOR A STABLE AND SECURE EUROPE FREE OF NUCLEAR AND
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOR A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES,
ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY SPENDING"

I have the honour to inform you that a meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held at Bucharest on 7 and
8 July 1989.

A communiqué was adopted along with a document entitled "For a Stable and
Secure Europe Free of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for a Substantial
Reduction of Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Spending".

You will find annexed hereto the texts of those documents in Russian,
English, French and Spanish.

As representative of the meeting's host country, I request you to arrange
for their distribution as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

Gheorghe Dolgu

Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties
to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was
held at Bucharest on 7 and 8 July.

The Meeting was attended:

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) - by Todor Zhivkov, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP),
President of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, head
of the delegation; Georgi Atanasov, member of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the BCP, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRB;
Dobri Dzhurov, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
BCP, Minister of National Defence; Petur Mladenov, member of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee of the BCP, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Dimitur Stanishev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP;

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) - by Milos Jakes, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
(CPC), head of the delegation; Gustav Husak, member of the Presidium of the
Central Committee of the CPC, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic; Ladislav Adamec, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of
the CPC, Prime Minister of the CSSR; Josef Lenart, member of the Presidium,
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC; Jaromir Johannes, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the CSSR; Milan Vaclavik, member of the Central Committee
of the CPC, Minister of National Defence of the CSSR;

For the German Democratic Republic (GDR) - by Erich Honecker, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany
(SED), Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic,
head of the delegation; Willi Stoph, member of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the SED, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR;
Hermann Axen, member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central
Committee of the SED; Heinz Kessler, member of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the SED, Minister of National Defence of the GDR;
Egon Krenz, member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Committee
of the SED, Vice-Chairman of the GDR Council of State; Günter Mittag, member
of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED,
Vice-Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR; Oskar Fischer, member of the
Central Committee of the SED, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR;

For the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR) - by Reszö Nyers, President of
the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, head of the delegation; Miklós Németh,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic;
Gyula Horn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the HPR; Ferenc Kárpáti, Minister
of Defence of the HPR;

For the Polish People's Republic (PPR) - by Wojciech Jaruzelski, First
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR);
Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, head of the
delegation; Mieczyslaw Rakowski, member of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the PUWP, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR; Józef Czyrek, member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP; Czesław Kiszczał, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Minister of Internal Affairs of the PPR; Florian Siwicki, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Minister of National Defence of the PPR; Tadeusz Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the PPR;

For the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR) - by Nicolae Ceaușescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, head of the delegation; Constantin Dascălescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the RCP, Prime Minister of the SRR; Ion Stoian, Alternate Member of the Executive Political Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP; Vasile Milea, Alternate Member of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the RCP, Minister of National Defence of the SRR; Ioan Totu, Alternate Member of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the RCP, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the SRR;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, head of the delegation; N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR; A.N. Yakovlev, member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Defence of the USSR.

The Meeting was also attended by Army General P.G. Lushev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, and Constantin Oancea, Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Committee, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The Meeting's participants exchanged views on developments in the international situation and discussed the main directions of mutual action by the allied States in the interests of peace and stability in Europe, of disarmament, and of intensifying international co-operation and dialogue.

It was noted that owing to the active policy of the Socialist countries, to the activities of all peace-loving and realistically-minded forces, there have been certain positive developments in international affairs, the lessening of tension and confrontation, confidence-building, developing political dialogue and intensifying inter-State contacts at various levels. The first steps in disarmament have been taken, a control mechanism has been created and is functioning effectively. The beginning of the Vienna negotiations is encouraging. Co-operation in the economic, scientific-technical and human rights fields has broadened. Progress has been made in the political settlement of regional conflicts. There is a growing readiness of the international community to co-operate in the field of security and in solving global issues.
Nevertheless, the world situation continues to be complex and contradictory, since the favourable processes have still not become irreversible. The build-up of weapons and their modernization has not stopped. Nuclear tests continue, as does work on the militarization of outer space. The concepts of confrontation, of reliance on force, born in the years of the "cold war" are being overcome with difficulty. The nuclear-deterrence strategy, reaffirmed at the recent session of NATO, remains a dangerous anachronism which runs counter to the interests of universal security. The practice of interference in the domestic affairs of States and attempts to destabilize them, as well as human rights violations, continue.

The Meeting's participants confirmed the attachment of their States to the ideal of ridding mankind of the threat of war by doing away with nuclear and chemical weapons and drastically reducing conventional weapons. They consider disarmament the cardinal issue of our time, the decisive factor for strengthening peace, security and confidence, deepening détente, developing broad international co-operation and solving global problems.

The Warsaw Treaty States attach paramount importance to the development of the common-Europe process in all areas, to bringing the continent to a new level of security and co-operation, to progress along the path of building an indivisible Europe of lasting peace and co-operation, of a common European home of countries having different social and State structures, of respect for today's territorial and political realities, of inviolability of existing frontiers, of every people's sovereignty and right freely to determine its destiny. Determination was expressed to promote in every possible way the implementation of the arrangements arrived at in the Vienna Meeting aimed at strengthening peace and security, better understanding and co-operation on the continent.

The position of the allied States on ensuring European and universal security and on the disarmament process is described in the document "For a Stable and Secure Europe free of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for a Substantial Reduction of Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Spending" adopted by the Meeting.

The Meeting's participants called for shifting the relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance into a non-confrontational channel, for the establishment of a constructive dialogue between them on political and military policies, for transforming such dialogue into a factor of security and co-operation on the continent. At the same time, the Warsaw Treaty States maintain their position of principle in favour of ridding Europe of military blocs, the simultaneous disbanding of both alliances and, as a first step, the elimination of their military organizations.

The States represented at the Meeting strongly urged the peaceful settlement of the regional conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Central America. Life has shown that negotiations are a productive procedure and that there is no rational alternative to it. They will continue to contribute to the political settlement of crisis situations in the world and to the further enhancement of the role of the United Nations in this respect.
In that connection, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty called for the holding, without delay, of an international conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and of a comprehensive Middle East Settlement on the basis of recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the existence of an independent State of Palestine, as well as the right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States in the region, including Israel. The Meeting's participants voiced their support for the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, for a just settlement of the situation in that country on the basis of national reconciliation, for a united, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan whose people is entitled to determine its own destiny without any outside interference.

Expressing concern over the serious economic problems being encountered by mankind, the deepening gap between developed and developing countries, the incessant increase in external debts and in the national resources required for their repayment, the States represented at the Meeting called for concerted efforts by all countries to solve these problems on an equitable basis, and on an equal footing, with the active participation of the United Nations, and for the establishment of a new international economic order. The Meeting underscored the need to eliminate the continuing discriminatory restrictions on the growth of trade, economic and scientific-technical relations based on the equal rights of the parties, and restrictions on access to modern technology. Economic relations must not be conditional upon political or other considerations.

In examining questions of collaboration in the preservation and restoration of the environment, the Meeting's participants reaffirmed the position of their countries as set forth in the document of the 1988 Warsaw Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, entitled "The consequences of the arms race for the environment and other aspects of ecological security". The participants expressed their readiness actively to work together with other countries, both multilaterally and bilaterally, in the solution of ecological problems and to promote the success of the Meeting on Protection of the Environment to be held at Sofia this autumn so that it may mark an important step in strengthening international co-operation in this area, and in the preparation of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development planned for 1992.

Noting the important role of the non-aligned movement in international life, the Meeting's participants expressed the hope that the forthcoming summit of the non-aligned countries would serve to increase the contribution of the movement to the solution of the key questions of our time, and to enhance its prestige and influence. The States represented at the Meeting attach great importance to the further development of relations with the non-aligned countries and to collaboration with them in international affairs.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will promote in every possible way the fuller exploitation of the peace-making potential of the United Nations, with the participation of all countries, irrespective of size and social structure, in the solution of world problems. They favour
enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations and wider use of the Organization's peacekeeping operations. They stressed the importance of active involvement of the United Nations in efforts to prevent international crises.

The Meeting's participants informed one another of domestic developments in their countries, on the course and the problems of socialist construction, noting the growing interdependence of domestic and foreign policies. They underlined the strong influence of socialist ideas, the importance of the transformations taking place in the allied States aimed at improving and renewing socialist society, making its political systems continuously dynamic, developing their democracy, promoting the people's well-being, improving the quality of life, bringing out the aptitudes of every individual, and ensuring fundamental human rights and freedoms. They base themselves on the fact that there are no universal models of socialism, that no one has a monopoly of the truth. The construction of the new society is a creative process and is carried out in each country in keeping with its conditions, traditions and needs.

The Meeting reaffirmed their common effort to work in the interests of socialism, of improving the collaboration of the allied States and of unequivocally ensuring their security. Confidence was expressed in the ability of the socialist States, of the leading forces of society, to solve the problems that have arisen at the present stage of their development. The necessity was also stressed of developing relations among them on a basis of equality, independence and the right of each of them separately to work out its own political policy, strategy and tactics without outside interference.

The Meeting's participants were unanimous in considering that the Warsaw Treaty is reliably serving the security of the States parties to it and is an important factor for peace and stability in Europe and the world at large. The constructive activities - individual and collective - of the allied countries are having a positive influence on world processes and are stimulating the development of international relations on democratic principles and in the spirit of the new political thinking.

The common opinion favoured strengthening the solidarity and interaction of the allied States and further development of their many-sided collaboration on the basis of equal rights and mutual respect for the benefit of their fraternal peoples and in the interests of universal peace.

It was decided to continue efforts to strengthen the political character of the Warsaw Treaty and to improve the mechanism of co-operation within its framework on democratic principles.

The activities of the Committee of Foreign Ministers and the Committee of Defence Ministers were assessed as positive and their further tasks were defined.

The Political Consultative Committee adopted a decision on the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.
The Socialist Republic of Romania, as the host country of the Meeting, will be responsible for distributing the Committee's documents among other States and international organizations.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I. P. Aboimov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, was appointed General Secretary of the Political Consultative Committee for the next period.

The Meeting was held in an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation.

The next meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will be held in Moscow.
FOR A STABLE AND SECURE EUROPE FREE OF NUCLEAR AND
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOR A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF
ARMED FORCES, ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY SPENDING

The representatives, at the highest level, of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic,
the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist
Republic of Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assembled at
Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 1989 for a meeting of the Political Consultative
Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, basing themselves upon
the realities of today's world and guided by the desire of their States to
ensure stable security in Europe, to achieve further progress in disarmament,
actively to promote the restructuring of international relations along new
lines and the passage of mankind to a new stage of development in a context of
peace and co-operation, declared the following:

I.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider as the supreme goal of
their foreign policy the consolidation of peace, the liberation of mankind
from the threat of war and the development of broad, mutually advantageous
international co-operation. They intend to continue to contribute in every
way to ensuring comprehensive and equal security.

The States represented at the Meeting reaffirm their determination to do
their utmost to reach new understandings in the field of disarmament and to
make the process of disarmament continuous and irreversible. They also call
for overcoming underdevelopment, for the firm establishment of a new
international economic order, and for the urgent solution of ecological and
other global problems.

The solution of the problems on which the survival of mankind and the
progress of its civilization depend requires the joint efforts and active
participation of all countries and peoples. In this connection, the States
represented at the Meeting stress the need to strengthen the role of the
United Nations and their readiness to contribute thereto by every means.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty declare themselves resolutely in
favour of ensuring security not by military but by political means, of
confirming the primacy of international law in inter-State relations, of
maintaining normal relations between States irrespective of their social and
political systems, of renouncing confrontation and hostility in favour of
policies of partnership, mutual understanding, confidence and good-
neighbourliness, of mutual consideration of the interests of all States and
peoples, of co-operation in the field of human rights and in the humanitarian
field in keeping with the obligations they have assumed.

Indispensable requirements for a policy of security, mutual understanding
and co-operation among States are strict respect for the national
independence, sovereignty and equal rights of all States, the equal rights of
peoples and the right of each people to self-determination, the free choice of
the path of their social and political development; non-interference in
internal affairs; unconditional renunciation of the use or threat of force in
whatever form; strict respect for today's territorial and political realities,
inviolability of existing borders and the territorial integrity of States;
settlement of any disputes between States exclusively by peaceful means; implementation in every country of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their entirety for all, irrespective of race, sex, language, religion or nationality; development of co-operation between States in various fields on the basis of mutual advantage; conscientious fulfilment of obligations under international law; observance of all the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and of the other generally accepted norms of international relations.

In the context of the growing interdependence of today's world the implementation of all these principles will help to consolidate common human values and rules of conduct in international relations.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reaffirm their willingness to extend and intensify dialogue with all States, and to co-operate with them constructively for the solution of the problems facing Europe and the world. Such dialogue and such co-operation are especially necessary at this key moment in the evolution of the international situation.

II.

Considering the elimination of the threat of nuclear or conventional war and the strengthening of international security as the objective prerequisite for the survival and progress of mankind, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty regard the cessation of the arms race and disarmament as the principal task of today's world.

The growing awareness of governments and peoples of their common interest in security has made it possible to take the first steps towards reducing military confrontation. The possibility has emerged of moving from senseless and dangerous military rivalry to the peaceful collaboration of States. In this connection, the Meeting's participants note the special importance of the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-range Missiles, the conclusion of which has started a process of physical destruction of nuclear weapons, as well as the businesslike atmosphere lately being manifested in a number of disarmament forums.

Nevertheless, a radical reversal in the matter of disarmament has as yet not occurred. Despite the recognition by both alliances of the inadmissibility of a new war, the level of military confrontation remains extremely high and dangerous. NATO's efforts to continue the policy of operating from a position of strength and to follow the strategy of nuclear deterrence cannot but arouse concern.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider that such a situation requires the active efforts of all countries and of all peace-loving, realistically-minded forces. Basing themselves on the concept of mutual and indivisible security, they resolutely call for achieving it through the maintenance of the military balance at the lowest level sufficient only for defence and excluding the possibility of sudden attack or the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. Their objective is the reduction of armaments to a level which completely eliminates the threat of an outbreak of war. That objective can be attained only through the efforts of both sides, involving the comprehensive strengthening of the political, and not the military, factors of security and stability.
They reaffirm that they are ready to continue to seek, together with all interested countries, understandings leading to the staged reduction and subsequent complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the radical reduction of conventional armed forces, the prevention of extension of the arms race to outer space, the gradual curtailment of military production, and the substantial reduction of military spending. In that connection, they proceed from the assumption that disarmament measures must ensure equal security for all States with full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of every State in its existing borders, and must exclude the possibility of the use of force or the threat of force in inter-State relations.

Expressing their satisfaction at the resumption of Soviet-United States negotiations on major disarmament issues, the allied States express the hope that they will soon lead to practical results.

As one of the priority objectives, they consider completion of work on the treaty for a 50 per cent reduction in the offensive strategic arms of the USSR and the United States subject to observance of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty as it was signed in 1972.

The States represented at the Meeting call for the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests, for detailed examination of this question including examination at the multilateral level, in particular at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. They call for the rapid finalization of the verification protocols to the USSR-United States Agreements of 1974 and 1976 and the entry into force of those agreements as a step towards the complete cessation of nuclear tests. As one of the ways of speedily achieving the prohibition of all nuclear tests, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty support the idea of the possible extension to underground testing of the applicability of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments.

The agenda includes the task of cessation and, later on, of prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons, the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as of missile technology for military purposes. Another major task is the protection of peaceful nuclear projects from attack.

The Meeting's participants are concerned by the danger to peace and international security represented by the threat of use of chemical weapons as long as they exist and are disseminated, and propose the adoption of a set of measures to remove that threat. They call for the speedy preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

A key question of security and stability in Europe is the reduction of conventional armed forces, the reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and confidence-building on the continent.

As the most immediate objective of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, the Meeting's participants consider, already as the result of a preliminary agreement, the arrival at a collective ceiling, which will be the same for both the NATO and Warsaw Treaty States, on the number of troops and the quantity of main types of armaments in Europe and its various regions.
The new levels would be significantly lower than the lowest levels of either side at present. The proposals made in this regard by the allied socialist countries at Vienna provide for a drastic mutual reduction of troops and armaments. This would also solve the problem of eliminating the imbalances in the field of conventional weapons. The reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments would take place under strict international control.

At the Meeting it was noted that the additional proposals put forward at the recent summit meeting of the NATO Council on the subject of conventional weapons and conventional armed forces in Europe constitute a movement towards the position of the allied socialist countries. The Meeting's participants expect that those proposals will be detailed and placed on the table of the Vienna negotiations in the near future. The Meeting reaffirmed the determination of the Warsaw Treaty member countries to do everything possible for the speedy achievement of positive results at the Vienna talks and expressed the view that the situation at the talks is now such that, given a constructive approach by all participants, it would be possible to arrive at initial arrangements as early as 1990. Experts will be instructed to work out the relevant proposals in operational terms.

The practical steps taken by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in implementation of their defensive doctrine, for unilateral reduction of their armed forces and armaments, giving them an obvious non-offensive structure and reducing armaments production and military spending, are aimed at the creation of favourable material and political prerequisites for a steady continuation of the arms limitation process and a lowering of the level of military confrontation.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty expect the NATO countries to take reciprocal steps to reduce their armed forces, armaments, military expenditure and military activities.

The Meeting's participants called for the strict observance of the Stockholm arrangements, the adoption at negotiations of the 35 States participating in the CSCE of new confidence- and security-building measures to develop them, the extension of notification, observation and limitation measures to all types of military activities of States, including those of their naval and air forces.

The creation of a Centre for reducing the danger of war and preventing a surprise attack in Europe, a body with informational and consultative functions, is bound to become an important contribution to confidence- and security-building and stability enhancement on the continent.

Other proposals put forward at the talks by the State parties to the Warsaw Treaty are also aimed at achieving the purposes of confidence- and security-building.

A major step, capable of raising the process of disarmament and of strengthening European security to a qualitatively new level can be the convening of a meeting of leaders of the 35 States participating in the CSCE, at which the results attained in these fields would be examined and future tasks determined.
The allied socialist countries express the hope that consideration of military doctrines, their character, their political and military-technical aspects and their future development will facilitate the transition to military concepts and doctrines based on strictly defensive principles.

Stability and security in Europe cannot be complete and sufficiently reliable without a solution of the problem of tactical nuclear equipment. Moreover, as conventional armaments are reduced, the destabilizing role of tactical nuclear weapons will inevitably grow. In that connection, NATO's plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons are causing great concern.

Having noted a certain development in the position of the NATO countries regarding talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty call on the NATO countries to solve the problem of tactical nuclear weapons not by modernization but by separate negotiations aimed at their step-by-step reduction, and reaffirm their proposals in that regard.

The Meeting's participants expressed support for the Soviet Union's intention, in case the NATO countries are prepared to begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, to proceed to further unilateral reductions of tactical nuclear missiles stationed in Europe.

They also support the decision of the Soviet Union taken earlier this year unilaterally to withdraw from the territories of allied socialist countries 500 warheads of tactical nuclear missiles, as well as its declaration that it is prepared to withdraw during 1989-1991 all nuclear ammunition from the territories of its allies on condition of a similar reciprocal step on the part of the United States.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are convinced that a step-by-step reduction, and later elimination, of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, along with a drastic reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments would constitute an effective means of lowering the danger of war and strengthening mutual confidence.

Solutions of the problem of ensuring security and stability and an ever lower level of the military balance cannot ignore the significance of naval forces and their armament as well as naval activities capable of exerting a destabilizing influence on the situation and of creating a threat to security in Europe and other regions. The Meeting's participants advocate an active dialogue on this problem area and consider it necessary to begin separate negotiations for their consideration between the States concerned and, first of all, the major naval Powers.

The meeting emphasized that a reduction of military standing allows the resources economized to be directed to the needs of social and economic development. In that connection, the effective solution of the problem of converting military production acquires major importance and this might become a subject of international consultations, including consultations in the framework of the United Nations.
Also mentioned was the great importance of joint and individual initiatives for promoting the solution of security problems as they affect various regions of the continent, in particular, for creating a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe; for armaments reduction and confidence building in central Europe; for creating along the line of contact of the States of the two alliances a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations; for creating in the Balkans a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons; for converting the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation; and for a drastic reduction of the level of military confrontation in northern Europe. They support multilateral and bilateral practical steps for the implementation of those initiatives.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider that disarmament measures must be accompanied by strict appropriate measures of control. They are prepared to join in the most effective solutions leading to the creation of a comprehensive disarmament-control system. In this connection, the United Nations could play a constructive role.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reiterate their recent appeal to the States members of the North Atlantic alliance calling on them to utilize the opportunities now emerging for completely overcoming the consequences of the "Cold War" in Europe and worldwide. They reaffirm their position of principle in favour of disbanding both of the military-political alliances.

III.

The focus of the efforts of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty continues to be the task of ensuring stability and security in Europe, the consolidation of relations there of a new type based on overcoming confrontation, and strengthening confidence and good-neighbourliness. They advocate the development of broad mutually advantageous co-operation on an equal footing in various fields, the participation of all countries and peoples in settling the pressing problems of the continent. The main foundation for building the new Europe must continue to be the common European process.

Expressing their firm intention to foster by every means intensification of the Helsinki process, the meeting's participants base themselves on the principle that the creation of a Europe of peace and co-operation is not possible in isolation from all that has been achieved on the continent both over the centuries and during recent decades. Differences between particular States or groups of States must not hinder mutual understanding and interaction. On the contrary, the diversity of experience of the European peoples can become a source of mutual enrichment. In this connection, it is important for the processes taking place in different parts of the continent to facilitate the development of inter-State relations on a bilateral, multilateral, and common European basis.

The States participating in the Meeting attach great importance to the build-up of mutually advantageous economic and scientific-technical co-operation among the countries participating in the CSCE. This would enable each country to make optimum use of its material and human resources, and the
possibilities offered by the international division of labour in the interests of their social and economic development. It is necessary to remove the obstacles and restrictions on the path of development of trade, scientific, technical and production links, and to broaden mutual access to modern technologies.

The question of expanding and intensifying multilateral and bilateral co-operation in the solution of pressing ecological problems has acquired particular urgency. Europe could set an example in this respect.

An inseparable part of efforts to normalize the situation in Europe is the expansion of co-operation in the humanitarian field, the encouragement of human contacts, the development of collaboration in information exchanges and the flow of information as well as in culture and education.

One of the first requisites for ensuring peace and co-operation in Europe is that all human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenants on Economic and Social, and Civil and Political Rights, in the Helsinki Final Act and in other United Nations and CSCE documents should be achieved in each country. The Warsaw Treaty States call for the full achievement of the civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights in their interdependence.

The strengthening of peace and security in Europe would contribute to solving many serious social problems with which the peoples of the continent are confronted, would ensure the right to life and to work.

The Meeting's participants stress that a firm rebuff must be given to any manifestations of revanchism and chauvinism, any form of sowing hatred among peoples. They share the concern of public opinion in the western European countries about growing manifestations of neo-fascism.

The allied socialist States attach a primordial importance to ensuring military, political and territorial stability in Europe. They start from the fact that each people decides the fate of its country, and has the right to choose its sociopolitical and economic system, the State system it thinks fit. There can be no single standard for the organization of society.

Stability presupposes renunciation of confrontational doctrines, of reliance on force, inadmissibility of direct or indirect interference in the domestic affairs of States. No country may dictate events in another country, claim the position of judge or arbiter.

IV

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are ready to develop their collaboration with the other States participating in the common European process, with all the States concerned, to work together with these States with a view to reaching
understandings on deep arms cuts and on disarmament, the strengthening of security and stability in Europe, the transition from confrontation to collaboration in relations among States, the building of a Europe of lasting peace, good-neighbourliness and collaboration. They will be receptive to and support any step or constructive proposal in this direction.

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria
TODOR ZHIVKOV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party,
President of the State Council
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
MILOS JAKES
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

For the German Democratic Republic
ERICH HONECKER
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany
Chairman of the Council of State
of the German Democratic Republic

For the Hungarian People's Republic
REZSO NYERS
President of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

For the Polish People's Republic
WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI
First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Polish United Workers' Party,
President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic

For the Socialist Republic of Romania
NICOLAE CEAUŞESCU
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party,
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
President of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Bucharest, 8 July 1989
LETTER DATED 1 AUGUST 1989 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, TOGETHER WITH ITS ANNEXES AND THE AGREED STATEMENTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT, SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON
12 JUNE 1989 */

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Agreement between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, together with its Annexes and
the Agreed Statements in connection with the Agreement, signed in Moscow on

I would request that you make arrangements for the Agreement to be issued
as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official Russian text of the above-mentioned "Agreement between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" is
to be found in CD/942.
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Confirming their desire to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding,

Convinced of the necessity to prevent dangerous military activities, and thereby to reduce the possibility of incidents arising between their armed forces,

Committed to resolving expeditiously and peacefully any incident between their armed forces which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities,

Desiring to ensure the safety of the personnel and equipment of their armed forces when operating in proximity to one another during peacetime, and

Guided by generally recognized principles and rules of international law,

Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

For the purposes of this Agreement:

1. "Armed forces" means, for the United States of America: the armed forces of the United States, including the United States Coast Guard; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: the armed forces of the USSR, and the Border Troops of the USSR.

2. "Personnel" means any individual, military or civilian, who is serving in or is employed by the armed forces of the Parties.

3. "Equipment" means any ship, aircraft or ground hardware of the armed forces of the Parties.

4. "Ship" means any warship or auxiliary ship of the armed forces of the Parties.

5. "Aircraft" means any military aircraft of the armed forces of the Parties, excluding spacecraft.

6. "Ground hardware" means any materiel of the armed forces of the Parties designed for use on land.

7. "Laser" means any source of intense, coherent, highly directional electromagnetic radiation in the visible, infrared, or ultraviolet regions that is based on the stimulated radiation of electrons, atoms or molecules.

8. "Special Caution Area" means a region, designated mutually
by the Parties, in which personnel and equipment of their armed forces are present and, due to circumstances in the region, in which special measures shall be undertaken in accordance with this Agreement.

9. "Interference with command and control networks" means actions that hamper, interrupt or limit the operation of the signals and information transmission means and systems providing for the control of personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party.

ARTICLE II

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, each Party shall take necessary measures directed toward preventing dangerous military activities, which are the following activities of personnel and equipment of its armed forces when operating in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party during peacetime:

(a) Entering by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure, or as a result of unintentional actions by such personnel;

(b) Using a laser in such a manner that its radiation
could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party;

(c) Hampering the activities of the personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party in a Special Caution Area in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment; and

(d) Interfering with command and control networks in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party.

2. The Parties shall take measures to ensure expeditious termination and resolution by peaceful means, without resort to the threat or use of force, of any incident which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities.

3. Additional provisions concerning prevention of dangerous military activities and resolution of any incident which may arise as a result of those activities are contained in Articles III, IV, V and VI of this Agreement and the Annexes thereto.

ARTICLE III

1. In the interest of mutual safety, personnel of the armed forces of the Parties shall exercise great caution and prudence while operating near the national territory of the other Party.
2. If, owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result of unintentional actions, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph 1(a) of this Agreement, personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party enter into the national territory of the other Party, such personnel shall adhere to the procedures set forth in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV.

1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, intend to use a laser and that use could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of that other Party, the personnel of the armed forces of the Party intending such use of a laser shall attempt to notify the relevant personnel of the armed forces of the other Party. In any case, personnel of the armed forces of the Party intending use of a laser shall follow appropriate safety measures.

2. If personnel of the armed forces of one Party believe that personnel of the armed forces of the other Party are using a laser in a manner which could cause harm to them or damage to their equipment, they shall immediately attempt to establish communications to seek termination of such use. If the personnel of the armed forces of the Party having received such notification are actually using a laser in proximity to the area indicated in the
notification, they shall investigate the relevant circumstances. If their use of a laser could in fact cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, they shall terminate such use.

3. Notifications with respect to the use of a laser shall be made in the manner provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party may propose to the other Party that the Parties agree to designate a region as a Special Caution Area. The other Party may accept or decline the proposal. Either Party also has the right to request that a meeting of the Joint Military Commission be convened, in accordance with Article IX of this Agreement, to discuss such a proposal.

2. Personnel of the armed forces of the Parties present in a designated Special Caution Area shall establish and maintain communications, in accordance with Annex 1 to this Agreement, and undertake other measures as may be later agreed upon by the Parties, in order to prevent dangerous military activities and to resolve any incident which may arise as a result of such activities.

3. Each Party has the right to terminate an arrangement with respect to a designated Special Caution Area. The Party intending to exercise this right shall provide timely notification of such
intent to the other Party, including the date and time of termination of such an arrangement, through use of the communications channel set forth in paragraph 3 of Article VII of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI.

1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, detect interference with their command and control networks which could cause harm to them or damage to their equipment, they may inform the relevant personnel of the armed forces of the other Party if they believe that the interference is being caused by such personnel and equipment of the armed forces of that Party.

2. If the personnel of the armed forces of the Party having received such information establish that this interference with the command and control networks is being caused by their activities, they shall take expeditious measures to terminate the interference.

ARTICLE VII

1. For the purpose of preventing dangerous military activities, and expeditiously resolving any incident which may arise as a result of such activities, the armed forces of the Parties shall establish and maintain communications as provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.
2. The Parties shall exchange appropriate information on instances of dangerous military activities or incidents which may arise as a result of such activities, as well as on other issues related to this Agreement.

3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States shall convey information referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article through the Defense Attache of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, D.C. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall convey such information through the Defense Attache of the United States in Moscow.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international agreements and arrangements in force between the Parties, and the rights of individual or collective self-defense and of navigation and overflight, in accordance with international law. Consistent with the foregoing, the Parties shall implement the provisions of this Agreement, taking into account the sovereign interests of both Parties.

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be directed against any Third Party. Should an incident encompassed by this Agreement occur in the territory of an ally of a Party, that Party shall have the right to consult with its ally as to appropriate measures to be taken.
ARTICLE IX

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties hereby establish a Joint Military Commission. Within the framework of the Commission, the Parties shall consider:

(a) Compliance with the obligations assumed in this Agreement;

(b) Possible ways to ensure a higher level of safety for the personnel and equipment of their armed forces; and

(c) Other measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Agreement.

2. Meetings of the Joint Military Commission shall be convened annually or more frequently as may be agreed upon by the Parties.

ARTICLE X

1. This Agreement, including its Annexes, which form an integral part thereof, shall enter into force on January 1, 1990.

2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party six months after written notice thereof is given to the other Party.

3. This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Moscow on the twelfth of June, 1989, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Signature]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Signature]

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
ANNEX 1

PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

Communications Channels

For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, the armed forces of the Parties shall provide for establishing and maintaining, as necessary, communications at the following levels:

(a) The Task Force Commander of the armed forces of one Party present in a Special Caution Area and the Task Force Commander of the armed forces of the other Party in the same Area;

(b) Commander* of a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or ground unit of the armed forces of one Party and the Commander* of a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or ground unit of the armed forces of the other Party; and

(c) Commander* of an aircraft of the armed forces of one Party and an air traffic control or monitoring facility of the other Party.

* "Commander" means the individual with authority to command or lead a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or ground unit.
Section II

Radio Frequencies

1. To establish radio communication, as necessary, the following frequencies shall be used:

   (a) between aircraft of the Parties or between an aircraft of one Party and an air traffic control or monitoring facility of the other Party: on VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz, or on HF band frequency 4125.0 KHz (alternate 6215.5 KHz); after initial contact is made, the working frequency 130.0 MHz or 278.0 MHz, or 4125.0 KHz should be used;

   (b) between ships of the Parties and ship-to-shore: on VHF band frequency 156.8 MHz, or on HF band frequency 2182.0 KHz;

   (c) between a ship of one Party and an aircraft of the other Party: on VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz; after initial contact is made, the working frequency 130.0 MHz or 278.0 MHz shall be used; and

   (d) between ground vehicles or ground units of the armed forces of the Parties: on VHF band frequency 44.0 MHz (alternate 46.5 MHz), or on HF band frequency 4125.0 KHz (alternate 6215.5 KHz).
2. The Parties agree to conduct necessary testing to ensure reliability of the communications channels agreed by the Parties.

Section III

Signals and Phrases

1. The Parties recognize that the lack of radio communication can increase the danger to the personnel and equipment of their armed forces involved in any incident which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities. Personnel of the armed forces of the Parties involved in such incidents who are unable to establish radio communication, or who establish radio communication but cannot be understood, shall try to communicate using those signals referred to in this Section. In addition, such personnel shall attempt to establish communications with other personnel of their armed forces, who in turn shall take measures to resolve the incident through communications channels set forth in this Agreement.

2. Ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications shall be conducted using signals and phrases as set forth in the International Code of Signals of 1965 and the Special Signals developed in accordance with the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas of 1972. Aircraft-to-aircraft communications shall be conducted using signals and phrases for intercepting and
intercepted aircraft contained in the Rules of the Air, Annex 2 to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). The additional signals and phrases contained in paragraph 4 of this Section may also be used.

3. Whenever aircraft of the Parties come into visual contact with each other, their aircrews shall monitor the frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz. If it is necessary to exchange information, but communications in a common language are not possible, attempts shall be made to convey essential information and acknowledgement of instructions by using phrases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Section. If radio communication is not possible, then visual signals shall be used.

4. The following table contains additional signals and phrases for communications between aircraft, ships, ground vehicles or ground units, in accordance with this Agreement:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. MEANING OF SIGNAL/PHRASE</th>
<th>B. VISUAL SIGNALS FOR AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>C. PHRASE</th>
<th>D. PRONUNCIATION</th>
<th>E. APPROPRIATE RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 You are in close proximity to our national territory.</td>
<td>Day and Night - The intercepting aircraft, flying above and parallel to the intercepted aircraft, rocking wings, and flashing navigation lights at slow regular intervals, followed by a series of shallow bank &quot;S&quot; turns in the horizontal plane, approximately 10 degrees either side of line of flight.</td>
<td>&quot;CLOSE TO TERRITORY&quot;</td>
<td>CLOSE-TO-TERRITORY</td>
<td>Intercepted aircraft turns away from national territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 You have entered into our national territory.</td>
<td>Day and Night - The intercepting aircraft, flying above and parallel to the intercepted aircraft, rapidly flashing navigation lights while rocking wings, followed by a shallow turn executed in the horizontal plane, with a 15-18 degree bank in the direction of the intercepted aircraft. The approach shall be accomplished with great caution and not closer than one wing span. Repeat until intercepted aircraft acknowledged or radio contact is established.</td>
<td>&quot;SOPHISTICATED ENEMY&quot;</td>
<td>TURN-1-TON</td>
<td>Intercepted aircraft shall follow the appropriate instructions of the intercepting aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 I need to land.</td>
<td>Day and Night - The aircraft flashes its navigation lights repeatedly and rapidly while rocking wings. Followed by a gentle pursuasion of the aircraft.</td>
<td>&quot;REQUEST LANDING&quot;</td>
<td>RE-QUEST-LANDING</td>
<td>Intercepting aircraft assists intercepted aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 I request radio communications on 130.0 MHz or 218.0 MHz. (Initial contact is established on 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz.)</td>
<td>Day and Night - If 121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz are inoperative, aircraft continues to alternate one long with one short flash of navigation lights while rocking wings.</td>
<td>&quot;RADIO CONTACT&quot;</td>
<td>RA-OI-O COR-TAC</td>
<td>Acknowledge requesting aircraft, ship, or air traffic control or monitoring facility with phrase &quot;RADIO CONTACT.&quot; After contact is made: tune to 130.0 MHz or 218.0 MHz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 My aircraft requests radio contact with your ship on 118.3 MHz or 137.0 MHz.</td>
<td>Day and Night - Aircraft circling the ship, in a left hand turn, at a safe distance and altitude until radio contact is established.</td>
<td>&quot;RADIO CONTACT&quot;</td>
<td>RA-OI-O COR-TAC</td>
<td>The aircraft and ship establish radio contact by exchanging the phrase &quot;RADIO CONTACT.&quot; Once both shall switch to 130.0 MHz or 218.0 MHz, as appropriate, for further radio communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 I am experiencing a dangerous level of interference with my command and control network. (Transmit PHRASE on contact frequency.)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>&quot;STOP INFORMATION&quot;</td>
<td>STOP-INF-IN-SEC</td>
<td>Investigate the circumstances and, as appropriate, terminate any activities which may be causing the dangerous interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 My planned use of a laser may create danger in this area. (Transmit PHRASE on contact frequency.)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>&quot;LASER DANGER&quot;</td>
<td>LASER DANGER</td>
<td>Take appropriate measures to prevent harm to personal or damage to equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8 I am experiencing a dangerous level of laser radiation. (Transmit PHRASE on contact frequency.) | None | "STOP LASER" | STOP LA-GER | Investigate the circumstances and, as appropriate, terminate any use of a laser that could cause harm to personal or damage to
ANNEX 2

PROCEDURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF INCIDENTS RELATED TO ENTERING INTO NATIONAL TERRITORY

This Annex sets forth the procedures for the expeditious resolution, by peaceful means, of any incident which may arise during entry being made by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result of unintentional actions, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph 1(a) of this Agreement.

Section I

Entering Into National Territory Owing To Circumstances Brought About By Force Majeure

1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party are aware that, owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure, they may enter or have entered into the national territory of the other Party, they shall continuously attempt to establish and maintain communications with personnel of the armed forces of the other Party, as provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

2. Upon receiving a communication from personnel of the armed forces of a Party who are aware that they may enter or have entered into the national territory of the other Party, personnel of the armed forces of that other Party shall provide them appropriate
instructions as to subsequent actions, and assistance to the extent of existing capabilities.

3. If personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party enter into the national territory of the other Party, the personnel shall take into consideration any instructions received from the personnel of the armed forces of the other Party that are appropriate to the existing circumstances and, subject to the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement, shall either depart the national territory or proceed to a designated location.

4. Personnel of the armed forces of a Party having entered into the national territory of the other Party, upon arrival at the location designated by personnel of the armed forces of that other Party, shall be:

   (a) Accorded an opportunity to contact their Defense Attache or consular authorities as soon as possible;

   (b) Cared for properly and their equipment protected; and

   (c) Assisted in repairing their equipment in order to facilitate their departure from the national territory, and in departing at the earliest opportunity.
Section II

Entering Into National Territory As A Result Of Unintentional Actions Of Personnel

1. When the personnel of the armed forces of one Party establish that personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party may enter into their national territory as a result of unintentional actions or that such an entry has already taken place, the personnel who have made this determination shall continuously attempt to establish and maintain communications with the personnel of the armed forces of that other Party, as provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement. The purpose of such communications is: to alert personnel of the armed forces of that other Party of the possibility of entry or the fact of entry into national territory; to clarify the reasons for and circumstances of their actions; to recommend that they take measures to prevent such an entry, if possible; or, to render them assistance as appropriate.

2. Personnel of the armed forces of a Party, having been alerted that they may enter into the national territory of the other Party, shall, if possible, undertake measures so that their actions do not result in such an entry.

3. If personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party enter into the national territory of the other Party, the personnel shall take into consideration any instructions received from the personnel of the armed forces of the other Party that are
appropriate to the existing circumstances and, subject to the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement, shall either depart the national territory or proceed to a designated location. With respect to personnel and equipment which have arrived at a designated location, the procedures provided for in Section I, paragraph 4 of this Annex shall be applicable.
AGREED STATEMENTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES

In connection with the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, the Parties have agreed as follows:

First agreed statement. In the case of any entry by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result of unintentional actions by such personnel, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph 1(a) of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, the procedures set forth in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Agreement shall apply regardless of whether that other Party has been made aware of the circumstances of such entry.
Second agreed statement. As indicated in Article VIII of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, this Agreement does not affect rights of navigation under international law, including the right of warships to exercise innocent passage.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
LETTER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NIGERIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Agreement on the Prohibition of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, proposed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and addressed to the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by the Honourable Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria, on 2 November 1989.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of the text of this Agreement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) E.A. Azikiwe
Permanent Representative
AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Agreement,

Being also parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 (hereinafter called "the Treaty"), have hereby accepted the following provisions:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which does not belong to a military alliance and does not have other security arrangements providing for mutual defence with a nuclear-weapon State.

Article II

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which belongs to a military alliance, or have other security arrangements providing for mutual defence, with a nuclear-weapon State but has no nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. The non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty referred to in this Article undertakes not to partake in, or contribute to, any military attack on any nuclear-weapon State Party to this Agreement, or its allies, Parties to the Treaty, except in self-defence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Article III

1. This Agreement shall be signed and shall be subject to ratification, or may be acceded to, as if the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty applied hereto.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force in respect of each State on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession of the State concerned.

3. The duration of this Agreement shall be the same as that of the Treaty and the provision regarding denunciation contained in Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty shall be applicable to it.

Article IV

This Agreement, the English, Russian, French and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Agreement shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, hereby sign this Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the ....... day of ......, one thousand nine hundred and ......

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LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING DOCUMENTS FROM THE WYOMING AND MOSCOW MEETINGS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE */

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents from the Wyoming and Moscow Meetings between the United States Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze.


- Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 10 February 1990.


In accordance with past practice and agreement, Minister Batsanov, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in Russian to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to enter these papers as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official Russian texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/974.
JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
23 September 1989

During their 22–23 September meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides consider the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. They believe that with the active and constructive participation of all States it will be possible to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the Convention at the earliest date, and call upon all parties to the negotiations to join them in achieving this objective.

The two sides also believe that greater openness between them and among others could contribute to the prospects for reaching an early agreement on an effective ban on chemical weapons. As a concrete expression of the commitment of their two countries toward this end, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The steps agreed upon in the memorandum are intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The verification experiment and data exchange will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general data on the sides' chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on their respective territories. In Phase II the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

The sides also agreed to undertake a co-operative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. They agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of the other side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

The sides noted their agreement on some procedures for conducting challenge inspections and on the provisions governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. These two approaches will be introduced into the multilateral negotiations in Geneva in an effort to contribute to those negotiations. They also stressed the need to concentrate in the near future on resolving remaining verification-related issues. The two sides intend to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to help achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They reaffirmed the importance of and their commitment to the
final declaration of the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons held earlier this year as well as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The two sides emphasized the obligation of all States not to use chemical weapons in violation of international law and urged that prompt and effective measures be taken by the international community if that obligation is violated. In this regard, they underscored their support for the United Nations Secretary-General in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

The sides welcomed Australia's convening of a Government-Industry Conference against chemical weapons, which has just concluded in Canberra. They noted that this conference provided an important opportunity for serious discussion between Government and industry representatives from around the world. The sides expressed satisfaction with the extensive and productive work accomplished at the conference and the positive results reflected in the Chairman's final summary statement.

Finally, the sides expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long-term basis. In the meantime, the sides emphasized their readiness to attempt to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. They intend to continue consultations on this issue.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING A BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE RELATED TO PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Determined to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons,

Convinced that increased openness about their chemical weapons capabilities is essential for building the confidence necessary for early completion of the convention,

Desiring also to gain experience in the procedures and measures for verification of the convention,

Having agreed as follows:

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. As set forth below, the two sides shall conduct a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

2. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange shall be conducted in two phases. In Phase I, the two sides shall exchange general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of visits to relevant facilities. In Phase II, the two sides shall exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspection to verify the accuracy of those data.

3. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange is intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons by:

   (1) enabling each side to gain confidence in the data on chemical weapons capabilities that will be provided under the provisions of the convention;

   (2) enabling each side to gain confidence in the inspection procedures that will be used to verify compliance with the convention; and

   (3) facilitating the elaboration of the provisions of the convention.

4. Terms used in this Memorandum shall have the same meaning as in the draft convention text under negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft convention text that is current as of the date of the exchange of data shall be used.

5. Data shall be current as of the date of the exchange, and shall encompass all sites and facilities specified below, wherever they are located.
6. Each side shall take appropriate steps to protect the confidentiality of the data it receives. Each side undertakes not to divulge this data without the explicit consent of the side that provided the data.

II. PHASE I

In Phase I, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons in agent tons;

2. the specific types of chemicals it possesses that are defined as chemical weapons, indicating the common name of each chemical;

3. the percentage of each of its declared chemicals that is stored in munitions and devices, and the percentage that is stored in storage containers;

4. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;

5. for each of its declared chemical weapons storage facilities:
   - the common name of each chemical defined as a chemical weapon that is stored there;
   - the percentage of the precise aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons that is stored there; and
   - the specific types of munitions and devices that are stored there;

6. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons production facilities, indicating the common name of each chemical that has been or is being produced at each facility; and

7. the precise location of each of its facilities for destruction of chemical weapons, including those currently existing, under construction, or planned.

In Phase I, each side shall permit the other side to visit some of its chemical weapons storage and production facilities, the exact number of which will be agreed upon as soon as possible. In addition, each side shall permit the other side to visit two industrial chemical production facilities. Each side will select the facilities to be visited by the other side.

III. PHASE II

In Phase II, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the chemical name of each chemical it possesses that is defined as a chemical weapon;

2. the detailed inventory, including the quantity, of the chemical weapons at each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;
3. its preliminary general plans for destruction of chemical weapons under the convention, including the characteristics of the facilities it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

4. the capacity of each of its chemical weapons production facilities;

5. preliminary general plans for closing and destroying each of its chemical weapons production facilities under the convention, including the methods it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

6. the precise location and capacity of its planned single small-scale facility allowed under the convention for the production, for non-prohibited purposes under strict safeguards, of a limited quantity of chemicals that pose a high risk, i.e., Schedule 1 chemicals;

7. the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 for development of chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

IV. TIMING

1. Except as specified below, Phase I data shall be exchanged not later than 31 December 1989. Visits shall begin not later than 30 June 1990, provided that the sides have agreed, with appropriate lead time, on the number of visits, as well as on the programmes and other detailed arrangements for the visits and assuming that the sides have agreed by 31 December 1989 on the type of facility to be visited by each side in its first visit to the other side.

2. In Phase I each side may withhold temporarily, for reasons of security, data on the locations of storage facilities that together contain a total quantity of chemical weapons that is not more than 2 per cent of the precise quantity of its chemical weapons. In addition, the other data pertaining to these locations, as specified in Section II, paragraph 5, shall be grouped under the heading "other storage locations" without reference to specific locations. Precise data pertaining to these locations shall be exchanged later in Phase I on a subsequent date to be agreed.

3. Phase II data shall be exchanged on an agreed date not less than four months prior to the initialing of the text of the convention. At that time, both sides shall formally and jointly acknowledge the possibility of initialing the convention within four months.

V. VERIFICATION

1. Each side shall use its own national means to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data.

2. During Phase I, the sides shall hold consultations to discuss the information that has been presented and visits that have been exchanged. The sides will co-operate in clarifying ambiguous situations.

3. During Phase II, each side shall have the opportunity to verify Phase I and Phase II data by means of on-site inspections. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the accuracy of the data that has been
exchanged and to gain confidence that the signature and ratification of the convention will take place on the basis of up-to-date and verified data on the chemical weapons capabilities of the sides.

4. Prior to the initialing of the convention, each side shall have the opportunity to select and inspect at its discretion up to five facilities from the list of chemical weapons storage facilities and chemical weapons production facilities declared by the other side. During Phase I, the sides will consider whether each side may inspect not less than half of the declared facilities of the other side if their number is more than 10. Should either side as of the date of the Phase II exchange possess a single small-scale facility for production of Schedule 1 chemicals, it shall be subject to an additional inspection.

Each side shall also have the opportunity to carry out up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. All inspections shall be carried out within the agreed four months from the date of the declaration pertaining to Phase II, referred to in Section IV.

5. While the signed convention is being considered by their respective legislative bodies, each side shall have the opportunity to request from the other side, and to obtain from it, updated data. Each side shall have the opportunity to conduct up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. During this process, the two sides will consult with their respective legislative bodies, as appropriate, in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

For each side, these inspections shall be carried out within a four-month period, beginning with the date that it conducts its first inspection. The sides shall consult and agree on the dates when the first inspection will be conducted by each side. The dates shall be chosen to ensure that the inspections shall be conducted by both sides at approximately the same time. Once the inspections begin, the sides may, by mutual consent, extend the four-month periods for an additional specified period.

6. Inspections of declared facilities, as well as challenge inspections, shall be conducted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the draft convention, taking into account that these inspections are being carried out on a bilateral basis and do not involve the bodies that will be established under the convention. If necessary, the two sides shall supplement the provisions of the draft convention by mutually-agreed procedures.

7. Challenge inspections may be made at any location or facility of the other side, as provided for in the draft convention text, except that, for the purposes of this Memorandum and without creating a precedent, challenge inspections at facilities not on the territory of the sides may be made only at military facilities of a side in a limited number of countries; the sides will agree later on these specific countries.

8. Challenge inspections conducted pursuant to this Memorandum shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the domestic law of the side being inspected and shall be based on a recognition by both sides of the need to resolve concerns and build confidence.
9. To clarify questions related to the data provided during Phase I and Phase II, the two sides shall employ normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as may be agreed upon.

VI. FORMAT

1. Unless otherwise provided in this Memorandum, the agreed data shall be provided according to the specifications contained in the draft convention text for the declarations that are to be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force.

2. Precise locations shall be specified by means of site diagrams of facilities. Each diagram shall clearly indicate the boundaries of the facility, all structures of the facility, and significant geographical relief features in the vicinity of the facility. If the facility is located within a larger complex, the diagram shall clearly specify the exact location within the complex. On each diagram, the geographic co-ordinates of the center of the facility shall be specified to the nearest second.

VII. ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate this 23rd day of September 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: James A. Baker III
JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

10 February 1990

During their 7-9 February meeting in Moscow, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed that chemical weapons must be eliminated worldwide. They have agreed on the following framework for the achievement of this goal which they consider to be a high priority:

1. The sides are determined to work to conclude and bring into force a multilateral, effectively verifiable Chemical Weapons Convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis. To this effect they will work to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving main outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date.

2. Even as these multilateral negotiations proceed, the sides will work out a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations pending the international Convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. They will proceed with the objective of completing and signing such an agreement at the June 1990 summit meeting.

3. The agreement would establish a programme of co-operation on technology and procedures for safe and expeditious as well as economically and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons.

4. When the CW Convention enters into force, the sides will further reduce their CW stocks to equal levels at a very small fraction of their present holdings over the first eight years of operation of the Convention. All remaining CW stocks should be eliminated over the subsequent two years. Of course, all CW-capable States must adhere to the Convention. Meanwhile, the sides will closely co-operate with each other and together with other States to ensure that all CW-capable States adhere to the Convention. Efforts to this effect are to begin without delay. The sides share the view that both nations should be among the original parties to the Convention whose ratification would be necessary for its entry into force.

5. The multilateral Convention shall contain the provision that all production of chemical weapons will halt upon its entry into force.

6. The sides will work out common principles that will guide their efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.
FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT

10 February 1990

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met 7-9 February in Moscow as part of the preparations for the United States-Soviet summit to be held in June in the United States. Proceeding from their common goal of building a more stable, constructive and co-operative relationship, they reviewed the broad range of issues on the United States-Soviet agenda. The Secretary also was received by Chairman Gorbachev for an open, wide-ranging exchange of views.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed developments in United States-Soviet relations since the Wyoming ministerial and the Malta meeting between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev. They examined the prospects for the summit, with the particular aim of advancing the objectives and priorities defined by the two leaders in Malta.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction the progress that is being made in United States-Soviet relations. While certain significant differences remain between the sides, their relationship is increasingly marked by understanding, co-operation and the search for mutual advantage. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that candid dialogue and continuing efforts at finding practical and concrete solutions will further the significant progress that has been recorded to date.

In this context, the Moscow ministerial was a useful and important step in preparing the ground for a productive summit. The high-level discussions were complemented by experts' working groups on arms control, regional, human rights, transnational and bilateral issues, as well as an informal group on economic questions. Specific agreements were reached in several areas of the agenda.

I

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough exchange of views on arms control and disarmament issues. With respect to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, they reaffirmed their common objective, of resolving all major issues by the June summit in order to allow signature of the Treaty by the end of the year. To further this goal, the sides reached agreement or exchanged new proposals in a number of areas.

On air-launched cruise missiles, the sides made substantial progress on a package approach, agreeing on all remaining issues with the exception of the range threshold.

The sides also made good progress on sea-launched cruise missiles. The sides agreed that such missiles would be dealt with by parallel, politically binding declarations for the duration of the START Treaty. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that the remaining issues involving SLCMs would be addressed at the negotiations in Geneva.

The sides agreed that there would be numerical limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the warheads attributable to them for all ICBMs of a
type that has been flight-tested from a mobile launcher. Other non-deployed ballistic missiles, non-deployed cruise missiles and non-deployed heavy bomber weapons will not be subject to numerical limits. The sides further agreed on a régime governing the location and movement of all non-deployed ballistic missiles.

The sides reached agreement on major elements of a régime to ensure the non-denial of telemetry data during flight tests of START-accountable ballistic missiles. These provisions will be included in the START Treaty, but will be implemented early, at the time of Treaty signature, through an exchange of letters.

The United States side presented new proposals on verification of mobile ICBMs, duration of the Treaty, phasing of reductions and attribution of warheads to future types of ballistic missiles. The Soviet side presented new proposals dealing with non-circumvention. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister instructed their negotiators to discuss these new proposals and to expedite efforts on resolving remaining differences in the text of the Treaty and its associated documents.

The sides discussed the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions and reiterated their determination to conclude an agreement as soon as possible in 1990. The sides discussed President Bush's 31 January proposal on manpower which was presented by NATO in Vienna on 8 February, as well as NATO's aircraft proposal presented on the same date. As a result of the discussions in Moscow, the differences on personnel were narrowed. The sides agreed to continue their discussions in the context of the negotiations in Vienna and at the Ministers' meeting on "Open Skies" in Ottawa.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had extensive discussions on how to proceed toward their common goal of achieving, through the negotiations in Geneva, a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and of their destruction. The United States and Soviet delegations in Geneva were instructed to proceed with developing means of practical co-operation in the area of chemical weapons elimination. The sides issued a separate, more detailed statement on chemical weapons.

In discussions on nuclear testing, the sides made progress on resolving the remaining issues. They believe that the task of completing the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 threshold limitation treaties for signing at the summit is realistic. The sides agreed on the right to simultaneous use of hydrodynamic and in-country seismic yield measurements. The sides also resolved several long-standing problems regarding the implementation of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. The sides identified the three seismic stations in each country to be used for in-country seismic yield measurements. The sides reaffirmed their adherence to the agreement reached in September 1987 with regard to the negotiations on nuclear testing.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed their hope that the Ottawa "Open Skies" conference – which they will both attend – would be a success and lead to early agreement. They believe an "Open Skies" régime can make a genuine contribution to openness, transparency and stability.
The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted the recent consultations between their experts on chemical weapons non-proliferation, missile technology control and nuclear non-proliferation. They agreed to prepare a document for consideration by their leaders covering both principles and concrete steps of co-operation in all areas of non-proliferation - chemical, missile and nuclear.

The sides conducted a discussion of the problem of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. They noted that they both adhere to the export guidelines of the existing régime relating to missiles, which applies to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres. They further agreed to continue joint discussions on this problem in the interim before the next ministerial.

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents from the Wyoming and Moscow meetings between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States Secretary of State:

Joint statement on chemical weapons by the USSR and the United States adopted in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States, on 23 September 1989;

Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons, signed on 23 September 1989 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States;

Joint statement on chemical weapons by the USSR and the United States adopted in Moscow on 10 February 1990;

Chapeau and part I (Arms control and disarmament issues) a second Soviet-United States joint statement adopted in Moscow on 10 February 1990.

In accordance with the past practice and the agreement reached, Ambassador S. Ledogar, the United States representative at the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in English to the Conference on Disarmament.

Please make appropriate arrangements for these documents to be issued as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and those of non-member States of the Conference which are participating in the Conference's work.

(Signed) S. Batsanov
Representative of the USSR
at the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official English texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/973.

GE.90-60256/5460A

I have the honour to forward to you the attached statement issued by the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, in commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to enter this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR

Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN COMMEMORATION OF THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

5 MARCH 1990

Twenty years ago today, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entered into force. One hundred and forty States have joined the Treaty, making it the most widely accepted arms control instrument in history. The NPT represents the primary legal barrier to nuclear proliferation and thus constitutes a principal foundation of international security. Later this year, the parties to the NPT will convene the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty. In the context of this Review, I reaffirm the determination of the United States to carry out its Treaty commitments and to work to assure its continuance in the interest of world peace and security.

The NPT has been not only a significant arms control instrument, it has also facilitated international co-operation in a wide variety of peaceful uses of atomic energy under international safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency. These applications have included using nuclear technology to improve health conditions, as well as to increase agricultural output, electric power generation, and industrial capabilities. The United States will continue to play a leading role in nuclear co-operation pursuant to the Treaty.

Our long-standing commitment to serious arms control negotiations has helped to bring forth a number of important arms control agreements, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, concluded in 1987. At this very moment we are making significant strides toward concluding far-reaching arms control agreements in the nuclear and conventional areas.

It is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major progress in arms control, that the community of nations works together even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the greatest risks to the survival of mankind. I urge all States that are not party to the NPT to join and thereby demonstrate their support for the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation, and I call upon all States party to the Treaty to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all countries.
LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1990 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE FIFTH ISSUE IN THE VERIFICATION BROCHURES SERIES ENTITLED "CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS: VERIFYING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION" */

In his plenary statement of 24 April to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Shannon announced that the Canadian delegation would make available to delegations the fifth issue in the Canadian verification brochures series. This is entitled "Canada and International Safeguards: Verifying Nuclear Non-proliferation". This brochure provides background information on Canadian efforts with respect to the nuclear non-proliferation régime and, in particular, to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. It also describes the achievements of the Canadian safeguards support programme.

I should be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of this document to the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ A limited distribution of this brochure in English only has been made to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada at Geneva.
LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL
CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE AGREED STATEMENT IN
CONNECTION WITH THAT AGREEMENT AND THE USSR-UNITED STATES JOINT
STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION */

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Agreement between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on
Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to
Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons. The
Agreement was signed in Washington on 1 June 1990 by President M.S. Gorbachev
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and President G. Bush of the
United States of America.

I also have the honour to transmit the text of a United States-USSR Joint
Statement on Non-proliferation adopted at the summit meeting in Washington.

In accordance with past practice, L. Breckon, the Acting Representative
of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, is to transmit these
documents in English to the Conference on Disarmament.

I would be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to issue these
papers as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and have them
distributed to the delegations of all States members of the Conference and
those of the non-member States of the Conference which are participating in
the Conference's work.

(Signed)    S. Batsanov
Representative of the USSR to
the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official English texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/1001.

I have the honour to forward to you the text of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons. This Agreement was signed in Washington on 1 June 1990, by President George Bush of the United States of America, and by President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I also have the honour to forward the text of a United States–USSR Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation, issued in Washington during the Summit meeting.

In accordance with past practice, Minister Batsanov, USSR Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in Russian to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to issue these papers as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) M. LYALL BRECKON
Acting Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official Russian texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/1000.

GE.90-61597/1999B
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties",

Determined to make every effort to conclude and to bring into force at the earliest date a convention providing for a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, hereinafter referred to as "the multilateral convention",

Aware of their special responsibility in the area of chemical weapons disarmament,

Desiring to halt the production of chemical weapons and to begin the destruction of the preponderance of their chemical weapons stockpiles, without waiting for the multilateral convention to enter into force,

Recalling the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on 23 September 1989, hereinafter referred to as "the Memorandum",

Recalling the bilateral commitment to co-operate with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, contained in the joint statement on chemical weapons issued at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on 23 September 1989, and

Mindful of the efforts of each Party aimed at the destruction of chemical weapons and desiring to co-operate in this area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISIONS AND AREAS OF CO-OPERATION

1. In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:

(a) to co-operate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;

(b) not to produce chemical weapons;

(c) to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels;

(d) to co-operate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and

(e) to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention.
2. Each Party, during its destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each Party shall destroy its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and emissions.

ARTICLE II

CO-OPERATION REGARDING METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DESTRUCTION

1. To implement their undertaking to co-operate regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, the Parties shall negotiate a specific programme of co-operation. For this purpose, the Parties may create special groups of experts, as appropriate. The programme may include matters related to: methods and specific technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons; measures to ensure safety and protection of people and the environment; construction and operation of destruction facilities; the appropriate equipment for destruction; past, current and planned destruction activities; monitoring of destruction of chemical weapons; or such other topics as the Parties may agree. Activities to implement this programme may include: exchanges of visits to relevant facilities; exchanges of documents; meetings and discussions among experts; or such other activities as the Parties may agree.

2. Each Party shall, as appropriate, co-operate with other States that request information or assistance regarding the destruction of chemical weapons. The Parties may respond jointly to such requests.

ARTICLE III

CESSATION OF THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Upon entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter, each Party shall not produce chemical weapons.

ARTICLE IV

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than 31 December 2002, and thereafter, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 5,000 agent tons. In this Agreement, "tons" means metric tons.


3. By no later than 31 December 1999, each Party shall have destroyed at least 50 per cent of its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons. The aggregate quantity of chemical weapons of a Party shall be the amount of chemical weapons declared in the data exchange carried out on 29 December 1989, or declared thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum, as updated in accordance with paragraph 6 (b) of this article.
4. In the event that a Party determines that it cannot achieve an annual rate of destruction of chemical weapons of at least 1,000 agent tons during 1995, or that it cannot destroy at least 1,000 agent tons during each year after 1995, that Party shall, at the earliest possible time, notify the other Party, in accordance with paragraph 10 of this article.

5. Each Party, in its destruction of chemical weapons, shall also destroy the munitions, devices and containers from which the chemicals have been removed. Each Party shall reduce and limit its other empty munitions and devices for chemical weapons purposes so that, by no later than 31 December 2002, and thereafter, the aggregate capacity of such munitions and devices does not exceed the volume of the remaining bulk agent of that Party.

6. Thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each Party shall inform the other Party of the following:

   (a) its current general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement and its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force. The detailed plan shall encompass all of the chemical weapons to be destroyed during the calendar year, and shall include their locations, types and quantities, the methods of their destruction, and the locations of the destruction facilities that are to be used; and

   (b) any changes, as of the entry into force of this Agreement, in the data contained in the data exchange carried out on 29 December 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum.

7. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than 30 November, of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the following calendar year.

8. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than 15 April, of the following:

   (a) any further changes, as of 31 December of the previous year, to the data contained in the data exchange carried out on 29 December 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum;

   (b) the implementation during the previous calendar year of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons; and

   (c) any update to the general and detailed plans provided pursuant to paragraphs 6 (a) or 7 of this article.

9. Each Party shall limit its chemical weapons storage facilities so that, by no later than 31 December 2002, and thereafter, the number of such facilities does not exceed eight. Each Party plans to have all such facilities located on its national territory. This is without prejudice to its rights and obligations, including those under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
10. If a Party experiences problems that will prevent it from destroying its chemical weapons at a rate sufficient to meet the levels specified in this article, that Party shall immediately notify the other Party and provide a full explanation. The Parties shall promptly consult on measures necessary to resolve the problems. Under no circumstances shall the Party not experiencing problems in its destruction of chemical weapons be required to destroy its chemical weapons at a more rapid rate than the Party that has experienced such problems.

ARTICLE V

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

1. Each Party shall provide access to each of its chemical weapons production facilities for systematic on-site inspection to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring at those facilities.

2. Each Party shall identify and provide access to each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons holding areas within these destruction facilities for systematic on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such inspection shall be accomplished through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. When a Party has removed all of its chemical weapons from a particular chemical weapons storage facility, it shall promptly notify the other Party. The Party receiving the notification shall have the right to conduct, promptly after its receipt of the notification, an on-site inspection to confirm that no chemical weapons are present at that facility. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year of the notification and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility for which it has received a notification pursuant to this paragraph, to determine that chemical weapons are not being stored there.

4. When a Party has completed its destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement, it shall promptly notify the other Party. In its notification, the Party shall specify the chemical weapons storage facilities where its remaining chemical weapons are located and provide a detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each of these storage facilities. Each Party, promptly after it has received such a notification, shall have the right to inspect each of the chemical weapons storage facilities specified in the notification, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons at each facility.

5. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year in which destruction begins and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility of the other Party that is not already subject to annual inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons that are being stored there.
6. On the basis of the reports of its inspectors and other information available to it, each Party shall determine whether the provisions of this Agreement are being satisfactorily fulfilled and shall communicate its conclusions to the other Party.

7. Detailed provisions for the implementation of the inspection measures provided for in this Article shall be set forth in the document on inspection procedures. The Parties shall work to complete this document by 31 December 1990.

ARTICLE VI

MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION

The Parties shall co-operate in making every effort to conclude the multilateral convention at the earliest date and to implement it effectively. Toward those ends, the Parties agree, in addition to their other obligations in this Agreement, to the following:

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than the end of the eighth year after entry into force of the multilateral convention, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 500 agent tons.

2. Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of States parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years.

3. The Parties shall intensify their co-operation with each other and with other States to ensure that all chemical weapon–capable States become parties to the multilateral convention.

4. The Parties declare their intention to be among the original parties to the multilateral convention.

5. To gain experience and thereby facilitate the elaboration and implementation of the multilateral convention, the Parties agree to conduct bilateral verification experiments involving trial challenge inspections at facilities not declared under the Memorandum or subsequently. The detailed modalities for such experiments, including the number and location of the facilities to be inspected, as well as the procedures to be used, shall be agreed between the Parties no later than six months after the signing of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VII

CONSULTATIONS

The Parties, in order to resolve questions related to this Agreement that may arise, shall use normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as they may agree.
ARTICLE VIII

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DOCUMENTS

1. After the multilateral convention enters into force, the provisions of the multilateral convention shall take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement in cases of incompatible obligations therein. Otherwise, the provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the provisions of the multilateral convention in its operation between the Parties. After the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to this Agreement shall consult with each other in order to resolve any questions concerning the relationship of this Agreement to the multilateral convention.

2. The chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, and chemical weapons production facilities subject to this Agreement are those that are subject to declaration under the Memorandum.

ARTICLE IX

AMENDMENTS

Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE X

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; WITHDRAWAL

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of instruments stating acceptance of the Agreement by each Party.

2. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration, unless the Parties agree to terminate it after the entry into force of the multilateral convention.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this first day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

s/G. Bush  s/M. Gorbachev
FOR THE UNITED STATES  FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
OF AMERICA  SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Paragraph 2 of Article VI of the Agreement stipulates that, "Upon
signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with
other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a
special conference of States parties to the multilateral convention be held
at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special
conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures,
whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for
proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks
over the subsequent two years".

In this connection, the Parties agree that an affirmative decision would
require the agreement of a majority of the States parties that attend the
special conference, with such majority including those States parties
attending the special conference that had taken the following three steps:

(a) presented officially and publicly, before 31 December 1991, before
the Conference on Disarmament, a written declaration that they were at the
time of that declaration in possession of chemical weapons;

(b) signed the multilateral convention within 30 days after it was
opened for signature; and

(c) became a party to the multilateral convention by no later than one
year after its entry into force.
United States-USSR Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation

Washington, D.C.

1 June 1990

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles capable of carrying such weapons, and certain other missiles and missile technologies. The more nations that possess such weapons, the more difficult it will be to realize the desire of people everywhere to achieve effective arms control and disarmament measures and to reduce the threat of war. Weapons proliferation can provoke or intensify insecurity and hostility among nations, and threatens mankind with warfare of unprecedented destructiveness.

Our discussions over the past months point the way to a new era in relations between our two countries. We have taken major steps toward concluding agreements to reduce our own strategic nuclear arsenals, to bring limits on nuclear testing into force, and to reach a global ban on chemical weapons. Together with the nations of Europe, we are taking unprecedented steps to reduce existing conventional weaponry as part of a process of building a lasting structure of European security. The progress we are making and the commitments we have made in these bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts clearly demonstrate that arms reductions can contribute to increased security, even when there have been long-standing and deep-seated differences between countries.

The historic steps we have taken to improve United States-Soviet relations and to co-operate in the interests of international stability create the possibility of even closer and more concrete co-operation in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and missile non-proliferation.

With these considerations in mind, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Declare their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles capable of carrying such weapons and certain other missiles and missile technologies, in particular those subject to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR);

- Agree to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons; and

- Call on other nations to join in a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation worldwide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology.

The two sides have taken specific actions to advance these commitments.
Nuclear weapons non-proliferation

In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Reaffirm their steadfast and long-lasting commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime;

- Reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agree that it continues to make an invaluable contribution to global and regional security and stability;

- Urge all countries which have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT;

- Urge all NPT parties to implement scrupulously their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations under the Treaty;

- Affirm their intention to co-operate together and with other treaty parties to ensure a successful 1990 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which would reaffirm support for the objectives of the Treaty and its importance to international security and stability;

- Support the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and urge all countries in the region to bring it into force at an early date;

- Reiterate their continuing commitment to strengthening the IAEA, whose unique system of safeguards has contributed to the widespread peaceful use of nuclear energy for social and economic development;

- Support increased international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards;

- Call on all non-nuclear weapons States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities to place these activities under international safeguards;

- Agree on the need for stringent controls over exports of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, to ensure that they will not be misused for nuclear explosive purposes, and urge all other nations capable of exporting nuclear-related technology to apply similarly strict controls;

- Continue to support efforts to improve and strengthen the international nuclear export control régime;

- Support discussions among States in regions of nuclear proliferation concern for the purpose of achieving concrete steps to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, join in calling on the nations of the Middle East, southern Africa, and South Asia to engage in and pursue such discussions;

- Agree to continue their regular, constructive bilateral consultations on nuclear weapons non-proliferation.
Missile and missile technology non-proliferation

In order to stem the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Have signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, demonstrating that controls on—indeed the elimination of—such missiles can enhance national security;

- Reaffirm their intention that the START treaty be signed by the end of the year;

- Affirm their support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Régime, covering missiles, and certain equipment and technology relating to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres and they call on all nations that have not done so to observe the spirit and the guidelines of this régime;

- Are taking measures to restrict missile proliferation on a world-wide basis, including export controls and other internal procedures;

- Have instituted bilateral consultations to exchange information concerning such controls and procedures and identify specific measures to prevent missile proliferation.

- Agree to work to stop missile proliferation, particularly in regions of tension, such as the Middle East;

- To this end, affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives to reduce the threat of missile proliferation, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives;

- Recall that they favour international economic co-operation including co-operation aimed at peaceful space exploration, as long as such co-operation could not contribute to missile proliferation;

- Appeal to all countries—to exporters of missiles and missile technology as well as purchasers—to exercise restraint, and express their willingness to continue their respective dialogue with other countries on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology;

- Are resolved, on their part, to continue to work to strengthen such international restraint with respect to missile and missile technology proliferation.
Chemical weapons non-proliferation

In order to stem the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Declare that a multilateral, effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis is the best long-term solution to the threat to international security posed by the use and spread of chemical weapons, and that non-proliferation measures are considered a step toward achieving such a convention;

- Will intensify their co-operation to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date;

- Have instituted bilateral confidence-building measures, including chemical weapons data exchange and reciprocal site visits;

- Have just signed a trailblazing agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

- Commit themselves, in that agreement, to take practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention;

- Having declared their possession of chemical weapons, urge other States possessing chemical weapons to declare their possession, to commit to their destruction, and to begin immediately to address, through research and co-operation, the need for chemical weapons destruction capability;

- State that they themselves will not proliferate chemical weapons;

- Have instituted export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons. These measures are not intended to hinder or discriminate against legitimate peaceful chemical activities;

- Have agreed to conduct bilateral discussions to improve the effectiveness of their respective export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;

- Conduct regular bilateral consultations to broaden bilateral co-operation, including the reciprocal exchange of information on the problems of chemical weapons proliferation;

- Confirm their intent to pursue political and diplomatic actions, where specific cases give rise to concerns about the production, use or spread of chemical weapons;

- Join with other nations in multilateral efforts to co-ordinate export controls, exchange information, and broaden international co-operation to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;
- Reaffirm their support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law;

- Are taking steps to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by:
  
  Encouraging States that are not parties to accede;

  Confirming their intention to provide active support to the United Nations Secretary-General in conducting investigations of reported violations of the protocol;

  Affirming their intention to consider the imposition of sanctions against violators of the protocol, including those under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

  Agreeing to consult promptly in the event of a violation of the Protocol to discuss possible bilateral and multilateral actions against the offender, as well as appropriate assistance to the victims of such violation;

- Agree that the presence and further proliferation of chemical weapons in areas of tension, such as the Middle East, is particularly dangerous. The two countries therefore affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives in the Middle East and other areas, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives as:

  Efforts to broaden awareness of the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation and its negative impact on implementation of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

  Bilateral or multilateral efforts to stem chemical weapons proliferation, including the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons;

  Efforts to destroy chemical weapons in advance of the multilateral convention, as the United States and the Soviet Union are doing.

The United States and the Soviet Union call on all nations of the world that have not already done so to join them in taking comparable, effective measures to stem chemical weapons proliferation.

I have the honour to inform you that a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held on 7 June 1990 in Moscow.

The meeting adopted a press release as well as a declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

As a representative of the country which organized the meeting, and in accordance with established practice, I hereby request you to distribute these papers as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(signed) S. Batsanov
Representative of the USSR to Conference on Disarmament
Press release on the outcome of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held on 7 June 1990 in Moscow. It was attended by the following:

People's Republic of Bulgaria - Petar Mladenov, President and head of delegation; Andrei Lukansov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of Defence; and Boiko Dimitrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Republic of Hungary - Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister and head of delegation; Arpad Goncz, interim President; Lajos Fur, Minister of Defence, Ferenc Somogyi, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Sandor Gjörke, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the USSR;

German Democratic Republic - Lothar de Maizière, Prime Minister and head of delegation; Sabina Bergmann-Pohl, Chairman of the People's Chamber, Markus Meckel, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Rainer Eppelmann, Minister of Disarmament and Defence;

Republic of Poland - Wojciech Jaruzelski, President and head of delegation; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Florian Siwicki, Minister of Defence;

Romania - Ion Iliescu, President and head of delegation; Petre Roman, Prime Minister; Victor Stanculescu, Minister of Defence; Romulus Neagu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Vasile Sandru, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the USSR;

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, President and head of delegation; Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Eduard Ambrosievich Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovenko, member of the President's Council; and Dmitri Timofeevich Yazov, Minister of Defence;

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic - Vaclav Havel, President and head of delegation; Marian Calfa, Head of Government; Jiri Dienstbier, Deputy Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Miroslav Vacek, Minister of Defence.

The Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Committee, I.P. Abolimov, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, Army General P.G. Lushev, also took part in the work of the meeting.

The participants examined the prospects for the CSCE process, the creation of new security structures and the strengthening of stability in Europe.

The participants exchanged views concerning the review of the nature, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty, and the possibility of its being fundamentally restructured.
The President of the USSR informed the leaders of the allied Governments of the results of the Soviet-American summit talks held between 30 May and 4 June 1990.

The representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Zdenek Matejka, was appointed as Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Committee for the next term of office.

The participants adopted a declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which is being issued separately.

The meeting was held in a friendly and business-like atmosphere.

The next meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty will be held in Prague.
Declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty

The high-level representatives of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty who gathered in Moscow on 7 June 1990 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee adopted the following statement.

I.

Current developments in Europe are creating the conditions for overcoming the bloc-based model of security and the division of the continent. These developments are becoming irreversible. They are in line with the interest of peoples in living in harmony, without artificial barriers or ideological enmity. The participants favour the establishment of a new, pan-European security system, and a united Europe of peace and co-operation.

The States which were represented at the meeting are actively participating in this dynamic process, and consequently consider it essential to review the nature and functions of the Warsaw Treaty. They are convinced that only thus can the Warsaw Treaty fulfil, in a period of transition, new urgent tasks related to disarmament and the creation of a pan-European security system.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty concur that the ideological image of the enemy has largely been overcome by the convergent efforts of East and West, while the very concepts of East and West are reacquiring purely geographical significance. They consider that danger could emanate only from threats threatening the security of countries in any form, including threats of force or the use of force, whoever might be involved. Elements of confrontation contained in documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance in past years no longer correspond to the spirit of the times.

In this new situation, the Governments which were represented at the meeting are undertaking a review of the nature, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as its transformation into a treaty among sovereign States with equal rights, built upon democratic foundations. For that purpose they have created a temporary commission of government plenipotentiaries which will submit appropriate concrete proposals to the Political Consultative Committee by the end of October 1990. The Committee will examine these proposals before the end of November 1990. In this way the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty wish to contribute to strengthening peace, security and stability in Europe and furthering the Helsinki process.

The participants reaffirmed their readiness to co-operate constructively with the North Atlantic Alliance and its members, and also with the neutral and non-aligned States of the continent, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, in the interest of stability and disarmament in Europe, the strengthening of trust and the consolidation of the principle of defensive sufficiency.

The participants also consider that the consistent and comprehensive institutionalization of the Helsinki process is an important step in this regard. This is the objective of proposals recently made by individual
participants in OSCE. The participants in the meeting expect that the first important decisions on this problem will be adopted at the forthcoming summit meeting of European States, the United States and Canada.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty take a positive view of certain concrete steps recently taken by NATO. They expect that the trend towards changes in NATO that has been observed will become more rapid and more thorough-going, and also that it will be reflected in appropriate substantive changes in the Alliance's activities.

II.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty expressed their wish for a successful conclusion to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe, in order that agreements on these subjects can be adopted at a meeting of leaders of CSCE participating States at the end of 1990.

Concerning the external aspects of the unification of Germany, a general conviction was expressed that it should be effected in the context of the CSCE process and on the basis of the principles of that process, stimulating and intensifying its development, taking account of the legitimate security interests of Germany's neighbours and all other States, and furnishing firm guarantees of the inviolability of European frontiers.

The States which were represented at the meeting will actively promote the establishment of a European economic and juridical space, as well as the full realization of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The participants noted that the agreements reached at the meeting between the Presidents of the USSR and the United States are conducive to further progress towards disarmament and the improvement of the international situation.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty express their conviction that all States participating in the Helsinki process fully acknowledge their responsibility to ensure that the historic opportunity to create a Europe without blocs and enmity will not be missed.
LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING JOINT STATEMENTS ON THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY, ADOPTED AT THE UNITED STATES-SOVET SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON 1 JUNE 1990 */

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents of the United States-Soviet summit meeting in Washington:

- Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, adopted on 1 June 1990;

- Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, adopted on 1 June 1990.

In accordance with past practice, Minister S. Batsanov, USSR Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in Russian to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to issue these statements as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official Russian texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/1005.
JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The President of the United States, George Bush, and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, discussed the status of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the great progress which has been made in the negotiations on this Treaty. In particular, they welcomed the mutually acceptable solutions which have been found on major issues in the talks and reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year. They instructed their negotiating teams in Geneva to accelerate their work to complete the Joint Draft Text recording the details of these solutions in order to fulfil this goal.

The START Treaty will be a major landmark in both arms control and in the relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It results from the recognition by both sides of the special obligation they bear to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, enhance strategic stability, and strengthen peace and international security. As such, the START Treaty will signal a turning point in United States-Soviet arms control efforts toward a more rational, open, co-operative, predictable and stable relationship. The Treaty will complement to a remarkable degree the important political changes which have recently begun to remove the hostility and suspicion and will facilitate the reduction of the sizeable stockpiles of strategic offensive arms which now exist.

The benefits of this Treaty are many. For the first time ever, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms — up to 50 per cent in certain categories. More importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible. The result will be greater stability and a lower risk of war.

Major agreed provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

The total number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 1,600; within this total deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be reduced to no more than 154.

The total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 6,000. Of these, no more than 4,900 will be warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, no more than 1,540 will be warheads on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1,100 will be warheads on mobile ICBMs;

The aggregate throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of each side will be limited to an agreed level which will be approximately 50 per cent below the existing level of the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of a date to be determined. This limit will not be exceeded for the duration of the Treaty;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6,000 limit;
Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and shall be attributed with an agreed number of warheads against the 6,000 limit. Existing and future United States heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 10 warheads each. Existing and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 8 warheads each;

Within the 1,600 limit on delivery vehicles the United States of America may have no more than 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are attributed with 10 warheads each. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may exceed that number of heavy bombers by 40 per cent. If the United States of America exceeds the 150 number, each additional heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics exceeds 210 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, each such heavy bomber will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped;

Existing and future United States heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs; existing and future Soviet heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs;

Long-range ALCMs will be considered those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. Future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs will not be considered nuclear if they are distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. There will be no restrictions on deploying such ALCMs on aircraft not limited by the Treaty.

Reductions will be carried out in three phases over a period of seven years. Specific, equal interim levels for agreed categories of strategic offensive arms will be achieved by the end of each phase of reductions;

The numerical limitations provided for by the Treaty will be achieved and complied with through conversion or elimination in accordance with agreed procedures.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will not be constrained in the START Treaty. Each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs and, annually for the duration of the Treaty, with unilateral declarations regarding its planned deployments of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e. those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. Those declarations will be politically binding. In the annual declarations the maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the following five Treaty years will be specified, provided that the number declared will not exceed 880. In the declarations of policy it will be specified that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. The sides reaffirmed their 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement to continue to seek "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification".

Except as specifically prohibited, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.
The START Treaty will include specific prohibitions on certain categories of strategic offensive arms, basing modes and activities. The following are among the bans under the START Treaty:

- new types of heavy ICBMs;
- heavy SLBMs and launchers of heavy SLBMs;
- mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with more than 10 re-entry vehicles;
- flight testing and deployment of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987;
- rapid reload of ICBM launchers;
- long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads.

The far-reaching reductions and other constraints contained in the Treaty will be accompanied by the most thorough and innovative verification provisions ever negotiated.

Taken together, the START Treaty’s comprehensive verification régime will create a degree of transparency in the military sphere which would have been unthinkable only a short time ago. It will not only provide for effective verification of the obligations of the Treaty, but will also greatly increase the mutual confidence which is essential for a sound strategic relationship. In addition, this verification system can provide a model which may be incorporated into future agreements. The verification régime under development includes:

- On-site inspections: For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the Treaty, each side will, on the basis of reciprocity, conduct 12 kinds of on-site inspections, as well as continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, in accordance with agreed procedures. Inter alia, each side will conduct short-notice inspections at facilities related to strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verify the numbers of re-entry vehicles on deployed ballistic missiles, inspections to verify elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities related to them, suspect site inspections, and various exhibitions.

- National technical means of verification: For the purpose of ensuring verification, each side will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. The Treaty will include a series of co-operative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. There will be a ban on interference with such means;

- Ban on denial of telemetric information: The sides agreed to make on-board technical measurements on ICBMs and SLBMs and to broadcast
all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. Except for strictly limited exemptions, there will be a ban on any practice, including the use of encryption, encapsulation or jamming, that denies full access to telemetric information;

- Information exchange: Before signature of the Treaty the sides will exchange data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of their strategic offensive arms. These data will be updated on a regular basis throughout the lifetime of the Treaty;

- A comprehensive agreement on the manner of deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles and appropriate limitations on their movements so as to ensure effective verification of adherence to the numerical limitations provided for in the Treaty. In addition, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers will be limited and mobile ICBMs will be subject to identification through the application of unique identifiers, or tags.

To promote the objectives of the Treaty, the sides will establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The sides have agreed that the Treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. If the sides so agree, the Treaty can be extended for successive five-year periods, unless superseded.

The progress outlined above fulfills the aim, set forth by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during their Malta meeting, of agreeing upon the basic provisions of the strategic offensive arms Treaty by the time of their Washington meeting. The two Presidents express confidence that the Foreign Ministers and the delegations of the two countries at the Geneva talks will be able to reach agreement in the remaining months on the outstanding issues that are still being negotiated.

Washington 1 June 1990
Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, building on the results of the current negotiations, agree to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The objectives of these negotiations will be to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. This will be achieved by seeking agreements that improve survivability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and defences.

In order to attain these objectives, the sides have agreed as follows:

First. This year the sides will complete work on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Following the signing of the Treaty, the sides will hold consultations without delay regarding future talks and these important talks will begin at the earliest practical date. Both sides in these future talks will be free to raise any issues related to any strategic offensive arms.

Within the existing negotiating framework on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva, the two sides will continue negotiations on ABM and space without delay.

Thus, in the future talks the two sides will discuss strategic stability issues of interest to them, including the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, taking into account stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and development of new technologies. The sides will work toward the important goal of reaching an early outcome in these negotiations.

Second. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as is the case in the emerging START Treaty, will, in the new negotiations, seek to reduce their strategic offensive arms in a way consistent with enhancing strategic stability. In the new negotiations, the two sides agree to place emphasis on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, on reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, and on giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs. Effective verification will be provided by national technical means, co-operative measures, and on-site inspection.

Third. Having agreed on the need to ensure a predictable strategic relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the sides will, for the entire duration of the START Treaty, exchange, at the beginning of each calendar year, information on planned changes in the numbers of strategic offensive arms as of the end of the current year.
Fourth. The sides will pursue additional measures to build confidence and ensure predictability of the military activities of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that would reduce the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of accident, miscalculation, terrorism, or unexpected technological breakthrough, and would prevent possible incidents between them.

Fifth. The sides believe that reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is the responsibility not only of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that other States should also make their contribution toward the attainment of this objective, in particular in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They call upon all States to consider the new opportunities for engagement in mankind's common effort to remove the risk of outbreak of nuclear war worldwide.

Accordingly, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give these future negotiations the highest priority so that the benefits of strengthened stability can be realized as soon as possible.
LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING JOINT STATEMENTS ON THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY, ADOPTED AT THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON 1 JUNE 1990 *

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents of the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Washington:

- Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, adopted in Washington on 1 June 1990;

In accordance with past practice, Ambassador S. Ledomar, Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in English to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to issue these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and to distribute them to the delegations of all States members of the Conference and States non-members of the Conference participating in the work of the Conference.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

(Signed) S. BATSANOV

*/ The official English texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/1004.

GE.90-61704/3713a

On behalf of those States which belong to the North Atlantic Alliance and are members of the Conference on Disarmament, I have the honour to forward to you the following document:

"Message from Turnberry, and Final Communiqué from the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, on 7 and 8 June 1990".

The document is attached in the official English and French versions. I should be grateful if you would circulate, as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, this letter together with the document adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in its English and French versions.

(Signed) T.A.H. Solesby
Ambassador
PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ M-1/90/129

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AT TURNBERRY, UNITED KINGDOM
7th-8th June 1990

MESSAGE FROM TURNBERRY

We, the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance, express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy. In this spirit, we extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and co-operation.

True and enduring security in Europe will be best assured through mutual acknowledgement and understanding of the legitimate security interests of all states. We are ready to contribute actively to building confidence and closer relations between all European countries, including the members of the two alliances. We welcome the statement issued by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow on 7th June. We are encouraged by the positive spirit conveyed in this declaration and in particular by the readiness on the part of the countries issuing it for constructive co-operation.

The CSCE process, which will become even more important as an instrument for co-operation and security in Europe, should be strengthened and given effective institutional form. We are committed to work for a rapid and successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The arms control process must be vigorously pursued.

We are convinced that German unification is a major contribution to stability in Europe.

Recognising the eminently political importance of these tasks, we are ready to do our utmost for their accomplishment.

*   *   *

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

1. The historic events that have occurred since we met last December in Brussels confirm that Europe is entering a new era. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are taking steps to establish democratic institutions, hold free elections and
promote political pluralism and market-oriented economic policies. Germany is peacefully and democratically moving towards unity. We welcome the expansion and deepening of political exchanges at all levels. The visits to NATO by the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Polish Foreign Ministers exemplify this broadened dialogue. We look to further such opportunities in the future. A continent divided for four decades is searching for new patterns and structures of co-operation. These positive trends are having repercussions beyond Europe: democracy, the search for peaceful solutions and respect for human values are gaining ground in other parts of the world as well. Our Alliance remains vitally important as an instrument both for ensuring the security of its members and the stability of Europe and as a keystone of our efforts to build a new European order of peace.

At this meeting, we have looked ahead to both continuing and new Alliance tasks in support of the positive changes in Europe, in preparation for the decisions to be taken by our Heads of State and Government next month in London. To that end, we have confirmed our agreement on the following points.

2. We strongly emphasise that we attach the highest priority to the conclusion this year of a CFE treaty. This must encompass all subjects under negotiation, and result in substantial, binding, verifiable reductions of conventional forces in Europe, thus eliminating destabilising disparities and the capability to launch a surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action. Such a treaty would be a dramatic advance towards greater stability and security in Europe. That goal is within sight, and it is now imperative that the remaining obstacles to its achievement be removed. We remain ready to take account of the stated interests of the other participants and to explore all open issues on the basis of a willingness on all sides to make reasonable compromises. We have therefore instructed our negotiators in Vienna to pursue new approaches to mutually acceptable solutions, in particular on aircraft, armour and verification. We call on the Soviet Union to co-operate in reaching agreement on all substantive issues this Summer, in order that progress can be made on the broader agenda for the construction of a new Europe, including a CSCE Summit later this year.

3. Allied governments will continue to work for substantive results in the CSBM negotiations, in the form of an agreement later this year. To that end, Allies have recently proposed a series of innovative co-operative measures, such as a mechanism for discussion of unusual activities of a military nature and annual implementation assessment meetings. We will continue to build on the contributions to confidence-building flowing from the Military Doctrine Seminar held in January in the framework of the CSBM negotiations in order to further expand military contacts and exchanges on military matters.

4. As soon as a CFE agreement is reached, Allies will be prepared to undertake follow-on negotiations to further enhance security and stability in Europe. The objectives of these follow-on negotiations, and of our further quest for European security, including through conventional arms control, will be considered at our meeting of Heads of State and Government.
5. We welcome the progress attained in the US-Soviet Summit held last week and, in particular, the agreement on major outstanding issues governing a START treaty that will result in deep reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear weapons and greatly expand bilateral military transparency in that area, as well as agreement to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically devoted to achieving a more stable strategic balance after the current treaty is completed. We took special note of the progress represented by the signature at the Summit meeting of verification protocols for treaties limiting nuclear testing and expressed our satisfaction with the bilateral agreement that will drastically reduce both sides' stocks of chemical weapons.

6. We believe the US-Soviet agreement on reducing chemical weapons stockpiles will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention for an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons now being negotiated, which remains our goal. All Allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other states to undertake a similar commitment. We reaffirm our determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and of missiles capable of carrying such weapons.

7. We will pursue the "Open Skies" initiative, convinced that such a regime would make a significant contribution to the openness and transparency we wish to encourage. We therefore regret that our efforts to reach such an agreement have thus far not been successful and look to the Soviet Union to join with us to take the steps necessary to create an "Open Skies" regime that will increase calculability, mutual confidence and the security of all participants.

8. Recognising that the verification of arms control treaties is destined to become a long-term task for the Alliance, we have decided to establish a co-ordination mechanism for this purpose.

9. We agree on the crucial importance of the political and economic reforms underway in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The continued progress of these states towards becoming democratic and economically prosperous partners co-operating with us will be an important element in the future security and stability of Europe. We are prepared to support their efforts to integrate their economies more closely into the world economy and to widen and deepen the scope of our co-operation with them as they progress, thus contributing to the success of their reform programmes.

10. We strongly hope that the processes of economic re-orientation and development and of democratic institution-building in these countries, necessarily complicated and uneven, will successfully overcome periods of uncertainty and potential instability. The historic changes already underway and the prospects for further positive developments have not removed all grounds for concern about the stability and security of Europe. Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is
continuing to modernise and which have implications for our defence.

11. The need to maintain our common defence remains vital. The Alliance's role of preventing conflict, precluding the use or threat of force against any of its members and guaranteeing stability will continue to be essential. That role is built upon the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries and embodies an indispensable link between North America and European democracies. For the foreseeable future, the prevention of war will continue to require an appropriate mix of survivable and effective conventional and nuclear forces, at the lowest levels consistent with our security needs. Our resolve, our commitment to the equitable and widespread sharing of responsibilities, and our solidarity with which we have maintained adequate collective defence arrangements for so long, including the presence of significant North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, will continue to be crucial factors in the maintenance of peace in Europe.

12. The military risks facing the Alliance have already decreased substantially, and implementation of a successful CFE agreement would result in a further dramatic improvement. The principles of Alliance security set out in May 1989 in the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament are the basis for our further work in assessing the implications of the changing situation in Europe for our strategy. Thus, those governments among us participating in the Defence Planning Committee welcome its recent decision to undertake a review of NATO's military strategy, and the means of implementing it, in the emerging circumstances. They also welcome the invitation to the NATO Military Authorities to undertake a study of the possibilities of greater use of multi-national forces. They endorse the US President's recent proposal that negotiations on US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded.

13. We see the CSCE process as an important framework for far-reaching reforms and stability and as a central element in the construction of a new Europe, along with other European institutions including the Alliance itself. The function of the CSCE will be complementary to that of the Alliance. The CSCE, having from the outset served to ease the burden of the division of Europe, will now become even more vital as an instrument for developing structures for a Europe whole and free and for co-operation within a united continent. The Allies look forward to an early outcome to the CFE negotiations which are taking place in the CSCE framework and to continued progress in the talks on confidence and security-building measures, which, along with results of CSCE inter-sessional activities, will lay the necessary basis for the CSCE Summit this year. The Summit should reflect the new role of the CSCE and take appropriate decisions. Furthermore, it is the hope of the Allies that the "2 + 4" process will be completed prior to the CSCE Summit. That Summit will help consolidate the changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe, and provide substantial new impetus to the CSCE process in all main areas of the Helsinki Final Act. To this end, implementation in letter and spirit of all CSCE
obligations by all CSCE participating states remains essential. Meanwhile, we believe that the time has now come to determine the modalities of institutionalisation without depriving the process of its flexibility and balance. A number of valuable proposals have been raised within the framework of Alliance consultations for the further development of the CSCE process and for enhancing regional co-operation efforts. They include a consultation mechanism on a high level as well as other arrangements in specific fields of co-operation. Our governments continue to develop these ideas as our preparations continue for the CSCE Summit. We are pleased that other CSCE participants are equally developing their ideas. We welcome the decision of the Foreign Ministers of the 35 CSCE states at their meeting in Copenhagen on 5th June 1990 to establish a preparatory Committee for the Summit, and for Ministers of the "35" to meet in the United States this Autumn.

14. Welcoming agreement at the recent Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe on fundamental principles to guide the conversion from planned to market-oriented economies, we fully support the efforts of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension now underway to reinforce and extend the protection and guarantee of human rights and individual freedoms. Allies place particular importance on resolutions concerning the right to free and fair elections held at regular intervals, a commitment to the rule of law, and rights of persons belonging to national minorities among many proposals put forward for consideration at the Copenhagen meeting. We hope that the Palma de Mallorca meeting on the Mediterranean will contribute to enhancing co-operation also in that region. We also welcome the interest recently expressed by the Albanian Government in associating itself with the CSCE process and the commitments therein. We look to the Albanian Government to demonstrate its willingness to comply with all existing CSCE commitments, including those on human rights.

15. We note with pride that after 40 years as a divided city, Berlin is finally growing together again. The Berlin Wall has come down. This heralds the long-awaited ending of the post-war era and of the division of Germany and of Europe. The realisation of the unity of Germany has always been a primary goal of our Alliance. Therefore, on the basis of our close and continuing consultations within the Alliance, we are united in actively supporting the process that has already been achieved in the process of German unification; we also support the efforts underway in the "2 + 4" talks to seek a final settlement under international law terminating the Four Power rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, and without the establishment of constraints on the sovereignty of Germany. A united Germany must have the right, recognised in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose to be a party to a treaty of alliance. We believe that European stability, as well as the wishes of the German people, requires that a unified Germany be a full member of this Alliance, including its integrated military structure, without prejudice to stated positions about nondeployment of NATO forces on the present GDR territory. The security guarantee provided by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty will extend to all the territory of a united
Germany. We seek no unilateral advantage from German unity and are prepared to demonstrate this, taking into account legitimate Soviet security interests. A free and democratic Germany will be an essential element of a peaceful order in Europe in which no state need harbour fears for its security against its neighbours. We underline the importance of the points on German unification discussed with the Soviet leadership in Washington, which fully reflect our consultations.

16. We express the wish that the problems accompanying the difficult internal transition of the Soviet Union be solved in a constructive manner and to the satisfaction of all concerned. In this context, we firmly support the expectations and aspirations of the Baltic peoples. It is our understanding that the leaders of Lithuania and the Soviet Union have indicated their willingness to begin a dialogue upon the suspension — and not retraction — by the Lithuanian leadership of the implementation of their declaration of independence. We appeal to all parties to show flexibility and enter into true dialogue to reach an early solution.

17. Our activities in the scientific and environmental fields, known as NATO's "Third Dimension", remain of major benefit to our member nations and are an expression of their solidarity. In the spirit of the 40th Anniversary Summit Declaration, we shall pursue measures to invite scientific experts from Central and Eastern Europe to participate in work on the environment connected with pilot studies within the framework of the Committee on the Challenges on Modern Society.

18. The NATO Summit in May 1989 launched a Democratic Institutions Fellowship programme intended to help qualified applicants from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those from Alliance countries, to study our democratic values and way of life. We intend to pursue this initiative and are pleased with the strong response it has received in its first year.

19. Mindful of the continuing need to inform our publics better about the work and objectives of the Alliance, we expressed our strong support for the network of Atlantic Committees and Associations brought together under the Atlantic Treaty Association. We are convinced that they have a vital role to play in deepening public understanding of the role of the Alliance. We underline the great value of the exchanges of views in the North Atlantic Assembly on issues facing the Alliance.

20. The developments which we are now witnessing and of which we have been and will continue to be among the principal architects, are producing far-reaching changes in the political and military fundamentals of European security, and consequently in the conditions under which our Alliance is required to work.

These changes call into question neither the necessity for maintaining the Alliance nor the permanence of its fundamental features. We will keep our Alliance dynamic and cohesive and will continue to foster a solid and fruitful transatlantic relationship between North America and an increasingly united Europe. We will remain cognisant of the need for intra-Alliance
co-operation and assistance. We must continue, in the face of 
historic change, to deepen and strengthen our political 
consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination.

Thus, while ensuring that the permanent principles which 
form the basis of our Alliance and guarantee its effectiveness 
are preserved, we must today adapt it to the enormous changes now 
taking place.

We have already begun this process in the political and 
defence spheres, as demonstrated by our Ministerial consultations 
this Spring. We have shown ourselves ready, through the arms 
control negotiations in which we are participating or which we are 
preparing to initiate, to adjust the size of the Allies' 
conventional and nuclear forces. We have noted that the Defence 
Ministers who participate in the Nuclear Planning Group and the 
Defence Planning Committee have decided to reconsider their 
strategy. Although the prevention of war will always remain our 
fundamental task, the changing European environment now requires 
of us a broader approach to security based as much on 
constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.

21. We recognise, against the background of the changes now 
taking place in Europe, that the modifications in certain aspects 
of the Alliance's policies and functioning will form part of a 
broader pattern of adaptation within the Organization. This 
process should encompass all activities of our Alliance and must 
be consistent with the principles which we have declared to be 
permanent and with the requirements of the new era upon which we 
are embarking. We have, therefore, instructed our Council in 
Permanent Session to oversee the work in hand, with a view to 
ensuring that it is effectively co-ordinated, and to report 
regularly to us on the progress made.

22. We express our deep appreciation for the warm hospitality 
provided by the Government of the United Kingdom.
LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "DECLARATION ON A TRANSFORMED NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ISSUED BY THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN LONDON ON 5-6 JULY 1990"

On behalf of those States which belong to the North Atlantic Alliance and are members of the Conference on Disarmament, I have the honour to forward to you the following document:

"Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5-6 July 1990."

The document is attached in the official English and French versions. I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and the attached declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

T.A.H. Solesby
Ambassador
1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by article 2 of our Treaty.

3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

4. We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every State is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.
6. The member States of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member States to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.

7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

10. Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes another such meeting this Autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on "Open Skies".

11. The significant presence of North American conventional and United States nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.

12. To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.
13. Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.

- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.

- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.
18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

19. We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.

20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member States concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defence", where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection, NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

21. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, inter alia:

- CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;
- CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;
- CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic co-operation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and
- CSCE co-operation on environmental protection.

22. We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalized to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE Governments establish:

- a programme for regular consultations among member Governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
- a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress toward a Europe whole and free;
- a small CSCE secretariat to co-ordinate these meetings and conferences;
- a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
- a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchanges of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member States; and

- a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member States.

The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.
LETTER DATED 22 JANUARY 1991 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON NUCLEAR POLICY SIGNED AT POZ DO IGUAZU, BRAZIL, ON 28 NOVEMBER 1990

We have the honour to attach the text of a joint statement on common nuclear policy signed by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Doctor Fernando Collor, and the President of the Republic of Argentina, Doctor Carlos Saúl Menem, at Poz do Iguazú, Brazil, on 28 November 1990.

We would appreciate if you would arrange for the distribution of the joint statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Roberto García Moritán
Ambassador
Special Representative of Argentina for Disarmament

(Signed): Rubens Ricupero
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Brazil
Argentine-Brazilian Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy issued at Foz do Iquaçu, Brazil, on 28 November 1990

The President of the Argentine Republic, Mr. Carlos Saúl Menem, and the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Mr. Fernando Collor, meeting at Foz do Iquaçu, Brazil,

CONSIDERING:

Their decision to advance the ongoing integration process;

The importance of the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes for the scientific, economic and social development of both countries;


The reaffirmation of those commitments by both Presidents in the joint communiqué issued at Buenos Aires on 6 July 1990;

The progress achieved in bilateral nuclear co-operation as a result of joint efforts within the framework of the Agreement on Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy;

NOTING:

The efforts made by the Permanent Bilateral Committee on Nuclear Co-operation to enhance co-operation between the two countries in the areas of research, the exchange of information, industrial complementarity, the exchange of nuclear material, the development of joint projects and policy co-ordination;

The visits by the Presidents and technical experts of the two countries to each other's nuclear facilities, especially to the uranium enrichment plants at Pilcaniyeu and Iperó and the radiochemical process laboratories at Ezeiza, which are a clear indication of the level of mutual confidence achieved between Argentina and Brazil; and

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT:

The fact that the Permanent Committee has developed mechanisms for monitoring the two countries' nuclear activities which establish, inter alia, joint criteria for the classification of nuclear material and facilities and the determination of their importance, and provide for reciprocal inspections of all nuclear facilities,

HEREBY DECIDE:

1. To adopt the Joint Accounting and Control System agreed on by the Permanent Committee, which shall apply to all the nuclear activities of the two countries;
2. That, as an initial step, the following activities will be carried out within the next 45 days:

   (a) The exchange of the respective lists describing all their nuclear facilities;

   (b) The exchange of the statements of the initial inventories of nuclear material existing in each country;

   (c) The first reciprocal inspections of centralized records systems;

   (d) The presentation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the records and reports system which is part of the Joint Accounting and Control System, with a view to bringing it into conformity with the records and reports which both countries submit to the Agency in accordance with the safeguards agreements in force.

3. To enter into negotiations with IAEA with a view to the conclusion of a joint safeguards agreement based on the Joint Accounting and Control System;

4. After the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with IAEA, to take appropriate action to permit the full entry into force for the two countries of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), including action to update and improve its wording.

I have the honour to send you herewith the text of the arms control and disarmament plan submitted by France on 3 June 1991.

I would be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements to publish this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to ensure that it is circulated to all Member States and non-Member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Gérard Errera

Ambassador
Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament
ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PLAN

The spread of increasingly costly and destructive weapons systems is exposing the world to growing dangers. Inequalities, injustices and the imbalance of forces are conducive to threats, the arms race, and conflicts of all kinds. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction gives a global dimension to these dangers. The whole world, South and North alike, has a vital interest in halting this race and in checking this dangerous and ruinous proliferation. This concerns us all.

Our aims are clear. Chemical weapons must be eliminated. Bacteriological weapons must not be produced. Existing nuclear arsenals must be reduced to the lowest level consistent with the maintenance of deterrence. The non-dissemination of nuclear weapons remains an imperative, whereas the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is justified. The dissemination of ballistic technologies must be strictly controlled in so far as they may be used for aggressive aims. On the other hand, there is no reason to prevent cooperation in space for civilian and scientific purposes.

As regards the so-called conventional weapons, a balance of forces should be maintained, or introduced, everywhere, region by region, while respecting the right of all States to security. Arms exports are consequently to be strictly controlled and so conducted as not to contradict this action. France has already made these goals its own, and is prepared to subscribe to any improvement in existing arrangements, to any new international or multilateral commitment based on them. It has already started thinking about this issue with its partners in the European Community.

* * *

Global arms control and disarmament presupposes action at three levels: the weapons category level, and the regional and worldwide levels.

I. CATEGORY OBJECTIVES

Each weapons category requires specific treatment, proceeding in stages if necessary. In order to achieve clearly-defined goals binding on all, France, which is constantly concerned to adapt its own regulation, proposes that concrete measures, sector by sector, should soon be taken.

1. Prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. The entire international community, meeting in Paris in January 1989, acknowledged the need to complete the convention banning chemical weapons, as soon as possible. France proposed convening the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in Geneva at ministerial level to conclude the negotiations before the end of the year. It calls on all States to become parties to the Convention from the outset.

2. Prohibition of bacteriological weapons. At the Review Conference of the 1972 BW Convention in September of this year, France will propose the addition of a protocol on verification.
3. Nuclear disarmament remains an essential goal. France supports the efforts to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the two major powers. It confirms that it will participate in the process as soon as the conditions it specified in 1983 have been fulfilled.

At the same time, it is important to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the present five nuclear powers.

France, which is already applying all of the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has in principle taken the decision to sign it and hopes that all States will accede to it.

4. The Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR), which allows those now in possession of missile know-how to limit the risks of ballistic proliferation, should only be a stage towards a more general agreement, one that is geographically more extensive, better controlled and applicable to all. The agreement would lay down rules promoting civilian cooperation in space, while removing the dangers of the diversion of technology for developing a military ballistic capability. Here again, the aim would be to arrive at a situation where all States wishing to gain access to space for development purposes would cooperate in a framework guaranteeing security.

France further recommends the development of outer-space confidence-building measures in the form of a "code of conduct" for civilian and military satellites.

5. Conventional weapons. Conventional weapons exports must not counteract the search, region by region, for a balance of forces at the lowest possible level consistent with the right of each State to security.

The five permanent members of the Security Council – which happen to be the principal producers of conventional weapons – are to start a round of concertation in the coming weeks aimed at determining rules of restraint. The process could then be broadened on the occasion of the next session of the General Assembly, with a view to establishing an international register of arms sales to be kept by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Particular attention will be given, in the course of these discussions, to sales of conventional weapons in parallel markets.

The members of the European Community have already begun a process of concertation aimed at making proposals on this subject.

II. OBJECTIVES

The example of Europe is encouraging. The Europeans have moved on from the cold war to peaceful coexistence, and now to cooperation within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They have adopted and applied security and confidence-building measures. They have signed the first disarmament agreement concerning conventional weapons. This experience cannot be transposed as such. But it does show that the arms race is not inevitable. This approach could serve as an inspiration for other initiatives in other regions.
We call for regional security arrangements based on the following rules:

(a) Only when the solution of conflicts is started, can this process get underway and confidence be created.

(b) Adoption by the parties concerned of regional confidence-building and security measures. Information is the prime condition of confidence. Transparency and confidence-building measures, i.e. mutual information on force capabilities and strengths, and on the movements of armed forces, reduce the sense of threat and paves the way for disarmament proper. For that, a framework is needed, which may be a regional organization, and means of inspection in situ and by satellite. France would be willing to disclose information available to it to regional agencies responsible for transparency. It would favour the transmission to such regional agencies of the means of observation, in particular those in outer space that as may be available to Europe and the United Nations.

(c) Efforts must be made, through national decisions and through negotiations, to move towards a balance of regional forces. Arms export policies must not run counter to this goal. Once this equilibrium has been attained, its level should progressively be lowered through negotiations providing for means of control.

(d) Strict regional application of the category régimes laid down for nuclear, bacteriological and chemical (NBC) weapons and ballistic missiles. That is why, at the initiative of France, United Nations Security Council resolution 687 on the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict noted that the specific constraints imposed on Iraq as regards nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, represented steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles, along with a global ban on chemical weapons. That goal should be pursued in other regions of the world.

III. The United Nations is now in a position to fully play the role it was assigned by its Charter. France considers that it is therefore for the Security Council to guarantee and, if necessary, to harmonize these disarmament and non-proliferation policies. The Council must encourage the signature of agreements on particular arms categories, as well as regional and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. From the agreements reached, it would derive general rules and thus exercise a function of worldwide vigilance.

This presupposes that the members of the Security Council and in the first place its permanent members will set the example.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a nuclear free-zone proposal made on 30 July 1991 by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I would be grateful if you could circulate it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Han Chang On
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

GE.91-62206/6935a
PROPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON THE NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The changing situation today raises the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as the mature demand that brooks no further delay.

The major nuclear weapon states, which consider the Korean peninsula their operational theatre for a nuclear showdown, are moving from confrontation to cooperation and reaching agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons. This fact affords a new objective possibility for turning the Korean peninsula into a zone free from nuclear weapons.

These days the United States takes the posture of not objecting in principle to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on condition that the parties concerned reach an agreement thereof, and expresses support to the proposal for establishing nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.

We consider that, if the United States and the south Korean authorities take a disinterested approach to our peace initiatives, join us in our sincere efforts to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, and follow the current of the times, the source of the danger of a nuclear war can be rooted out without difficulty on the Korean peninsula.

It is with such expectation and conviction that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea puts forward the following new proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

1. The north and south of Korea shall agree on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and make a joint declaration thereof.

We consider that the north and south should negotiate all the legal and practical matters related to turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and adopt a joint declaration with legal effect not later than the end of 1992.

We consider that the joint declaration should provide for the ban on the test, manufacturing and possession of the nuclear weapons by the north and south, the prohibition of the deployment and passage of nuclear weapons and of the nuclear military exercises in the sphere of the nuclear-free zone of the Korean peninsula and the verification of the absence of nuclear weapons through inspections of the north and south.

2. The United States, and Soviet Union and China, the nuclear weapons states neighbouring on the Korean peninsula, shall legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and declaration is adopted to this effect.
The nuclear weapon states must stimulate the process of establishing a nuclear-free zone by expressing their willingness not to hinder the Korean peninsula from becoming a nuclear-free zone but guarantee such status.

Within one year after the north and south of Korea jointly declare the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, the nuclear weapon states should remove all factors contravening the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula and give assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, as required by international law.

Particularly, the United States, the party which has deployed its nuclear weapons in south Korea, must take measures to withdraw these weapons in conformity with the requirement of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

3. The non-nuclear weapon states in Asia shall support the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and respect its nuclear-free status.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is ready to hold bilateral or multilateral negotiations any time to discuss the matter of establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

This proposal is of weighty importance in eliminating the nuclear threat against us and strengthening the system of nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula and, furthermore, will make a substantial contribution to consolidating peace and security in Asia and the world.

If the Korean peninsula is turned into a nuclear-free zone, it will create a favourable phase for creating a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia and lay down a basis for expanding the nuclear-free zone to the rest of the Northeast Asia region.

Proceeding from its anti-nuclear, peaceloving policy, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea solemnly declares at home and abroad its readiness to take all the necessary measures to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic people's Republic of Korea.


I have the honour to send you herewith the official text of the communiqué issued following the meeting held in Paris on 8 and 9 July 1991 between representatives of the five States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council concerning arms transfers and non–proliferation.

I would be grateful if you would circulate this text as an official document of the Conference, and arrange for its translation into the other languages of the Conference.

(Signed) Gérard ERRERA

GE.91-62283/1228H
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF THE
FIVE ON ARMS TRANSFERS AND NON-PROLIFERATION

(Paris, 8 and 9 July 1991)

1. Representatives of the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, met in Paris on 8 and 9 July to review issues related to conventional arms transfers and to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

They noted with concern the dangers associated with the excessive build up of military capabilities, and confirmed they would not transfer conventional weapons in circumstances which would undermine stability. They also noted the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as on a regional basis.

2. They had a thorough and positive exchange of views on the basis of the arms control initiatives presented in particular by President Bush, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Major and on other initiatives which address these problems globally and as a matter of urgency in the Middle East. They also agreed to support continued work in the United Nations on an arms transfers register to be established under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, on a non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency on arms transfers and in general in military matters.

They stressed that the ultimate response to the threat of proliferation is verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements amongst the parties concerned. They expressed strong support for full implementation of existing arms control regimes. For their part, they will contribute to this objective by developing and maintaining stringent national and, as far as possible, harmonized controls to ensure that weapons of mass-destruction related equipments and materials are transferred for permitted purposes only and are not diverted.

They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. They expressed their view that critical steps towards this goal include full implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 and adoption by countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control for the region, including:

- a freeze and ultimate elimination of ground-to-ground missiles in the region;

- submission by all nations in the region of all of their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards;

- a ban on the importation and production of nuclear weapons usable materials;
agreement by all States in the region to undertake to becoming parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as it is concluded in 1992.

3. They acknowledged that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guarantees every State the right of self-defence. That right implies that States have also the right to acquire means with which to defend themselves. In this respect, the transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to the ability of States to meet their legitimate defence, security and national sovereignty requirements and to participate effectively in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability. They are fully conscious of the special responsibilities that are incumbent upon them to ensure that such risks be avoided, and of the special role they have to play in promoting greater responsibility, confidence and transparency in this field. They also recognize that a long-term solution to this problem should be found in close consultation with recipient countries.

4. They expressed the intention that:

- when considering under their national control procedures conventional weapons transfers, they will observe rules of restraint. They will develop agreed guidelines on this basis;

- taking into account the special situation of the Middle East as a primary area of tension, they will develop modalities of consultation and of information exchanges concerning arms transfers to this region as a matter of priority;

- a group of experts will meet in September with a view to reaching agreement on this approach;

- another plenary meeting will be held in October in London;

- further meetings will be held periodically to review these issues.

5. They expressed the conviction that this process of continuing cooperation will contribute to a worldwide climate of vigilance in this field which other countries will share.
LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED
BY THE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE CONCERNING
INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT

I have the honour to transmit the text of the Statement on International
Disarmament issued by Mr. Eduardo Vargas C., Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Chile, on 12 February last in the city of Santiago.

I should be most grateful if you, Sir, in accordance with established
practice, would arrange for this text to be issued as an official document of
the Conference on Disarmament and distributed it to all delegations, both of
the member States and of the non-member States participating in the work of
the Conference.

(Signed) Ernesto Tironi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.92-60439/8803a
STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ISSUED BY ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I should like to announce some important advances in matters of international disarmament, a question to which the Government of Chile attaches the greatest importance.

First, I wish to refer to the announcement of the President of France, Francois Mitterrand, at the United Nations Security Council Summit on 31 January last, concerning the ratification by his country of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco). We welcome that decision as a significant move towards the desired goal of the entry into force of that Treaty.

When this French initiative is added to the Safeguards Agreement recently concluded by Argentina and Brazil with the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna, and to the favourable statements of the Government of Cuba regarding its ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there is now justified hope that by the twenty-fifth anniversary of its signature, in 1992, this instrument may begin to have effective validity.

Pursuant to the permanent instructions of President Aylwin, the Ministry is taking the necessary diplomatic actions for the early consideration in OPANAL, which is the technical body established by the Treaty for such purposes, of the legal and technical procedures for strengthening and updating Tlatelolco and bringing it into force. In preparing such actions, this Ministry will coordinate with the national technical body concerned, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission.

I should also like to mention as an interesting development in the international field the signature on 30 January last of a safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency of Vienna which will enable IAEA to carry out the appropriate inspections of the installations and fissionable materials in that country. We have reason to hope that that agreement will be ratified and that, together with the agreement on reconciliation of the two Koreas, it will help to create a climate of security, peace and stability in that part of the world. I must point out that Chile supported the initiative of Australia, Canada and Japan urging the Government of North Korea to enter into this safeguards agreement and that our Ambassador to IAEA, as Chairman of the Group of 77 in Vienna, made important efforts to bring about consensus on the matter. This process taking place in a region of Asia adds to the explicit statements in favour of non-proliferation made by the States belonging to the new Commonwealth of Independent States and so considerably strengthens the global scope of international security.

Another important dimension is that relating to the multilateral convention on chemical weapons which is being negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and which unquestionably represents the most
important international effort in the matter of disarmament and a significant contribution to the protection of the global environment. In that connection, it will be recalled that Foreign Minister Silva Cimma, along with his colleagues from Argentina and Brazil, signed the Mendoza Agreement, subsequently joined by the other Latin American States before and during the Presidential Summit of the Rio Group at Cartagena. At present, we are finalizing with Argentina and Brazil the contribution which the three countries can make to the procedures of verification and implementation of the future convention in keeping with the position taken in the Mendoza Agreement.

Santiago, 12 February 1992
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1156
23 June 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE LEADER OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION ON 23 JUNE 1992

I should like to draw your attention to the following announcement made
by Mr. Malcolm Rifkind MP, United Kingdom, Secretary of State for Defence, in
answer to a Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons on 15 June 1992:

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization confirmed last autumn that
the sub-strategic nuclear capability remains essential to provide the
link between conventional and strategic forces, but that significant
reductions in sub-strategic nuclear forces were now possible. In
addition to the reductions announced last autumn, the alliance has
decided to terminate the deployment of United States nuclear depth bombs
on NATO maritime patrol aircraft.

"The Government are committed to maintaining the United Kingdom's
nuclear arsenal at the minimum level necessary for our deterrent needs. My
predecessor announced last September that tactical nuclear weapons
would no longer be deployed on Royal Navy ships in normal circumstances.
The Government have now decided that this residual capability is no
longer needed. Royal Navy ships and aircraft and Royal Air Force
maritime patrol aircraft will therefore no longer have the capability to
deploy tactical nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom weapons previously
earmarked for this role will be destroyed. The United Kingdom's
sub-strategic nuclear capability will therefore consist of Royal Air
Force dual-capable aircraft with the WE177 free-fall bomb."

I believe the above statement has a direct relevance to the work of the
Conference on Disarmament and I should be grateful if you would circulate this
letter as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Michael Weston
Ambassador

GE.92-61962/4369H
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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GE.92-62961/4877B (E)
B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

35. At its 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992, the Conference decided that informal meetings be held during its 1992 session on the substance of the agenda item, and that the discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Four informal meetings devoted to the agenda item were held between 12 March and 23 July 1992.

36. At the time of the adoption of that decision, the President of the Conference stated the following (CD/PV.612):

"Under the rules of procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have myself taken the initiative of preparing a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3. That list is my own and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the agenda items, as is the normal practice of the Conference."
37. The list of topics read out by the President was as follows:

"Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I in the light of the trends in international relations

Evaluation of the dynamics of the nuclear arms race in the light of recent international developments

Halting and reversing the qualitative aspects of the nuclear arms race, and related matters

Existing international instruments concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament: the need for a global, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory non-proliferation régime in order to achieve the goal of complete nuclear disarmament

The interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; the need for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament

Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons in view of recent developments and in the light of the global consequences of existing and envisaged disarmament and arms limitation agreements

The role of nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace for 40 years: the need to proceed carefully and gradually in reducing reliance on nuclear deterrence

The relevance of doctrines of nuclear deterrence in the present-day context

Principles governing nuclear disarmament

Proposals on stages and measures of nuclear disarmament

Cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and measures against the reuse for weapons purposes of fissionable material released by disarmament steps

Naval nuclear armaments and disarmament

A zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

Collateral measures with the aim of consolidating and continuing the ongoing process of nuclear disarmament:

Measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, to deter efforts of threshold and emerging nuclear States to acquire nuclear weapons
Non-proliferation of missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as their technology

Confidence-building measures promoting nuclear disarmament

Regional aspects of security: how to prevent competition for nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction

A global and multilateral verification agency under United Nations auspices

Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements

Existing proposals."

38. The following documents were submitted to the Conference under the agenda item during the 1992 session:

(a) Document CD/1134, dated 24 February 1992, submitted by the delegation of Chile, entitled "Statement issued by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile concerning International Disarmament"; and

(b) Document CD/1156, dated 23 June 1992, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, transmitting a statement made by Mr. Malcolm Rifkind MP, Secretary of State for Defence, in answer to a Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons on 15 June 1992, concerning the ending of the United Kingdom's maritime tactical nuclear weapons capability.

39. Various issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament were addressed by delegations at plenary meetings of the Conference. The statements, which contributed to further explanation of the positions of delegations, including individual nuclear-weapon States, as reflected below, appear in the verbatim records of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, various aspects of this item were discussed at the informal meetings.

40. The Group of 21 joined the consensus to discuss this item in the informal meetings.

41. Nineteen members of the Group of 21 placed on record their wish that the Conference on Disarmament establish an ad hoc committee on this agenda item with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1992 session in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference could best contribute to progress on this urgent matter. They pointed out that Resolution 45/37 C, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, had called upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear-arms freeze, which would embrace, besides a comprehensive test-ban on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the complete cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes under appropriate and effective measures and procedures for verification. Those States were convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures, had been amply demonstrated especially in the present-day international climate. In their opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament had long been overdue. They took note of the progress achieved in the bilateral negotiations in the nuclear field and looked forward to further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals in the context of the START process. However, according to these delegations, bilateral negotiations could not replace or bypass the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations had a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. They felt that the existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative development directly and fundamentally jeopardized the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike. They emphasized that it was an accepted fact that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. The present international situation and the end of the cold war lent further credence to the long-standing demand of an overwhelming majority of the world community to take further urgent measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The accumulation of nuclear weaponry constituted a threat to the very security that it sought to protect. In the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine was the doctrine of collective security. Moreover according to them the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which in the ultimate analysis were predicated upon a willingness to use nuclear weapons, could not be the basis for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, which was now a real danger due to possible loss of control over existing arsenals. A nuclear war would affect participants and innocent bystanders alike. Those members of the Conference on Disarmament reiterated the validity of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), of 1961, which declared, inter alia, that the use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against civilization. They considered that in the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bore a special responsibility. All nuclear-weapon States should accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps in a time-bound manner towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. Paragraph 50 of the Final document of SSOD-I set out guidelines for the Conference on Disarmament to provide an effective and complementary process in the multilateral framework. Those States remained firmly committed to the implementation of the provisions of that paragraph.

42. Three other delegations, belonging to the Group of 21, who had a different position, while stressing the continued crucial importance of the subject of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, felt that a fresh look should be taken at the nuclear-related issues. The new world situation after the end of the cold war as well as agreed cuts in the nuclear arsenals and unilateral measures in the same direction could not fail to have an impact on the approach to the nuclear-related issues. According to these three delegations the Conference on Disarmament should consider these important questions in a broader context, taking also into account among other things the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries which have up to now not possessed such weapons.
43. One delegation, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru introduced the Cartagena Declaration 
on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CD/1114) signed 
on 4 December 1991.

44. One delegation belonging to the Group of 21 stated that despite the NPT, 
there were today more nuclear weapons stationed in a larger number of 
countries; there were differing estimates of the number of nuclear warheads 
with unresolved questions of their accountability and control and there were 
worries of smuggling of fissionable material and clandestine transfer to 
terrorists. According to this delegation, the overwhelming focus of all 
efforts at non-proliferation had been to prevent non-nuclear-weapon States 
from acquiring nuclear weapons while nuclear weapons proliferated in geometric 
proportions and new generation of nuclear weapons were invented and deployed 
in nuclear-weapon States. Since 1968, several non-nuclear-weapon States had 
developed or acquired sophisticated technology in the nuclear field. This 
delegation held that in this changed scenario, it was unrealistic to achieve 
non-proliferation through a discriminatory treaty which came into effect 
in 1968 since it failed to provide an acceptable balance of mutual 
responsibility and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. 
This delegation stated that closed door "clubs", "groups" and "regimes" 
created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in technology, equipment 
and material on a discriminatory basis could not prevent proliferation. 
Non-proliferation had to be addressed in all its aspects and the only 
realistic solution to stop proliferation was to have a global and 
comprehensive approach to the problem. In its view, just as chemical and 
biological weapons were matters of global concern, a new international 
understanding and consensus on what constituted non-proliferation was urgently 
required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation which 
was universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory was seriously attempted. 
This delegation recalled a specific Action Plan presented by its Government, 
eventually leading to a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world as an 
ultimate goal at the Third Special Session on Disarmament in 1988. It noted 
that this Plan, which had assumed increased relevance in the present day 
context, outlined a systematic, rational and practicable time-frame to achieve 
these objectives. The Plan recognized the need for flexibility in the staging 
of these measures and called upon all States, nuclear, threshold and others, 
to accept equal obligations without discrimination. The same delegation 
reported that due to its apprehension on the question of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons purposes, it had proposed a freeze on the production of 
nuclear weapons and related fissile material as early as SSOD-II and 
simultaneously had presented a paper at SSOD-III on New Technologies and the 
Qualitative Arms Race. This delegation elaborated upon elements which could 
constitute the scope for a cut-off proposal, and stated that so long as the 
envisaged regime for an international control on fissile material production 
was based on one set of rules for nuclear-weapon States and another for the 
rest, verification of such a cut-off will remain difficult. It stated that 
existing stockpiles of weapons grade fissionable material and the availability 
of such material through recycling of warheads would also need to be taken 
into account.
45. Another delegation member of the Group of 21 recalled the salient provisions of its country’s initiatives on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and declaring the Middle East free from all weapons of mass destruction. The same delegation noted the growing international support for these initiatives. Several delegations reiterated in the 1992 CD session their support to the above-mentioned initiatives. The same delegation highlighted ideas on enhancing the security of the countries of the region through the lowest level of armament and through a qualitative and quantitative balance between the military capabilities of all States in a region, long torn by conflicts. Fully supporting the peace process in the Middle East launched in Madrid last October, the same delegation considered this process directed towards achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East so as to provide prosperity and development for all nations in the region.

46. One delegation of the Group of 21 which belongs to the Group of the three above-mentioned States maintained that nuclear deterrence, devised in the context of the cold war through the phased management of the strategic crisis to prevent the confrontation from leading the opponents to self-destruction, made arms control its essential tool as a way of keeping the arms race between the two main power blocs within manageable limits. Arms control was therefore incapable of halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of that delegation, the end of the cold war as a result of the collapse of Communism and the disappearance of the Soviet Union had taken nuclear deterrence to its historical crisis point and arms control to the point where, apart from the strange exception of one intermediate nuclear Power, it did not occur to anyone today to advocate renewing nuclear arsenals. The emerging new world order afforded a good opportunity to update the Baruch Plan with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That process of selective disarmament could be strengthened by the establishment of regional or subregional zones that were free from weapons of mass destruction and the Cartagena Declaration adopted by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela was an important precedent in that regard.

47. One nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Group of East European and other States* stressed that the main orientations of the policy of its Government in the field of limitation and reduction of armaments was predicated on the firm conviction that this State was not even a potential adversary of other States, whether in the West, East, North or South. In its view this premise created a fundamentally new political context applying also to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The gap between the new political realities and the military technological situation presented itself in the most dramatic terms in the fact that the strategic forces of the nuclear Powers, despite their political positions, remained targeted on each other’s territories. According to this State while the best solution would be the total elimination of nuclear weapons, this could not be done overnight. Hence, its proposal that the strategic offensive weapons which Russia and the United States would retain after the upcoming deep cuts should not be targeted on United States or Russian facilities, respectively, nor on other countries.

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* The reference to the Group of East European and other States here and elsewhere in the Report includes the following States: Bulgaria; Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; Hungary; Poland; Romania; and the Russian Federation.
This proposal could be implemented by certain ideas. Firstly, to consider the question of taking off alert status the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear Powers that were targeted on one another's territories and facilities, thereby attaining a kind of "zero action-readiness" of nuclear weapons. Secondly, separate storage of nuclear weapons' delivery vehicles and warheads. That would provide assurance against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Another advantage of such a measure was that it would be verifiable and the details of verification could be agreed upon. Thirdly, there was a need for a fundamental reassessment of the entire military-strategic situation in the world and, accordingly, of nuclear military doctrines. It suggested that a new look could be taken at ideas proposed in the past concerning control of nuclear weapons by an international organization, for example, the United Nations. Moreover, thought might be given to exchanging on a reciprocal basis among all nuclear Powers data on the number and types of existing nuclear weapons, the quantity of fissionable materials and on nuclear-weapons production, storage and elimination facilities. According to this State agreement to that effect could be reached at the Conference on Disarmament, in which all the nuclear Powers were represented and which had experience in dealing with similar issues in the context of the negotiations on chemical weapons. The main contribution to resolving all questions relating to nuclear disarmament should now be made by two major nuclear-weapon States. Other nuclear Powers could join the process of nuclear disarmament later, when the nuclear arsenals of all the States possessing them would have become comparable. This State declared its full support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and was in favour of strengthening the effectiveness of its safeguards. The State announced its decision to adhere to the principle of full-scale or "IAEA comprehensive guarantees" as a condition of its peaceful nuclear exports.

48. Two nuclear-weapon States announced that their presidents had reached an extraordinary agreement between them on two areas of vital importance to both their countries and to the world. The agreement signed between them on 17 June 1992 would further reduce the two nuclear arsenals well below the totals agreed by the START Treaty. The total number of strategic nuclear weapons for both sides would be reduced from 21,000 to 6-7,000. This target would be accomplished in two phases. Under the first phase, deployed warheads for each side would be reduced to a number between 3,800 to 4,250. In the second phase, the total number of strategic nuclear weapons for each side would drop down to a number between 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, with each nation determining the exact figure it considered appropriate to ensure its defence and security. Of special importance was the agreement to eliminate in the second phase heavy ICBM's and ICBM's with multiple individually targeted warheads. In the framework of agreed reductions, each side would have a certain degree of freedom with respect to the specific configuration of its strategic offensive weapons, taking into account its security requirements. The second phase would be completed no later than the year 2003 and might be completed as early as the year 2000 if the United States could assist Russia in the required destruction of ballistic missile systems. This agreement was generally welcomed in the Conference.
49. The Western Group welcomed discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament because it believed that such discussions played a positive role in strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. The Group stated that nuclear disarmament remained one of its highest priorities. It stressed that since the process of disarmament affected the vital security interests of all States, all should be actively involved and contribute to measures of disarmament and arms limitation. Nuclear proliferation was one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and stability. Thus, nuclear disarmament and the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear arms, particularly following the political changes of the last 12 months, represented one of the most serious challenges and demanded the attention and commitment of all members of the Conference on Disarmament.

50. The Western Group noted that the last 18 months had seen some positive steps in the process of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It welcomed the progress made by the United States and Russia in their bilateral negotiations, especially the unilateral decisions taken by them to eliminate all land-based short-range nuclear weapons. The Group hoped that the implementation of these measures would take place in the best possible conditions of security and transparency. They were of the view that these initiatives should lead to further far-reaching steps to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces. The Group supported the continuation of negotiations between the United States and Russia on defence and space issues. The Western Group welcomed the various initiatives taken in Latin America. It supported efforts to make progress both towards peace and in disarmament in the Middle East and recalled its support for President Mubarak's initiative to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The Group also looked forward to an early implementation of the agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA. The group viewed each of the above steps as a major contribution towards substantial reductions in the global level of nuclear weapons, leading to the shared, ultimate goal of global nuclear disarmament.

51. The Western Group believed that while the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with those States which possessed the most important nuclear arsenals, the international community as a whole had to be actively involved and contribute to measures of nuclear disarmament and arms limitations and to non-proliferation. The Group wished to see the achievement of further such substantial reductions and a reinforcement of existing barriers to nuclear weapon proliferation.

52. The Western Group reaffirmed its strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in general and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular as a cornerstone of the international regime of non-proliferation. The Group welcomed recent accessions to the NPT and urged all States that have not yet done so to adhere to that treaty. The Group welcomed the recent signing in Lisbon of the protocol to the START Treaty and reiterated the importance it attached to the single control of nuclear weapons and to the effective control of nuclear exports from all the new States of the former Soviet Union. The Group along with some other delegations welcomed the establishment of an international research centre in Russia to coordinate research in various fields.
53. It was the view of the Western Group that the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime were key instruments for the control of transfers of sensitive nuclear and missile materials, technology and equipment. The Group welcomed recent decisions of the NSG to control exports of nuclear-related dual use items and to require fullscope safeguards as a condition of supply, while recognizing at the same time the legitimate interest of the international community in the transfer of high technology for civil purposes. The group wished that discussion and cooperation would continue in this field.

54. One delegation, member of the Western Group, outlined a seven-point plan for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons presented by its Prime Minister on 21 May, which contained the following steps: first, to extend indefinitely and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1995; second, to strengthen the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to increase its resources in order to stop nuclear cheating; third, to tighten controls on the export of nuclear weapons' technologies; fourth, to stop the sale of nuclear brainpower to States wishing to develop or strengthen their nuclear weapons potential; fifth, to strengthen regional security cooperation so as to reduce the underlying causes of tension; sixth, the 1995 NPT Review Conference should confirm the basic bargain implicit in the NPT, a commitment of the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire any such weapons; seventh, it would be reasonable for those States which have acquired nuclear weapons to give assurances to all those countries which have signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapons States, that such weapons would never be used against them.

55. One nuclear-weapon State member of the Western Group recalled the initiatives it had taken to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, inter alia its decision to accede to the NPT and to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the suspension of its nuclear testing in 1992. It stressed that the recent positive trend towards real nuclear disarmament could be jeopardized if some non-nuclear-weapon States attempted to acquire nuclear weapons. It supported the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the developing countries who made the choice of non-proliferation and needed to increase their cooperation with the industrialized countries.

56. One nuclear-weapon State not belonging to any group continued to view nuclear disarmament as an issue of paramount importance. It indicated that it had all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It held that to achieve this objective the two major nuclear-weapon States should assume a special responsibility and obligation to take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically cut all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home and abroad, thus creating conditions for convening a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. It welcomed the recent progress made by the two major nuclear Powers, such as the complete implementation of the INF Treaty, the signing of the START Treaty and the conclusion of the agreement on further reduction of nuclear warheads. It considered, nevertheless, that the two
major nuclear Powers would still possess the largest nuclear arsenals in the world even after their nuclear warheads are reduced as planned, which continued to be a serious threat to international peace and security. It further stated that all the nuclear weapons thus cut should be destroyed and the nuclear warheads duly disposed of. The reductions should not be confined merely to the nuclear weapons on the territories of the two major nuclear Powers and in Europe, but should also include those deployed by them in Asia and the Pacific. It stated that, for the purpose of maintaining world peace and promoting the security of all nations, it did not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation. In 1988 its Government signed a unilateral submission agreement with IAEA to place a part of its nuclear energy installations under the Agency's safeguards. On 9 March this year, its Government deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT and became a member of the Treaty.
LETTER DATED 4 FEBRUARY 1993 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE ON 30 JANUARY 1993 BY LEONID KRAVCHUK, PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, ON "HOW TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

I have the honour to forward to you the attached statement of the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, on "How to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons" made at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos on 30 January 1993.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with the established practice, you would arrange for this statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations, both member and observer States.

(Signed): Olexandre SLIPTCHENKO
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

GE.93-60223 (E)
How to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Statement by Leonid M. Kravchuk, President of Ukraine,
at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 30 January 1993

The problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the acutest problems of the modern age and a source of concern both to statesmen and to world public opinion. It is at the centre of the attention of the Ukraine’s political leaders and of its parliament. The possibility of growth in the number of nuclear weapons and of a corresponding increase in the risk of unauthorized use of such weapons is a real threat to international peace and security.

At present the only instrument at the international community’s disposal in its efforts to forestall that threat is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Special responsibility for universal compliance with the provisions of the NPT lies above all on the nuclear Powers, especially the depositaries of the Treaty.

Recognizing the importance of this international instrument and proceeding from the premise that accession to it is in Ukraine’s highest interests, I have placed before the Supreme Council a proposal that Ukraine should accede to the Treaty. At the same time, proposals have also been submitted for the parliament’s consideration for the ratification of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) and the Lisbon Protocol thereto.

I.

Intensive hearings on this issue are in progress in the Supreme Council’s parliamentary commissions and a special working group. That is a normal process requiring some time.

The Ukrainian parliament has an enormous responsibility to the country’s people for seeing to it that all aspects of the START Treaty, the Lisbon Protocol to that instrument and NPT are given the most careful study and that all possible consequences for Ukraine, especially for its military and environmental security, as well as the country’s possible financial losses in connection with the obligations it assumes, are analysed. After all, it is not a matter of a one-third or two-thirds cut in nuclear weapons, but of the total elimination of such weapons in Ukraine, something that will have serious consequences from the point of view of the security and even of the very existence of Ukraine as an independent State. An overwhelming majority of deputies have expressed support for Ukraine’s nuclear-free option, which the Supreme Council proclaimed as long ago as 1990. At the same time, however, deputies are insisting on the resolution of a number of issues of importance to us before the START Treaty and NPT are submitted for final approval by the parliament.

This is a reference to the provision to Ukraine of guarantees of its national security by the nuclear Powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the provision to Ukraine of genuine help in
funding programmes for the elimination of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine and in defining the future use of the nuclear components of the strategic and tactical warheads that are deployed in Ukraine or have already been removed from its territory for dismantling in Russia.

It is felt that not all our partners understand just why Ukraine is raising these issues or on what its demands are based. It would seem worthwhile taking a few minutes to explain - in connection with Ukraine’s forthcoming accession to NPT - how we see the problem of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine.

II.

The situation regarding the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine is unique, without precedent in the history of the world. For the first time a State which, together with the other successor States of the former USSR, has the right to be nuclear is pursuing a policy of achieving non-nuclear status. What is more, on the territory of this State – Ukraine – there are already nuclear weapons that do not belong to any other State and that have merely been placed under the operational control of the Unified Command of the Strategic Forces of CIS.

In renouncing nuclear weapons, which are an unquestionably effective means of restraining any potential aggressor, Ukraine is indisputably entitled to demand from the nuclear Powers guarantees of its national security.

That means a legally binding political instrument adopted at the highest level by the nuclear Powers, and first and foremost Russia and the United States of America, to the effect that those Powers will not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, will not employ against it conventional weapons or the threat of force, will refrain from applying economic pressure in order to resolve any contentious issues, and will respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders.

Those undertakings mainly repeat generally recognized principles of international law as defined in particular in the CSCE Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. But it is important for us that they should be reaffirmed in the context of Ukraine’s acquisition in the future of the status of a non-nuclear weapon State. As the course of the discussions in the commissions of our Supreme Council shows, there is not yet full clarity on this matter and a significant number of deputies are not ready for the START Treaty and NPT to be submitted for ratification. We cannot be hasty here; we must convince the deputies with facts, not words.

III.

Ukraine did not participate in the taking of the decisions that led to the stationing on its territory of the world’s third most powerful missile force. But all the same the people of Ukraine had, at the expense of its own welfare and economic development, to finance the nuclear arms race of the former Soviet Union.
Now it is in practice being demanded of us that we should finance a huge programme connected with the destruction of those weapons. That means not just the destruction of strategic offensive weapons on account of the requirements of environmental security and economic expediency, which we would have to do anyway, but compliance in that connection with the extremely complex and very costly procedures laid down in the START Treaty for the sole purpose of preventing the former USSR from circumventing its provisions.

One way or another we shall have to destroy the nuclear arms on the territory of Ukraine. However, we are entitled to expect in the destruction of those weapons genuine assistance consistent with our expenditure on the destruction of such weapons. So far, we have not received a single cent from the West for this purpose. But can it really be that the West is not interested in eliminating nuclear weapons in our country as soon as possible? They are certainly well aware there that we cannot manage this task on our own.

We are grateful to the United States, which has offered to provide us with financial and technical assistance in the amount of $175 million for the destruction of nuclear weapons. But it can easily be understood that this sum will by no means cover all Ukraine’s likely expenses, and we hope that other States, particularly nuclear States, will join the United States in this matter. In this connection, we have proposed the creation of a special international fund for nuclear disarmament.

It can hardly be expected of us that, in this difficult economic situation, priority will be given to nuclear arms reduction rather than to the laying of the foundations of a sound, socially-oriented market economy. It must be said openly that, in view of the crisis in our economy, Ukraine can only allocate from its own budget limited sums for the execution of a programme to eliminate strategic offensive weapons.

IV.

The next problem is that of deciding the future use of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium from the strategic warheads stationed in Ukraine and the tactical warheads that have been taken to Russia to be dismantled. This question is of fundamental importance for us.

Ukraine does not exercise operational control over the Strategic Forces stationed on its territory and consequently does not control, within the meaning of NPT, nuclear warheads. On the other hand, all the components of the nuclear warheads that are subject to dismantling and to destruction are the property of Ukraine. We are merely interested in being able, once the nuclear warheads have been dismantled and destroyed, to use their components to resolve problems of Ukraine’s economic development and, in particular, of fuelling Ukraine’s nuclear power stations.

Negotiations on this issue with the Russian Federation began recently and we hope that their final outcome will be positive.
The resolution of the aforementioned issues will help to speed up the adoption by the Ukrainian Supreme Council of a positive decision concerning accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the ratification of the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol thereto, but delay by the western Powers on which their resolution depends places on those Powers equal responsibility for the protracting of the process of examination of those important instruments in the Ukrainian parliament.

V.

Although it would be an important step in the strengthening of NPT, Ukraine’s accession to that instrument will not remove the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world.

It is common knowledge that today there are at least fifteen what are termed "threshold" States that are close to, or suspected of making their own nuclear weapons. Many experts believe that some of them already have nuclear weapons.

But even with the present level of technological development in those countries, for them to make nuclear weapons by relying solely on their own capabilities is impossible. In carrying out their nuclear programmes, all these countries have had the support of some or other of the nuclear Powers. Some countries suspected of already having nuclear weapons which are not parties to NPT are receiving large-scale assistance from nuclear Powers in the military, economic and other spheres and are not being subjected to any real pressure from those Powers to encourage them to accede to this Treaty and renounce their nuclear ambitions.

Ukraine considers that in the present day and age no State, and still less a nuclear State, can pursue the twofold policy common in the recent past in the domain of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that all nuclear Powers, without exception, must take the course followed by Ukraine, the course of acquisition in the future, hopefully the near future, of non-nuclear status, and that they must pursue a uniform, consistent policy as regards ensuring the universal implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the accession to this international instrument of all the world’s States.
I have the honour and duty to inform you that on 4 February 1993 the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus ratified the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 31 July 1991 and the Protocol thereto signed in Lisbon on 25 May 1992 as well as took a decision on the accession of the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State.

The aforesaid decisions have been adopted as an expression of the consistent course of the Republic of Belarus towards achieving the status of a non-nuclear and neutral State. It is the first time in the history of the international community that a sovereign State has voluntarily renounced the possibility of actual possession of nuclear arms. Having taken this unprecedented step, the Republic of Belarus expects that the world community would support its course of peace and its desire to make a meaningful contribution to strengthening European and global security.

Among all the countries legal successors to the former USSR as regards the START Treaty, Belarus is the first and only one to have declared its readiness to implement in full its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. The fact that Belarus has ratified the above-mentioned Treaties without any conditions or reservations has once again demonstrated the consistent and constructive nature of its foreign policy.
The voting in the Supreme Soviet of Belarus proves that the course at achieving the status of a neutral and non-nuclear State is supported by parliamentarians representing all political factions. The resolution on the ratification of the Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol thereto was adopted all but unanimously, with just one deputy voting against.

The Republic of Belarus expects that its attitude towards nuclear disarmament issues would be duly appreciated by the international community, and it has every right to count on all-round financial assistance in dealing with the entire range of questions pertaining to the practical realization of the obligations assumed under the aforesaid Treaties as well as in effecting the conversion of military industries and modernization of technologies.

I would request you to make necessary arrangements to have the text of this note issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all States members of the Conference as well as States participating in but non-members of the Conference.

(Signed) A. Mardovitch
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Belarus
BELARUS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the Republic of Belarus,
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine
and the United States of America
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their support for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Recognizing the altered political situation resulting from the replacement of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a number of independent states,

Recalling the commitment of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States that the nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be maintained under the safe, secure, and reliable control of a single unified authority,

Desiring to facilitate implementation of the Treaty in this altered situation,

Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; and to allocate costs.

ARTICLE III

1. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall be interpreted to mean the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
2. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase "national territory," when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be interpreted to mean the combined national territories of the Republic of Byeloruss, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

3. For inspections and continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the Republic of Byeloruss, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, that state shall provide communications from the inspection site or continuous monitoring site to the Embassy of the United States in the respective capital.

4. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the embassy of the Inspecting Party referred to in Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms shall be construed to be the embassy of the respective state in Washington or the embassy of the United States of America in the respective capital.

5. The working languages for Treaty activities shall be English and Russian.
ARTICLE IV

Representatives of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with Article I of this Protocol.

ARTICLE V

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary actions to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices.

ARTICLE VI

1. Each Party shall ratify the Treaty together with this Protocol in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange instruments of ratification with the United States of America. The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty.

DONE at Lisbon on May 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the Byelarusian, English, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BYELARUS:

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

FOR UKRAINE:

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Signed at Moscow on 3 January 1993
TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON
FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war,

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52 K of December 9, 1992,
Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

   (a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;

   (b) 1200, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and

   (c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.

4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

   (a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number
as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750;

(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and

(c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.

6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000.

**Article II**

1. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), with the exception of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Each Party shall carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of this Treaty.
3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:

(a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty; or

(b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted.

4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.

5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall only be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.

6. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty.
9. Beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:

(a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty;

(b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMs, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time exceed the limit of 500 warheads for each Party provided for in subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty;

(c) each Party shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and

(d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry vehicle platform.
3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it under this Treaty; and

(b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.

3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution.

4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.

The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is actually equipped.
5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.

6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

8. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements:

   (a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time;

   (b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles;
such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and

heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role.

Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role.

10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.

11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.

12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the
differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such
differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in
paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in
accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on
Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of
the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be
used for implementation of this Treaty.

2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the
Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if
either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of
the Bilateral Implementation Commission to:

   (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the
       obligations assumed; and

   (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be
       necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution,
Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions
and Inspections, all of which are integral parts thereof, shall
be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on
the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not
prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty.

2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this
Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the
date of its signature.

3. This Treaty shall remain in force so long as the START
Treaty remains in force.

4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter
of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall
give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior
to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:                        FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
PROTOCOL
ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMS
AND ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONVERSION OF SILO LAUNCHERS
OF HEAVY ICBMS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter
referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon
procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and upon
procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such
ICBMs.

I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their
Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in
accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section at
elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty or
shall be carried out by using such missiles for delivering
objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof
shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
(NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at
conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch,
in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to
paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

(a) shall remove the missile’s reentry vehicles;

(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical
devices of the missile’s guidance and control
system from the missile and its launch canister,
and other elements that shall not be subject to
elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this
Section;

(c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister
and disassemble the missile into stages;

(d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;
(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;

(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and

(g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMs:

(a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed.

5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.
II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for Heavy ICBMs, and Silo Test Launchers for Heavy ICBMs

1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to inspection.

2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps:

   (a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher;

   (b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and

   (c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.

5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these procedures have been carried out:

   (a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:
(i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence; and

(ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section; and

(b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted.

6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question;

(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured;

(c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;

(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to
measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

(e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;

(f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and

(g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete;

(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo launcher can be measured;

(c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete;

(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to remeasure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such
inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

(e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;

(f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;

(g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and

(h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.

9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct visual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on
the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring.

10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.

III. Equipment; Costs

1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete. The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
PROTOCOL
ON EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS
RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.

I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers

1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.

2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions:

(a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party;

(b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the exhibition;

(c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours;

(d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty;

(e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and variant of a type that were reoriented to
a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection; and

(f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers

1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to perform, during data update and new facility inspections conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the inspection:

(a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior;

(b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and
(c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.

2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection.

3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.
DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ON WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION AND HEAVY BOMBER DATA RELATING TO THE
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter
referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data
current as of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons
for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type
equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped. No later than
30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the
Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date
of entry into force of the Treaty, according to the categories of
data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a
conventional role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear
role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which a reduced number of warheads is
attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on
conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.

Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty
that differ from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on
the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty
are included in this Memorandum.

I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers
Other than Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each
Party undertakes not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on
heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the number
specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph
2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of
warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented to a
conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to
heavy bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such
numbers shall only be changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of
Article IV of the Treaty. The Party making a change shall
provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to making
such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to demonstrate
the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of
the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:
(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Number of Warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52H</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1B</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
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<td>B-2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

(b) Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Number of Warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Bear B</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear G</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear H6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear H16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackjack</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role

1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type

Number

* Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period.
2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows:

(a) United States of America
   Air Bases:
   Name/Location

   __________________________
   Heavy Bombers Reoriented
to a Conventional Role

   __________________________
   Number

(b) Russian Federation
    Air Bases:
    Name/Location

    __________________________
    Heavy Bombers Reoriented
to a Conventional Role

    __________________________
    Number

3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

(a) United States of America
    Heavy Bomber Type
    and Variant of a Type

    __________________________
    Difference

(b) Russian Federation
    Heavy Bomber Type
    and Variant of a Type

    __________________________
    Difference

4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role are as follows:

(a) United States of America
    Heavy Bomber Type
    and Variant of a Type

    __________________________
    Difference
(b) Russian Federation

III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs to Which a Reduced Number of Warheads Is Attributed

For each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases, and on ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed to them is reduced pursuant to Article III of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) United States of America

| Type of ICBM or SLBM | Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs, on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced | Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It | Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced | Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs of that Type |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Location</th>
<th>ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced</td>
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<td>Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It</td>
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<td>Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced</td>
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<td>Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs of that Type</td>
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SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

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<tr>
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(b) Russian Federation

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</table>

IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs

1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

   (a) United States of America

   Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers

   ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:

   Name/Location

   ICBM Type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher

   Silo Launcher Group: (designation)

   Silo Launchers:

   (b) Russian Federation

   Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers
2. For each Party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America
   Deployed Heavy ICBMs
   Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs
   Eliminated Heavy ICBMs

(b) Russian Federation
   Deployed Heavy ICBMs
   Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs
   Eliminated Heavy ICBMs

V. Changes

Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum.

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy only of its own data.

This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on
such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:
LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1993 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ON 1 APRIL 1993

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

As the representatives in the Conference on Disarmament of the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London and Moscow on 1 July 1968, we wish to draw your attention to a statement issued by our three Governments on 1 April 1993 with regard to the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty. The English and Russian language texts of this statement are enclosed.

We should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its enclosure to be circulated as an official document of the Conference. It is the hope of our Governments that members of the Conference and non-member participants will wish formally to associate themselves with the statement of the Depositary Governments.

(Signed) S.B. Batsanov
Ambassador
Representative
of the Russian Federation

(Signed) M.C.S. Weston
Ambassador
Representative
of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

(Signed) S.J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Representative
of the United States
of America

GE.93-60585 (E)
The Governments of the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States, which are the Depositary Governments of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), wish to issue the following statement:

"- We express regret and concern at the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

- Since the NPT is an essential element of international peace and security, DPRK withdrawal from the NPT would constitute a serious threat to regional and international stability.

- We question whether the DPRK’s stated reasons for withdrawing from the Treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the Treaty. In this regard, we recall that we have provided nuclear related security assurances to the DPRK as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

- Remaining a party to the Treaty and complying fully with its terms would be in the DPRK’s interests. It would help to reassure the international community about the nature of the DPRK’s nuclear programme and the DPRK’s desire for positive international relations, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

- Moreover, DPRK withdrawal from the NPT would jeopardise stability on the Korean peninsula, which has improved in recent years, and undermine efforts to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

- We urge the DPRK to retract its announcement and to comply fully with its Treaty commitments and its safeguards obligations, which remain in force. In this respect, we strongly support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement its safeguards agreement with the DPRK."

The three Governments call upon all NPT parties to associate themselves with this statement and to urge the DPRK to reconsider its position and to fulfil its commitments under the Treaty.
LETTER DATED 5 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 290 (VII) ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL
CONFERENCE OF THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN CONTAINING AMENDMENTS TO THE
TREATY OF TLALELOLCO

I have the honour to transmit herewith certified copies of the Spanish,
English and French texts of resolution 290 (VII) of the General Conference of
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (OPANAL) adopting amendments to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

I should be most grateful if you would have the above-mentioned official
texts of the amendments circulated as an official document of the Conference
on Disarmament.

(Signed) Miguel Marin Bosch
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.93-60611  (E)
RESOLUTION 290 (VII)

AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

The General Conference,

Recalling that as indicated in the preamble of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature in Mexico City on 14 February 1967, and which took effect on 25 April 1969, the militarily denuclearized zones do not constitute an end in themselves, but rather a means to advance towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control following the criteria established on the matter by the pertinent agencies of the United Nations,

Stressing the importance of achieving full application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as soon as possible once France has ratified Additional Protocol I of said Treaty, by which the two Additional Protocols enter into effect, being the purpose of the latter to ensure, on the one hand, the denuclearized status of the territories of the Latin American region that, the jure or the facto, are under the control of extracontinental Powers, and on the other, to procure the guarantee that the nuclear Powers respect the denuclearized status of Latin America,

Expressing its satisfaction on the decision made by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to take the necessary measures as soon as possible so that the Treaty will take full effect in each of those countries,

Urging with due respect that the States of Latin America, to which the Treaty is opened for their signing, immediately take the necessary steps to become Parties to said international instrument, thus contributing to one of the most noble causes uniting Latin America,

Reaffirming the importance that any modification to the Treaty strictly respects its basic objectives and the fundamental elements of the necessary system of control and inspection,

Resolves:

Reports of the Contracting Parties

Article 14

"2. The Contracting Parties to the Treaty shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of the reports submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relate to matters subject of this Treaty that are relevant to the work of the Agency."
3. The information furnished by the Contracting Parties shall not be, totally or partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addressees of the reports, except when the Contracting Parties give their express consent."

Complementary or supplementary information

**Article 15**

"1. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties and with the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any extraordinary event or circumstance which affects the compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies."

Text replacing the existing Article 16 in effect:

**Special inspections**

**Article 16**

"1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the power of carrying out special inspections in accordance with Article 12 and with the agreements referred to in Article 13 of this Treaty.

2. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties and in accordance with the procedures established in Article 15 of this Treaty, the Council may submit for the consideration of the International Atomic Energy Agency a request that the necessary mechanisms be put into operation to carry out a special inspection.

3. The General Secretary shall request the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to transmit to him in a timely manner the information forwarded to the Board of Governors of the IAEA relating to the conclusion of the special inspection. The General Secretary shall make this information available to the Council promptly.

4. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall transmit this information to all the Contracting Parties."

**Relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency**

**Article 19**

"1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the Control System established by this Treaty."
The remaining paragraphs of Article 19 are then renumbered as a new Article 20, with consequential renumbering of subsequent articles.

Relations with other international organizations

Article 20

"1. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.

2. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute."

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, hereby sign this Act on behalf of their respective Governments.

Done at Mexico City, on the twenty-sixth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and ninety two.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the declaration of the Government of Turkey which associates Turkey with the joint statement of the Depositaries of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, concerning the withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the above-mentioned Treaty.

I request you to have this text circulated as an official document of the Conference of Disarmament.

(Signed): Gündüz AKTAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.93-60703 (E)
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY

"The Government of Turkey associates itself with the joint statement of the Depositaries of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 concerning the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from the said Treaty.

"The Government of Turkey wishes to underline, in this context, that all the countries, that have not yet done so, should become parties to the NPT and that all the NPT parties should fully observe their obligations arising under the Treaty.

"The Government of Turkey reiterates its strong held view that relevant steps should be taken as early as possible for the further strengthening of the verification regime of the NPT in order to prevent the violation of obligations under the Treaty through an effective international control and monitoring system."

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I have the honour to transmit to you the statement issued on 12 May 1993 by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in relation to the fact that the United Nations Security Council finally adopted an unreasonable "resolution" over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I would be grateful if you could circulate it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Ri Tcheul

GE.93-60835 (E)
STATEMENT OF SPOKESMAN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

An unreasonable "resolution" over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted at the United Nations Security Council on 11 May despite opposition from different countries.

Admission to or withdrawal from an international treaty belongs to the sovereignty of each country.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive measure taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exercising the right pursuant to the NPT under the extraordinary situation in which the supreme interests of the country were exposed to grave threat.

Therefore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT is not a matter to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations has no legal pretext or ground to adopt a "resolution" over this matter.

It is unreasonable for the United Nations Security Council to talk about "reconsideration" of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s measure to withdraw from the NPT.

The United Nations Charter has no article which stipulates that signatories to an international treaty should not withdraw from the treaty or that issue should be taken with withdrawal from the treaty.

The "double standard" policy of the United Nations Security Council can by no means be justified in conniving at the misconduct of the offender and putting pressure on the victim.

The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea resolutely rejects the "resolution" of the United Nations Security Council, considering it an interference in its internal affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereignty.

What is done by the United States and its followers at the United Nations Security Council reminds one of the 1950s when the Korean issue was discussed illegally at the United Nations Security Council.

If the latest "resolution" of the United Nations Security Council was adopted from motives of following the example of the "resolution" in the 1950s, the situation would get worse.

It is extremely abnormal and contradictory for the United Nations Security Council, which encouraged negotiation through "president’s statement", to block negotiation at a time when negotiations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the IAEA are ripe to allow IAEA inspectors and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-United States talks are to move ahead.
This proves that the United States is resorting to means of pressure, not to means of negotiations in the settlement of problems and the United Nations Security Council has been appropriated for the schemes of the United States, a belligerent party against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to stifle the socialist system of Korea.

Such unjustifiable "double-dealing" policy of the United States through the United Nations Security Council has created grave difficulties in the way of negotiations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the IAEA.

The "nuclear problem" on the Korean peninsula cannot be solved by "strong-arm acts" and "pressure".

The United States and its followers, some other member nations of the United Nations Security Council, must not mistake for an expression of weakness the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s stand and efforts to solve the problem through negotiations on the basis of mutual trust.

If the United Nations Security Council finally puts such unreasonable "pressure" on us as "sanctions" on the basis of this "resolution", we cannot construe it otherwise than a "declaration of war" against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

It is the United States that gave rise to the "nuclear problem" on the Korean peninsula and it is also the United States that initiated the adoption of the "resolution". So, the United States will be held entirely responsible for all the consequences to be entailed therefrom.

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LETTER DATED 10 AUGUST 1993 FROM THE ACTING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATING TO UKRAINE’S POLICY CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOCATED ON ITS TERRITORY

I have the honour to transmit the attached statement by the Government of the Russian Federation relating to Ukraine’s policy concerning nuclear weapons located on its territory.

I would be very grateful if this text could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to delegations both of member States and of non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): V. Zemskov
Acting Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament
Statement by the Government of the Russian Federation

Recently, Kiev has taken a number of steps towards the establishment of control over the nuclear weapons which remain on Ukrainian territory. On 2 July 1993 the Ukrainian Parliament approved "Guidelines for the Foreign Policy of Ukraine", declaring Ukraine to be the owner of these weapons. This move by the Parliament has been supported in subsequent public declarations by the Ukrainian leadership. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has decided to incorporate the troops responsible for the storage and maintenance of nuclear warheads into the 43rd Missile Army under its command. This gives Ukraine direct control over nuclear armaments.

In this connection, the Government of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to state the following.

Such a policy pursued by Kiev, causing concern in the entire world community, could have very serious consequences for international stability and security and for the whole system of international relations.

In declaring itself the owner of nuclear weapons, Ukraine is violating the international obligations it assumed concerning its non-nuclear status, thus openly challenging the international order, and introducing legal nihilism into international relations.

Kiev is in direct breach of a number of agreements concluded within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in particular the decision by the Heads of States of CIS on 6 July 1992 that among the successor States to the USSR, the Russian Federation alone would be a nuclear-weapon State.

It is also in breach of the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, under which Ukraine took the obligation to accede at the earliest possible time to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The written declaration of the Ukrainian Party on the occasion of the signature of this Protocol says that: "... The right and the burden of owning nuclear armaments of the former USSR is left, with the explicit consent of Ukraine and other successor States to the former USSR, to the Russian Federation alone".

Nor is Kiev’s policy compatible with Ukraine’s commitment to the withdrawal from its territory, by the end of 1994, of nuclear weapons for dismantling and destruction.

Ukraine is undermining the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the 1968 Treaty while endangering the Treaty itself, the fate of which will be decided at a conference in 1995. A dangerous precedent is being created; it may be used by countries now on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons.

The results of years of effort by the international community to achieve nuclear disarmament, notably the START I and START II treaties, are being torpedoed.
Since Ukraine does not have the requisite physical and technological capacity, its taking control of nuclear weapons considerably increases nuclear and environmental risks, and for this Ukraine must bear the entire responsibility.

The Russian Federation, as the only successor to the USSR where possession of nuclear weapons is concerned and as a depositary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, cannot accept as legal any claims or actions that run counter to the international agreements on the preservation and enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We urge Ukraine to do everything possible to ensure strict respect of its non-nuclear status under international agreements, and to reconsider the above-mentioned decisions by the Parliament and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine taking control of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the Russian Federation expresses its readiness to continue cooperation with Ukraine in ensuring the nuclear and environmental security of nuclear weapons on the basis of the provisions set forth in the Message of 30 April 1993 from the President of Russia, Mr. B.N. Yeltsin, to the President of Ukraine.

Moscow, 5 August 1993

I have the honour to forward to you the attached Statement of the Press Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on matters concerning nuclear disarmament of Ukraine issued on 18 August 1993.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with the established practice, this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations, both member States and non-member States, participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) OLEXANDR SLIPCHENKO
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Ukraine
STATEMENT

of the Press Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
on the matters concerning nuclear disarmament of Ukraine

As is known, the Russian Federation Government issued a statement in connection with certain issues related to strategic nuclear arms on the territory of Ukraine. The statement is based on erroneous or twisted notions with regard to Ukraine’s position on nuclear issues. In particular, the statement asserts that by proclaiming itself the owner of the nuclear weapons Ukraine violates the international commitments, takes over control of the nuclear weapons, and that the 43rd missile army is under the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s command.

In fact, the guidelines of Ukraine’s foreign policy endorsed by the Verkhovna Rada on 2 July 1993 state that "having become by virtue of historic circumstances, the nuclear weapons owner, which it inherited from the former USSR, Ukraine will never sanction their employment, excludes from the arsenal of its foreign policy threatening with their employment".

This provision just registers the situation, which in legal terms, was defined by Ukraine’s laws based on international legal norms, particularly on the Vienna Convention on States’ successorship of 1983.

Ukraine has not accepted the so-called take-over of the nuclear weapons from any other country, it has become their legal successor by virtue of international legal norms, and it does not produce nuclear weapons.

Ukraine has ceded its right to use the nuclear weapons to the CIS Unified Command, provided it retains control over these weapons’ non-employment. All these facts do not contradict Ukraine’s desire to eventually acquire the nuclear-free nation status, and the relevant provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The NPT does not even contain the term "property", its key article 2 states only commitment of nuclear-free States not to accept from any States nuclear weapons, as well as control over them.

Thus, Ukraine only reaffirmed its successorship with regard to its proprieal right to a category of property located on its territory.

Regrettably, a normal constructive dialogue on issues involving the nuclear weapons stationed on Ukraine’s territory is hindered by Russia’s recent unilateral moves aimed at altering the status of the former USSR’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, which was defined by the Presidents of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and at liquidating the CIS Unified Command set up by the four Presidents, and at denying Ukraine its proprieal right to components of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.

Thus, the Russian Federation unilaterally and without agreeing with Ukraine made a decision to liquidate the CIS Unified Command under whose operational control the Ukrainian nuclear weapons had been placed. This act is a direct violation of precisely those provisions of the Minsk agreement on
strategic forces which the Russian Federation’s statement refers to, and which because of this act, virtually cannot be regarded as valid for Russia and Ukraine.

The string of unilateral actions by the Russian Federation includes the Russian Defense Ministry’s decision made in February 1993 to liquidate category "C" facilities on Ukraine’s territory which used to be technically serviced and secured in terms of nuclear safety of warheads stationed on Ukraine territory. The Russian side quite consciously for over 18 months has not supplied components necessary for the warheads’ safety maintenance and subject to periodical replacement either to these units or to the 43rd Army. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry, in view of these moves by the Russian Federation’s Defense Ministry, was forced to make a decision about retaining two such facilities in Ukraine and making them reportable to the 43rd Army of the CIS Strategic Forces.

In making this decision the Ukrainian side was guided solely by the interests of security nuclear safety of the strategic offensive arms dismantling process.

A decision with regard to the future destiny of the nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s territory will be made by the Verkhovna Rada, which is currently considering the issue of the START’s ratification.

But even now preparatory work is under way in Ukraine to implement the START and Lisbon Protocol after they come into effect. In particular, Ukraine is ready to implement article II of the Lisbon Protocol which provides for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine reaching agreements among them as to specific distribution among themselves of such limitations and restrictions, which were defined for the USSR. In doing this Ukraine is proceeding from the assumption that after the START becomes effective it will reduce strategic means of delivery inherited from the USSR in accordance with the reduction norm set for the former USSR by the START, that is, roughly by 36 per cent.

It is quite natural that in the first place most obsolete SS-19 missiles will be reduced, which pose the greatest threat to Ukraine’s nuclear and environmental safety.

Ukraine has unilaterally declared its intention to become, in future, a nuclear-free State and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This intention’s speedy and unimpeded implementation is dependent not on Ukraine alone, but on a balanced stance with regard to Ukraine on the part of nuclear powers, primarily Russia and the United States of America and on their relevant political decisions.

Dmytro Tabachnyk
Cabinet Press Secretary

I have the honour to forward to you the texts of an agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the recycling of nuclear warheads, as well as basic principles governing the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine, which were signed by the heads of government of the two countries in Yalta on 3 September this year.

Please take steps to ensure the distribution of the agreement and the basic principles as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): G. BERDENNIKOV
Agreement

between the Government of the Russian Federation and
the Government of Ukraine
on the recycling of nuclear warheads

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming the attachment of the Parties to the strengthening of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

Taking into account the Treaty of 31 July 1991 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive arms, and the instruments associated with it,

Taking into account the agreement of 18 April 1992 between the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning the procedure for the transfer of nuclear munitions from the territory of Ukraine to central locations in the Russian Federation for the purposes of dismantling and destruction,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of the present agreement the terms set out below shall have the following meanings:

"Nuclear warhead" - the munition section of a weapon deployed in the territory of Ukraine, which contains nuclear materials in a single structure;

"Nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations" - material containing fissionable nuclides with a uranium-235 concentration of no more than 4.4 per cent, which, when placed in a nuclear reactor, makes possible a nuclear chain reaction;

"Highly enriched uranium" - uranium with a uranium-235 content of 20 per cent or more by weight;

"Low-enriched uranium" - uranium with a uranium-235 content of between 4.4 and 20 per cent by weight;

"Fuel assembly" - a cluster of fuel elements which form a whole and cannot be separated from one another on loading into the core of a reactor, irradiation and unloading;

"Fuel element" - an element of a fuel assembly consisting of the nuclear fuel itself and the fuel jacket, which ensures the safe transfer of heat from the fuel to the coolant;
"Recycling of nuclear warheads" – the process of dismantling, transport, storage and processing with a view to the use of nuclear warhead components for peaceful purposes.

**Article 2**

1. The Russian Federation shall ensure the recycling of all nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine.

2. The Russian Federation shall ensure that highly enriched uranium obtained as a result of the recycling of nuclear warheads is reprocessed into low-grade uranium, which shall be used to produce fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations in Ukraine or for other peaceful purposes.

**Article 3**

1. Fuel assemblies from the Russian Federation for nuclear power stations in Ukraine shall be supplied on the understanding that Ukraine will place its nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2. For the purpose of attaining the objectives set out in article 2 of the present agreement, the Parties shall conclude a contract. The contract shall be concluded within a period of six months following the entry of the present agreement into force. The Parties may as necessary conclude supplementary contracts in conformity with the present agreement.

3. In the event of any divergences between the present agreement and the contracts concluded in conformity with the present agreement, the provisions of the present agreement shall prevail.

**Article 4**

Each of the Parties shall designate implementing agencies for the application of the present agreement. For the Russian Federation the implementing agency responsible for the dismantling and transport of nuclear warheads shall be the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, while the implementing agency responsible for processing, storage and accounting shall be the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation; the agencies for Ukraine shall be the Ministry of Defence and the State Committee of Ukraine on the Use of Nuclear Energy. Each of the Parties shall have the right to replace the implementing agency by providing 30 days’ notice in writing to the other Party.

**Article 5**

To ensure the implementation of the present agreement the Parties shall guarantee the unhindered entry and exit of personnel from the Parties and shall grant various reciprocal tax concessions which shall be subject to agreement between the Parties.
Article 6

1. The present agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of notifications by the Parties that they have fulfilled the domestic procedures necessary for the agreement’s entry into force.

The present agreement, which shall apply in the context of the pertinent international obligations of the Parties, shall remain in force for 30 years. The period of validity of the present agreement may be modified by written agreement between the Parties.

2. The present agreement may be supplemented or modified by agreement between the signatory Parties.

3. The validity of the present agreement may be brought to an end one year after receipt of written notification to that effect by one of the Parties.

4. Done in Yalta on 3 September 1993 into two copies, each in the Russian and Ukrainian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Russian Federation

V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of Ukraine

L. Kuchma
Basic principles
for the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have agreed on basic principles for the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine:

1. Dismantling and transport

(a) The Parties shall guarantee conditions for removal by the Parties of all types of nuclear warheads from ICBMs and the transfer of these warheads, and also front sections from nuclear ALCMs, to the territory of the Russian Federation with a view to dismantling and recycling.

(b) The implementing agencies of the Parties shall cooperate in the removal, transport and storage of these warheads, and shall be guided by the provisions of the 1992 agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation concerning the procedure for the transfer of nuclear munitions from the territory of Ukraine to central locations in the Russian Federation for the purposes of dismantling and destruction.

(c) The Parties shall guarantee security in the process of the operation and removal of nuclear warheads from the missiles and their transport in accordance with current technical requirements and standards regarding nuclear weapons. In this regard, the transport of the nuclear warheads shall be effected by and at the expense of the Russian Party. The Ukrainian Party shall be responsible for ensuring secure conditions for the movement of nuclear warheads on its territory.

(d) Operations for the implementation of paragraph 1 shall be effected in accordance with a schedule to be drawn up by the Parties and confirmed by their heads of government. Account shall be taken of the need to dismantle first of all nuclear warheads for which the time-limit for the use or storage of munitions and individual components has already passed. Compensation for each nuclear warhead removed from Ukraine to the Russian Federation shall be effected within one year after the date on which the warhead crosses the border between the Parties.

2. Procedure for reimbursing the value of nuclear materials

(a) All the highly enriched uranium (approximately 50 metric tonnes) removed from nuclear warheads under the present agreement shall be reprocessed in the Russian Federation into low-grade uranium.

(b) The principles governing accounting for such uranium shall include the following:

(b) (1) Neither of the parties shall subsidize the other.

(b) (2) No profit, no loss.
(b) (3) Prices and expenses to take account of inflation and changes in the world market.

(b) (4) The Russian Federation shall deliver to Ukraine fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations. Compensation for expenses incurred by the Russian Federation in supplying the assemblies for Ukraine shall be made through the sale of uranium extracted from strategic nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine.

(c) Weapon-grade plutonium extracted from strategic warheads deployed in Ukraine shall be stored in the Russian Federation until such time as the Parties adopt a decision on its recycling.

Ukraine shall receive the value of the weapon-grade plutonium as it is sold, less costs and expenses incurred by the Russian Federation in recycling it.

(d) Non-nuclear components of strategic nuclear weapons extracted from nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine shall be recycled on terms to be agreed by the Parties.

(e) The Parties shall ensure transparency as regards accounting for the nuclear materials and their value in their activities under (a), (b) (4) and (c).

(f) Fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations in Ukraine shall be supplied on the basis of annual contracts between the implementing agencies of the Parties.

(g) In cases where uranium extracted from warheads located on the territory of Ukraine is sold on the world market, tripartite agreements may be concluded guaranteeing that the Parties will receive appropriate shares of the value of the products.

The validity of the present basic principles shall be the same as that of the agreement of 3 September 1993 between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the recycling of nuclear warheads.

For the Government of the Russian Federation

V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of Ukraine

L. Kuchma

I am sending you for information a press release dated 21 September 1993 and a statement by a representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 1 October, relating to the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

I would be most grateful to you if these documents could be distributed to delegations of member States of the Conference and observer States.

(Signed): V. ZEMSKOV
Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation on the Conference on Disarmament
PRESS RELEASE

The 9 September 1993 issue of the newspaper Kievskie Vedomosti carried a photocopy of the "Protocol on the withdrawal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine".

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is authorized to state the following in this respect.

During the meeting in Massandra on 3 September this year between the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, it was agreed that all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces which are deployed in Ukraine will be withdrawn to Russia no later than 24 months after the date of ratification of the START-1 Treaty by Ukraine. The substance of this agreement, as can be seen from the photocopy, is reflected in the title of the document, which includes the word "all". The Presidents decided that the document would be of a confidential nature and would bear the signatures of their heads of government. Moreover, the Prime Ministers signed a prepared document which reads as follows:

"The President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine have agreed that after ratification of the START-1 Treaty by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine the Government of Ukraine will, no later than 24 months after the date of ratification, ensure the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantling and destruction."

However, A.D. Buteiko, an adviser to the Ukrainian President, taking advantage of the fact that the documents passed through his hands after being signed by the head of the Ukrainian Government, L.D. Kuchma, made two handwritten corrections to the text, changing the substance of the agreement entirely. These corrections are clearly visible in the copy published in Kiev: the word "all" is crossed out and the words "subject to the Treaty" are added after the words "strategic nuclear forces". These amendments in fact signify that Ukraine, or in this case a certain group in the government apparatus, is striving to retain some of the nuclear weapons in Ukrainian hands in defiance of Ukraine’s international obligations.

In spite of a high-level protest from the Russian side, Ukrainian representatives refused to restore the original language. Given this behaviour by the Ukrainian side, which is to say the least unusual in diplomatic practice, the Russian side officially invalidated this Protocol and immediately notified the Ukrainian representatives accordingly.

Thus the "Protocol on the withdrawal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine" is non-existent. This, of course, does not affect the substance of the agreements reached by Russia and Ukraine at the level of heads of State and government.
STATEMENT BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As is well known, on 3 September 1993, during the meeting between the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Massandra, historic agreements were achieved regarding the elimination of all nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine. The agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the recycling of nuclear warheads, as well as the basic principles governing the recycling of nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine, associated with this agreement, were signed by the heads of government of both countries and published in the press. Moreover, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine agreed that after ratification of the START-1 Treaty by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine will, no later than 24 months after the date of ratification, ensure the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantling and destruction.

Nobody has cancelled or repudiated these agreements. This was stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on 21 September. Yet we believe that it is necessary to draw this to the attention of the international community once again, in view of the fact that a racket has recently been raised in some of the media, partly at the prompting of certain Ukrainian officials, with the transparent purpose of calling into question the agreements on nuclear weapons reached between the President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine. All the evidence indicates that this is being done by those in Ukraine who are displeased with the actions and decisions of their own President and wish to cancel the results achieved in Massandra.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to state that all the agreements reached in Massandra regarding nuclear weapons remain fully in effect. The task now is to begin their practical implementation as soon as possible. Russia stands ready to do so.

1 October 1993

I have the honour to forward to you the attached press release of the Press-Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine dated 24 September 1993.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with established procedure, this press release could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations both member States and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) OLEXANDR SLIPCHENKO
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

* Reissued for technical reasons.

GE.93-62691 (E)
PRESS RELEASE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued the press release on the occasion of the denunciation of the "Protocol on the withdrawal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads ... deployed in Ukraine" signed on 3 September this year in Crimea, referring to the fact that the photocopy of this document recently published in the newspaper "Kievskiy vedomosti" bore well noticeable corrections made by hand, which allegedly changed completely the content of the agreement.

In connection with the above-mentioned the Press-Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is authorized to state the following.

Contrary to the usual diplomatic practice, members of the Russian delegation presented to the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Russia for signing the version of the text differing from the one discussed and agreed upon by the experts of the delegations.

Since the text presented for signing contained elements which did not correspond to the national interests of Ukraine, representatives of the Ukrainian side made the above-mentioned corrections in the presence and with agreement of the representatives of Russia. The Russian side did not make any objections or protests. Due to technical reasons the document was not retyped.

It is astonishing that the Press Release of the MFA of the Russian Federation maintains that the Russian side officially annulled this Protocol immediately, of which act the representatives of Ukraine were allegedly informed. This does not correspond to reality absolutely. It is not clear why in this case the Russian side needed 14 days to make the statement on the denunciation of the Protocol and why the State, as influential as Russia, has chosen for this such an unusual method in diplomatic practice as the press release.

The Ukrainian side regards the mentioned press release as lacking objectivity, distorting real events and amounting only to an awkward attempt of unfounded discredit of one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation.

PRESS-CENTRE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE

24 SEPTEMBER 1993
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1229
30 November 1993
Original: ENGLISH


I have the honour to forward to you the attached resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the Protocol to it, signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with established procedure, this resolution could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations, both member States and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

I am also transmitting to you the press releases issued by the Permanent Mission of Ukraine at Geneva, which contain certain relevant information concerning ratification of the START-1 by the Parliament of Ukraine.

GE.93-62797 (E)
I would very much appreciate, Mr. Secretary-General, if you could find an appropriate way of conveying the content of these press releases to all delegations, both member States and non-member States, participating in the work of the Conference.*

(signed) OLEXANDR SLIPCHENKO
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

* Circulated in the delegations' boxes.
RESOLUTION
OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE

On ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the Protocol to it, signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine resolves:

To ratify on behalf of Ukraine - successor state to the former USSR - the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty), signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, which includes the following documents - its integral parts:

Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty;
Protocol on Procedures Governing Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty;
Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty;
Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty;
Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-Weight Relating to the Treaty;
Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty;
Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty;
Annex on Agreed Statements;
Annex on Terms and Their Definitions;
Protocol to the Treaty, signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 2° May 1992 (except Article V);

with following reservations concerning the Treaty and the documents - its integral parts:

1. In accordance with the Vienna convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 1983, and in accordance with the Law of Ukraine On the Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations of Union Subordination located on the Territory of Ukraine of September 10, 1991, and also with The Fundamental Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine, all assets of Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Forces deployed in Ukraine, including their nuclear warheads, are state property of Ukraine.

2. Ukraine does not consider article V of Lisbon Protocol binding for Ukraine.

3. Having become the owner of the nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR, Ukraine exercises administrative control over Strategic Nuclear Forces deployed on its territory.

4. The people of Ukraine, having suffered disastrous consequences of Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, realizes its high responsibility before the peoples of the world that the nuclear war should not be unleashed from the Ukraine's territory. Hence Ukraine undertakes appropriate measures to prevent the use of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.

5. Ukraine as the state-owner of nuclear weapons shall move towards non-nuclear status and gradually get rid of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory provided guarantees of its national security under which nuclear states shall assume obligations to never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, never use conventional armed forces against it and refrain from the threat of force, to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine and to refrain from economic pressure on Ukraine as a means of resolving any disputes.

6. Reductions of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine, with the destruction, shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty and Article II of the Lisbon Protocol based on the calculation that 36% of launchers and 42% of nuclear warheads shall be subject to elimination. This does not exclude the possibility of elimination of any additional launchers and warheads pursuant to procedures which will be determined by Ukraine.

7. Ukraine shall fulfill its obligations under the Treaty in terms it fixes, proceeding from the legal, technical, financial, organizational and other considerations to ensure nuclear and environmental safety and security. Taking into account current economic crisis in Ukraine the
implementation of these obligations shall be possible only if sufficient international financial and technical assistance be provided.

8. Entry into force of the Treaty and its implementation do not create any basis for the States Parties to this Treaty to attempt to achieve unilateral advantages for their entities on the high technologies market, in science and technology exchanges and in cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in the use of missile technologies which can affect Ukraine's national security interests.

9. If dismantlement and elimination of nuclear warheads deployed on Ukraine's territory is done outside its territory, Ukraine would control directly this process in order to ensure the non-use of nuclear component of these nuclear warheads for the production of new nuclear weapons.

10. Conditions and schedule for transfer of nuclear warheads for their dismantlement and elimination shall be determined in relevant agreement or agreements providing for the return to Ukraine of the components of nuclear weapons for their use for peaceful purposes, or compensation for their value.

Conditions for compensation shall also apply to tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukrainian territory to Russia in 1992.

11. Proceeding from the fact, that Ukraine has not negotiated the Treaty to recommend the President and the Government of Ukraine to conduct negotiations with respective states and international organizations on the following:

1) international guarantees for national security of Ukraine;
2) conditions of economic, financial and scientific and technical assistance in the implementation of the commitments under the Treaty;
3) guarantee and author's supervision of nuclear warheads and missile complexes;
4) revision of conditions of inspection activity financing under the Treaty;
5) possibilities of the reliably controlled use of silos for peaceful purposes;
6) conditions of the use of weapons-grade fissile materials removed from the nuclear weapons in the course of their elimination;
7) guarantees of fair compensation for nuclear weapons components' value.

12. To recommend the President of Ukraine to approve the schedule of elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms determined by this Resolution and ensure control over its implementation.

13. To recommend the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to open a special budget line for costs incurred by fulfillment of obligations of Ukraine under this Treaty in drafting Ukraine's budget for 1994.
Ukraine will exchange the instruments of ratification only after the fulfillment of the conditions mentioned in the paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11.

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine expresses its hope that the nuclear states which are not Parties to the Treaty will join the efforts of Ukraine and other USSR successor-states, as well as of the USA and will begin reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

Entry into force of the Treaty and its implementation will open a prospect of resolution by the Verkhovna Rada of the issue of accession of Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the July 1, 1968.

SIGNED

Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

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LETTER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 25 NOVEMBER 1993 REGARDING A DECISION ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME SOVIET OF UKRAINE ON 18 NOVEMBER 1993 CONCERNING THE START-1 TREATY

I have the honour to forward to you the text of a statement made by the Government of the Russian Federation on 25 November 1993 in connection with a decision taken by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 18 November 1993 concerning the START-1 Treaty.

Please take steps to ensure the distribution of this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): G. BERDENNIKOV

GE.93-62803 (E)
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Alarming news has reached us from Ukraine: that country has grossly violated its international obligations with regard to nuclear weapons. On 18 November this year the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted a decision concerning the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1), which it has signed, and the Lisbon Protocol, which is an integral part of it.

The world waited a long time for Kiev to ratify these agreements. All the other parties to them - Russia, the United States, Kazakhstan and Belarus - did so a long time ago. Ukraine alone was dragging its feet. Without its approval, the process of deep cuts in nuclear weapons could not begin.

Over a period of many months promises emerged from Kiev that Ukraine would comply with the obligations it had assumed in the eyes of the world community. Very recently, during a meeting of State delegations from Russia and Ukraine in Massandra, headed by the Presidents of the two countries, Ukraine signed agreements embodying its reaffirmation of these promises.

However, we have now seen violence done to important international instruments, whose basic provisions have been deleted by Ukrainian parliamentarians.

Suffice it to point to the official proclamation of State ownership of nuclear weapons by Ukraine, and the rejection of article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol, under which Ukraine assumed an obligation to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State - a fundamental condition for its joining the START-1 Treaty. Instead of fulfilling its obligation to destroy all the nuclear weapons located on its territory, Ukraine proposes to eliminate only 36 per cent of the delivery vehicles and 42 per cent of the nuclear warheads, while the entire remaining nuclear missile arsenal would belong to Ukraine.

In a word, Ukraine is rejecting all the obligations it has assumed both bilaterally and multilaterally in respect of nuclear weapons. How can such an international partner be trusted?

The Government of the Russian Federation wishes to state that the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine concerning the START-1 Treaty cannot be recognized because the reservations contained in the decision distort the goals of the Treaty. Specifically, the reservations are incompatible with article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The decision taken by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 18 November this year creates a situation in which Russia is not in a position to maintain the strategic offensive weapons located on Ukrainian territory, as it has done in the past. In the present circumstances, providing such maintenance would involve the Russian Federation in a violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The unilateral actions taken by Ukraine, which affect the interests of all States, may require the international community to take steps, inter alia within the framework of the United Nations Security Council, to prevent the undermining of the process of nuclear disarmament, strategic stability and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Russia has been and remains committed to the policy of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and strictly respects the principle that all countries should fulfil their international obligations. The whole world knows that the Government of the Russian Federation has endeavoured to do its utmost, in response to the wishes of the Ukrainian side, to facilitate Ukraine’s fulfilment of its international obligations. All the issues related to the receipt by Ukraine of a "peace dividend" stemming from the elimination of all the strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory were resolved as far as the Russian side was concerned: agreements to that effect were drawn up and signed by Government leaders of the two countries. Russia also provided Ukraine with all necessary guarantees regarding its security, as provided for in international law.

The Russian side is ready to continue a constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian side in order to resolve the whole complex of nuclear arms issues. This requires recognition by Ukraine of its responsibility before the international community, strict compliance with the agreements it has signed, and genuine rather than bogus ratification of the START-1 Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol.

I have the honour to submit to you a document containing the statement by President Soeharto, in his capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, on the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula.

It would be highly appreciated, if you could take the necessary steps to include this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and at the same time to make it available to all member and non-member States, participating in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat

GE.94-60131 (E)
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

As is already known, at the Tenth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Heads of State/Government of the member-countries of the NAM noted and declared their support for the positive developments on the Korean Peninsula with regard to the objective of the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas as well as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as reflected in the agreement reached at the high level meeting between the two Koreas in February 1992. Also in this context, President Soeharto as Chairman of the NAM, after having carefully followed the current developments on the Korean Peninsula especially in relation to the nuclear issue which has subsequently emerged, has asked the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs to give instructions to the Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations to hold consultation with the NAM Coordinating Bureau as well as with the Member-Countries of the NAM caucus in the UN Security Council, with a view to considering the best steps to take in order to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Nuclear issue involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This issue has evidently drawn the attention of the international community as manifested by its being taken up in recent Security Council and General Assembly sessions.

In recent days the NAM Chairman has observed with concern the developments on this nuclear issue, especially after the postponement of the third round of negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, direct talks between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, and the talks between DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There is growing concern that, inter alia, the statements issued by the parties directly involved may lead towards the worsening of the situation which will ultimately affect the stability and security of the region in particular and of the ASEAN continent in general. On the other hand, President Soeharto fully realizes that the problem appears to be complex, difficult, and at the same time sensitive. It is in this regard that President Soeharto as Chairman of the NAM has asked the Head Executive Assistant to the NAM Chairman to continuously monitor the developments on this issue particularly by collecting as many factual information and data as possible which the NAM Chairman needs in weighing the steps that he may in due time take in order to alleviate tensions and help create a condition conducive to a settlement through negotiations. For that
purpose, the NAM Chairman sent the Head Executive Assistant to the NAM Chairman as his special envoy to meet with President Kim Il Sung and other high-ranking officials of the DPRK, on a visit which took place on December 18 - 21, 1993.

As Chairman of the NAM, Indonesia has always been informed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a member of the NAM on the developments on the problem and has always had DPRK's assurances that it would seek a solution to the issue through negotiations. Indonesia welcomes the willingness of all the parties, expressed on various occasions, to solve the problem through negotiations. Indonesia, in its capacity as chairman of the NAM, therefore calls for the continuation of negotiations through the existing and ongoing dialogue forums such as the dialogue forums of DPRK-US, DPRK-ROK, and DPRK-IAEA, as well as other diplomatic efforts, so as to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties involved. While these efforts are in progress, Indonesia as Chairman of the NAM also appeals to all parties to work seriously for the creation of the conducive atmosphere needed for the expeditions conduct of these negotiations.

Indonesia believes that the solution of this problem could engender the growth of economic relations and cooperation that are mutually beneficial, while at the same time promoting peace, security and prosperity which have always been the aspiration of the NAM in particular and of the international community in general.

Jakarta, 5 January 1994

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Corrigendum

Page 2, paragraph 2, line 8

For ASEAN read Asian

We have the honour to forward to you the English and Russian language texts of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America, as well as the Annex to the Trilateral Statement. The documents were signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Grigori V. Berdennikov (Signed) Olexandre Slipchenko
Ambassador Extraordinary Ambassador
and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative
Permanent Representative of Ukraine
of the Russian Federation Head of Delegation
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador and United States
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.94-60255 (E)
Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine
Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk met in Moscow on January 14. The three Presidents reiterated that they will deal with one another as full and equal partners and that relations among their countries must be conducted on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each nation.

The three Presidents agreed on the importance of developing mutually beneficial, comprehensive and cooperative economic relations. In this connection, they welcomed the intention of the United States to provide assistance to Ukraine and Russia to support the creation of effective market economies.

The three Presidents reviewed the progress that has been made in reducing nuclear forces. Deactivation of strategic forces is already well underway in the United States, Russia and Ukraine. The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation of RS-18s (SS-19s) and RS-22s (SS-24s) on Ukrainian territory by having their warheads removed.

The Presidents look forward to the entry into force of the START I Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol and associated documents, and President Kravchuk reiterated his commitment that Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state in the shortest possible time. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin noted that entry into force of START I will allow them to seek early ratification of START II. The Presidents discussed, in this regard, steps their countries would take to resolve certain nuclear weapons questions.

The Presidents emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons pending their dismantlement.

The Presidents recognize the importance of compensation to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus for the value of the highly-enriched uranium in nuclear warheads located on their territories. Arrangements have been worked out to provide fair and timely compensation to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as the nuclear warheads on their territory are transferred to Russia for dismantling.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the completion of the highly-enriched uranium contract, which was signed by appropriate authorities of the United States and Russia. By converting weapons-grade uranium into uranium which can only be used for peaceful purposes, the highly-enriched uranium agreement is a major step forward in fulfilling the countries' mutual non-proliferation objectives.
The three Presidents decided on simultaneous actions on transfer of nuclear warheads from Ukraine and delivery of compensation to Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin informed President Kravchuk that the United States and Russia are prepared to provide security assurances to Ukraine. In particular, once the START I Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States and Russia will:

--- Reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE member states and recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means; and reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and that none of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

--- Reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another CSCE participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind;

--- Reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate UN Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

--- Reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin informed President Kravchuk that consultations have been held with the United Kingdom, the third depositary state of the NPT, and the United Kingdom is prepared to offer the same security assurances to Ukraine once it becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
President Clinton reaffirmed the United States commitment to provide technical and financial assistance for the safe and secure dismantling of nuclear forces and storage of fissile materials. The United States has agreed under the Nunn-Lugar program to provide Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus with nearly USD 800 million in such assistance, including a minimum of USD 175 million to Ukraine. The United States Congress has authorized additional Nunn-Lugar funds for this program, and the United States will work intensively with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to expand assistance for this important purpose. The United States will also work to promote rapid implementation of the assistance agreements that are already in place.
For the Russian Federation:

For the United States of America:

For Ukraine:

Moscow                        January 14, 1994
Annex to the January 14 Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine
The three Presidents decided that, to begin the process of compensation for Ukraine, Russia will provide to Ukraine within ten months fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations containing 100 tons of low-enriched uranium. By the same date, at least 200 nuclear warheads from RS-18 (SS-19) and RS-22 (SS-24) missiles will be transferred from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling. Ukrainian representatives will monitor the dismantling of these warheads. The United States will provide USD 60 million as an advance payment to Russia, to be deducted from payments due to Russia under the highly-enriched uranium contract. These funds would be available to help cover expenses for the transportation and dismantling of strategic warheads and the production of fuel assemblies.

All nuclear warheads will be transferred from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for the purpose of their subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Russia will provide compensation in the form of supplies of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for the needs of its nuclear power industry within the same time period.

Ukraine will ensure the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements and during the seven-year period as provided by the START I Treaty and within the context of the Verkhovna Rada Statement on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. All RS-22s (SS-24s) on the territory of Ukraine will be deactivated within ten months by having their warheads removed.

Pursuant to agreements reached between Russia and Ukraine in 1993, Russia will provide for the servicing and ensure the safety of nuclear warheads and Ukraine will cooperate in providing conditions for Russia to carry out these operations.

Russia and the United States will promote the elaboration and adoption by the IAEA of an agreement placing all nuclear activities of Ukraine under IAEA safeguards, which will allow the unimpeded export of fuel assemblies from Russia to Ukraine for Ukraine’s nuclear power industry.
For the Russian Federation:

For the United States of America:

For Ukraine:

Moscow

January 14, 1994

I have the honour to forward to you the text of the Resolution dated 3 February 1994, of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the implementation by the President of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine of the recommendations contained in paragraph 11 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms" signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the Protocol to it signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992".

I would be grateful if you could take appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to have it distributed to all member State delegations and to non-member State delegations taking part in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Alexander Slipchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ukraine

GE.94-60273
THE RESOLUTION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA
OF UKRAINE


The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine:
- taking into account the concrete measures taken by the President and the Government of Ukraine during November 1993 - January 1994 concerning implementation of provisions of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of November 18, 1993;
- proceeding from the results of the meeting of the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and the Russian Federation in Moscow on January 14, 1994, as well as of the Trilateral Statement and the Annex thereto signed by them;
- taking into account the fact, that Ukraine has received the assurances on the side of the Presidents of USA and Russia about their readiness to provide Ukraine with the guarantees of the national security after entry into force of the START-1 Treaty and accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state, as well as bearing in mind the obligations on the side of the United States and Great Britain toward Ukraine to respect independence, sovereignty and existing boundaries, to refrain from the threat by force or its use against territorial integrity or political
independence, to refrain from economic pressure and the commitment not to use any weapons against Ukraine;

- taking into consideration the confirmation by the Presidents of Ukraine, USA and Russia that their relations will be built on the basis of respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state, as well as the confirmation of their readiness to provide assistance in the establishment of the effective market economy in Ukraine;

- recognising the fact that the United States of America assured Ukraine in providing technical and financial assistance for the safe and secure dismantlement of the nuclear weapons and storing of fissionable material, as well as contributing to the fast realisation of the already existing agreements in connection with such an assistance;

- taking into account that in accordance with the Protocol "On the Procedure of the Control over the Elimination of Nuclear Munitions Transferred from the Territory of Ukraine to the Industrial Enterprises of the Russian Federation" the representatives of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine will realise control over the dismantlement and elimination of the strategic nuclear charges on the territory of Russia, that will exclude the re-use of the components of these charges for their original purpose;

- taking also into account the obligation of Russia to provide for the servicing and safety of nuclear charges;

- proceeding from the fact that Ukraine will get the fair compensation for the cost of highly-enriched uranium and other components of all the nuclear weapons, the owner of which Ukraine is;

- taking into consideration the arrangement on providing Ukraine with fair and timely compensation for the cost of highly-enriched uranium on the Russian Federation and the United States.
of America while nuclear warheads are being withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement and that measures on withdrawal and providing compensation to Ukraine are simultaneous;

- proceeding from the fact that the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Ukraine will steadily comply with the arrangements contained in the Trilateral Statement and the Annex thereto, and with the existing agreements among them and with those which will be concluded concerning the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine;

- considering that the above mentioned facilitates the implementation of the conditions and reservations which were made in the Resolution of November 18, 1993.

RESOLVES:

1. Bearing in mind the concrete measures taken by the President and the Government of Ukraine on the implementation of the provisions of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of November 18, 1993, the meeting steps on behalf of the USA and Russia, to remove the restriction in respect of the Article V of the Protocol to the START-1 Treaty signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1993.

2. To instruct the Government of Ukraine to realise the exchange of the instruments of ratification on the START-1 Treaty and to intensify the activities on concluding specific international agreements resulting from the reservations contained in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Ratification of the START-1 Treaty.

We have the honour to forward to you the English and Russian language texts of the Joint Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the de-targeting of nuclear missiles issued in Moscow on 15 February 1994.

We should be grateful if you would take the appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Sir Michael Weston, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament  
(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.94-60535 (E)
JOINT DECLARATION
BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

- Affirming the fundamental importance of the relationship of partnership between their two countries based on the Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 9 November 1992;

- Emphasising that an element of principle in this relationship of partnership is cooperation between the two countries in the strengthening of European and global security and in building new, non-confrontational international relations;

- Welcoming the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America of 14 January 1994 on the de-targeting of strategic nuclear missiles;

- On the basis of discussions between the sides on nuclear weapons issues, and on the basis of their desire to make a weighty practical contribution to the strengthening of strategic stability in the world;

- Declare that they will ensure the adoption of all necessary measures so that strategic nuclear missiles under their respective command will be de-targetted not later than 30 May 1994.
Accordingly, the day-to-day management of both sides' nuclear forces will be carried out in accordance with the mutual recognition that the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are not adversaries.

Moscow, 15 February 1994

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1994 FROM THE ACTING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A JOINT UNITED STATES-UKRAINE STATEMENT ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT RELATING TO A UNITED STATES-UKRAINE MISSILE EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENT, ISSUED IN WASHINGTON ON 13 MAY 1994

We have the honour to forward to you the text of a Joint United States-Ukraine Statement on security and defence matters as well as the text of a document relating to a United States-Ukraine Missile Export Control Agreement, as issued in Washington on 13 May 1994.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): James H. Madden (Signed): Olexander Slipchenko
Acting United States Ambassador
Representative to the Permanent Representative
Conference on Disarmament of Ukraine
Head of Delegation

GE.94-61484 (E)
Following is the text of a Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine as released 13 May 1994 in Washington.

The United States and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to building a relationship based on partnership and mutual trust and respect between their two countries, and to continuing to build a new relationship in security and defence matters that reflects the end of the cold war. In this regard, the United States and Ukraine recognize the importance of fulfilling their obligations under the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, the January 1994 Trilateral Statement, and bilateral commitments these two countries have made to each other regarding elimination of strategic offence arms and assistance to be provided for this purpose.

Ukraine welcomes United States progress in reducing strategic offensive arms. As the first step toward meeting the reductions required by the START Treaty, the United States has already removed over 3,500 nuclear warheads from over 780 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Within the next few months, all warheads will have been taken off United States ballistic missiles whose launchers will be eliminated under this treaty. Ukraine also notes with satisfaction that, as a reflection of the improved international security environment, by 30 May United States strategic ballistic missiles will no longer be targeted on Ukraine or any other country.

The United States strongly supports the Verkhovna Rada’s and President Kravchuk’s commitment that Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State in the shortest possible time, and underscores its willingness to assist in helping Ukraine eliminate strategic offensive arms located in Ukraine. The United States welcomes the progress in the process of deactivation of missiles on Ukrainian territory, and - in accordance with the Trilateral Statement – 180 nuclear warheads have been transferred from Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement. The United States also welcomes the beginning of the process of delivery from Russia of fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants in Ukraine, in accordance with the Trilateral Statement.
Washington - Following is the text of a White House release as issued by the office of the Vice-President on 13 May 1994 headlined "United States-Ukrainian Missile Export Controls Agreement":

Vice-President Gore and Deputy Prime Minister Shmarov of Ukraine today signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Missile-Related Exports. In the memorandum, Ukraine agreed to conduct its missile- and space-related exports according to the criteria and standards of the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This formal commitment on the part of Ukraine meets a major non-proliferation objective of the United States and the 24 other members of the MTCR.

The memorandum is a welcome expression of the strong partnership that the United States and Ukraine have established to address issues of non-proliferation and arms control. Ukraine’s commitment to abide by the criteria and standards of the MTCR is an important step that shows its readiness to be a responsible national actor in the sale of high-technology goods and services, including in the aerospace sector.

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PROHIBITION OF THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Statement by the Netherlands on behalf of the Western Group

1. Today I take the floor to deliver a statement on behalf of the Western Group on the issue of negotiations on a ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, or "Cut-off".

The Western Group has listened with great interest to the progress report just presented by the CD’s Special Coordinator on Cut-off, Ambassador Shannon.

2. The Western Group would like to commend the Special Coordinator for the way he has discharged himself of the responsibilities entrusted to him in the Presidential statement of 25 January last. The Western Group is encouraged by the consensus among members that the Conference is the appropriate forum to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and by the agreement, in principle, for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on this item.

3. The Western Group had expected that, on the basis of the consensus on the CD as the appropriate forum, the Conference would be able to agree on a negotiating mandate and to establish an Ad Hoc Committee during its 1994 session. Most regrettably, that expectation has not been met. None the less, the Western Group continues to look forward to an early negotiation in the CD, and to that end supports the request that the Special Coordinator continue his consultations.

4. The Western Group would like to reiterate that it fully supports the original draft mandate, which is based on the wording of the United Nations General Assembly consensus resolution 48/75L. The Western Group further notes that this simple mandate enjoys the support of the preponderance of the members of the CD, and that only a handful of delegations has been unwilling to uphold the commitment embodied in the 1993 Cut-off resolution. The simple draft mandate reads as follows:

GE.94-64267 (E)
"1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad hoc Committee on a ‘Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’.

2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The Ad hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session."

In the view of the Western Group, CD members should seize the unique opportunity of the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly to begin, as soon as possible, the negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. The Western Group expresses the hope that the Special Coordinator can successfully conclude his consultations and declares its readiness to render him every support in doing so.
PROHIBITION OF THE PRODUCTION OF FISSION MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Statement by Poland on behalf of the Eastern European Group

On behalf of the Eastern European Group I should like to make the following statement concerning the question of negotiations on a ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Eastern European Group wishes to express to the Special Coordinator its appreciation of the dedication and perseverance with which Ambassador Shannon has been seeking to discharge the responsibilities that were entrusted to him in the Presidential statement at the outset of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Eastern European Group is grateful to Ambassador Shannon in particular for his efforts which have resulted in two important findings: first - that there is consensus among CD members that this body is the appropriate forum to negotiate a non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and second - that there is agreement, in principle, on the establishment of an appropriate Ad Hoc Committee.

The Eastern European Group is disappointed and concerned that, despite the remarkable meeting of minds in the Conference on Disarmament, an agreement on a negotiating mandate and on the actual establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee has proved elusive.
Bearing in mind that consensus General Assembly resolution 48/75 L is at the origin of the efforts to negotiate a cut-off treaty, the Eastern European Group is confident that the window of opportunity created by this resolution will not be closed. We, therefore, lend our firm support to the request that the Special Coordinator continue his consultations in the time ahead. We wish him every success in that effort and we pledge to him our full cooperation.

The members of the Eastern European Group are determined to spare no effort to see negotiations commenced as soon as possible on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and international and effectively verifiable ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Certainly no less can be expected from other CD members who joined in the consensus on United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L.
LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT MADE ON PARAGRAPH 29 OF THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE ISSUE OF A FISSILE MATERIALS CONVENTION

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a statement I delivered at the 692nd plenary meeting on 7 September 1994, concerning the text of paragraph 29 of the Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if the statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Ahmad Kamal
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR AHMAD KAMAL ON THE TEXT OF PARAGRAPH 29 OF THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE ISSUE OF A FISSILE MATERIALS CONVENTION

1. My delegation was happy to hear the report of the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon, and welcomes the agreement on the text of paragraph 29 on the subject of a future Fissile Materials Convention which has been incorporated in the report of the Conference on Disarmament.

2. As we all know, the Special Coordinator’s consultations have been prolonged and difficult. This was essentially because there was, and there continues to be, a wide divergence of views among the members of the Conference on Disarmament on the scope of the proposed Fissile Materials Convention.

3. This disagreement emerged after it became clear to many that the word "production" used in the General Assembly resolution 48/75 of 16 December 1993, was going to be restrictively interpreted to imply "future" production only, thus excluding past production and stockpiles altogether. This effort at deliberately excluding past production or stockpiles from the purview of a Convention on Fissile Materials does not make logical sense, even less so in the light of recent incidents and developments, and is, therefore, not acceptable to many delegations. It would be a perpetuation or legitimization of the asymmetry which exists globally and regionally, and would put the whole concept of nuclear disarmament into serious doubt.

4. My delegation has also taken note of Ambassador Shannon’s suggestion that the mandate proposed by him earlier was without prejudice to a discussion on the stockpiles issue in the Ad Hoc Committee. If this proposal was made in all earnestness and with the approval of those who oppose discussion of the stockpiles issue, then my delegation fails to understand why an explicit reference could not be made in the mandate. We all know that it is the mandate from which the scope is derived, which in turn guides the debate in the Committee. We would not be justified in believing that without any reference to stockpiles in the mandate, the Treaty will address this important issue.

5. The recent plutonium smuggling incidents, which may only be a precursor to what could happen, vindicates our view that the stockpiles issue needs urgent attention. It is a clear hint that the most immediate danger today comes from the existing stocks and has to be addressed urgently.

6. A Fissile Materials Convention will have to be negotiated on a basis of non-discriminatory approach and a comprehensive scope if it is to meet the security interests of concerned States and the aspirations of the international community. We have all agreed, in principle, that an Ad Hoc Committee should be established as soon as a mandate is agreed. We have no doubt that the Special Coordinator will continue his efforts to propose a mandate which incorporates these unexceptionable objectives.

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Group of 21

Proposal for the establishment of an
Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament

1. The Group of 21 proposes that the Conference on Disarmament adopt the following decision:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time.

The Conference decides to appoint ............... as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during its 1996 session."

2. The Group of 21 further proposes that this decision be adopted by the Conference on Disarmament during the first part of its 1996 session. The negotiations in the framework of this Ad Hoc Committee should commence immediately after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in 1996.
ALGERIA, BANGLADESH, BRAZIL, CAMEROON, COLOMBIA, CUBA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAQ, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, KENYA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, MYANMAR, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PERU, SENEGAL, SRI LANKA, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, VENEZUELA, VIET NAM, ZAIRE AND ZIMBABWE

Proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons

Introduction

Effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war have been accorded the highest priority by the international community. The post Cold War era provides an unprecedented opportunity to establish a new system of international security based on the immutable principles of the United Nations Charter. Rationalisations for the continued possession of nuclear weapons need to be discarded. So long as the role of the nuclear weapons in the context of security is not delegitimised and existing nuclear doctrines not abandoned, there will always be a threat of a resumption of the nuclear arms race and the escalation of the nuclear threat.

It is therefore incumbent to ensure that existing favourable circumstances in the international relations are utilised in order to translate the objectives of eliminating all nuclear weapons from a rhetorical goal into a living reality. This requires active multilateral efforts to identify, negotiate and implement specific, step by step measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons dated 8 July 1996, has established that the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come, render them potentially catastrophic. According to the Court, "The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet".

GE.96-63540
The International Court of Justice concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts, and in particular the principles of and rules of humanitarian law and stated that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

As stated in its declaration of 28 March 1996 to the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, the Group of 21 has persistently pressed for commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament, an objective which has been accorded the highest priority by the international community. It will be recalled that on 14 March 1996 the Group of 21 put a decision before the Conference for adoption (CD/1388), through which the Conference would establish an Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament "to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time", as requested by General Assembly Resolution 50/70 P.

This programme to be carried out by the Ad-hoc Committee could include the following steps and measures, as a basis for its work. The list of measures in each phase is indicative and not exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect priority. Nevertheless, it is to be understood that in any programme for nuclear disarmament all measures and steps to be taken are inextricably bound to each other.

**Programme of action**

**First Phase.- 1996 - 2000**

A. Measures aimed at reducing the nuclear threat.
   
   - Immediate and concurrent commencement of negotiations and early conclusion of:
     
     - a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
     
     - a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
     
     - a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
     
     - a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
End the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, by agreements on:

- Cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and closure of all nuclear weapon test sites; and
- Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for the upgrading of existing nuclear weapons systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development.

- Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and South-East Asia and establishment of additional nuclear weapons free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.

- Declarations of the stocks of nuclear weapons and of nuclear weapons usable material.

B. Measures of nuclear disarmament.

- Stand down nuclear-weapon systems from a state of operational readiness.

- Preservation of the ABM (Anti-ballistic missiles) Treaty.

- Moratorium and prohibition on testing of outer space weapons systems.

- Ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty.

- Commencement and conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START III).

- Placement under IAEA safeguards of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by the nuclear weapons States.

- Further negotiations for nuclear disarmament by all nuclear weapon States, including the cessation of production of nuclear warheads.

- Recommendation to the General Assembly to declare the decade 2000-2010 as the "Decade for nuclear disarmament".
Second Phase.— 2000 – 2010

Measures to reduce the nuclear arsenals and to promote confidence between States.

- Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including measures such as:

  - Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles;

  - Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision leading to the removal of special nuclear materials from warheads; and

  - Transfer of nuclear materials including fissile materials and delivery vehicles to peaceful purposes.

- Preparation under international auspices of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

- Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.

- Recommendation to the General Assembly to declare the decade 2010 – 2020 as the "Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons".

Third Phase.— 2010 – 2020

Consolidation of a Nuclear Weapon Free World.

- Adoption of principles and mechanisms for a global cooperative security system.

- Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the completion of further measures such as:

  - Conversion of all facilities devoted to the production of nuclear weapons to peaceful purposes;

  - Application of safeguards on nuclear facilities on a universal basis; and

  - Elimination of all nuclear weapons.
JAPAN

Proposal to appoint a Special Coordinator on Nuclear Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament appoints a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations with its members to identify the issue(s) in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result of these consultations no later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. Japan considers the issue of nuclear disarmament to be a high priority for the Conference on Disarmament.

2. While the Conference may not necessarily take up every aspect of nuclear disarmament, it is clear that there exist appropriate issues in the field of nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in the Conference.

3. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations should commence immediately as the next item for negotiations in the Conference.

4. In addition to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the Conference should identify the issue(s) of nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in the future. Unfortunately the basic lines of thought for dealing with nuclear disarmament have continued to be divergent. Likewise, a convergence of views on the forum, or mechanism, in which to identify the issue has not yet evolved.

5. Under such circumstances, it is most practical for the Conference to have as flexible a mechanism as possible, in order to identify the issues for future negotiation(s). In this regard, a Special Coordinator can have bilateral, multilateral or any other form of consultations and discussions, and, thus, can provide an appropriate forum for nuclear disarmament talks in the Conference.

6. The Conference should not further delay addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, the Conference should start its first step, even if a modest one, to explore various possibilities for nuclear disarmament negotiations.

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GE.97-60182 (E)
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Proposal on
The Programme of Work

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to establish:

   I. An Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" with the mandate as described in CD/1121.

   II. An Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 7 to consider means of promoting transparency in armaments.

2. The Conference also decides to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with issues under agenda item 1.

3. The Conference decides further to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of its members within agenda item 6 on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the issues on which consensus could be achieved.

4. The special coordinators appointed under paragraphs 2 and 3 above shall present an interim report at the end of May and a final report not later than mid-June 1997 to the Conference.
LETTER DATED 27 MARCH 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF EGYPT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A WORKING PAPER FOR A POSSIBLE
MANDATE OF AN AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Bearing in mind the highest priority attached to nuclear disarmament as
reflected in SSOD I, and with reference to document CD/1388 dated 14 March
1996 concerning the proposal submitted by the G.21 for the establishment of an
Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, please find attached a Working Paper
submitted by the Delegation of Egypt for a possible mandate of an Ad-hoc
Committee on nuclear disarmament.

I would be grateful if you would issue this Working Paper as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) : Ambassador
          Mounir Zahran

GE.97-60800
Working Paper submitted by Egypt

Draft mandate for an Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament

The Conference decides to establish an Ad-hoc Committee under agenda item 1 on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and on a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the special coordinator on this item (CD/1299) and the views relating to the scope of the treaty.

In discharging its function, the Ad-hoc Committee will take into account the Proposal for a Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard.
CANADA

Views on the Conference on Disarmament’s agenda and programme of work

Current Debate

With regard to the three issues currently the major focus for debate Canada’s position is:

Nuclear Weapons

The CD must address nuclear disarmament, it should establish a mechanism for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more issues should be the subject of negotiation.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The CD should establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, based on the Shannon Paper and the mandate therein.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

Canada does not object to the proposal by Chile, Finland and Poland to appoint a Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

CD Agenda/Work Programme

In putting forward the above current positions, Canada maintains its views on the CD Agenda/Work Programme as set out in its overview paper of January 21, 1997:

GE.97-61174
Proposed Work Programme

1. Weapons of Mass Destruction/Nuclear Disarmament
   - Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
   - Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

2. Conventional Disarmament
   - Transparency in armaments
   - Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers

3. Outer Space
   - Legally-binding Instrument to Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space

4. Consideration and adoption of annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations

I have the honour to enclose herewith the section on 'Disarmament and International Security' (paras 54 to 71) of the Final Document adopted at the XII Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi, 7-8 April, 1997.

I should be grateful if the enclosed document is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Arundhati Ghose
54. The Ministers noted that with the end of the cold war, there is no justification for nuclear arsenals, or concepts of international security based on promoting military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. While the end of the cold war had created unprecedented opportunities to promote this objective, regrettably there had been assertions which sought to justify continued reliance on nuclear doctrines, in certain cases against non-nuclear-weapon states. The Ministers recalled that the Cartagena Summit had called for the adoption of an Action Plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. They called upon the international community to join them in negotiating and implementing universal, non-discriminatory disarmament measures and mutually agreed confidence-building measures.

55. The Ministers noted and welcomed the various international initiatives which stress that the opportunity now exists for the international community to pursue nuclear disarmament as a matter of the highest priority. They also noted that our present situation whereby nuclear-weapon states insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet monopolize the right to own them, is highly discriminatory, unstable and cannot be sustained.

56. The declarations that nuclear weapons continue to offer security to the nuclear weapon states could contribute to the escalation of the nuclear threat and were contrary to their undertakings to fulfill nuclear disarmament obligations. Nuclear weapons continued to exist in massive numbers and in a state of operational readiness. It was imperative that security in the post-Cold War era should be promoted through drastic reductions in nuclear weapons and their eventual
elimination. They called for a series of agreed measures forming part of a programme for nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

57. The Ministers welcomed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". They noted and welcomed the growing body of authoritative international opinion which stressed that nuclear disarmament should be pursued by the international community as a matter of the highest priority. They recalled that a number of NAM countries had taken collective initiatives at the 50th and 51st UNGA sessions to underscore the need for urgent action in the field of nuclear disarmament, as mandated at the Cartagena Summit. The Ministers welcomed the useful work that had been done by a number of NAM countries, members of the Conference on Disarmament, in developing an Action Plan for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework.

58. The Ministers:

- called on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on priority, an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

- urged Nuclear Weapon States to agree to commence the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding international instrument to provide unconditional assurances to all non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
urged Nuclear Weapon States to agree to commence negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

- supported the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament; and

- expressed satisfaction at the work of the Working Group on Disarmament established by the NAM Coordinating Bureau in New York.

59. The Ministers noted with concern that, though the Chemical Weapons Convention will enter into force on 29 April, 1997, the two declared possessors of chemical weapons have still not ratified it, which jeopardises both the necessary universal and disarmament character of the Convention as originally conceived, which has been the guiding principle during the protracted negotiations through which the Convention was achieved. The Ministers emphasised that the First Conference of States Parties should adopt the appropriate measures towards ensuring that the Convention is operationalised in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner that safeguards the principle of universality and the disarmament character integral to the Convention. The Ministers further emphasised that the outstanding issues before the Preparatory Commission needed to be satisfactorily resolved in order to ensure effective implementation of the Convention. In this context, they called on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all existing multilateral as well as national discriminatory restrictions that
are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.

60 In the context of ongoing deliberations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Ministers emphasised that, given the importance of biotechnology for economic development, any verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention should contain specific provisions to safeguard the security and economic interests of the developing countries, parties to the BWC. The strengthening of the BWC should provide for ensured access for peaceful purposes to the relevant material, equipment and technologies for their economic growth. While asserting that the Biological Weapons Convention inherently precludes the use of biological weapons, the Ministers emphasized their support for the explicit prohibition of the use of these weapons in the Convention. In this connection the Ministers noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented a proposal to amend Article 1 of the title of the Convention to include the prohibition of use of biological weapons and urged an early reply from the state signatories to the inquiries by the depositories on this proposal.

61. The Ministers reaffirmed that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary and could be pursued simultaneously. They urged States in various regions of the world to negotiate agreements to promote greater balance in conventional armaments and restraint in the production and acquisition of conventional arms and, where necessary, for their progressive and balanced reduction, with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security. They stressed that the peaceful resolution of regional and inter-State disputes is essential for the creation of conditions which would enable States to divert their resources from armaments to economic growth and development. Regional disarmament initiatives, to be practical, needed to take into account the special characteristics of each region and enhance the security of every state of the region concerned. The question of accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirements of states for self-defence
should also be addressed, taking into account the special characteristics of each region.

62. The Ministers considered the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global Nuclear Disarmament. They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to creating nuclear-weapon free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-1. In this context, they welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. The Ministers considered the question of the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in other parts of the world and agreed that this should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned and in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-1. The Ministers welcomed the effort of Mongolia to institutionalise its status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

63. The Ministers reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the Ministers reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without delay, and to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and they condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. Stability can not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are
maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allow one
party to threaten its neighbours and the region. They further welcomed the initiative
by H.E. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the
establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
They stressed that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for
the establishment of this zone. They also called for the total and complete prohibition
of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities,
resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or
technological fields to Israel.

64 The Ministers welcomed the signing of “The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty” (Treaty of Pelindaba) in Cairo on 11 April, 1996 and affirmed that this
treaty will further consolidate global efforts towards non-proliferation and contribute
to the strengthening of international peace and security. The Ministers further
affirmed that the establishment of NWFZs, especially in the Middle East, would
enhance the security of Africa.

65 Consistent with the decisions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference, the Ministers of States Parties to the NPT called upon all states,
particularly the nuclear weapon states, to fulfill their commitments, particularly those
related to Article VI of the Treaty. They also emphasised the need to ensure and
facilitate the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented. In this context, the Ministers of
the States Parties to the NPT called upon the Preparatory Commissions up to and
including the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to engage immediately in
substantive work for the meaningful implementation of the obligations under the
Treaty and the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document

66. The Ministers of States signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) took note of the opening of the CTBT for signature in 1996. They agreed that if the implications of the treaty are to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all State signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament will be essential.

67. The Ministers stated that in order to enhance international security and stability, all States Parties to non-proliferation, arms limitations and disarmament treaties should comply with and implement all provisions of such treaties. They emphasized that questions of non-compliance by States Parties should be resolved in a manner consistent with such treaties and international law. They further emphasized that any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the UN Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress of violations of their provisions. Such deviations would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the Conference on Disarmament. They underlined that circumventing or undermining the provisions of existing treaties will seriously prejudice the role of the Conference.

68. The Ministers expressed particular concern over the illicit transfer and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their accumulation in many countries, which constituted a threat to the population and to national and regional security and were a factor contributing to destabilization of states. They urged states to take steps to deal effectively, through administrative and legislative means, with the increasing problem of illicit transfers of weapons, particularly small arms, which exacerbate tensions leading to strife, conflict and terrorism and impact negatively on
the socio-economic development of affected countries. In this regard, they welcomed the adoption of guidelines in 1996 for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 September 1991 by the UN Disarmament Commission.

69. The Ministers welcomed the various bans, moratoria and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines and the growing consensus against the indiscriminate use and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. They also took note of the efforts to eliminate them as early as possible. In this regard the Ministers welcomed the decision taken by the Central American countries to constitute their region as an anti-personnel landmines free zone. The Ministers underlined that any negotiations to ban landmines should take into account the legitimate national security concerns of States as well as their legitimate rights to use appropriate measures for self-defence. They called for urgent and specific measures to ensure that affected countries had full access to material, equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance. Access to non-lethal technologies being developed to perform the legitimate defensive role of landmines would help generate support for their elimination. The Ministers also called for continued humanitarian assistance for victims of landmines.

70. The Ministers expressed concern about the residue of the Second World War, particularly in the form of landmines which cause human and material damage and obstruct development plans in some Non-Aligned countries. They called on the States responsible for laying the mines outside their territories to assume responsibility for the landmines, to cooperate with the affected countries, to provide the necessary information, maps and technical assistance for their clearance, to contribute towards defrayal of the costs of clearance and provide compensation for any ensuing losses.

71. The Ministers noted with concern that undue restrictions on export to
developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. The Ministers emphasized that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.

UNQUOTE

Corrigenda

Page 5, paragraph 60, line 11
For Article 1 of the read Article 1 and the

Page 9, paragraph 68, line 10
For 6 September 1991 read 6 December 1991

Attached are four documents signed at the joint U.S.-Russian summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland, on March 21, 1997. The documents are (1) a Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, (2) a Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, (3) a Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on European Security, and (4) a Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons.

We would be grateful if you would issue these four documents together as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participant States of the CD.

(Signed): Katharine C. Crittenden (Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Permanent Representative Permanent Representative
of the United States to the of the Russian Federation
Conference on Disarmament to the Conference on
Disarmament

GE.97-61306
JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

- Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

- Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and
organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

- Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

- Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  

William J. Clinton

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Yeltsin

Helsinki  

March 21, 1997
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

-- The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

-- Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

-- Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

-- Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

-- The scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.
The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 20, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States-Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty -- the obligation not to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode -- the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence-building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems are:

- The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

- The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

- The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

- The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.
The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher-velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

William J. Clinton

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

March 21, 1997
JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, means the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.
They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision-making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a modal for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE’s essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.
The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.
The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

William J. Clinton

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

March 21, 1997
JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

President Clinton and President Yeltsin discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. They stressed the commitment of the United States and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the Convention.

The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the United States be a party when the Convention enters into force in April of this year, and is strongly urging prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

Mindful of their special role and responsibility in the matter of chemical disarmament, the United States and Russia understand that their participation in the Convention is important to its effective implementation and universality.

The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in chemical disarmament.

The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Helsinki

March 21, 1997
GROUP OF 21

Proposal on the Programme of Work

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish:

I. An Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 1 "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

II. An Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 3 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

III. An Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 4 "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

2. The Conference decides to appoint a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on agenda item 6 "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" with a special reference to the issue of anti-personnel landmines.

3. The Conference also decides to appoint a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on agenda item 7 "Transparency in armaments".

4. The Conference decides further to appoint Special Coordinators to carry out consultations on the issues of its expansion and agenda as well as improved and effective functioning.

* * * * *

The Group of 21 continues to attach the highest priority to the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament under agenda item 1.

The Group of 21 has presented on 14 March 1996 a proposal for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in document CD/1388.

In this context, a specific proposal on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee will be presented in the near future.
The Conference decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1 on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time.

In discharging its function, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account the Proposal for a Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419, 7 August 1996) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard.

The Ad Hoc Committee will establish working groups to negotiate, as a first step a universal and legally-binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, an agreement on further steps required in a phased programme with time frames leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the special coordinator on this item (CD/1299) and the views relating to the scope of the treaty.

Working Groups will report to the Ad Hoc Committee on a regular basis or as necessary on the progress of their work. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1997 session.
SOUTH AFRICA

Draft decision and mandate on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiations in the Conference.

2. In discharging its function, the ad hoc committee will take into account existing proposals and views, as well as future initiatives on nuclear disarmament.
Canada proposes that

- the CD establish an Ad Hoc Committee for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally.

BACKGROUND

- Nuclear disarmament issues continues to be a primary and priority preoccupation of the global community.

- While the Nuclear Weapon States have particular responsibility on nuclear disarmament issues, and thus have specific contributions to make, other members of the international community have both stakes and interests with regard to these issues.

- The CD, as the multilateral negotiating mechanism on disarmament issues, should be appropriately and substantively engaged on nuclear disarmament issues.

- That being said, Canada does not consider that the CD should be mandated to negotiate nuclear weapon reduction per se or specific operational issues concerning such weapons.

- But the CD should respond to the broad multilateral desire to support, as appropriate, Nuclear Weapon States' efforts in the disarmament field; to be more aware of issues and developments; and, to express views on developments.

- More directly, the CD should and could be used to identify and explore issues which could be negotiated at an appropriate point by a multilateral mechanism.

- The CD has negotiated such an issue, i.e. the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in the recent past; Canada continues to consider that the CD could make a further contribution by the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

GE.98-60241
- Other issues appropriate for negotiation in the CD may well emerge in the future, not least of all as the result of substantive discussions on general nuclear disarmament issues and developments in that body.

- Canada's current suggestion along these lines was made last year as a part of the ideas proposed, inter alia, in CD/1456.

- While Canada considers that such an Ad Hoc Committee with such a mandate could and should be established now, this does not preclude the CD establishing another mechanism or process to fulfil such a mandate.
BELGIUM

Proposal on nuclear issues

“The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc group for reflection and study on ways and means of opening an exchange of information within the Conference on matters relating to article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

I have the honour to transmit to you the English and Spanish texts of the Joint Declaration relating to nuclear disarmament of 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

I shall be grateful if the Joint Declaration is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Lars Norberg
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
JOINT DECLARATION BY THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND,
SLOVANIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND SWEDEN

1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states, as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.

2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again."

3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called for a commission to make proposals for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." While we can rejoice at the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.

4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.
5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistent reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.

9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches.

11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.

12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the NPT, negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.

13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.

14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a joint
no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security assurances.

15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon states together with the non-nuclear-weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.
ALGERIA

Proposal under item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

"Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
BACKGROUND

1. The Algerian delegation considers that nuclear disarmament is an absolute priority for the Conference on Disarmament. A number of proposals have been made on this subject, all of them of undoubted interest. This working paper is designed to add substance to the debate, point to avenues which may be explored, and help in reaching decisions. It sets out a dual proposal on nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of fissile material, with a possible compromise formula.

2. The dual proposal on nuclear disarmament and fissile material draws on principles and rules which are broadly accepted, as well as positions, observations and views set out by delegations in the Conference on Disarmament.

3. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament constitute two inseparable and interacting dimensions which must be dealt with hand in hand.

The plan for non-proliferation is based on the NPT and includes other concomitant measures: the banning of nuclear testing, the granting of security assurances and the prohibition of fissile material. The NPT has now been extended indefinitely and possesses a strengthened review mechanism, nuclear testing has been banned under the CTBT and security assurances are being handled within an ad hoc committee established this year in the Conference on Disarmament, as well as being dealt, with or examined and considered in other settings (denuclearized zones and NPT).

4. It now remains to pursue two actions:

4.1. To put the finishing touches to this plan for non-proliferation by accomplishing the last phase in the form of negotiations on fissile material; this is the purpose of proposal B.

This proposal has been drafted in the light of the need to initiate negotiations on a clear and unequivocal basis, following a common vision which is free of ambiguity as regards the scope and objectives of a treaty to ban fissile material.

The logic underlying this proposal lies in a separation of the negotiations on future production and on stockpiles, which will lead to:

* A treaty whose scope is limited to future production (the wording of the mandate contained in the Shannon report);

* A protocol to govern stockpiles arising from production which predates the entry into force of the treaty and the dismantling of nuclear weapons under the START process. The negotiations will determine whether it is possible to opt for a protocol simply annexed to the body of the treaty, or an addicionaln protocol to be opened for signature by
States, with its own preamble, operative part and entry-into-force clauses.

Such negotiations would make it possible to take into account the concerns expressed by the various delegations, to launch negotiations on a clear and unequivocal basis and to guarantee the smooth course of work in the ad hoc committee established for the purpose, by avoiding entanglement between the negotiations on future production and those on stockpiles, which are supposed to provide a mutual feedback.

4.2 To outline the « plan for disarmament » through an in-depth examination of nuclear disarmament: this is the purpose of proposal A.

This in-depth exercise can be carried out effectively through:

*Negotiation of a convention involving a political commitment on the part of all States to the goal of nuclear disarmament. This legal instrument should, in our view, constitute the cornerstone of the « disarmament regime », in the same way that the NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

*Identification of practical measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons. At this stage this would involve an identification exercise which would take account of the unilateral initiatives for nuclear arms limitation and bilateral efforts to reduce such weapons (the START process). This identification exercise could draw on numerous ideas and proposals (the proposal for a programme of nuclear disarmament put forward by 28 delegations from the G.21, the work of the Canberra Commission, etc.)

5. The Algerian delegation considers that this dual proposal addresses the substance of item 1 on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in a balanced manner.

The Algerian delegation considers also that for non-proliferation there exists a regime which requires some finishing touches (the purpose of proposal B), and that disarmament must necessarily be provided with a regime which is similar and complementary to the former, which should be initiated in an adequate and appropriate manner (the purpose of proposal A).
Proposal A.

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of its agenda with the task, as first stage, of negotiating a multilateral, universal and legally binding convention committing all States to the objective of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. The ad hoc committee established in this way shall also strive to identify the measures which should be taken to attain this goal and thus safeguard and further strengthen nuclear non-proliferation, while taking due account of the unilateral and bilateral initiatives being pursued in this field and proposals made on this subject.

3. As the measure to be taken immediately has already been identified (a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices), it shall be the subject of a separate decision by the CD.

4. The ad hoc committee shall report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.

Proposal B

1. In pursuance of decision CD/... of..., and taking into account the Shannon report contained in document CD/1299 of 24 March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

2. The Conference directs the ad hoc committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

3. At the same time, the ad hoc committee shall be entrusted with the task of developing an international regime to govern stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, which could take the form of a protocol annexed to the treaty referred to in paragraph 2 above, or an additionnal protocol.

4. The ad hoc committee shall report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.
The G.21 emphasises that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority for the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In order to promote the work of the CD, the group underscores its flexibility in accepting the proposal to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda - entitled «Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament» - to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices». This gesture should be reciprocated by others through their agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, as well as during the course of the negotiations to be conducted in the ad hoc committee which we have just agreed to establish.

The group of 21 stresses the importance of the elimination of the possibility of nuclear war and the threats derived from the continued existence of nuclear weapons, and the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The group expresses its support for the President’s declaration that in accordance with paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, intensive consultations will continue with a view to reaching a decision on an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The group is of the view that these consultations should lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls the various proposals presented collectively and individually by its members.

The G.21 believes that the proposed treaty dealing with fissile material must constitute a nuclear disarmament measure, and not only a nuclear non-proliferation measure, and be an integral step leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty shall also promote international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Mindful that the achievement of nuclear disarmament requires urgent negotiation, the group emphasises the imperative need for all states to commit themselves unequivocally to the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. An ad hoc committee should be established in the CD to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention.

The G.21 believes firmly that a satisfactory solution to the issue of nuclear disarmament will have a direct bearing on the work of the CD in the future.
EFFECTIVE

Draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament

The Conference decides to establish an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament with the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In discharging its function, the ad hoc committee will take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard.

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BELGIUM, GERMANY, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY

Proposal on nuclear disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views within the Conference on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament.

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CANADA

Proposal concerning CD action on nuclear disarmament

Canada renews its proposal that:

- the CD establish an ad hoc committee for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally.

BACKGROUND

- Nuclear disarmament issues continue to be a priority preoccupation of the global community.

- This was recognized by the CD in the statement made by its President on March 26, 1998, in which agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" was emphasized as "an extremely high priority".

- The nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility in this regard and have committed themselves to "the determined pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,...".

- This does not however preclude the interests of other members of the international community in the achievement of that objective. There is a clear need for renewed momentum and progress.

- The CD, as the multilateral negotiating mechanism on disarmament issues, should be appropriately and substantively engaged on nuclear disarmament issues.

- Canada does not consider that the CD should be mandated to negotiate nuclear weapon reductions per se or specific operational issues concerning such weapons.

- The CD should establish a mechanism through which it can be more aware of issues and developments in the nuclear disarmament field, can express views on developments therein, and can identify and explore issues which could be negotiated at an appropriate point by a multilateral mechanism.

- The CD has negotiated one such instrument, i.e. the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in the recent past; it has initiated the process by which it can make a further contribution by the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

- Canada urges early action by the CD in response to this proposal as well as to those by other CD members.

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The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention".

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The purpose of this working paper is to set out considerations relevant to the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues which Canada has long advocated should take place in the CD.

Context:

Canada's policy objective is to secure the elimination of nuclear weapons. We have accepted that this objective must be achieved through a series of measures over time given the political, strategic security and technical complexity of the issue. At the same time this is not an open-ended process and the five Nuclear-Weapon States, which have primary responsibility in this context, are committed to "the determined pursuit .... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons ...". The recognition by Canada of the primary responsibility of the five Nuclear-Weapon States is accompanied by a strong assertion of the political and security interest of Canada in nuclear disarmament as well as of its legal undertaking under Article VI of the NPT to be a responsible contributor to and participant in that process. This is matched by an equally strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, that is, the prevention wherever possible and the roll-back wherever necessary of the spread of nuclear weapons to states other than the five Nuclear-Weapon States.

A corollary of the above is the assertion by Canada that the CD has a contribution to make in the field of nuclear disarmament, with that contribution falling into two categories:

(a) the negotiation of appropriate multilateral instruments (e.g. CTBT, FMCT) as appropriate and agreed; and,

(b) the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues through which the international community can be better informed on a continuing basis, can express its views as to the process, and can identify issues which might be subject to multilateral negotiations.

Each of these are significant and mutually reinforcing. The substantive discussion of any issue under (b) in no way implies agreement to negotiate that issue under (a). Specifically, for example, substantive discussion of the nuclear weapons reduction process through START would not in any manner predispose or lead to the assumption that the CD would ever negotiate such reductions; such negotiations remain the perogative of the Nuclear-Weapon States.

GE.99-60827
Issues:

Various suggestions have been made concerning issues or "programmes of issues" which should be discussed in the CD. Set out below in a sequential thematic manner are issue areas which, inter alia, Canada suggests could be subjects of discussion:

1) Rationales for Possession/Numbers of Nuclear Weapons
2) Theories of Deterrence
3) Strategic and Tactical Weapons: Distinctions and Doctrines
4) START Process: Stages and Elements
5) Transparency of Strategic/Tactical Inventories
6) Measures to Promote Irreversibility
7) Viability of the ABM Treaty
8) Unilateral Efforts
9) Related Steps
   a) Information on Missile Launchings/Early Warning
   b) Material Management and Disposition
   c) Operational Measures:
      e.g. - Demating
      e.g. - Dealerting

These are only a number of categories on which substantive discussion would take place. Several (e.g. No. 4 on the START Process) may have a wide range of clarifications considered desirable.

Relevant also is the question of what the CD should not or would not do. As Canada has frequently stated over the past year this should also be the subject of prior discussion and agreement.

Mechanism/Mandate

This is of "extremely high priority" (CD/1500) for Canada. We consider that ongoing substantive discussions of nuclear disarmament issues should take place in the CD, preferably with the clear objective of identifying specific issues appropriate for multilateral negotiations in the CD at some time. At this time two options for action by the CD exist:
Option A: establishment of a standing mechanism (the title is not critical) for the substantive ongoing discussion of nuclear disarmament issues per the Canada proposal (CD/1568) or the Belgium et al proposal (CD/1565) as amended (i.e. with the deletion in line 2 of the wording "study ways and means of" so to read "to establish an exchange ....");

Option B: (if agreement is not possible on Option A): continuing intensive consultations by the Presidency using an "enhanced troika" process building upon the agreement reached in 1998 as reflected in paragraph 3 of CD/1566 tabled by the former President of the CD on 02 February 1999; in this context the mandate of this enhanced troika process could be the proposal by Belgium et al without amendment. Other additional elements for an enhanced troika might include: regular meetings (i.e. every two weeks); focusing on written proposals; regular reporting to the Plenary.
NEW ZEALAND

RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY
THE NEW ZEALAND PARLIAMENT, 23 FEBRUARY 2000

The Parliament of New Zealand resolves, relying upon:

- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- the final document of the first UN special session devoted to disarmament;
- the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987;
- the unanimous finding of the International Court of Justice and its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons that, "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control";
- the unanimous report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons;
- the (Eight) Foreign Ministers Joint Declaration 1998;
- and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999;

as a mark of the dawning of the year 2000, to appeal to all fellow member states of the United Nations, and especially the nuclear weapons states, to join with New Zealand in fulfilling the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control

and that the text of this resolution be conveyed by the Government to each and every member state of the United Nations by the most effective diplomatic means available; and copies of the resolution be simultaneously communicated by the Government to the UN Secretary-General, the President of the UN General Assembly, the President of the UN Security Council, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, and the President of the International Court of Justice; and that the Government of New Zealand work for the fulfilment of the obligation in all appropriate international forums.

GE.00-60914

On behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden I have the honour to inform you that the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted by consensus, in its Final Document, practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty.

These steps read as follows:

"15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.
The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

   - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

   - Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear-weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary-confidence building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

   - The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

   - Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

   - A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

   - The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world."

We request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Antonio de Icaza
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
LETTER DATED 29 MAY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RUSSIAN
PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The Russian delegation shares the concerns of other delegations in the Conference on Disarmament regarding the current situation in this unique multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. We have carefully studied all the proposals relating to the Conference’s programme of work which have been submitted since 1998, the last time the programme of work was adopted, and we highly appreciate the constructive ideas which they contain.

The Russian Federation would like to make its own contribution to these joint efforts by introducing a package proposal on the programme of work relating to the two outstanding issues, namely, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). We are proceeding on the assumption that the consensus on the third priority issue - the launching of substantive work in the Conference on FMCT - still exists.

After thorough consideration, we have decided to support the ideas of a large number of delegations in the Conference and to agree on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. The package also makes provision for the establishment at the same time of an ad hoc committee on PAROS, with a negotiating mandate.

In our view, the Russian proposal is constructive and not detrimental to the positions of any delegation. The wording used in both draft mandates is taken from documents that have been adopted by consensus at various international conferences held in the past.

The Russian delegation has already had an opportunity to discuss this proposal unofficially with many colleagues in the Conference. We are especially grateful to those of them who provided comments and suggestions relating to the draft mandates. We made every effort to take these into consideration in the final version of our proposal.
The Russian delegation hereby requests you, Mr. President, to take the necessary steps to have this letter and the attached proposal on the Conference’s programme of work issued as an official document of the Conference and to distribute it to all member States and observers of the Conference on Disarmament. Permit me to express the hope that the Russian proposal will be considered by all delegations in a spirit of good will and will contribute to restarting the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Nuclear disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the 2001 session, under item 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Committee will take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2001 session.
Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the 2001 session, under item 3 entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space. This regime could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

The Ad Hoc Committee will take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2001 session.

I have the honour to forward to you the English language version of the paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda countries to the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if you would issue this paper as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants of the Conference.

(Signed:) Mary WHELAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reproduced from previously issued document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/9 of 5 April 2002 as attached.

GE.02-63853
New Agenda Coalition
Paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Countries

I. Background

1. In 1995, the States parties extended the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. The Review Process of the Treaty was strengthened and Principles and objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty were adopted. The Resolution on the Middle East was adopted as an integral part of the 1995 package.

2. In 1996, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

3. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference represents a positive step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In particular, nuclear-weapon States made the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and agreed on practical steps to be taken by them that would lead to nuclear disarmament. To this end, additional steps were necessary to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty.

II. Fundamental Principles

4. The participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability. International security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement. Internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security. Unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament. It is essential that fundamental principles, such as transparency, verification and irreversibility, be applied to all disarmament measures.

5. We reaffirm that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

6. Irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions, and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. A fundamental pre-requisite for promoting nuclear non-proliferation is continuous irreversible progress in nuclear arms reductions.

7. Each article of the Treaty is binding on the respective State parties at all times and in all circumstances. It is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict
compliance of their obligations under the Treaty.

8. Further progress on disarmament must be a major determinant in achieving and in sustaining international stability. The 2000 NPT undertakings on nuclear disarmament have been given and implementation of them remains the imperative.

9. A nuclear weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing sets of instruments.

III. Developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference

10. To date, there have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

11. We remain concerned that in the post Cold War security environment, security policies and defense doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons. The commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defense doctrines has yet to materialize. This lack of progress is inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

12. In addition, we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of new security strategies.

13. The Conference on Disarmament has continued to fail to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The expectations of progress that resulted from the 2000 NPT Review Conference have to date not been met.

14. Although implementation of the CTBT's international monitoring system has proceeded, the CTBT has not yet entered into force.

15. There are no indications that nuclear-weapon States have increased transparency measures.

16. Measures have been taken by one nuclear-weapon State to unilaterally reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons systems.

17. To date, there is no evidence of any agreed concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

18. There is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading
to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, there are worrying signs of the
development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

19. While welcoming the statements of intent regarding substantial cuts by the United States and
Russian Federation to deployed nuclear arsenals, we remain deeply concerned at the continuing
possibility that nuclear weapons could be used. Despite the intentions of, and past achievements in
bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still
amounts to thousands.

20. There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the State parties to the treaty on the
limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and
its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to and facilitating nuclear
disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It could
also have grave consequences for the future of global security and create an apparent rationale for
action based solely on unilateral concerns. Any action, including development of missile defense
systems, which could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is of concern to
the international community. We are concerned about the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer
space.

21. The achievements and promise the bilateral START process held, including the possibility it
offered for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the
practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments, undertaken in the pursuit of the
elimination of nuclear weapons, is in jeopardy.

22. In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the heads of State and Government resolved to
strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all
options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference
to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

23. We are concerned by the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States
that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as their failure to renounce that option.

24. There has been progress in the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some
regions, and, in particular, the movement towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas
from such weapons. In this context, the ratification of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok
and Pelindaba by all States of the region, and all concerned States is of great importance. They should
all work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties
by all relevant States that have not yet done so. States Parties to those treaties should be encouraged to
promote their common objectives with a view to enhance cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free
zones and to working together via the proponents of other such zones. On the other hand, no progress
has been achieved in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia
and other regions.
IV. The Way Ahead

25. We remain determined to pursue, with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That outcome provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament.

26. Multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear weapon States parties. The Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on the modalities for immediate negotiations on this issue. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

27. The nuclear-weapon States must increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures.

28. Further efforts by nuclear-weapon States to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally are required. Formalization by nuclear-weapon States of their unilateral declarations in a legally binding agreement including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility is essential. Nuclear-weapon States should bear in mind that reductions of deployments are a positive signal but no replacement for the actual elimination of nuclear weapons.

29. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the NPT commitments to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying the nuclear warheads in the context of strategic nuclear reductions and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment. While deployment reduction, and reduction of operational status, give a positive signal, it cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

30. Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be a priority. Nuclear-weapons States must live up to their commitments. Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner and to include reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the overall arms reductions negotiations. In this context, urgent action should be taken to achieve:

(a) further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
(b) further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;
(c) concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, and to
(d) formalizing existing informal bilateral arrangements regarding non-strategic nuclear reductions, such as the Bush-Gorbachev declarations of 1991, into legally binding agreements.
31. Nuclear-weapon States must undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

32. We underline the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT without delay and without conditions. This gains additional urgency since the process of the installation of an international system to monitor nuclear weapons tests under the CTBT is more advanced than the real prospects of entry into force of the treaty. This is a situation not consistent with the idea of elaborating a universal and comprehensive test ban treaty. In the interim, it is necessary to uphold and maintain the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of the CTBT. The strict observance of the CTBT’s purposes, objectives and provisions is imperative.

33. The Conference on Disarmament should establish without delay an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.

34. The Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

35. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Conference should complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, and to establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible.

36. The international community must redouble its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT and to be vigilant against any steps that would undermine its determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those three States\(^1\), which are not yet parties to the NPT, must accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States, promptly and without condition, and bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional model protocol, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

37. The Trilateral initiative between the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States must be implemented, and consideration should be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapons States.

38. Arrangements should be made by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification.

\(^1\) India, Pakistan and Israel.
39. International treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be observed, and all obligations flowing from those treaties must be duly fulfilled.

40. All States should refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

V. The Strengthened Review Process

41. The Preparatory Committee should deal with the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward but also with matters of substance as was decided in the 1995 and 2000 outcomes, and to ensure that the issues of substance deliberated upon are recorded in the factual summary of the Preparatory Committee.

42. The Preparatory Committee should substantively focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Accountability will be assessed in the consideration of these reports that the States parties agreed to submit.

43. The Preparatory Committee should consider regular reports to be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision. The strengthened review process envisioned in the 2000 NPT Final Document concerning the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1&2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 should be fully implemented.

44. These reports should be submitted to each session of the Preparatory Committee. The reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the thirteen steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, the number and specifications of warheads and delivery systems in service and number and specifications of reductions, dealerting measures, existing holdings of fissile materials as well as reduction and control of such materials, achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability). These reports should address current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.

I have the honour to forward to you the English language version of the paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda countries to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*.

I would be grateful if you would issue this paper as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants of the Conference.

(Signed:) Tim CAUGHLEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

* Reproduced from previously issued document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/16 of 29 April 2003 as attached.
NEW AGENDA COALITION PAPER

Submitted by New Zealand

on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden
as members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)

I. Background

1. In 1995, the State parties extended the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. The Review Process of the Treaty was strengthened and Principles and Objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty were adopted. The Resolution on the Middle East was adopted as an integral part of the 1995 package.

2. In 1996, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

3. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference represents a positive step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In particular, nuclear-weapon States made the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and agreed on practical steps to be taken by them that would lead to nuclear disarmament. To this end, additional steps were necessary to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty.

II. Fundamental Principles

4. The participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability. International security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement. Internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security. Unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament. It is essential that fundamental principles, such as transparency, verification and irreversibility, be applied to all disarmament measures.

5. We reaffirm that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

6. Irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions, and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. A fundamental pre-requisite for promoting nuclear non-proliferation is continuous irreversible progress in nuclear arms reductions.
7. Each article of the Treaty is binding on the respective State parties at all times and in all circumstances. It is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance of their obligations under the Treaty.

8. Further progress on disarmament must be a major determinant in achieving and in sustaining international stability. The 2000 NPT undertakings on nuclear disarmament have been given and implementation of them remains the imperative.

9. A nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing mutually reinforcing sets of instruments.

III. Developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference

10. To-date there have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

11. We remain concerned that in the post Cold War security environment, security policies and defence doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons. The commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defence doctrines has yet to materialise. This lack of progress is inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

12. In addition, we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of new security strategies.

13. The Conference on Disarmament has continued to fail to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The expectations of progress that resulted from the 2000 NPT Review Conference have to date not been met.

14. Although implementation of the CTBT’s international monitoring system has proceeded, the CTBT has not yet entered into force.

15. There are no indications that nuclear-weapon States have increased transparency measures.

16. Measures have been taken by one-nuclear weapon State to unilaterally reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons systems. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the Moscow Treaty”) is but one step towards this goal.
17. To date, there is limited evidence of any further agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

18. There is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary there are worrying signs of the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.

19. We remain deeply concerned at the continuing possibility that nuclear weapons could be used. Despite the intentions of, and past achievements in, bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to thousands.

20. We acknowledge that reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Moscow Treaty represents a positive step in defining the new relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. We however question the Treaty’s contribution to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty does not contain verification provisions, is not irreversible, and ignores non-operational warheads. Reductions in deployments and operational status of strategic nuclear warheads cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.

21. There is concern that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) has brought an additional element of uncertainty to international security, has impacted negatively on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to and facilitating nuclear disarmament, and will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It could also have grave consequences for the future of global security and create apparent rationales for action based solely on unilateral concerns. Any action, including the development of missile defence systems, which could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is of concern to the international community. We are concerned about the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space.

22. The achievements and the promise the bilateral START process held, including the possibility it offered for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments, undertaken in the pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons, is in jeopardy.

23. In the UN Millennium Declaration, the Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open to achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international Conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

24. We believe that the recent international debate in the United Nations Security Council, including statements made by its Permanent Members, on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, underlined international concerns about the legitimacy, possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction. These statements should provide a further impetus to international efforts to de-legitimise all nuclear weapons and to hasten international efforts towards nuclear disarmament. These statements
furthermore underline our basic belief that the only real guarantee against the use of any weapons of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again.

25. Of particular concern has been the decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT and also its declared intention to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, without IAEA safeguards. Leaving aside the circumstances that led to these decisions, the implications are grave and affect us all. Like the rest of the international community, the New Agenda supports dialogue over confrontation. We hope for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation, leading to the DPRK’s return to full compliance with the Treaty’s terms and we call on the DPRK to reconsider its decisions.

26. We are concerned by the continued retention of the nuclear weapons option by those three States – India, Israel and Pakistan – that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the NPT, as well as at their failure to renounce that option.

27. The continued possession of nuclear weapons or the retention of the nuclear weapons option by some States exacerbates the possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The only complete defence against this prospect is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again.

28. There has been further progress in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions. We welcome Cuba’s accession as a State Party of both the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty, which makes the regime of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean complete. We also welcome the endeavours of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region and trust that these efforts will add further impetus to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world, including the Middle East and South Asia. Progress continues towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas from such weapons. In this context, the ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all States of the region, and all concerned States is of great importance. They should all work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so. States Parties to those treaties should be encouraged to promote their common objectives with a view to enhancing co-operation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones and to working together with the proponents of other such zones.

IV. The Way Ahead

29. We remain determined to pursue, with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That outcome provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament.

30. Multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear weapon States parties. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review
Conference on security assurances. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the five nuclear weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

31. The nuclear-weapon States must increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures.

32. Further efforts by nuclear-weapon States to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally are required. Formalisation by nuclear-weapon States of their unilateral declarations in a legally binding agreement including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility is essential. Nuclear-weapon States should bear in mind that reductions of deployments are a positive signal but no replacement for the actual elimination of nuclear weapons.

33. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the NPT commitments to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying the nuclear warheads in the context of strategic nuclear reductions, and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment. While deployment reduction, and reduction of operational status sends a positive signal, it cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

34. Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be a priority. Nuclear-weapon States must live up to their commitments. Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner and to include reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the overall arms reduction negotiations. In this context, urgent action should be taken to achieve:

i. further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

ii. further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons. These measures should include the exchange of data on holdings and status of non-strategic nuclear weapons, safety provisions, types of weapons, yields, ranges of their designated delivery systems, distribution by region and weapons elimination;

iii. concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk of use, pre-emptive or accidental, of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

iv. formalising existing informal bilateral arrangements, initiatives and declarations regarding non-strategic nuclear reductions, such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991/92, into legally binding agreements;
v. prohibiting, as a first step, those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons, as well as an undertaking not to increase the number or types of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed; and

vi. enhancement of security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials.

35. Nuclear-weapon States must undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

36. We underline the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT, without delay and without conditions, and in the context of the progress in implementing the international system to monitor nuclear weapons tests under the Treaty. In the interim, it is necessary to uphold and maintain the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion pending entry into force of the CTBT. The strict observance of CTBT purposes, objectives and provisions is imperative.

37. The Conference on Disarmament should establish without delay an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.

38. The Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

39. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, has the primary role for the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Conference should complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, and to establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible.

40. The international community must redouble its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT and to be vigilant against any steps that would undermine the determination of the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those three States, which are not yet parties to the NPT, must accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States, promptly and without condition, and bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Model Protocol, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
41. The Trilateral initiative between IAEA the Russian Federation and the United States must be implemented and consideration should be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapon States.

42. Arrangements should be made by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification.

43. International treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be observed and all obligations flowing from those treaties must be duly fulfilled.

44. All States should refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

45. We remain gravely concerned at heightened tensions in the Middle East and Asian regions. We renew our support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons including other weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, we note that all states of the region with the exception of Israel are States Parties to the NPT and call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. We also renew our support for the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in Central Asia and South Asia and in this context, urgently call on India and Pakistan to pull back from their aspirations to nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty without condition.

V. The Strengthened Review Process

46. The Preparatory Committee should continue to deal with the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward but also with matters of substance as was decided in the 1995 and 2000 decisions, and to ensure that the issues of substance deliberated upon are recorded in the factual summary of the Preparatory Committee.

47. The Preparatory Committee should substantively focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Accountability will be assessed in the consideration of these reports that the States parties agreed to submit.

48. The Preparatory Committee should continue to consider regular reports to be submitted by all States Parties on implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision. The strengthened review process envisioned in the 2000 NPT Final Document concerning the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 should be fully implemented.

49. These reports should be submitted to each session of the Preparatory Committee. The reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the thirteen steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, number and specification of warheads and
delivery systems in service and number and specifications of reductions, de-alerting measures, existing holdings of fissile materials as well as reduction and control of such materials, achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability). These reports should address current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.

50. The States parties need to better utilise the opportunity of the preparatory meetings to make further substantive progress in the implementation of the Treaty and the strengthened review process and to interact substantively on contributions made.

51. The Review Process should continue to be strengthened.

I have the honour to forward to you the English language version of a working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*.

I would be grateful if you would issue this paper as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member states and non-member participants of the Conference.

(Signed): David Broucher
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

* Reproduced from previously issued document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.1 of 23 April 2003 as attached.
Introduction

1. At the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the United Kingdom identified three areas relevant to nuclear arms control measures, including, ultimately, the global elimination of nuclear weapons. These were the ability to verify:

   i. that States are not testing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

   ii. that States are not producing fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

   iii. reductions and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and warheads in any State that might have produced or otherwise acquired them, and disposition of the fissile material arising.

2. The United Kingdom is well known for its long-standing support of international efforts being made in the first two of these areas. The United Kingdom contributed significantly to the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty and it has ratified the Treaty, being, jointly with France, the first of the Nuclear Weapon States to do so. It fully supports the efforts being made by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organisation in Vienna to develop and establish an effective verification regime for this Treaty - for example, by conducting research into events-screening methods, providing technical and other experts at appropriate meetings, attending workshops and contributing to the debate on the civil and scientific benefits of verification systems. The United Kingdom also supports the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including its work on safeguards. The United Kingdom continues to support negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and announced in 1995 that it had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to provide information about the work in the third area, which is particularly relevant to the 13th “practical step” as set out in the NPT 2000 Review Conference Final Document, Article VI, paragraph 15.

The United Kingdom Programme

3. At the 2000 Review Conference, the United Kingdom announced that it had just commenced a programme to consider technologies that could be used in the verification of any future arrangement seeking to reduce and ultimately eliminate stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The programme includes work on:
• the authentication of warheads and their components, i.e. establishing that an item declared to be a nuclear warhead or a component from a nuclear warhead is consistent with those declarations;

• the dismantlement of warheads and their components;

• the disposition of the fissile material arising, to ensure that it can no longer be used in nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices; and

• the monitoring of nuclear complexes.

4. Initial studies into some of these areas are being conducted at the United Kingdom’s Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston. The United Kingdom intends to present the consolidated findings of these at the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, following the interest shown at the 2002 Preparatory Committee meeting, the United Kingdom has decided to give an interim report on some aspects of the work conducted to-date, principally on the technical approaches potentially applicable to the authentication of nuclear warheads and their components. The United Kingdom’s work to date has focused on warhead authentication, because this will almost certainly be the most technically challenging verification task arising from any potential arrangements to control nuclear warheads directly.

Technical approaches to Authentication

5. Technical approaches to authentication could rely on identifying characteristic "signatures" associated with nuclear warheads. Alternatively, or in parallel, the establishment of provenance and subsequent maintenance of a robust chain of custody could also be used to good effect. Nuclear warheads have various signatures. Passive and active radiation signatures are likely to contain the most information about them and have therefore been an important subject of the United Kingdom’s work to date.

6. All nuclear warheads contain the fissile isotopes of plutonium or uranium, and these all emit radiation, either spontaneous neutron or gamma radiation. Depending on their energies, and also the amount of shielding (both by the item itself or by additional external shielding), this radiation can be detected passively and externally to the nuclear device. By measuring passively these “radiation signatures” valuable deductions can be made about the existence, type, distribution and quantity of the radioactive materials present within the item under examination. The detection and identification of such radiation therefore offers a step in the process of authenticating or disproving that an object is a nuclear warhead.

7. Nuclear warheads may also contain components made of, or containing, various low atomic number elements such as, for example, deuterium, tritium and beryllium. These do not give off characteristic radiation signatures which can be passively detected and measured. But when

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1 Research has concentrated on the unique aspects of warhead verification in the warhead complex. However, it is recognised that there is much experience in other areas that may contribute to future treaty verification, e.g. work related to IAEA and Euratom Safeguards, and in the context of the United States-Russian Federation-IAEA Trilateral initiative.
actively irradiated by gamma or X-rays, some of these elements can undergo various reactions resulting in the emission of neutrons. These neutrons can then be detected externally to the warhead using simple detectors, and, if some energy resolution is applied, can be used to indicate the presence of some specific elements and hence to increase confidence that the object under consideration is a nuclear warhead.

**Studies conducted to date**

8. During the first three years of the research programme the radiation signatures from a number of United Kingdom nuclear warheads, both those recently decommissioned (WE1772 and Chevaline3) and those in-service (Trident), have been examined using both passive and active techniques.

9. The items investigated have included:

- WE177 primary and secondary sub-assemblies in containers;
- Chevaline Re-entry Bodies (ReB) in various configurations e.g. direct, close access or uncontained and in various containers;
- Chevaline ReBs in storage containers through earth mounded magazines and metal doors;
- Chevaline primary and secondary sub-assemblies in various containers;
- A Trident Re-entry Body assembly (RBA) in a storage container;
- Trident primary and secondary sub-assemblies in various containers.

10. Different approaches have been adopted for passively detecting and measuring radiation from either the warheads or their components. These have included low and high resolution gamma ray spectroscopy and time-correlated neutron spectroscopy. Active interrogation techniques have included using X-radiation to determine the presence of low atomic number elements in warheads or their components. The experimental work on both passive and active measurements has been supplemented by modelling/computer calculation.

**Conclusions from the Technical Authentication work conducted to date**

11. The interpretation of the measurements made during this programme is difficult and often requires detailed knowledge or understanding of the relevant nuclear warhead designs. Much of this information is sensitive and classified and thus detailed conclusions cannot be revealed fully. Nevertheless, the studies to date suggest that:

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2 WE177 was a free-fall nuclear bomb or nuclear depth charge deployed by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy respectively.
3 Chevaline was the nuclear warhead for the Royal Navy's submarine-deployed Polaris missile system.
• fissile material in a number of different types of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components can be detected externally using relatively simple instrumentation;

• detection can be made of a nuclear warhead in a number of locations such as in storage and various containers;

• in many instances detection requires access close to the item, often of the order of a few metres;

• the number of warheads inside containers can be assessed;

• in some cases isotopic composition, fissile material mass, and some geometrical dispositions of nuclear materials can be estimated using high resolution spectroscopic techniques;

• it may be possible to "reverse engineer" design information from raw radiometric data, which means that great caution would need to be exercised in using technical transparency technology within any dismantlement verification arrangements;

• X-ray interrogation of components is a technique that could be used to verify non-fissile strategic materials often found in nuclear warheads, but requires further investigation.

12. Overall the information obtained so far should be of significant value in discussing verification arrangements for any decommissioning of nuclear warheads that may be required by some future Treaty. However, in developing technologies and technical approaches applicable to such arrangements, consideration will need to be given to how far such instruments and information are sensitive from non-proliferation and national security points of view.

Other verification aspects of the United Kingdom’s work

13. As well as authentication, the United Kingdom is considering other aspects of verification, such as chain of custody, provenance, and managed access techniques.

14. The technical approaches to authentication would need to be carefully supported by verifying the maintenance of the chain of custody of warheads and their components and materials, during the decommissioning, dismantlement, demilitarisation and disposition sequence. Maintaining an adequate chain of custody of key items and materials through these processes would also be a demanding task. The work conducted so far has included conceptual studies relating to tags and seals, and has considered how various signatures could play a role.

15. A potential alternative or addition to authentication would be to establish the provenance of an item, to build confidence that an item comes from its declared origin. Approaches to establishing the provenance of an item could include measures to establish that it has come from place that supports the declaration, for example from a submarine returning from deployment to base. This could be achieved, through inspection or remote monitoring, by tagging and then tracking the item from such a point through the remainder of the processes. Increasing confidence about provenance could also involve inspection of manufacturing, service deployment, and transport records, as well as any authentication activities.
16. As these approaches might require the presence of an international verification team, the United Kingdom has also examined managed access processes that could allow such a team to enter sensitive nuclear facilities, so as not to reveal sensitive information. As part of this study the United Kingdom conducted an exercise at its nuclear weapons' assembly and disassembly facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Burghfield in order to examine representative managed access arrangements for such a sensitive facility. Making arrangements to allow access for a verification team into warhead disassembly facilities is likely to be difficult. Considerable effort would be needed to overcome the formidable challenge of enabling any such access without compromising sensitive information.

The future

17. The United Kingdom is continuing to fund this work through its Ministry of Defence through to the year 2005. The aim is to continue to develop an information and knowledge base of technologies potentially applicable to the verification of any international arrangement for the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear warheads and the disposition of any resulting surplus material. It is our intention to produce another interim report at the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting and a consolidated report on our work at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Letter dated 2 September 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba addressed to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting an information note on the holding of the eighteenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in Havana, Cuba, on 5 and 6 November 2003

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other international organizations with headquarters in Switzerland presents its compliments to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and has the honour to transmit in the annex an information note on the holding of the eighteenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), in Havana, Cuba, on 5 and 6 November 2003.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if this note could be published as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Jorge Iván Mora Godoy
Ambassador
Annex

Information note from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba on the eighteenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)

The eighteenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) will be held in the Palace of Conventions in Havana, Cuba, on 5 and 6 November 2003, as agreed by the OPANAL Council at its 204th session, held on 3 July 2003 at the Agency headquarters in Mexico City.

Following the recent accession by the Republic of Cuba to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the holding of this General Conference in Havana further demonstrates the importance and priority which the Cuban Government attached to all matters relating to nuclear disarmament, and serves to reaffirm Cuba’s political resolve to make an active contribution to the full implementation of international instruments dealing with this issue.

The eighteenth General Conference of OPANAL will unquestionably offer a new arena for Latin American and Caribbean countries to renew their commitment to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and will also provide an ideal opportunity to endorse the status of Latin America and the Caribbean as the world’s first inhabited area completely free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it will provide a favourable context for promoting exchanges and strengthening relations between OPANAL and other global and regional intergovernmental agencies and bodies whose work is directly related to disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular, or which play a prominent role at the regional level.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba will shortly be posting on its web site (www.cubaminrex.cu) a handbook containing more detailed information about the organization and other logistic issues related to the holding of this event. This handbook may also be viewed on the OPANAL web site (www.opanal.org).
LETTER DATED 27 AUGUST 2003 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PERU ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE COMMUNIQUÉ ADOPTED BY THE RIO GROUP ON 26 AUGUST 2003 IN SUPPORT OF THE MULTILATERAL TALKS ON THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The Permanent Mission of Peru to the international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to forward the communiqué adopted by the Rio Group on 26 August 2003 in support of the multilateral talks on the situation on the Korean peninsula.

I should be very grateful if you could arrange for the document in question to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all member States of the Conference as well as non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Jorge Voto-Bernales
Ambassador

* Re-issued for technical reasons.

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Annex

COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE RIO GROUP IN SUPPORT OF THE MULTILATERAL TALKS ON THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

On the eve of the start of the multilateral talks to be held in the People’s Republic of China concerning the delicate current situation on the Korean peninsula, the Rio Group expresses its support to the Governments of the six countries which are shortly to gather in Beijing and encourages them to promote a final solution to the present crisis, reaffirming the commitments assumed by the international community in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In keeping with its communiqué on this situation issued on 16 January 2003, the Rio Group urges the countries directly involved in the talks which start tomorrow, 27 August, to do their utmost to ensure the success of their deliberations, thus fostering the maintenance of peace in the north-east Asian region. Similarly, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean which are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency renew our firm commitment to the regime of denuclearization and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in the context of the aims set out in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Charter of the United Nations, reaffirming our conviction that, today more than ever, international security depends on multilateral action.

Lima, 26 August 2003

Interim secretariat of the Rio Group
I have the honour to transmit herewith the United Kingdom's White Paper entitled "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent", of December 2006.

I should be grateful if this document could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegation of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed:) John Stewart Duncan
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the
Conference on Disarmament
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent

Presented to Parliament by
The Secretary of State for Defence
and
The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
By Command of Her Majesty

December 2006
FOREWORD TO THE WHITE PAPER BY THE PRIME MINISTER

The primary responsibility of any government is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. For 50 years our independent nuclear deterrent has provided the ultimate assurance of our national security. For most of that time, during the Cold War, its purpose was clear, though never without controversy.

Today's world is different. Many of the old certainties and divisions of the Cold War are gone. We cannot predict the way the world will look in 30 or 50 years time. For now, some of the old realities remain. Major countries, which pose no threat to the UK today, retain large arsenals some of which are being modernised or increased. None of the present recognised nuclear weapons States intends to renounce nuclear weapons, in the absence of an agreement to disarm multilaterally, and we cannot be sure that a major nuclear threat to our vital interests will not emerge over the longer term.

We also have to face new threats, particularly of regional powers developing nuclear weapons for the first time which present a threat to us. Despite our best efforts, the number of states with nuclear weapons continues to grow, and may grow further. We are already trying to counter the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea and by the nuclear ambitions of Iran. And we need to factor in the requirement to deter countries which might in the future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism from their soil. We must assume that the global struggle in which we are engaged today between moderation and extremism will continue for a generation or more.

Those who question this decision need to explain why disarmament by the UK would help our security. They would need to prove that such a gesture would change the minds of hardliners and extremists in countries which are developing these nuclear capabilities. They would need to show that terrorists would be less likely to conspire against us with hostile governments because we had given up our nuclear weapons. They would need to argue that the UK would be safer by giving up the deterrent and that our capacity to act would not be constrained by nuclear blackmail by others.

The Government believes that now, as in the Cold War, such an argument is misguided. We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential part of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the future. We have therefore decided to maintain our deterrent system beyond the life of the Vanguards with a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines. We will also extend the life of the Trident D5 missile.

I believe it is crucial that, for the foreseeable future, British Prime Ministers have the necessary assurance that no aggressor can escalate a crisis beyond UK control. An independent deterrent ensures our vital interests will be safeguarded. But as before, it will be the minimum necessary. We already have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads among the recognised nuclear weapons States, and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system. In this White Paper we are announcing a further 20 per cent cut in our operationally available warheads. This leaves the deterrent fully functioning, with fewer than 160 warheads, but it means Britain continues to set an example for others to follow in our
commitment to work towards a peaceful, fairer and safer world without nuclear weapons. Our decision to maintain the deterrent is fully compatible with all our international legal obligations.

Our nuclear deterrent is of course only one part of our overall military capability. We are, as before, committed to ensuring that the investment required to maintain it will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need.

Some argue that we should put off this decision. But one is necessary because the present submarines will start to leave service in the early 2020s, and we have to decide now whether we want to replace them. Delaying a decision would risk a future break in our deterrent protection.

These are not decisions a government takes lightly. The financial costs are substantial. We would not want to have available the terrifying power of these weapons unless we believed that to be necessary to deter a future aggressor.

The Government's decision followed a careful review of all the issues and options, which are set out in full in the White Paper. We now look forward to a substantial period of public and parliamentary debate in which the issues can be aired freely. But I am confident that that debate will only confirm that maintaining our nuclear deterrent is in the best interests of the country's future security.

(Signed:)

Tony Blair
Executive Summary

The UK is committed to helping to secure international peace and security. Since 1956, the nuclear deterrent has underpinned our ability to do so even in the most challenging circumstances. Over the last 50 years, it has been used only to deter acts of aggression against our vital interests, never to coerce others.

Why do we need to take decisions now?

At the 2005 General Election our manifesto made a commitment to retain the UK's independent nuclear deterrent. Even with an extension to their lives, the Vanguard class submarines are likely to start leaving service from the early 2020s. We estimate that it will take around 17 years to design, manufacture and commission a replacement submarine. So we need to take decisions now on whether to retain this capability in the longer term.

Why should we retain our nuclear deterrent?

The Government's primary responsibility is for the security of current and future UK citizens. The UK's security position has changed from the Cold War, and this change was reflected in the sharp reductions in the scale and readiness of our nuclear forces that were set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.

The threat has now changed - but the global context does not justify complete UK nuclear disarmament:

significant nuclear arsenals remain, some of which are being modernised and expanded;

the number of states possessing nuclear weapons has continued to grow, as demonstrated most recently by North Korea's attempted nuclear test in October this year.

Ballistic missile technology has also continued to proliferate and most industrialised countries have the capability to develop chemical and biological weapons.

It is not possible accurately to predict the global security environment over the next 20 to 50 years. On our current analysis, we cannot rule out the risk either that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK's vital interests will re-emerge or that new states will emerge that possess a more limited nuclear capability, but one that could pose a grave threat to our vital interests. Equally there is a risk that some countries might in future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism from their soil. We must not allow such states to threaten our national security, or to deter us and the international community from taking the action required to maintain regional and global security.

We can only deter such threats in future through the continued possession of nuclear weapons. Conventional capabilities cannot have the same deterrent effect. We therefore see an enduring role for the UK's nuclear forces as an essential part of our capability for deterring blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests by nuclear-armed opponents.

We have thus decided to take the steps necessary to sustain a credible deterrent capability in the 2020s and beyond.
How should we maintain our nuclear deterrent?

Our review of the available options has demonstrated that retaining a submarine-based system provides the most effective deterrent; and that no credible alternative is cheaper. Submarines are far more difficult to detect and track and so are less vulnerable to attack than the other options. Ballistic missiles are more effective than cruise missiles because they have much greater range and payload, and are far harder to intercept.

We have therefore decided to maintain our nuclear deterrent by building a new class of submarines. Currently we require a fleet of four submarines to maintain one continuously on patrol and retaining this posture is essential to assure the invulnerability of the deterrent. We will investigate fully whether there is scope to make sufficiently radical changes to the design of the new submarines, and their operating, manning, training and support arrangements, to enable us to maintain these continuous deterrent patrols with a fleet of only three submarines. A final decision on whether we require three or four submarines will be taken when we know more about their detailed design.

We have also decided to participate in the US life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile, which will enable us to retain that missile in-service until the early 2040s. Our existing nuclear warhead design will last into the 2020s. We do not yet have sufficient information to know whether it can, with some refurbishment, be extended beyond that point or whether we will need to develop a replacement warhead: a decision is likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.

What will this cost?

The costs of this programme will be refined as we engage in detailed discussion with industry. Our current estimate is that the procurement costs of the new submarines and associated equipment and infrastructure will be in the region of £15-20 billion (at 2006/07 prices) for a four-boat fleet. The costs will fall principally in the period between 2012 and 2027. The investment required to maintain our deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need. Decisions on the level of investments in nuclear and conventional capability will be taken in the Comprehensive Spending Review, the results of which will be announced next year. In-service costs for the deterrent over the period between 2020 and 2050 will remain broadly similar to the current position.

What are our international obligations?

Renewing our minimum nuclear deterrent capability is fully consistent with all our international obligations. It is also consistent with our continuing commitment to work towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons. We have taken a leading role in a wide range of multilateral initiatives in support of the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We have also taken significant steps to reduce our nuclear capabilities. We have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads amongst the nuclear weapon States recognised under the NPT and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system.

We have now decided that we can reduce our stockpile of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160. This will represent a 20% reduction on the figure set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, and is almost a 50% reduction compared to the plans of the previous Government.
Summary

We are committed to retaining the minimum nuclear deterrent capability necessary to provide effective deterrence, whilst setting an example where possible by reducing our nuclear capabilities, and working multilaterally for nuclear disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation. We believe this is the right balance between our commitment to a world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons and our responsibilities to protect the current and future citizens of the UK.
Section 1: Maintaining our Nuclear Deterrent

1-1. The United Kingdom is committed to helping to secure international peace and security. Since 1956, the UK's nuclear deterrent has underpinned our ability so to do, even in the most challenging circumstances. Throughout, the UK has proved itself a responsible steward of nuclear weapons, reducing our capability as circumstances have allowed. Consistently we have employed our nuclear forces strictly as a means to deter acts of aggression against our vital interests and have never sought to use them to coerce others.

1-2. Our manifesto at the 2005 General Election made a commitment to retain the UK's existing nuclear deterrent. We have already said this means retaining this capability at least until the current system reaches the end of its life. We have now reached the point at which procurement decisions are necessary on sustaining this capability in the longer term. The timetable for decision-making is driven by our assessment of the life of elements of the existing Trident deterrent system and the time it might take to replace them.

HMS Vanguard
The Vanguard Class Submarines

1-3. The first of four Royal Navy Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (or SSBNs), which carry the Trident D5 missile, was launched in 1992 and the class had an original design life of 25 years. We have undertaken detailed work to assess the scope for extending the life of those submarines. Our ability to achieve this is limited because some major components on the submarines - including the steam generators, other elements of the nuclear propulsion system and some non-nuclear support systems - were only designed for a 25-year life. The submarines have been, and will continue to be, subjected to a rigorous through-life maintenance regime and we believe that, by revalidating those
components, it should be possible to extend the life of
the submarines by around five years. Accordingly, the
first submarine would be going out of service around
2022 and the second around 2024. Continuous
deterrent patrols could no longer be assured from
around this latter point if no replacement were in place
by then.

1 -4. Any further extension of the life of the
submarines would mean that the key components
described previously would need to be replaced or
refurbished, and this would require a major refit of the
submarines. This would not extend the lives of the
submarines much further and would not therefore be
cost effective. There have been some suggestions that
we should replicate US plans to extend the lives of their
Ohio-class SSBNs from 30 to over 40 years. A substantial
life extension of this kind would need to have been
built into the original design of the Vanguard-class,
and into the subsequent manufacture, refit and
maintenance of the boats. Unlike with the Ohio-class,
this was not the case. There are also some radical
differences between the two classes - such as the
propulsion systems - which mean that their potential
lives are different.

1-5. Past experience with UK submarine
programmes suggests that even a 5-year life extension
will involve some risk. The lives of the previous
Resolution-class SSBNs ranged between 25 and 28
years, but there was a significant loss of availability
and increase in support costs towards the end of their
lives. The longest life extension for any UK nuclear
powered submarine was to 33 years for one of the
Swiftsure-class conventional role submarines but again
availability was significantly reduced during its later
years. Therefore, while it should be possible to extend
the life of the Vanguard-class into the 2020s, we
believe that it would be highly imprudent now to plan
on the basis that it

will be possible to extend them further.

1-6. We have considered carefully how long it
might take to design, manufacture and deploy
replacement submarines. It took some 14 years from the
decision to purchase Trident in 1980 to the system first
being deployed operationally in 1994. However, in the
preceding decade a good deal of initial concept and
design work had already taken place. Much has
changed since 1980. Safety and regulatory standards
have been raised over the last 25 years. The capacity
and experience within the UK submarine industry is less
now than it was in 1980. There are also risks that, in the
event of a significant gap between the end of design
work on the Astute-class conventional role nuclear
submarines and the start of detailed design work on new
SSBNs, some of the difficulties experienced on the
Astute programme would be repeated because of the
loss of key design skills.

1-7. Detailed assessment of the duration of a
programme to build new SSBNs will need to await
contractual negotiations with industry. A reasonable
estimate is that it might take around 17 years from the
initiation of detailed concept work to achieve the first
operational patrol. This estimate reflects the judgement
of industry and is consistent with US and French
experiences. Given this estimate, the fact that non-
submarine options are likely to take at least as long to
develop and that our current SSBNs will reach the end
of their (extended) lives during the 2020s, detailed
concept work on renewal of our deterrent system
needs to start in 2007 if we are to avoid a gap in
deterrence at the end of the life of the Vanguard-class
submarines.
HMS VANGUARD test fires a Trident D5 missile in October 2005

The Trident D5 Missile

1-8. The US Government plans to extend the life of the Trident D5 missile to around 2042 to match the life of their Ohio-class submarines. That will involve the manufacture of a number of new missiles and the modernisation of the existing missiles. Work will focus entirely on replacing components of the system to minimise the risk of obsolescence, especially of the electronics in the flight control systems. There will be no enhancement of the capability of the missile in terms of its payload, range or accuracy.

1-9. Unless we participate in that life extension programme, it will not be possible to retain our existing Trident D5 missiles in service much beyond 2020, except at much greater cost and technical risk. Decisions on whether or not we should participate are required by 2007.

The Warhead

1-10. Our existing Trident warhead design is expected to last into the 2020s and no decisions on any refurbishment or replacement are required currently. The longer term position is described in Section 7.

Conclusions

1-11. We have concluded that, if we are to maintain unbroken deterrent capability at the end of the life of the Vanguard-class submarines, we need to take decisions now on whether to replace those submarines and whether to participate in the Trident D5 life extension programme.
Section 2: The Policy Context

2-1. Section 1 set out why decisions on the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent are needed now. Given the implications of those decisions, we considered that it was appropriate also to reassess our policy in this area.

2-2. Our over-arching policy on nuclear weapons remains as set out in the December 2003 Defence White Paper (Command 6041-1 Paragraph 3.11):

We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons and continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security.

Disarmament

2-3. We have taken a series of measures (see Box 2-1) to reduce the scale and readiness of our nuclear forces to ensure they are the minimum necessary to achieve our deterrent objectives. We have now decided to make a further reduction in the number of operationally available warheads. This will be reduced from the present position of fewer than 200 to fewer than 160. Also, we will make a corresponding 20% reduction in the size of our overall warhead stockpile, which includes a small margin to sustain the operationally available warheads.

2-4. These further reductions will mean that, since coming to power in 1997, we will have reduced the upper limit on the number of operationally available UK nuclear warheads by nearly half. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK will have reduced the overall explosive power of its nuclear arsenal by around 75%. The UK’s nuclear deterrent now accounts for less than 1% of the global inventory of nuclear weapons, and our stockpile is the smallest of those owned by the five nuclear weapon States recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

2-5. In the 1998 Strategic Defence Review we announced that we had by then purchased 58 Trident D5 missiles. Subsequently, we decided not to take up an option to purchase an additional seven missiles. As a result of a number of test firings, our current holding has reduced to 50. We believe that no further procurement of Trident D5 missiles will be necessary through its planned in-service life.
Box 2-1: UK Progress on Nuclear Disarmament

- We stand by our unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- We are the only nuclear weapon State recognised under the NPT which has reduced its deterrent capability to a single nuclear weapon system. We have dismantled our maritime tactical nuclear capability and the RAF’s WE177 free-fall bombs.

- We will reduce the upper limit on the number of operationally available warheads to less than 160, a reduction since 1997 of nearly one half, compared to the previously declared maximum.

- We have reduced significantly the operational status of our nuclear weapons system. Normally, only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol at any one time, with up to 48 warheads on board. That submarine is normally at several days ‘notice to fire’. Its missiles are not targeted at any country.

- We have not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1991 and we ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1998.

- We have increased our transparency with regard to our fissile material holdings. We have produced historical records of our defence holdings of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

- We have ceased production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We support the proposal for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and call for the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

- We continue to make progress on the “13 practical steps” towards nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

2-6. Through the NPT and a wide range of fora, including the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission, we continue to work multilaterally to help and encourage others to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. In 1998 we ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We call on other states to do likewise. Repeatedly, we have called for negotiations to begin immediately and without preconditions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Such a treaty would put a global cap on the amount of fissile material available to be turned into nuclear weapons. We have supported the significant reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons achieved by the bilateral arms control initiatives between the United States and Russia, and are encouraging both sides to make further reductions.

Counter-Proliferation

2-7. We have made further efforts to counter proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons (see Annex A). We have put in place a comprehensive multilateral strategy to strengthen legally-binding obligations on states to strengthen export controls, to combat supply chains, and to prevent old or unused materials from falling into the wrong hands.
2-8. But proliferation risks remain. Most countries around the world with industrialised economies have the capability rapidly to develop and manufacture large scale chemical and biological weapons. Also, we are concerned at the continuing proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Fewer states have acquired nuclear weapons capabilities than some foresaw when the NPT entered into force in 1970. For example, South Africa and Libya have both renounced former nuclear weapons programmes. However, the number of states with nuclear weapons has continued to increase. Most of the 40 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organisation of suppliers of nuclear equipment and material who act together to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation through the implementation of suitable export controls, have the technical ability and means to initiate a viable nuclear weapons programme. Whilst the size and readiness of global nuclear capabilities has reduced markedly since the end of the Cold War, large nuclear arsenals remain and some are being modernised (details are set out in Box 2-2).

Our International Legal Obligations

2-9. The UK's retention of a nuclear deterrent is fully consistent with our international legal obligations. The NPT recognises the UK's status (along with that of the US, France, Russia and China) as a nuclear weapon State. The NPT remains the principal source of international legal obligation relating to the possession of nuclear weapons. We are fully compliant with all our NPT obligations, including those under Article I (prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapon technology) and Article VI (disarmament).

2-10. Article VI of the NPT does not establish any timetable for nuclear disarmament, nor for the general and complete disarmament which provides the context for total nuclear disarmament. Nor does it prohibit maintenance or updating of existing capabilities. Nevertheless, we will continue to press for multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.

2-11. In 1996 the International Court of Justice delivered an Advisory Opinion which confirmed that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is subject to the laws of armed conflict, and rejected the argument that such use would necessarily be unlawful. The threshold for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons is clearly a high one. We would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence (including the defence of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme circumstances. The legality of any such use would depend upon the circumstances and the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the use of force and the conduct of hostilities.
Conclusions

2-12. We see no reason to change the judgement reached in the 2003 Defence White Paper that the conditions for complete UK nuclear disarmament do not yet exist. For this judgement to change, there would need to be much greater progress, first towards reductions in existing nuclear stockpiles, and second in securing global adherence to obligations not to proliferate nuclear weapons or related technology, under the APT and other treaties and export control regimes.

Box 2-2: Current Global Nuclear Capabilities

The Nuclear Weapons States Recognised Under the APT

The US nuclear deterrent consists of systems launched from submarines, silos and aircraft. The US Navy retains a force of 14 Ohio-class ISBNs, each carrying up to 24 Trident D5 missiles. US silo-based systems currently comprise 500 Minuteman inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), following withdrawal of the Peacekeeper system. This has reduced from over 1000 in 1990 and is planned to reduce to 450 from 2007. A modernisation programme will sustain the Minuteman force until the 2020s. The US has air-delivered cruise missiles and free-fall bombs delivered by a range of aircraft. By 2012, under the terms of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, total US operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead numbers will reduce to a maximum of 2,200.

Russia deploys strategic nuclear weapons in a triad of land, sea and air based systems and, in addition, retains a very large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Its strategic arsenal comprises some 520 inter-continental ballistic missiles, more than 250 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and about 700 air-launched cruise missiles. Under the terms of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, Russia will reduce the number of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a maximum of 2,200 by the end of 2012. Russia continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal. Currently it is deploying the new SS-27 (Topol-M) inter-continental ballistic missile and has recently been testing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Since the end of the Cold War, France has scaled back its nuclear arsenal, with the withdrawal of four complete weapons systems, as well as a general reduction of its nuclear holdings. The French nuclear deterrent is now based on two systems: submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. A new French ballistic missile, the M51, is in development and recently has been flight tested. It will be carried on board a new class of four ISBNs, the last of which is due to come into service in 2010. France is also developing a new air-launched cruise missile for deployment on the Rafale aircraft around 2009. Total warhead numbers are around 350.

China is modernising its nuclear forces. Its strategic capability currently comprises a silo-based ICBM force of around 20 missiles. It also deploys a larger number of nuclear-armed intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles, all of which are believed to carry single warheads. New projects include mobile ICBMs, an ICBM equipped with multiple warheads, a submarine-launched
strategic ballistic missile and, potentially nuclear-capable, cruise missiles.

Other States

**India** conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and in 1998 both India and **Pakistan** conducted tests. They are now capable of delivering nuclear weapons by fixed-wing aircraft and land-based ballistic missiles. Development work on warheads and delivery systems continues in both countries. Both countries are working on cruise missiles and India is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile capability, which could eventually be nuclear-armed.

**North Korea** attempted a nuclear test in October 2006 and is assessed to have enough fissile material for a small number of nuclear weapons. North Korea has short and medium range ballistic missiles in service and, with the launch of the Taepo Dong-1 as a satellite launch vehicle in August 1998, demonstrated some of the key technologies required for long range multi-stage missiles. The much larger Taepo Dong-2, which could be configured either as a satellite launch vehicle or as a ballistic missile, was launched in July 2006 but suffered an early in-flight failure. If developed successfully, the Taepo Dong-2 would have the capability to reach Europe.

**Israel** is not a signatory of the NPT and is believed to have a nuclear weapons capability. Israel possesses short and intermediate range missiles which are believed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
Section 3: Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

3-1. Section 2 concluded that, despite our best efforts, the conditions have not yet been met to enable the UK to give up its nuclear deterrent. This section sets out in more detail the reasons for retaining a deterrent.

The Original Rationale for the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent

3-2. During the Cold War, the UK’s nuclear deterrent was intended to address on the threat to the UK’s vital interests from the Soviet Union. NATO did not possess sufficient conventional military forces to be confident of defeating an attack by the Warsaw Pact, and there were significant concerns that the Soviet Union might have considered that the potential advantages of a conventional and chemical attack on Western Europe outweighed the military risks. Furthermore, this threat from the Warsaw Pact was backed up by a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, against which conventional military forces could not have hoped to prevail. Since then, successive governments have felt it important to retain an independent deterrent as an essential contribution to our security.

The UK Approach to Nuclear Deterrence

3-3. The fundamental principles relevant to nuclear deterrence have not changed since the end of the Cold War, and are unlikely to change in future. In terms of their destructive power, nuclear weapons pose a uniquely terrible threat and consequently have a capability to deter acts of aggression that is of a completely different scale to any other form of deterrence. Nuclear weapons remain a necessary element of the capability we need to deter threats from others possessing nuclear weapons.

3-4. Five enduring principles underpin the UK’s approach to nuclear deterrence:

- **our focus is on preventing nuclear attack.** The UK’s nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during conflict but instead to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other means.

- **the UK will retain only the minimum amount of destructive power required to achieve our deterrence objectives.** Since 1997, the Government has made a series of reductions in the scale and readiness of our nuclear forces in line with changes in the global security environment. We are now taking further measures to reduce the scale of our deterrent. We are reducing the number of operationally available warheads from fewer than 200 to fewer than 160, and making a corresponding reduction in the size of our overall stockpile.
we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons.

- the UK’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area. Nuclear deterrence plays an important part in NATO’s overall defensive strategy, and the UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial contribution.

- an independent centre of nuclear decision-making enhances the overall deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces. Potential adversaries could gamble that the US or France might not put themselves at risk of a nuclear attack in order to deter an attack on the UK or our allies. Our retention of an independent centre of nuclear decision-making makes clear to any adversary that the costs of an attack on UK vital interests will outweigh any benefits. Separately controlled but mutually supporting nuclear forces therefore create an enhanced overall deterrent effect.

Insuring against an Uncertain Future

3-5. It is a key responsibility of government to be sure that the UK is properly protected should the future turn out to be less secure than we hope. There are limits to the extent to which intelligence can inform us about medium to long-term changes in the nuclear capabilities of others, or give prior warning of a possible change in intent by an existing nuclear weapon State. We must therefore be realistic about our ability precisely to predict the nature of any future threats to our vital interests over the extended timescales associated with decisions about the renewal of our nuclear deterrent.

3-6. Our assessment of the potential security environment between 2020 and 2050, the period relevant to the decisions set out in this White Paper, highlights some trends that give rise to significant causes for concern. In spite of the successes of arms control activities in slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the number of states with nuclear capabilities has continued to grow. We do not assume that this trend will endure and we will continue to do all we can to slow or reverse it. But we cannot discount the possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons may have increased by 2050.

3-7. In addition, there are a range of other risks and challenges to future global stability. Weak and failing states will continue to offer safe havens for international terrorists and potentially create wider instability. Increasing pressure on key resources such as energy and water (which could be driven by a range of factors, potentially including population growth, increasing global economic development and climate change) may increase interstate tension. The rapid and uncontrollable development of militarily-relevant technology by the civil sector will make potential adversaries increasingly capable. These factors potentially could lead to increasing levels of international instability and risk of interstate conflict. We are concerned that, over the period from 2020 to 2050, this potential prospect, combined with possible further nuclear proliferation, could lead to an increased risk of conflict involving a nuclear-armed state.
3-8. Currently no state has both the intent to threaten our vital interests and the capability to do so with nuclear weapons. However, the fact that such a conjunction does not exist today is not a reliable guide to the future. The risks set out above raise the possibility that, at some stage in the future, nuclear capabilities and hostile intent will become dangerously aligned. We can foresee nuclear risks in three specific areas:

Re-emergence of a Major Nuclear Threat

3-9. There are risks that, over the next 20 to 50 years, a major direct nuclear threat to the UK or our NATO Allies might re-emerge. A state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of existing capabilities could change relatively quickly: for example, there was little prior warning of the collapse of the Soviet Union. We will continue to work actively with all our friends and partners to enhance mutual trust and security, but we cannot rule out, over the 2020-2050 timescale, a major shift in the international security situation which puts us under threat.

Emerging Nuclear States

3-10. Over the next 20 to 50 years, one or more states could also emerge that possess a more limited nuclear capability, but one that poses a grave threat to our vital interests. We must not allow such states to threaten our national security or to deter us and the international community from taking the action required to maintain regional and global security. The UK’s continued possession of a nuclear deterrent provides an assurance that we cannot be subjected in future to nuclear blackmail or a level of threat which would put at risk our vital interests or fundamentally constrain our foreign and security policy options.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

3-11. We know that international terrorists are trying to acquire radiological weapons. In future, there are risks that they may try to acquire nuclear weapons. While our nuclear deterrent is not designed to deter non-state actors, it should influence the decision-making of any state that might consider transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to terrorists. We make no distinction between the means by which a state might choose to deliver a nuclear warhead, whether, for example, by missile or sponsored terrorists. Any state that we can hold responsible for assisting a nuclear attack on our vital interests can expect that this would lead to a proportionate response.

3-12. A key element of our ability to exercise effective deterrence in such circumstances is our capability precisely to determine the source of material employed in any nuclear device. We will retain and strengthen the world-leading forensic capability at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston in this area. We will also continue to work to strengthen international expertise in this field.

Conclusions

3-13. In view of the continued existence of large nuclear arsenals, the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in combination with the risk of increased international instability and tension, we believe that a nuclear deterrent is likely to remain an important element of our national security in the 2020s and beyond. We have therefore decided to make the minimum investment required to sustain this capability over that period. We judge that this continues to be a price worth paying.
Box 3.1: Responses to Counter-Arguments

A number of arguments have been made in recent years to the effect that the UK unilaterally should give up its nuclear deterrent. Some of these are set out below, along with the reasons that we do not accept them:

1. The main threat to the UK is from terrorism, against which nuclear weapons are useless. Nuclear weapons were designed to deter a specific range of threats. We still need to insure against those threats, even though new threats such as terrorism have emerged. The UK has an intensive strategy for managing the risks from terrorism and we maintain a range of capabilities to deal with them. As noted in Section 3, we believe that retention of an effective nuclear deterrent by the UK has a role to play in reducing the potential threat from state-sponsored nuclear-armed terrorists.

2. It is hypocritical for the UK to maintain its deterrent while arguing that countries such as Iran and North Korea cannot develop one. The NPT recognised the UK, the US, France, Russia and China as nuclear weapon States and established other signatories as non-nuclear weapon States. We have an excellent track record in meeting our NPT obligations. Iran and North Korea signed the NPT, so pursuit of nuclear weapons programmes is in breach of the Treaty.

3. If the UK unilaterally gave up its nuclear deterrent, this would encourage others to follow suit.

4. The money required to maintain a nuclear deterrent should instead be invested in our conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons remain a necessary element of the capability we need to deter threats from others possessing nuclear weapons. Conventional forces cannot deliver the same deterrent effect. Since 1997, the Government has made significant additional resources available to Defence, providing many new capabilities to enable us to undertake those military tasks that cannot be achieved by nuclear deterrence. The investment required to maintain our deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need.

5. The UK retains nuclear weapons because of the international status that this might bring, in particular the UK’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. We maintain our nuclear forces as a means of deterring acts of aggression against our vital interests and not for reasons of status.

6. The UK does not require a nuclear deterrent as we are already protected by the US nuclear deterrent. A potential adversary
might miscalculate the degree of US commitment to the defence and security of Europe. An independent deterrent provides the assurance that it can be used to deter attacks on our vital interests. An independent centre of nuclear decision-making in the UK also reinforces the overall deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces and thus enhances our security and that of NATO allies.

7. *Replacing Trident is illegal.* Maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent is fully consistent with all our international legal obligations, including those under the NPT (as set out in paragraphs 2-9 to 2-11).

8. *Ballistic missile defence could take the place of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.* Ballistic missile defences are only designed to be able to defend against limited missile attacks. They do not, on their own, provide a complete defence against the full range of risks set out in this White Paper. They should be regarded as complementary to other forms of defence or response, potentially reinforcing nuclear deterrence rather than superseding it.

9. *All the UK needs is a dormant nuclear weapons capability, from which we could re-establish a deterrent if and when specific threats emerge.* Any UK decision to give up an active credible nuclear deterrent system would, for political and cost reasons, be extremely difficult to reverse. In practice, the timeframe for re-establishing a credible minimum deterrent would probably be longer than the likely warning of any change in intent of an established nuclear power or any covert programme elsewhere to develop nuclear weapons. Also, any move from a dormant programme towards an active one could be seen as escalatory, and thus potentially destabilising, in a crisis.
Section 4: Ensuring Effective Deterrence

4-1. If they are to have the required deterrent effect, our nuclear forces need to continue to be credible against the range of risks and threats described in Section 3. This section describes the key characteristics that are necessary to establish this credibility.

Invulnerability and Readiness

4-2. A deterrent system must be able to function irrespective of any pre-emptive action that might be taken by a potential aggressor. Also, it is important for safety and security reasons that our nuclear forces are protected properly at all times against actions ranging from a full scale strategic nuclear strike to a terrorist attack. There are a number of ways in which this might be achieved: by making the system invulnerable to attack; by having a sufficiently large capability that even a full scale attack would not prevent the launch of an effective counter strike; by making the system difficult to target, most obviously by making it undetectable; and by holding the system continuously at a sufficiently high level of readiness that it could be launched before any pre-emptive strike takes effect.

4-3. Our preference is for an invulnerable and undetectable system, which allows us to maintain it at a minimum level of scale and readiness, but we believe that it should also be capable of being held at high readiness for extended periods of time. It should be possible, both overtly and covertly, to increase or decrease its readiness thereby giving the Government maximum flexibility in terms of setting and adjusting our nuclear deterrent posture: this is especially important during a crisis.

Range

4-4. There is increasing uncertainty about the nature of future risks and challenges to UK security. Whereas during the Cold War the likely source of threats was well established, the position is more uncertain now and may be even less clear by the 2020s. Therefore we believe that our nuclear deterrent should retain our existing capability to deter threats anywhere in the world.

4-5. Closely linked to the range of our nuclear capability is the question of whether we should plan on simultaneously or near simultaneously having to deter more than one threat against our vital interests. While it is theoretically possible to envisage some eventualities where this question might arise, we do not believe that this factor should determine either the nature or scale of our deterrent system.

Independence

4-6. The UK's nuclear forces must remain fully operationally independent if they are to be a credible deterrent. It is essential that we have the necessary degree of assurance.
that we can employ our deterrent to defend our vital interests. The UK's current nuclear deterrent is fully operationally independent of the US:

- decision-making and use of the system remains entirely sovereign to the UK;
- only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK's nuclear deterrent, even if the missiles are to be fired as part of a NATO response;
- the instruction to fire would be transmitted to the submarine using only UK codes and UK equipment;
- all the command and control procedures are fully independent; and
- the Vanguard-class submarines can operate readily without the Global Positioning by Satellite (GPS) system and the Trident D5 missile does not use GPS at all: it has an inertial guidance system.

There is nothing in the planned Trident D5 life extension programme that will change this position.

4-7. We continue to believe that the costs of developing a nuclear deterrent relying solely on UK sources outweigh the benefits. We do not see a good case for making what would be a substantial additional investment in our nuclear deterrent purely to insure against a, highly unlikely, deep and enduring breakdown in relations with the US. We therefore believe that it makes sense to continue to procure elements of the system from the US.

4-8. The US has never sought to exploit our procurement relationship in this area as a means to influence UK foreign policy nor does this relationship compromise the operational independence of our nuclear deterrent.

Scale

4-9. We need to make a judgement on the minimum destructive capability necessary to provide an effective deterrent posture. This judgement requires an assessment of the decision-making processes of future potential aggressors, and an analysis of the effectiveness of the defensive measures that they might employ. Retaining some degree of uncertainty over the nature and scale of our response to any particular set of circumstances is an important part of our overall deterrence posture. However, we believe that our existing capability to deploy up to 48 warheads on the submarine on deterrent patrol is sufficient. As with our current deterrent, the ability to vary the numbers of missiles and warheads which might be employed, coupled with the continued availability of a lower yield from our warhead, can make our nuclear forces a more credible deterrent against smaller nuclear threats.
Section 5: Deterrent Options, Solutions and Costs

5-1. The previous two sections have described why we wish to retain a nuclear deterrent, and the key attributes we believe that it should continue to have. This section sets out the various options that we have considered and the extent to which each option meets our requirements. It also sets out our proposed solution and how much this will cost.

The Options

5-2. Four generic options were subjected to detailed assessment and comparative costing: a large aircraft equipped with cruise missiles; silo-based ballistic missiles; and both surface and sub-surface maritime platforms equipped with ballistic missiles. Table 5-1 shows their relative through-life costs.

5-3. The process by which these options were identified, and the details of our assessment of them, is set out in Annex B. We rejected the large aircraft option primarily because of vulnerability to pre-emptive attacks and because of the costs involved in procuring new large aircraft and the supporting refuelling tankers, providing new infrastructure, and designing and procuring a new cruise missile. Silo-based systems in the UK could be a credible deterrent only against states with a limited nuclear capability, and even then there would be significant additional costs compared to a submarine-based system capable of
deterring all credible threats. A deterrent based on surface ships would be less capable, more vulnerable and no less expensive than a submarine-based solution.

5-4. We considered the relative merits of deploying cruise or ballistic missiles on a submarine. Any programme to develop and manufacture a new cruise missile would cost far more than retaining the Trident D5 missile. In capability terms, cruise missiles are much less effective than a ballistic missile (see Box 5-1). Therefore it was clear that, in terms of both cost and capability, retaining the Trident D5 missile is by far the best approach.

Next Steps

5-5. We have decided to maintain our existing nuclear deterrent capability by replacing the Vanguard-class submarines with a new class of submarines and we plan shortly to commence detailed concept work. We believe this programme will be sufficiently mature for us to place a contract for their detailed design by around 2012 to 2014.

5-6. We have started to consider some of the fundamental design issues. We believe that the new submarines will need to be nuclear powered, as conventional propulsion systems cannot currently generate sufficient power and endurance to meet our requirements. We envisage that the design of the new ISBNs will maximise the degree of commonality with other in-service submarines where this can be done in a cost-effective manner. The scope for this will be determined during the next phase of work. However, some changes to the design of the Vanguard-class will be required, to take account of equipment obsolescence, the need to continue to meet modern safety standards and to maximise the scope to make the new ISBNs

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**Box 5-1:** Comparison of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles

**Tomahawk Land Attack Missile**

Ballistic missiles, such as the Trident D5 missile, have a number of design advantages over cruise missiles:

**Payload:** Ballistic missiles can carry multiple warheads, compared to the single warhead that can be carried by a cruise missile.

**Range:** Ballistic missiles have a range typically up to around 12,000 kilometres, compared to a maximum of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometres for a cruise missile.

**Speed:** Ballistic missiles can travel at speeds in excess of ten times the speed of sound whilst cruise missiles are currently sub-sonic.

**Vulnerability:** Compared to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are more prone to interception, largely because of their slower speed and lower trajectory. Ballistic missile defences are being developed by a number of countries, but we believe that it is highly unlikely that the effectiveness of the UK Trident D5 missile force will be jeopardized, even over the planned extended in-service life of that missile. A less vulnerable delivery system also enables us to maintain a lower stockpile of warheads.
5-7. A critical feature of the credibility of a deterrent is its invulnerability to preemptive action. At present, we achieve this invulnerability by maintaining a submarine permanently on patrol (see Box 5-2). That requires a fleet of four Vanguard-class submarines. At any one time, one of the Vanguard-class submarines is normally undergoing an extensive refit that takes it out of the operational cycle for around four years. Three submarines normally are required to be operationally available in order to sustain continuous deterrent patrols, although continuous deterrence can be maintained for limited periods when only two are available.

5-8. We have reviewed once again the operational posture of our submarines and have confirmed that, for the foreseeable future, we should continue to retain a submarine continuously on deterrent patrol.

5-9. We are not yet in a position to make a firm judgement about how many submarines we require in future because we do not yet understand comprehensively the likely operational availability of the replacement SSBNs. We will investigate fully whether there is scope to make sufficiently radical changes to the design of the new SSBNs, and their operating, manning, training and support arrangements, to enable us to maintain continuous deterrent patrols with a fleet of only three submarines. A final decision on the number of submarines that will be procured will be made when we know more about their detailed design.

5-10. We have decided to participate in the Trident D5 life extension programme, at a cost of some £250 million, which is very significantly less than it would cost to acquire an alternative delivery system. This will enable us to keep this missile in service until the early 2040s. We will continue to participate in the joint UK/US support arrangements for the D5 missile at the facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia. This arrangement represents excellent value for money. We anticipate that the first life-extended D5 missiles will enter service with the Royal Navy towards the end of the next decade.

Costs and Funding

5-11. The procurement costs involved in sustaining our independent deterrent capability will need to be refined as work on the concept and assessment phases is taken forward with industry. More accurate cost estimates will be available by the time we come to place a contract for the detailed design of the submarines in the period 2012 to 2014. Our initial estimate is that the procurement costs will be in the range of £15-20 billion (at 2006/07 prices) for a four-boat solution: some £11-14 billion for the submarines; £2-3 billion for the possible future refurbishment or replacement of the warhead; and £2-3 billion for infrastructure over the life of the submarines. There would be savings from a three-boat solution but these would not be in proportion to the reduction in the number of submarines. These costs will fall principally in the period 2012 to 2027. The comparable cost for the Trident system was some £14.5 billion at today's prices. These costs are also comparable to the procurement costs of major weapons systems such as Typhoon aircraft. Depending on future decisions, there could also be the cost of starting to replace the D5 missile from the 2030s. At this range, any estimate of cost would be highly speculative: the equivalent cost for the Trident D5 missile was some £1.5 billion at today's prices.

5-12. It is not possible to be sure what the size of the defence budget will be
over the timescales involved but the procurement costs are likely on average to be the equivalent of around 3% of the current defence budget over the main period of expenditure. This is around the same as for the Trident programme. In meeting our public spending commitments, the MOD continues to pursue a high level of efficiency savings.

5-13. We will continue the programme of investment in sustaining capabilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), both to ensure we can maintain the existing warhead for as long as necessary and to enable us to develop a replacement warhead if that is required. Additional investment averaging £350 million per annum over the years 2005/06 to 2007/08 was announced last year. Further investment will be necessary, and early in the next decade the costs of AWE are likely - at their peak - to be the equivalent of about 3% of the current defence budget (compared to about 2.5% today).

5-14. Once the new fleet of SSBNs comes into service, we expect that the in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which will include AWE’s costs, will be similar to today (around 5-6% of the defence budget).

5-15. The investment required to maintain our deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need. Decisions on the level of our investments in nuclear and conventional capability will be taken in the Comprehensive Spending Review, the results of which will be announced next year.

Box 5-2:

SSBN Operations

The rationale for continuous deterrent patrolling (which the UK has maintained since 1969, and mirrors how the US and France operate their SSBNs) is that:

- the submarine on patrol is invulnerable to an attack. For example, we are confident that our SSBNs on deterrent patrol have remained completely undetected by a hostile or potentially hostile state. This means we have an assured nuclear deterrent available at all times;

- unlike any other nuclear weapon State recognised under the NPT, the UK has reduced to a single deterrent system: a single platform, delivery system and warhead design. If we ceased continuous deterrent patrols, a single deterrent force in a single location would be unacceptably vulnerable when a submarine was not on patrol;

- invulnerability and assuredness of capability are key components of the credibility of our deterrent, and also enable us to keep only a minimum deterrent. Greater vulnerability could necessitate increases in the scale of our nuclear deterrent;

- our deterrent's invulnerability and assuredness contribute to stability, as this removes any incentive pre-emptively to attack our nuclear forces;

- if we ceased continuous deterrent patrols, we could be deterred or prevented from deploying an SSBN in a crisis; and

- the Royal Navy has a clear and demanding operational target, which it has met since 1969. This is good for motivation and morale. If the requirement was for less than constant readiness, it would be harder to motivate the crews, and others who support the deterrent, on whom the effectiveness of the capability ultimately depends.
Section 6: Industrial Aspects

6.1 Designing and building new ISBNs, and integrating them with other elements of the overall system, will be a significant technical challenge for the Ministry of Defence and for industry. Nuclear powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles represent, in engineering terms, one of the most complex and technically demanding systems in existence.

HMS ASTUTE under construction at BAe Systems Submarines, Barrow-in-Furness (picture courtesy of BAe Systems)

6.2 In our Defence Industrial Strategy, published in December 2005, we explained that the UK’s fleet of nuclear powered submarines requires a specialist subset of skills within the maritime industry. Over many years the UK has developed a high level of expertise in the design, manufacture and maintenance of nuclear powered submarines. The early stages of the programme to build the new Astute-class conventional role submarines were, however, difficult, in part due to less than optimal industrial and design arrangements, resulting in a submarine design that could not initially be built at planned cost. Lessons have been learnt from that programme. Nevertheless, more change is needed for industry to be able to deliver a new programme on time and at an acceptable cost. We believe that the imperative for change is well recognised.

6.3 It would be our intention to build the new ISBNs in the UK, for reasons of national sovereignty, nuclear regulation, operational effectiveness and safety, and maintenance of key skills. But this is dependent on proposals from industry that provide the right capability at the right time and offer value for money. For the reasons set out in the Defence Industrial Strategy, progress towards industrial consolidation and a sustainable industrial base, will be an important ingredient. Final decisions will be taken in the lead up to the placing of a contract for the detailed design of the submarines.
For the replacement SSBN programme we expect that there will be a much greater collaborative effort between the MOD and industry than has been the case in the recent past.

The current industrial structure limits the scope for system-level competition in the UK. Therefore a key to successful procurement in the UK would be to work closely with industry right down the supply chain to put in place sustainable collaborative arrangements that run through the life of the platform. This is important for driving down the whole-life costs of the programme. We will also seek to bear down on the costs by sourcing some sub-system elements from overseas in line with the policy set out in the Defence Industrial Strategy.

Safety and Regulation

Safety will be a key element of the design and operation of the replacement SSBNs. The operation of our nuclear-powered submarines is regulated by independent safety authorities within the MOD, whilst the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate license facilities for reactor construction and deep maintenance. A fundamental principle applied by those authorities is that successful safety risk management is founded in a proper understanding of nuclear technologies.

Disposal Policy

The disposal of the Vanguard-class submarines is still some way off, and it is therefore too early to estimate the possible decommissioning costs. When the Vanguard submarines leave naval service, they will be subject to a process known as Defuel, De-equip and Lay-up Preparation, which will involve spent nuclear fuel and other materials being removed for storage at Sellafield, and any remaining irradiated material being secured within the reactor compartment. In line with current practice for other submarines now leaving service, the submarines themselves will then be stored afloat at Devonport, pending final disposal. Afloat storage has proved to be a safe arrangement for over 20 years.

We are examining options for the disposal of defuelled nuclear powered submarines, including future storage of the resulting intermediate level radioactive material. This work is linked closely to the work of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, which has recently reported on the wider question of the storage of UK nuclear waste. We are also working with industry to ensure that any future nuclear submarine is designed to facilitate the safe decommissioning and storage of nuclear materials.
Section 7: Future Decisions

7-1. The plans set out in this White Paper will enable the UK to maintain an effective and operationally independent nuclear deterrent until the early 2040s, when the Trident D5 missile is due to be withdrawn from service. A number of additional decisions will need to be taken over the coming years: these are illustrated in Table 7-1.

Submarines

7-2. As described in Section 5 and 6, we need in future to take further decisions on the new class of SSBNs, including on their detailed design and on the number of submarines to be procured.

Warheads

7-3. The UK produced a new nuclear warhead to coincide with the introduction into service of the Trident system. This warhead was designed and manufactured in the UK by AWE, although it was decided that it would be more cost effective to procure certain non-nuclear components of the warhead from the United States.

7-4. The current warhead design is likely to last into the 2020s, although we do not yet have sufficient information to judge precisely how long we can retain it in-service. Decisions on whether and how

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<th>Future UK Deterrent Plans</th>
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we may need to refurbish or replace this warhead are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament. In order to inform these decisions, we will undertake a detailed review of the optimum life of the existing warhead stockpile and analyse the range of replacement options that might be available. This will include a number of activities to be undertaken with the United States under the 1958 UK-US Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.

The Delivery System

7-5. We expect that the new class of SSBNs will have a design life of at least 25 years. On this basis, the new SSBNs would be unlikely to start going out of service until the 2050s, which will go beyond the planned life of the Trident D5 missile, even when its life is extended out to the early 2040s. Further investment will be necessary if we wish to sustain an effective nuclear delivery system throughout the life of the new submarines. Decisions on whether we wish to acquire a successor to the life extended D5 missile, and what form any successor might take, are unlikely to be necessary until the 2020s.

7-6. We have sought, and received, assurances from the US Government that, in the event they decide to develop a successor to the D5 missile, the UK will have the option of participating in such a programme. We have also received an assurance that any successor to the D5 should be compatible, or can be made compatible, with the launch system to be installed in our new SSBNs. These and other assurances will be set out in an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, the texts of which will be published.

7-7. These agreements will ensure that, if future UK Governments wish, they will have the option of retaining a nuclear deterrent capability throughout the lives of the new class of SSBNs.
Annex A:
The UK's Non-Proliferation Efforts

**International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):** The UK is working closely with the IAEA to develop assurances of supply for nuclear fuel, which provide energy security without the need for proliferation of sensitive enrichment technology. Our latest "enrichment bond" proposal, involving advance consent for exports of low enriched uranium, has been very well received. We also continue to press for agreement to the IAEA's Additional Protocol to be made a condition of supply before a state can receive any sensitive nuclear technology. We have agreed an Additional Protocol to our Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, and all UK enrichment and reprocessing facilities are now liable to international safeguards inspections.

**Iran/IAEA:** Since 2003, the UK, France and Germany have been leading international diplomatic efforts to convince Iran fully to co-operate with the IAEA over international concerns about its nuclear programme. Latterly, this has involved working closely with the US, Russia and China in the UN Security Council. This led, in July this year, to the adoption of UNSCR 1696.

**Middle East WMD Free Zone:** The UK continues to support the creation of an effective and verifiable chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, in keeping with the resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

**UNSCR 1540:** The UK was one of the leading proponents of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which established legally-binding obligations on all UN Member States to take steps to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through national legislation, co-operative action, development of effective export controls and physical protection of WMD related materials. In September 2004, the UK was one of the first states to comply with the national implementation reporting requirements of UNSCR 1540.

**Libya/AQ Khan:** The UK played a key role in the process that led to Libya's announcement, in December 2003, that it would eliminate its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes and limit its missile projects. This process contributed to the discovery and dismantling of the proliferation activities being pursued by the AQ Khan network.

**Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):** The UK has been involved actively in driving forward the PSI, which aims to prevent the acquisition and development of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons by states of concern and non-state actors, together with those who supply such programmes through trafficking in sensitive materials, equipment and technology.

**Export Control Regimes:** The UK is a leading and active member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the
Missile Technology Control Regime and the Zangger Committee - arrangements which aim to minimise the risk of assisting Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation through more effective national level export licensing measures.

**G8 Global Partnership Co-operative Threat Reduction:** The UK has committed up to $750 million over ten years to this work and currently supports projects to help dismantle old Russian nuclear submarines, dispose of 34 tonnes of plutonium in Russia, destroy Russia's stocks of chemical weapons (a total of 40,000 tonnes) and create new employment for former Soviet weapons scientists. Such efforts prevent the materials used to make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, and the weapons themselves, from falling into the wrong hands.

**Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT):** The UK is an Initial Partner Nation of the GICNT, unveiled by the Presidents of the United States and Russia in July this year. The initiative calls for co-operation in efforts directed at, among other things, improving control of nuclear materials, and detecting and suppressing illicit trafficking of such materials.

**Norwegian 7 Country Initiative:** The UK is an active member of the 7 Country Initiative, which aims to foster fresh thinking on how we can take forward the three pillars of the NPT-access to nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes, non-proliferation and disarmament.

**Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)/Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:** We are working with the European Union to encourage and help all countries accede to both treaties and to implement fully their obligations. In the last 5 years over 20 additional countries have joined the CWC.
 Annex B:
Options Assessment Process

B-1. Before arriving at decisions, we undertook a thorough review of the widest possible range of options to replace the Vanguard-class submarines. We then used a detailed assessment process to narrow the range of options under consideration to four generic options: a large aircraft equipped with cruise missiles; silo-based ballistic missiles; and both surface and sub-surface maritime platforms equipped with ballistic missiles. Some flexibility was included within these options to enable trade-offs to be made between potential costs and capability. There was also scope to consider variants between the four options: for example, although cruise missiles were considered as part of the air-launched option, the analysis also enabled consideration of the possibility of delivering cruise missiles from a submarine or surface ship.

B-2. We discarded some of the other possible options for the following reasons. We rejected the possibilities of employing short- and medium-range aircraft operating from the UK or overseas, or short- or medium-range land-based missiles, on the grounds that these options lacked sufficient range. Even aircraft launched from aircraft-carriers would not meet our range criteria. Furthermore, these options would be vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks whilst on the ground or at sea, or to interception by air defence systems whilst in the air.

B-3. We rejected mobile land-based systems because of the serious concerns at the technological risks involved with developing such systems, given that no such capability is currently readily available from reliable sources. We also perceived major vulnerability and security difficulties in operating any such system within a relatively small and densely populated island such as the UK.

B-4. The only ballistic missile which we considered in any detail in the analysis was the Trident D5 missile. In capability terms, this missile meets all our likely future operational requirements. And the costs of retaining this missile in service out to the early 2040s are greatly exceeded by the potential costs and technical risks associated with any programme to acquire an alternative ballistic missile system. There would be some costs and risks associated with adapting the Trident D5 missile for use in a surface ship or silo because of the likely need for an extensive engineering and test programme. But adapting the Trident D5 missile would still be likely to represent, by some way, the most cost-effective delivery system for any UK silo-or surface ship-based deterrent.
The Four Generic Options

B-5 We undertook a cost and capability-based assessment of the four generic options against the basic requirements for our nuclear deterrent described in Section 4. The conclusions of this analysis are as follows:

Option 1:
A long-range aircraft equipped with cruise missiles

![Airbus A350](image)

**Platform:**
- 20 large converted civil aircraft plus 20 refuelling aircraft
- Range (with refuelling) in excess of 20,000km
- Capacity to carry four large cruise missiles

**Delivery system:**
- Subsonic cruise missile (new development or off-the-shelf purchase)
- Range up to 3,000 km
- New nuclear warhead

**Infrastructure and Support:**
- Two large main operating bases (one new, one a modified existing base)
- New nuclear storage facilities and command and control system
- Extensive new training burden

**Operational Posture:**
- Impracticable to sustain continuous airborne deterrent patrols
- Aircraft normally retained at high alert on the ground

B-6 Assessment: The combination of a long-range aircraft armed with cruise missiles suffers from several major drawbacks. The whole system would be vulnerable particularly to preemptive attacks: whilst on the ground, to conventional and nuclear missile threats, and to terrorist attacks, and once airborne, to surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. Similar concerns would also apply to the airborne refuelling tankers, which would be essential if the aircraft were to be able to meet the requirement to be able to deter threats anywhere in the world. Cruise missiles are also significantly more vulnerable to being intercepted than ballistic missiles because they fly at much lower speed and altitude.

B-7 Even with a fleet of 20 large aircraft, we would also face a major challenge in terms of guaranteeing a sufficient capability to establish an effective deterrence posture. Also we had concerns about meeting readiness requirements: measures to increase the readiness of aircraft on the ground would be visible and therefore potentially escalatory in a crisis.

B-8 Finally, in terms of costs, assuming a fleet of 20 aircraft, this option was the most expensive of the four generic options, with through-life costs more than double those of a submarine option, the main cost drivers being procurement of the new aircraft and delivery system and the extensive new infrastructure requirements. Overall, this was the most expensive and by some distance the least capable option.
Option 2:
A large surface ship, equipped with Trident ballistic missiles

An artist's impression of a ballistic missile surface ship (picture courtesy of the US Department of Defense)

Platform:
• Three large conventionally-powered ships, each approximately 30,000 tonnes
• Additional air defence and anti submarine warfare destroyers/frigates plus support from a conventional role submarine

Delivery System:
• Adapted Trident D5 missile

Infrastructure and Support:
• Minor modification and upgrading of existing infrastructure
• At least three additional Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships to provide at-sea support

Operational Posture:
• Continuous at sea deterrent patrols

B-9 Assessment: We concluded that the option of developing large surface ships able to launch ballistic missiles suffered from serious drawbacks, primarily relating to vulnerability and security. Compared to a submarine, a large surface ship is easier to detect and track, including from space-based systems, and also is rather easier to attack, whether from the air or by a submarine. Continuous at sea patrols probably could be sustained with a fleet of only three ships (compared to four for the Vanguard-class SSBNs), because of the more limited refit requirements and the ability to provide stores replenishment and crew rotation whilst deployed on deterrent patrol. But the requirement to procure and maintain three large new ships, as well as a significant number of other supporting assets makes this option at least as expensive as a submarine option. Overall, we concluded that this option would provide less capability with greater vulnerability, and at a broadly similar whole life cost, to a submarine option.

Option 3:
A land-based (silo) system equipped with Trident ballistic missiles

Test firing a Minuteman III missile (picture courtesy of the US Department of Defense)

Platform:
• Two silo fields, each with 16 widely dispersed silos

Delivery system:
• adapted Trident D5 missile

Infrastructure and Support:
• Acquisition of new land: each silo field covering several hundred square kilometres
• Construction of the silos plus associated command and control bunkers
• Hardened communications link to political decision-makers to enable very high readiness
• New infrastructure to transport the missiles from the manufacturer to the silos

Operational Posture:
• Continuous deterrent capability, with the ability to hold very high readiness levels for extended periods of time

Area of Great Britain = 80,800² miles

The area of Frances E Warren Air Base superimposed on Great Britain

Area of Warren Air Force Base = 12,600² miles

B-10 Assessment: Silo-based systems suffer from vulnerability to preemptive attacks in that they are immobile and impossible to conceal. Whilst it is possible to design and construct silos that have a large degree of self-protection, they remain vulnerable to a well-targeted nuclear strike. The US has overcome this difficulty by retaining land, sea and air-based deterrent systems and by dispersing a relatively large number of ground-based missiles over large areas, so that any one nuclear detonation cannot destroy more than one silo. For example, the 90th Space Wing at Frances E Warren Air Base in Wyoming, with a total of 150 silos, is dispersed across an area of 12,600 square miles, one and a half times the size of Wales. Such an approach is entirely impractical in the UK. Clustering silos together in a small area, for example within the existing boundaries of an RAF base in the UK, would leave them vulnerable to being destroyed by a single incoming nuclear-armed missile.

B-11 The option was considered of holding ground-based missiles at sufficiently high readiness to be launched before any incoming missile reached the target. However, this would not be an effective deterrent posture, as it is possible that there would only be a few minutes warning of a ballistic missile attack on the UK, leaving very little time to make decisions, and it would require an extremely expensive and complex command and control system to retain political control over the launch procedure in such circumstances. Holding our nuclear forces at such high readiness could be highly destabilising in a crisis.

B-12 Overall, this option presented some major practical difficulties, especially in terms of vulnerability, and the through life costs were around twice those for a submarine option.
Option 4: A submarine equipped with Trident ballistic missiles

Currently, once deployed, the submarine is by far the least vulnerable of the platform options considered. For example, we are confident that, since July 1968, when the first Polaris patrol took place, our SSBN on deterrent patrol has remained completely undetected by a hostile or potentially hostile state.

Platform:
- A fleet of three or four new SSBNs

Delivery System:
- The Trident D5 missile

Infrastructure:
- Some modernisation of submarine infrastructure at Faslane and Coulport

Operational Posture:
- Continuous at sea deterrent patrols

B-13 Assessment: A submarine-based system meets all of our key requirements. The option of a conventionally-powered submarine was rejected because of the impracticality of developing a non-nuclear propulsion system that could generate the necessary power and endurance.

B-14 We have assessed carefully the potential for future developments in antisubmarine warfare to compromise this position. We believe it is unlikely there will be any radical technological breakthrough which might diminish materially the current advantages of the submarine over potential anti-submarine systems. Over the life of a new class of SSBNs, it is conceivable that unforeseen new technologies could emerge that could enhance the ability of a potential adversary to use air-, sea- or space-based systems to monitor submarine movements. However, even in this eventuality, provided we continue to invest in suitable research and development on effective counter-measures, we believe that it is likely to be possible to use a combination of new technology and new tactics to ensure that the risks to the SSBN on patrol remain manageable. In any event, we judge that a submarine will remain by far the least vulnerable of all the platform options considered.

A Russian Il-38 May Maritime Patrol Aircraft (picture courtesy of the US Department of Defense)
B-15 A submarine-based solution equipped with ballistic missiles also meets our other key requirements. It can be deployed covertly and achieve deterrent effect anywhere in the world. We can also change its readiness state either covertly or, if required as a demonstration of intent, overtly, for example by announcing the deployment of a second SSBN.

Conclusion

B-16 From a capability perspective, we concluded that a submarine-based system offers the most practical and effective means of meeting our future nuclear deterrence requirements. In terms of cost, maintaining a submarine-based deterrent has a significant advantage over the large aircraft and silo-based approaches and is broadly similar to the surface ship option.
INDIA

WORKING PAPER

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

1. The international community has long recognised that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to humankind and therefore, it is essential for it to take urgent steps towards realisation of the goal of their complete elimination. The UN General Assembly, in its very first resolution, Resolution 1(I) of 1946, adopted unanimously, sought the elimination, from national armaments, of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and to use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes, a goal that has been reaffirmed by the General Assembly on several occasions thereafter.

2. The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I), the only document on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus by all member States, affirmed and accorded the highest priority to the goal of nuclear disarmament and outlined concrete steps to achieve that objective. It pointed out that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require urgent negotiation of agreements, at appropriate stages, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned, for (i) the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems; (ii) the cessation of production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes; and (iii) a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed timeframes, whenever possible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time. It emphasized that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear weapon States, in particular those among them that possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. It also emphasized that the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way and requires measures to ensure that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments. The principles and objectives, which were agreed by all, remain of continuing relevance and need to be reaffirmed by the international community.

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1 Originally issued as document of the First Committee under the symbol A/C.1/61/5.
3. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded in 1996 that: “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The UN Millennium Declaration reiterated the commitment of the Member States of the United Nations to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim. Various proposals for nuclear disarmament have since been considered, including in a number of studies ranging from the Canberra Commission to the more recent WMD Commission. The Pugwash Movement and the NGO Community have also made valuable contributions to the nuclear disarmament discourse.

4. The Non-aligned Movement, described as the largest peace movement in history, has always accorded the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. The NAM Summit has recently reaffirmed the Movement’s principled positions on nuclear disarmament and emphasized the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

5. The international community is far from achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, though there has been some progress in this regard. In particular the Russian Federation and the United States have taken steps to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles, and India welcomes such efforts. Notwithstanding these reductions the global threat posed by nuclear weapons has not subsided. In recent years another dimension has been added by the possibility that terrorists and other non-State actors may acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and so-called “dirty-bombs”.

6. Despite the end of the cold war, the international security situation is still characterised by lack of trust and political will amongst states to make progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States have serious concerns about the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament. The absence of any reference whatsoever to disarmament and non-proliferation in the 2005 World Summit Outcome underscored this fact. The Final Document of SSOD-I enshrined the essential principle of mutually reinforcing linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation. States that have voluntarily undertaken disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under respective treaties must implement them fully and faithfully.

7. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Effective, credible and comprehensive system of export controls, which at the same time do not hinder legitimate applications of science and technology for peaceful and developmental purposes, could be building blocks of a move towards universally acceptable non-discriminatory norms and effective international non-proliferation arrangements. Non-proliferation policies must also be forward looking, so as to allow for the expansion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for countries desirous of increasing the share of nuclear energy as a non-polluting energy source, in a manner that is safe, secure and proliferation resistant.

8. International efforts in nuclear disarmament would yield tangible results when they are backed by an international consensus. The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. The Disarmament Commission is the universal deliberative forum. The UN Charter endows the General Assembly with a responsibility on disarmament
matters. The General Assembly must explore the convening of the Fourth Special Session on Disarmament, subject to consensus on its objectives and agenda. These remain the best fora to enable the emergence of a consensus and to make effective contribution to the goal of nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

9. India has played an active role in the international community’s endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. India was the first to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954 and a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as distinct from non-dissemination, in 1965. India’s proposition on non-proliferation was predicated on the principle that the progressive steps towards elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be based on a balance of obligations between those who possess such weapons and those who do not. In 1978, India proposed negotiation for an international convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In 1982, India called for a ‘nuclear freeze’ - a prohibition on production of fissile materials for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems.

10. In 1988, India presented the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan to the General Assembly that provided a holistic framework seeking negotiations for a time-bound commitment for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons to usher in a world free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence. This Action Plan was by far the most comprehensive initiative on nuclear disarmament, covering issues ranging from nuclear testing, fissile material for nuclear weapons to a time bound elimination of stockpiles. India, together with 27 other members of the Group of 21, in August 1996, presented to the Conference on Disarmament a Programme of Action, as contained in document CD/1419, for the elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified time frame. This was further endorsed by the Group of 21 in documents CD/1570 and CD/1571.

11. So long as the States that possess nuclear weapons continue to believe that nuclear weapons constitute a critical element of their security strategy, the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will remain elusive and distant. Therefore, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in strategic and security doctrines and policies is essential for realizing the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Alignment of nuclear doctrines to a posture of ‘no-first-use’ and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States by all nuclear weapon States will be an important step towards achieving this objective.

12. The non-nuclear weapon States have persistently sought legally-binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons against them. They have regarded the security assurances provided so far by the nuclear-weapon States as inadequate, conditional and non-binding. Legally-binding assurances on use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States would further reduce the nuclear danger and mitigate the sense of insecurity among non-nuclear weapon States and, thereby, strengthen the non-proliferation regime. India firmly supports a policy of ‘no-first-use’ and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. India is ready to join multilateral negotiations to enshrine its commitment to no-first-use and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States in legally binding agreements. An agreement among the States possessing nuclear weapons on a global ‘no-first-use’ posture will engender strategic stability and reduce the danger of the accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons.
13. The international community succeeded in negotiating Conventions on total elimination of biological and chemical weapons mainly because their use had already been prohibited through the 1925 Geneva Protocol and States were prepared to relinquish these weapons as they did not foresee the likelihood of their use or their contribution to ensuring security. There is no reason why nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated in the same manner. A prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be essential for eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

14. The General Assembly resolution on a “Convention on the Prohibition of the use of Nuclear Weapons”, first presented by India in 1982, requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The resolution reflects India’s belief that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would help generate necessary political will among States possessing nuclear weapons to engage in negotiations leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; it would also contribute to mitigation of the nuclear threat in the interim, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

15. The General Assembly resolution on “Reducing Nuclear Danger” manifests India’s conviction that the hair-trigger posture of nuclear forces carries the risk of unintentional, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons leading to a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences. The very real danger posed by the increased risk of systems and components falling into the hands of non-State actors or rogue actors within State structures, has further aggravated the existing dangers. Unilateral, bilateral and regional confidence-building measures, could supplement international agreements in reducing nuclear danger as also the risk of accidental nuclear war.

16. Progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament will require a climate of mutual confidence in the international community to conclude universal non-discriminatory and verifiable prohibitions on nuclear weapons leading to their complete elimination. No effort must be spared in consensus building to this end.

17. We would urge the international community to intensify dialogue, so as to build a consensus that strengthens the ability of the international community to initiate concrete steps towards achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament based on the following elements:

- Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines;

- Taking into account the global reach and menace of nuclear weapons, adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental nuclear war, de-alerting of nuclear-weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;

- Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on ‘no-first-use’ of nuclear-weapons;
• Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States;

• Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

• Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.
NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 FEBRUARY 2007 FROM THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF ALGERIA ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS OF THE
HIGH-LEVEL AFRICAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THE CONTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO PEACE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, HELD IN ALGIERS
ON 9 AND 10 JANUARY 2007

The Permanent Mission of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the
United Nations Office and the international organizations in Switzerland presents its
compliments to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour
to attach copies in English and French of the following documents of the High-level African
Regional Conference on the Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Peace and Sustainable
Development, which was held in Algiers on 9 and 10 January 2007, as well as a diskette
containing the same documents:

– Statement to the Conference by H.E. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, President of the
  Republic;

– Final declaration of the Conference;

– Plan of Action;

– Decision No. 339 of the tenth Summit of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa,
  Ethiopia, on 29 and 30 January 2007.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the Secretary-General would take the
necessary steps to issue these documents as official documents of the Conference on
Disarmament.
Statement by H.E. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, at the opening of the African regional conference on nuclear energy

Algiers, 9 January 2007

Mr. President of the Commission of the African Union,
Mr. Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

The holding in Algiers of a high-level African regional conference on the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and sustainable development is a highly significant and far-reaching event.

This is true both for Algeria and Africa and for the international community as a whole.

The importance of this first African regional conference, and of the theme it addresses, is heightened by the participation of eminent scientific and government figures and of senior officials at the head of international organizations.

As I warmly welcome all the participants, I would like to highlight and express my pleasure at the presence among us of the representatives of the Commission of the African Union, which convincingly outlines the ambitious vision of an Africa that places the inexhaustible ingenuity of its peoples and its elites at the service of its development.

I would like also to welcome Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for his personal commitment and that of his Agency to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a commitment for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2005 in such a timely manner.

Mr. El Baradei and the Agency under his leadership provided support in many forms to create the conditions necessary for the success of this conference, for which they have rightly earned the keen appreciation of all the participants and that of Algeria.

In the beneficial task of shortening the path to development which Africa must achieve, it is fortunate that we can draw on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that the African scientific community is enabled to play a decisive role in this regard.

The members of this community, and especially those in this room, are the worthy agents of a process whereby Africa is awakening to the need to acquire the means to play an effective role in the tremendous control of nature by science and technology.

May their non-African fellow scientists, men and women, who have agreed to come and share their knowledge and their experience, enjoy the recognition and tribute which are their due for their contribution to the success of this major project.
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

This first African regional conference on the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and sustainable development is being held in a particularly appropriate context.

At the African level, it paves the way for the forthcoming Summit of the African Union, which will be able to draw on the conference in its discussions on science and technology for development.

This conference is being held against the background of the major challenges posed by the interconnected problems of energy security, climate change and the preservation of natural resources, as well as the key challenge of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, at a time when nuclear energy is asserting itself as a clean, sustainable and economically viable alternative to fossil fuels.

In this regard, your proceedings will facilitate the clarifications required by the major linkages between international policy factors, the challenges of the global economy and geostrategic elements on an uneasily balanced international stage.

This conference offers African leaders and experts an appropriate framework to address the advantages of nuclear energy as a field of scientific excellence with a view to making proposals covering a broad spectrum of sectors including, in particular, basic science, engineering and research and development.

It is clear that Africa must and can promote the acquisition of scientific knowledge and obtain the infrastructure which is needed to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in such important fields as agricultural development, the harnessing of water resources and the improvement of health services, as well as the conservation of natural resources and even power production.

In this regard, it is nuclear applications outside the energy sector which stand out, where Africa is concerned, as a range of basic options that require relatively modest facilities and accessible know-how.

It is one of the objectives of this conference to encourage African countries to improve their ability to benefit from the scientific and technological progress achieved in the nuclear field, and from IAEA technical cooperation programmes designed to promote the role of nuclear science and technology in support of peace, health and prosperity for our peoples - goals that are at the heart of the development projects of African countries.

Such applications are not beyond the reach of the developing countries, and should not constitute a privilege benefiting only countries with a major industrial and technological base.

At the same time, these applications are called on to address many of Africa’s recognized needs. In the field of human health, non-energy applications cover cancer therapy, diagnosis of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, control of tsetse flies using the sterile insect technique, detection of drug-resistant strains, sterilization of medical products and evaluation of intervention programmes in the field of nutrition.
Applications related to food and agriculture make it possible to develop new plant varieties, preserve agricultural products, protect date palms against the Bayoud disease vector, seek to eradicate pests, including desert locusts, combat animal diseases and improve livestock productivity and production.

Meanwhile, nuclear applications in the field of water resources management range from underground water mapping to evaluation of underground water quality and dam safety.

Concerning the preservation of the environment, nuclear applications contribute, through pollutant studies, to the rehabilitation of polluted areas and the management of the marine environment and coastal areas.

As for nuclear applications in industry, which make use of irradiation treatment, these help in industrial quality control by means of non-destructive testing, as well as the production of radioisotopes that are used in many activities.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

The world of today and tomorrow has an increasing need for energy applications to meet continuously growing demand which requires the mobilization of different sources of energy.

There is a perceptible renewal of interest in nuclear energy and its fair and democratic use for exclusively peaceful purposes, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has picked up this major trend by highlighting the comparative advantages and prospects it offers in meeting growing energy needs while respecting the environment and promoting sustainable development.

Noteworthy in this regard is the interest displayed by African countries in projects for the assessment of energy needs and the use of nuclear power, on the basis of energy planning studies and the establishment of regulatory mechanisms.

This trend in national development priorities presupposes increased mobilization of scientific, technological and industrial capabilities that require highly specialized human resources.

To this end, regional and international cooperation is necessary to encourage and ensure the cost-effectiveness of efforts to derive maximum advantage from existing achievements and map out further steps forward. This is the moment for me to welcome the Regional Cooperative Agreement to promote nuclear sciences and technology in Africa (AFRA), which my country supports, and whose programmes draw on a remarkable range of expertise of several African countries, including Algeria.

The time has come to harmonize our approaches and work for synergies between NEPAD and AFRA, as well as the establishment of a regional network aimed at supporting and strengthening intra-African cooperation and exchanges in the nuclear field.

Algeria is committed to the improvement of cooperation among African countries, convinced that this will help to give a fresh impetus to South-South cooperation, which remains a means of leveraging development and mutual assistance in areas that call for new operational approaches.
In this context, we must welcome the progress achieved within the framework of IAEA programmes of technical cooperation with African States, and particularly the fact that most African cooperation projects are consistent with the objectives of NEPAD for the next round of the IAEA 2007-2008 cooperation programme.

Equally welcome is the practical implementation of the Agency’s operational technical programme in support of national and regional programmes which have a link with NEPAD.

In this way, NEPAD, which is a philosophy of collective self-reliance through which Africa and its international partners undertake to move towards development by focusing their efforts on the distant future, finds in nuclear energy a natural vehicle for launching the continent on a path of modernization which has multiplier effects on efficiency and productivity.

It is clear that supporting measures are still needed to improve the ability of African States to draw full benefit from their right to develop nuclear energy. Whereas increased efforts at the national level are objectively needed to make the most of human skills and infrastructure, international cooperation is essential to broaden the scientific and technical base continent-wide, so as to make it an effective tool for development.

In this respect, it is important to work for the strengthening of the activities of the regional centres of excellence, as service and expertise providers, and for the emergence of new centres, particularly in the fields which are not yet covered by such institutions, such as nuclear medicine and waste management.

It is also important for IAEA to establish an operational partnership with AFREC, the Algiers-based Energy Commission of the African Union, in order to bolster the efforts of African countries to achieve energy security.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

Together with all the African countries, we are aware of the need for a dynamic balance between promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of strict and effective nuclear safety and security measures, and the enforcement of a technically effective and politically neutral nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime.

These countries, which are highly sensitive to the complexity of situations of conflict involving imbalances among these three components of the nuclear issue, can under no circumstances resign themselves to being excluded from the achievements of nuclear technology and its benefits.

These countries, whose large-scale support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has considerably enhanced the authority and influence of this international legal instrument, cannot but feel legitimate concern at unilateral interpretations and attempts to promote the erosion of their right to acquire nuclear technologies for development purposes, without any discrimination.

African countries fully recognize that their nuclear activities must meet the highest safety and security obligations and standards. Enhanced efforts should be made to instil a culture of safety and security among all those concerned with the development of nuclear activities.
Africa needs cooperation and technical assistance from the outside, and particularly from IAEA, to strengthen national infrastructures for the regulation and monitoring of radioactive sources and promote the exchange of information on radiological and nuclear security.

Greater participation by African experts in IAEA activities in the field of safety and security standards is of crucial importance. Likewise, the establishment of a regional nuclear safety and security forum to contribute to the exchange of experience and the harmonization of safety standards at the African level should be a matter for special attention.

This conference should reflect the growing concern around the world over nuclear proliferation in general, and the risk that nuclear weapons or radioactive sources may fall into the hands of terrorist groups or other non-State actors.

At the same time, a legitimate concern is growing in the non-nuclear-weapon States, which are faced with pressure to take on ever-greater commitments in the name of non-proliferation, at a time when concrete disarmament measures that have already been negotiated and approved at the international level are not being implemented and the nuclear-weapon States are slow in honouring their commitment to make substantial progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals.

This one-sided situation in nuclear matters, and the sophistication of industries and technologies in many developed countries, make it practically impossible to acquire nuclear equipment, which is sometimes improperly allocated to the elastic category of dual-use technologies.

It is easy to understand the concern of the NPT signatory countries which find themselves in practice denied the benefits of article IV of the Treaty, which promises them effective assistance in gaining access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

More than ever, at a time when volatile situations are developing and exacerbating tensions and conflicts, the forthcoming conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should, unlike previous conferences, produce significant progress in the balanced and fair implementation of the Treaty, in order to curb the threats and risks to international peace and security and the environment surrounding cooperation for sustainable development.

In this same spirit, it is important and urgent to speed up the process of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which should bring forward its entry into force, in order to contribute to greater respect for the fundamental principles which determine the future of global security by discouraging the arms race in its horizontal as well as vertical dimensions.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

Africa appreciates the crucial impact of sustainable development on its unremitting quest for an era of progress and prosperity for its peoples. It strives to promote peace and development throughout the continent.
Africa has been in the vanguard of nuclear disarmament, with the effective dismantling of South Africa’s military nuclear programme. It drafted and concluded the PELINDABA Treaty, which proclaimed the African continent to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Africa has also made a substantial contribution to the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, it is helping to broaden the geopolitical foundations for the membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the dispatch of the Agency’s missions.

Africa cannot but strongly support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In order to tackle the blockages in the Middle East, where crises are becoming more acute and complex in the absence of solutions which are based on justice and in conformity with international law, it is essential for the credo of “atoms for peace” popularized by President Eisenhower to replace the suicidal doctrines of “massive retaliation” and the “balance of terror” once and for all in this sensitive region of the world and elsewhere.

A French scholar predicted just over a century ago that “universal peace will be achieved one day, not because men have become better … but because a new order of things, a new science and new economic imperatives will impose the state of peace on them”.

The twentieth century did not see this prediction come true: lulls and respites were no more than gaps between armed conflicts of all kinds, including the conflict which bears the indelible stigma of the use of nuclear weapons.

Will the twenty-first century witness a radical change in men’s behaviour to enable mankind as a whole to enjoy universally shared peace and prosperity?

We very much appreciated the statement made by Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, from which we benefited.

Like him, we belong to a continent which feels an urgent need for all the additional assistance from an agency which is led with competence, integrity and skill by one of the sons worthy of the African continent who, we are convinced, will spare no effort to place his knowledge at the service of mankind, peace and the well-being of all the disadvantaged countries of our continent.

It is my wish that your deliberations and your recommendations will be inspired by this hope, and that this conference will constitute a new step along the path of peace and sustainable development for Africa and mankind as a whole.

Thank you.
FINAL DECLARATION OF ALGIERS

African Ministers and officials, meeting on 9 and 10 January 2007 in Algiers within the framework of the High-level African Regional Conference on the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and sustainable development,

Aware of the significant progress achieved in nuclear sciences and technology at the global level, and its impact on improving human health, nutrition, agriculture, the mobilization of water resources and the protection of the environment,

Also aware of the contribution that nuclear energy can make to the consolidation of sustainable peace and development in Africa as a necessary precondition for progress and improvement of the well-being of the peoples of the region,

Further aware of the need to substantially increase support for the promotion of nuclear sciences and technology to the benefit of African development,

Emphasizing the renewed interest shown in nuclear energy at the global level as a viable and sustainable alternative to fossil energies and a strategic option to diversify the sources of power generation in order to assure the African continent’s energy security,

Seeking to explore all the paths and options available to Africa, including nuclear power generation, to achieve its development and attain the Millennium Development Goals, taking into account the needs of African peoples in the fields of health, agriculture, food, water resources, industry and energy, inter alia through cooperation and the establishment of strategic partnerships,

Aware of the need to promote the use of nuclear sciences and technology for the socio-economic development of Africa, taking into account the strategic importance of environmental protection, inter alia through effective and mandatory radioactive waste management measures,

Reaffirming that universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime, and their effective implementation, contribute to regional and international peace and security,

Reiterating the need for balanced and non-selective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the commitments entered into under article VI of the Treaty,

Recalling the solemn OAU declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, adopted at the first OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, as well as United Nations General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) on the denuclearization of Africa, adopted on 3 December 1965,

Emphasizing the fundamental role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for human development, in accordance with article II of its statute,
Aware of the need for greater efforts in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies so as to speed up Africa’s socio-economic development,

Having adopted the opening statement by His Excellency Mr. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, President of the Republic, as a Conference document,

1. Reaffirm Africa’s strategic choice in favour of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with article IV of the NPT;

2. Thank the Algerian Government for organizing this Conference as a contribution to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies in Africa;

3. Express their deep gratitude to His Excellency Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the Republic of Algeria, for agreeing to the holding of this Conference under his patronage;

4. Welcome the participation in the Conference of Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of IAEA, as well as a large number of African Ministers and officials and Commissioners of the African Union, thus bearing witness to the importance and special interest which African States and IAEA attach to the theme of this meeting;

5. Welcome also the progress achieved by some African countries in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies, and call for the strengthening of inter-African cooperation, notably within the framework of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA);

6. Underline the need to develop, at the national and regional levels, policies to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear sciences and technologies, at the national and regional level, in order to speed up socio-economic development and improve the well-being of the peoples of Africa;

7. Urge African States to increase the share of the budget allocated to scientific research and technological development programmes, so as to reach the objective of allocating 1 per cent of GDP to such programmes in the medium term, and invite the African States to incorporate this percentage as an indicator in the Peer Review Mechanism;

8. Welcome also the existing cooperation between African States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and call on the Agency to strengthen its programme of cooperation with African States both at the bilateral level and within the framework of support for the implementation of the AFRA agreement;

9. Encourage the integration of AFRA programmes within the framework of NEPAD in order to sustain the Continent’s interest in nuclear sciences and technologies and boost the momentum of the New Partnership For Africa’s Development;

10. Call on African States that have not yet done so to ratify the Agreement establishing the African Energy Commission (AFREC), based in Algiers, and encourage IAEA to develop a special partnership with the Commission in the context of their terms of reference;
11. **Undertake** to strengthen nuclear safety and security measures as part of a global approach aimed at promoting the safe and accountable use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, taking into account requirements in terms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

12. **Encourage** African States that have not yet done so to take such steps as they deem useful to expedite the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba), and call on the other non-African States concerned to ratify the protocols to the Treaty so as to allow the Treaty to enter into force;

13. **Reiterate** their support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a major confidence-building measure that can contribute to the establishment of peace and security in the region;

14. **Adopt** the Plan of Action annexed to this Final Declaration of the Conference and decide to submit the two documents as a contribution to the forthcoming Summit of the African Union on science and technology for development, scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa on 29 and 30 January 2007.

Algiers, 10 January 2007
PLAN OF ACTION

At the end of its deliberations, the Conference adopted the following Plan of Action, which is annexed to the Final Declaration:

I. IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

1. To work for general and complete disarmament under and international effective control, in pursuance of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), at the international level and within the framework of close continent-wide coordination;

2. To work for the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba);

3. To strive to promote African States’ inalienable right to unobstructed access to nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, and to take the appropriate steps to develop strategic partnerships in this area;

4. To sustain regional cooperation by identifying complementarities in the field of technology and science between African countries so as to draw the greatest possible benefit therefrom;

II. IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS AND SCIENCES

5. To encourage the harnessing of nuclear technologies and promote their application at the national level, inter alia through the development of a strategic plan which is consistent with the national development programme in the fields of health, industry, agriculture, water resources and the environment. The promotion activities could be undertaken through, for example:

   – The devising of an information and awareness creation programme on the benefits and contributions of nuclear technologies, targeted on decision makers;

   – For countries that so wish, the drafting of a handbook of procedures for the gradual introduction of nuclear technologies while ensuring sustainability;

6. To update the database of existing expertise and specialized operational infrastructure in the region, and promote skill mobility and the optimal use of installations;

7. To create a framework of safety legislation and regulations which is in conformity with international recommendations and permits the efficient adoption of programmes and activities related to nuclear applications;

8. To launch a national-level programme for the development, improvement and preservation of skills, with a view to effective programme implementation, inter alia, through the establishment of specialized nuclear science and technology training institutes;
9. To promote the creation of an environment conducive to research and development in nuclear sciences and applications by allocating adequate financial resources, in conformity with the commitments entered into, in particular within the framework of NEPAD;

10. To establish machinery and facilities that allow monitoring of technological developments in the field of nuclear applications in the medium and long term;

11. To ensure the continuous growth of research and development activities in the field of nuclear sciences and technologies, by promoting methods of evaluation and audit, so that the sustainability of the institutions in charge of programmes can be assured;

III. IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

12. To initiate studies to assess energy needs taking into account all possible energy development and planning scenarios, in the medium and long term (over periods ranging from two to three decades), in order to identify the contribution of nuclear energy in possible and viable solutions for the mobilization of energy sources which are vital for the well-being of peoples;

13. In this context, to envisage the option of a combined solution to satisfy both energy and drinking-water needs through seawater desalination. This could lead to the choice of nuclear power generation as a solution that responds to both concerns in a viable and appropriate manner in the context of a sustainable development perspective;

14. Also in this context, to envisage the option of an African regional partnership for the development of nuclear technology and guaranteed nuclear fuel supply;

15. To introduce nuclear power in Africa on the basis of appropriate, tested and powerful reactor technology, taking into account the need to expand African countries’ industrial capabilities and the electricity grid;

16. To draw maximum benefit from skilled human potential through exchanges and partnerships with the countries of the region. These actions would aim at harmonization of training programmes, cooperation among research centres in the region through joint research and development programmes and projects, scientific exchanges among research workers, and the establishment of regional training institutes specializing in nuclear sciences and engineering;

17. To encourage cooperation and synergies between African States and nuclear technology suppliers and networking with international institutions specializing in this field, with a view to organizing the effective and sustainable transfer of nuclear technology;

18. To develop a legislative and regulatory framework to ensure the safe operation of nuclear installations and adequate protection against radiological risks for the public, workers and the environment;

19. To draw up a long-term strategy for the management and storage of radioactive wastes as a necessary accompaniment to the implementation of a nuclear power generation programme;
IV. IN THE FIELD OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

20. To boost scientific and technical cooperation between IAEA and the African countries, in particular through the strengthening of the AFRA agreement and its gradual integration to NEPAD;

21. To encourage regional cooperation in the AFRA framework as well as interregional cooperation in research and development related to nuclear sciences and technologies, as well as the establishment of regional centres of excellence in the fields of training and R & D. The appointment of an African expert panel to draw up a global strategy for the promotion of nuclear technologies in Africa is recommended;

22. To work for the implementation at the national level of all the recommendations drawn up at events organized by the African Union in the field of science and technology;

23. To establish special cooperation between AFREC and IAEA.

Algiers, 10 January 2007
DECISION CONCERNING THE HIGH-LEVEL AFRICAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The Executive Council

1. Takes note of the communication from the head of the Algerian delegation on the outcome of the High-level African Regional Conference on the Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Peace and Sustainable Development, held in Algeria in January 2007;

2. Recognizes the contribution that nuclear energy can make to the consolidation of sustainable peace and development in Africa and the need for greater efforts in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies so as to speed up Africa’s socio-economic development;

3. Reaffirms the need to explore all the paths and options available to Africa, including nuclear power generation, in order to achieve its development and attain the Millennium Development Goals;

4. Reiterates the need for balanced and non-selective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

5. Welcomes the outcome of the High-level African Regional Conference on the Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Sustainable Peace and Development, held in Algiers on 9 and 10 January 2007;

6. Thanks the Algerian Government for successfully organizing this Conference with a view to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies in Africa;

7. Underscores that it is important for African countries to promote the acquisition of the scientific know-how and infrastructure needed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in the fields of human and animal health, agriculture, water resources and electricity generation;

8. Takes note with satisfaction of the Algiers Declaration and the related Plan of Action, which emphasize the need for Africa to benefit fully from the advantages of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for its economic and social development, and which also reiterate Africa’s position on the question of disarmament.

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 APRIL 2007 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CUBA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE WORKING PAPER ENTITLED “RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS” SUBMITTED BY THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION DURING ITS 2007 SUBSTANTIVE SESSION IN NEW YORK\(^1\)

The Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva and the international organizations based in Switzerland presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to attach the working paper entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement to the Disarmament Commission during its 2007 substantive session.

Noting the importance which the Non-Aligned Movement attaches to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and its awareness of the potential benefit of the attached working paper in carrying forward the work of the Conference on Disarmament on matters relating to nuclear disarmament, the Permanent Mission of Cuba wishes to request the distribution of the present letter and its attachment as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Geneva, 26 April 2007

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Working paper submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement

We reaffirm that achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament continues to be our highest priority. We remain alarmed by the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use and deeply concerned over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament.

We are convinced that disarmament and arms control, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security.

While the final objectives of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace.

We underline the need for all members of the Commission to fulfil their obligations in relation to nuclear disarmament and arms control and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. We call upon all members to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

We would like to emphasize that progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects is essential to strengthening international peace and security. We reaffirm that efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence-building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security.

We also reaffirm the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and are determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulations and disarmament negotiations.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while reaffirming the package of agreements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, call for the firm commitment by all States parties to the Treaty to the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty and the full implementation of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.
In view of the above and in an effort to achieve the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Non-Aligned Movement presents the following recommendations:

1. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States:
   - To refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in conformity with their obligations;
   - To fulfil with determination their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament;
   - To forgo any efforts to research and develop new types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
   - To further implement their commitment to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies/doctrines to minimize the risk that such weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
   - To implement their commitment to further reducing the operational status of their nuclear weapon system (de-alerting);
   - To establish a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time frames, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;
   - To further reduce their non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral or bilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
   - To apply the principle of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability to nuclear disarmament, arms control and other related reduction measures;
   - To respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States;
   - To reaffirm their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices;
   - To refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons and maintaining their voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
To take further steps to bring into effect the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols;

To place under IAEA safeguards fissile materials transferred from military to peaceful uses to ensure that such materials remain permanently outside military programmes.

2. While underlining the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, calls upon all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and providing for their elimination.

3. To establish as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21 and the Five Ambassadors, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention.

4. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that includes, inter alia, immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament. This would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

5. Reaffirms that the qualitative improvement and development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention with the undertakings provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons.

6. Expresses concern on strategic defence doctrines that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons.

7. Expresses concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space, which could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons, and declares the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

8. While noting the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, stresses that reduction in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in nuclear weapons.
and their total elimination; calls upon the United States and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to further reduction of their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, under the Treaty.

9. Reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, calls for the conclusion of, as a matter of priority, a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. Recommends to the General Assembly to declare the decade 2010-2020 the “Decade for nuclear disarmament”.

11. Reaffirms the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

12. Supports the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons which would pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

13. Reaffirms the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by the nuclear-weapon States, to contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore towards the enhancement of international peace and security.

14. Underlines that a positive decision on the part of the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and emphasizes that early ratification by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in annex 2 to the Treaty.

15. Reaffirms the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament.

16. Supports Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, considering that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

17. Urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the principles and guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session.

18. Supports the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council
resolution 487 (1981) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, and
recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive
IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

19. Calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related
equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of
assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

20. Reaffirms the basic and inalienable right of all States to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

21. Expresses concern that undue restrictions persist on export to developing countries of
material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

22. Reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and
assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and its safeguards system, compliance with its
safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under
article III, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

23. Reaffirms that a clear distinction has to be made between the legal obligations of
Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary commitments,
in order to ensure that such voluntary commitments are not turned into legal safeguards
obligations.

24. Emphasizes that nothing shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all
the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III
of the Treaty; and reaffirms that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international
cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle
policies.

25. Calls upon all Member States to support international efforts within the
United Nations framework to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery and urges all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as
appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of
delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

26. While recognizing that the most effective way to address the concern arising from
non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is the total elimination of such weapons
and noting Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), believes that measures to prevent non-State
actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials
should be adopted through a universally negotiated instrument.

On 24 January of this year, the six 2007 Presidents of the Conference (P6) had appointed the following as Co-ordinators to work under the auspices of the P6:

Ambassador Wegger Strømmen of Norway for agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", Ambassador Carlo Trezza of Italy for agenda item 2 entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", Ambassador Paul Meyer of Canada for agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", Ambassador Carlos Paranhos of Brazil for agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria for agenda item 5 entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", Ambassador Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia for agenda item 6 entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", and Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom for agenda item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments".

In my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament and through you, Mr. Secretary-General, I would like to warmly thank all the seven Co-ordinators for the important work done under their most professional guidance. The seven Co-ordinators’ reports submitted to the President, and attached to this letter in annexes I - VII, capture their most valued work and should be one important point of reference for future activities of our Conference.
Consequently, I should be grateful if *this letter together with its seven annexed documents* could be issued as *one* official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

*(signed)*: The President of the Conference on Disarmament

Jürg Streuli
Ambassador

Annexes: I to VII
The seven Co-ordinators’ Reports to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda items 1 to 7
Annex I

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 1

entitled

"Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 1
Ambassador Wegger Strommen of Norway
CD agenda item 1:  
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament

Summary of proposals made during the first part of CDs annual Session, with a view to commencing negotiations

Clustering compiled by co-ordinator, Ambassador Wegger Chr. Strømmen, Norway

Convention – prohibiting nuclear weapons

- a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat of use or actual use of nuclear weapons and their elimination (as expressed in the SSOD 1 final declaration and action plan)

- negotiations of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe

- establish a subsidiary body, preferably under item 2 of the agenda, to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

- negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- comprehensive overview over the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear weapons free world, including:
  - prohibition to acquire, develop, test, produce, stockpile, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons
  - control of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings
  - steps for destruction of all nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles
  - mechanisms for verifying destruction and ensuring compliance
  - international organisation to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under international control
  - disarmament and non-proliferation education

Other legal instruments

- negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons
- negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons or threat of use against non-nuclear weapon States

- negotiate an FMCT

- agreement on specific and legally binding measures to achieve the universalization of the NPT

**Ad hoc committee – phased program on nuclear disarmament**

- an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapon convention (as expressed in the final documents of the 14th Ministerial Meeting of the NAM (Kuala Lumpur) and the 14th Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of NAM (Havana)

- nuclear weapon states must fulfil disarmament obligations under the NPT

- multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals by a certain number or percentage

- reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

**Transparency and Confidence Building Measures**

- principles on transparency, irreversibility, verification of nuclear disarmament, including data sharing, international monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, registry

- NWS provide information on number and types of nuclear weapons in current arsenals and projected levels in five years. Provide status on weapons and delivery systems removed from active service or dismantled, and conversion efforts

- regular (formalised) briefings to CD members by declared nuclear weapon states

- multilateral agreement to reduce the operational readiness of deployed nuclear systems.

- de-alerting and de-activation of nuclear weapon systems

- compliance mechanism that could consist of technical assistance in destruction, procedures for national implementation, dispute resolution procedure, penalties for non-compliance, recourse to the UN Security Council, UNGA and ICJ for further action

- reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security policy
Other specific measures

- entry into force of the CTBT, maintaining the moratorium on nuclear test explosions
- establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East
- nuclear-weapon free zones
- negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument
- the link between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
- consideration by an ad hoc committee of: simultaneous pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; prominence of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; asymmetric possession of WMD; terrorists and WMD; cooperation in the field of nuclear energy
- adopt a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the CD, and to establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate the four core issues
- reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons
- reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines
Annex II

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 2

entitled

"Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters"
submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 2
Ambassador Carlo Trezza of Italy
Geneva, 7 August 2007

Report on the informal meetings that took place in the Conference on Disarmament, under the coordination of Ambassador Carlo Trezza, on Item 2 of the CD Agenda (Prevention of nuclear weapons including all related matters)

- The meetings took place on 8-9 February and from 5 to 7 March 2007. Preliminary remarks were made by the Coordinator on February 8th (Annex 1). The deliberations were based on an “Outline for discussions” originally composed of 5 issues and 10 sub-issues (Annex 2), which was accepted by the Six Presidents and the CD members. During the meetings some delegations suggested to add three additional sub-issues (ix, xii, xiii) to the Outline which was adjusted accordingly (Annex 3). The deliberations took place bearing in mind the understanding that “for practical reasons the topic of FMCT will be discussed under agenda item 2” (CD/2007/CRP.3 of February 2/2007).

- The structure of the “Outline for discussion” was based on the existing CD documents and in particular CD/INF.49 and CD/INF.49/Add.1. Among the documents a Draft Treaty (CD 1777) presented by one delegation was the object of frequent references during our proceedings.

- Substantial discussions were preceded by introductory remarks by the Coordinator (Annex 4).

- At the conclusion of Round one and Round two, the coordinator shared with delegations his synthetical recollection of the deliberations on each item and sub item (Annex 5). This synthesis was read to member states on March 5 and on March 7 and was adjusted on the basis of the comments received.

- In addition to the informal meetings a number of bilateral or plurilateral consultations took place with several delegations. The Coordinator also indicated his availability to brief all regional groups, most of which accepted to meet with him.

- As indicated in enclosure 5, the deliberations under item 2 of the Agenda were focused on the issue of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, which according to CD document CD/INF.49 has been the object of CD deliberations since 1995. A debate on this issue took place also last year as indicated under para 14 b) of last years CD Report.

- The full time allocated (18 hours) was used for focused and substantial work exclusively by CD delegations. The atmosphere of the discussions was cordial and constructive; the deliberations took place mostly in an interactive mode with active participation of a large number of CD delegations. National experts from capitals integrated some members’ delegations. The CD Presidency, the Secretary General and their collaborators attended the meetings.
Preliminary remarks by the Coordinator for item 2 of the Agenda

Ambassador Carlo Trezza (Geneva, 8 February 2007)

• This is the first informal meeting under item 2 of the CD Agenda. We are starting a new process and thus sailing through uncharted waters. We started deliberations on item 1 under of the Agenda the coordination of Ambassador Strommen of Norway. In my opinion they took place in a constructive atmosphere of mutual trust. I shall make all efforts to maintain that atmosphere.

• I thank the Conference for agreeing to my appointment by the 2007 Presidents as coordinator for item 2 of the Agenda (Prevention of nuclear weapons, including all related matters). I also thank all delegations which contacted me in advance.

• My understanding based on doc. CD/2007/CRP.3 of Feb 2/2007 is that “for practical reasons the topic of FMCT will be discussed under agenda item 2”. Let me recall that the issue of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was widely dealt with during the focused and structured debate last year. Working documents were presented and experts participated in our deliberations. On this basis and on the basis of the indications received by the Presidents, I have elaborated and submitted to the Presidents and to the Conference on January 29 an outline for discussion and a time table, which I suggested as a terms of reference for our deliberations. This outline was illustrated and discussed by the Conference on January 29. It was subsequently incorporated into document CD 2007 CRP.2 as part of the indicative timetable of formal and informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament for 2007 session. I explained on January 29 that the issues and sub issues contained in the outline for discussion were based principally on document CD/INF 49 which contains a collection of working documents made by the Secretariat on the issue of FMCT. I thank the Secretariat for having prepared that document. I am especially grateful to the Secretariat for the timely distribution, on February 6, of CD/49/Add1 containing “Basic documents of the Conference on Disarmament Related to the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” which were presented in 2006.

• On January 22, 2007 the President of the CD, on the occasion of the approval of the Agenda made the following statement “in connection with the adoption of the agenda, I, as the President of the Conference, should like to state that it is my understanding that if there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues, they could be dealt with within this agenda. On that basis I would like to ask if delegations have additional issues to suggest under item 2 of the Agenda.
Coordinator for item 2 of the Agenda

First Outline for discussion of item 2 of the agenda of the CD: February 5-9 and March 5-9, 2007 (Phase I)

The objective of these sessions would be to identify and discuss issues and sub-issues within item 2, with a focus on the issue of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The following selection of sub-issues and timetable are based on the collection of official documents on FMCT contained in document CD/INF.49 of 9 May 2006 and subsequent official documents presented by delegations during the 2006 session.

Proposed Workplan

**Week 3**

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<th>Morning</th>
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<td>5) Assessment of work done and future plan for part II</td>
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Thursday, February 8 (morning):

1) Identification of issues falling under item 2 of the Agenda.

2) General discussion on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Thursday, 8 February (afternoon):

3) Consideration of sub-issues to be dealt within a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:


Friday, 9 February (morning):


Monday, 5 March (afternoon):

4) Discussion on possible other issues under item 2 of the Agenda


Tuesday, 6 March (afternoon):


ix) National implementation CD/1777.

x) Settlement of disputes, entry into force, ratifications and depositaries: CD/1714-CD/1773-CD/1777.

Wednesday, 7 March (afternoon):

xi) Duration and withdrawal: CD/1777.

xii) Eligibility for signature and arrangements for accession after entry into force: CD/1777

xiii) Review and amendment procedure.

5) Assessment of work done, next steps and future plan for part II.
Coordinator for item 2 of the Agenda

Amended outline for discussion of item 2 of the agenda of the CD: February 5-9 and March 5-9, 2007 (Phase I)

The objective of these sessions would be to identify and discuss issues and sub-issues within item 2, with a focus on the issue of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The following selection of sub-issues and timetable are based on the collection of official documents on FMCT contained in document CD/INF.49 of 9 May 2006 and subsequent official documents presented by delegations during the 2006 session.

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**Thursday, 8 February (morning):**

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**Thursday, 8 February (afternoon):**

3) Consideration of sub-issues to be dealt within a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:


* new sub-issues
Friday, 9 February (morning):


Monday, 5 March (afternoon):

4) Discussion on possible other issues under item 2 of the Agenda


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xi) Duration and withdrawal: CD/1777.

xii) Eligibility for signature and arrangements for accession after entry into force: CD/1777.

xiii) Review and amendment procedure.

5) Assessment of work done, next steps and future plan for part II.
Introductory remarks by the Coordinator on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

i. Purposes and possible preamble

The following considerations are based on the content of previous official CD documents. Many delegations in their official past documents have indicated that a treaty banning the production of fissile for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be both an essential building block towards nuclear disarmament and a precondition for success in preventing nuclear non-proliferation, including nuclear terrorism. Some delegations indicated also that such a treaty would represent the most important negotiation since the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Other delegations stressed the need, already seven years ago, to commence in the CD negotiations on such a treaty, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, with a view to their conclusion within five years.

These concepts, along with others that delegations might submit, could represent also a starting point for a possible preamble of the treaty.

ii. Definitions

In past CD documents several delegations have provided their national views on a definition of “fissile material” the production of which should be prohibited by a treaty. The common ground for a definition could be the prohibition of the production of those fissile materials relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. All delegations that have intervened on this topic identified both highly enriched uranium and plutonium, even if with reference to different levels of enrichment and isotopic compositions, as the main fissile materials to be concerned by a treaty. Some delegation identified also Neptunium, Americium, Tritium and Thorium as materials that, to some extent, could be regulated by an FMCT.

It emerged clear from the studying of CD documents that the production of “fissile material” for other than nuclear explosive uses should not be affected by such a treaty.

iii. Scope

As one of the sub-issues of a possible FMCT, the issue of the scope has been addressed frequently by Member States in their CD documents and statements. Some delegations are of
the view that the scope of an FMCT should include future production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

Another issue related to the scope of an FMCT is whether a possible prohibition of
production would include also an obligation to close down or decommission facilities
producing the material considered by an FMCT or to convert them to non-nuclear-weapon
use. In this connection, the issue of possible “reversion” of such closed-down or
decommissioned facilities back to production could also be addressed.

Furthermore, for some countries the “diversion” of fissile material from non-nuclear-weapon
purposes to nuclear-weapon purposes after the entry into force of an FMCT should be subject
to a ban.

A minimum common denominator is that a primary focus of a treaty on fissile material
should be to stop the further production of those fissile materials necessary to manufacture
nuclear weapons.

iv. Production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes

An FMCT should prohibit the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or
other explosive devices. One issue to be addressed under the item of the outline entitled
“Production of fissile material for non explosive purposes” is whether HEU for non
explosive purposes should be dealt with under an FMCT. There seems to be a wide
propension to consider that a future FMCT should not cover uranium enriched for non-
explosive use, among which naval propulsion and research reactors. But some CD
documents mention that HEU used for naval propulsion purposes should be placed under
appropriate material control and accounting.

Some CD documents indicate the views of experts according to whom, due to the highly
classified nature of submarine operations and due to the fact that they operate most of the
time out on the sea, it would be virtually impossible to develop appropriate verification.
On the basis of the many documents and statements on this issue, production of fissile
material for purposes other than production of explosive devices should not be prohibited.
Therefore, an exception should be made for military naval reactors available so far also to
Non Nuclear Weapon States within the Non Proliferation Treaty.

v. Existing organizations: role of the IAEA

According to many working documents, the IAEA could play a significant role in negotiation
and possible implementation of an FMCT. Documents also mention a possible role in
verification. Should an FMCT require a multilateral body to implement its provisions, there
would, no doubt, be an advantage in using expertise and knowledge of the IAEA and its
robust infrastructure, including administration, equipment and know-how, in order to save administrative costs and reduce financial burdens on States parties. Documents suggest arrangements could be concluded by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA safeguards, to ensure that this material remains permanently outside of military programmes under an FMCT. Preoccupations were expressed about possible overburdening of the existing IAEA safeguard regime. Those that advocate a robust verification system under an FMCT believe that IAEA safeguards measures like the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol would provide a good basis for the considerations of a future verification system of an FMCT. Additional obligations would not, in principle, be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States which adopt both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. It was argued that the IAEA has the means to do reliable verification without disclosing sensitive information. Some documents indicate moreover that production of fissile material for naval propulsion is not forbidden under the NPT even to non nuclear weapon States. The IAEA was invited and made a presentation to the CD on 24 August 2006.

vi. Transparency

The issue of transparency in nuclear weapons is a key component of the disarmament discourse. We have dealt with it under item 1 and item 7 of the agenda. It has been the object of UN resolutions. We should focus here on the fissile material related aspects. We all know the NPT non nuclear-weapon States are supposed to submit all their nuclear installations and fissile materials under IAEA Safeguards. This includes plants for enrichment and reprocessing which are relevant for an FMCT. Additional Protocols create further restrictions and require additional transparency, such as declaring all new nuclear materials and facilities which subsequently become subject to the terms of the Safeguard agreement. It is not envisageable that an FMCT would entail further transparency requirements for NPT non nuclear-weapon States. Further transparency -this is my understanding- would be expected from States which have nuclear military capability. NPT nuclear-weapon States do not have similar obligations under the NPT- IAEA Safeguards regime. In some cases they have offered, on a voluntary basis, that IAEA safeguards may be applied to all or part of their civilian nuclear activities.

Some nuclear-weapons States have produced comprehensive histories of their military plutonium production. In 1997 nine countries (BELGIUM, CHINA, FRANCE, GERMANY, JAPAN, RUSSIA, SWITZERLAND, USA AND UK) also agreed on a series of civil plutonium management guidelines that require annual reporting on plutonium holdings.
Some delegations indicated in CD documents that transparency on the issue of fissile material could play an important role as a confidence building measure. The collection, updating and release of information about the size of fissile materials inventories by nuclear-weapon states is seen by some countries as a step necessary in addressing the issue of excess stocks.

vii. Compliance and verification

Most, but not all, disarmament treaties, be they multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral, have provision for a multilateral verification regime to ascertain compliance. Moreover some States have also the possibility of employing national means of verification. Based on CD documents presented so far, it can be said that there is of course no opposition whatsoever to the fact that an FMCT should be complied with. Some member States indicate that an FMCT should, in any case, include a commitment to negotiate verifiability. No member state seems to be contrary in principle to verification in itself. What is put into question is the feasibility, effectiveness and costs of FMCT verification (CD/1771). Two CD documents (CD/1777 and CD/1782) omit international verification provisions, because the authors believe that “effective verification” of an FMCT cannot be achieved. CD/1782 adds that “mechanisms and provisions that provide the appearance of effective verification without supplying its reality could be more dangerous than having no explicit provisions for verification. Such mechanisms and provisions could provide a false sense of security”.

No member State is on record for opposing discussion on verification in the framework of FMCT negotiations. The use of information obtained by national means and methods, the possibility of consultations regarding implementation and of a mechanism to address concerns regarding compliance is contemplated by the only FMCT draft treaty presented by a member State (CD/1777). It was also suggested (CD/1775) that the negotiation of verification measures can be conducted separately and subsequently to the acceptance of the basic political commitments of an FMCT, applying the NPT model. Some delegations declared that definitions cannot be established without dealing with the issue of verification. In its presentation to the CD on 24 August 2006, IAEA did not exclude the possibility of using verification systems similar to those applied under the safeguard regime. IAEA also indicated that it does not wish to prejudge the outcome of the discussion of such issue in the CD, but it is ready to assist in the process of further negotiations in whatever way is considered appropriate by States.

Verification is also widely discussed by specialized literature: a focused versus comprehensive approach to verification is widely debated among authors. But what is more relevant to this debate is the position of states.
viii. National implementation

During the initial debate on possible sub-issues within FMCT, one Delegation suggested the inclusion of the issue of “national implementation” of an FMCT. Our understanding is that national implementation refers to all the national measures that States Party to such a treaty would adopt to implement it including in particular national legislation. The only document that mentions national measures is document CD/1777 in Article III para 1, when it indicates that “each party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all persons and entities anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control do not produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and do not use fissile material produced after entry into force of this Treaty for that Party in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

National implementation of disarmament treaties including criminal legislation has proven to be very helpful to promote the implementation of the same treaties. The concept as national means of verification can also be relevant to this argument.

ix. Settlement of disputes, entry into force, ratification and depositaries

a) Settlement of disputes

CD document 1777 is the only document which specifically deals with settlement of disputes. It indicates the following steps: “a) Any questions that arise regarding the implementation by a Party of the provisions of this Treaty shall be addressed through consultations between that Party and the Party or Parties seeking clarification; b) In addition, any Party may bring to the attention of the Parties to this Treaty concerns regarding compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by another Party or Parties and may request the depositary to convene the Parties to the Treaty to consider the matter; c) If, in connection with the implementation of the Treaty, any Party believes that questions should arise that are within the competence of the UN Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that Party may request consideration of such questions by the Security Council. The requesting Party should provide evidence related to the matter”.

b) Entry into force

According to document CD/1777, the treaty shall enter into force on the date on which an instrument of ratification has been deposited by the five nuclear weapon States. Document CD/1773 indicates that entry into force previsions should make a treaty credible and meaningful. The rationale for subordinating entry into force to ratification by a number of countries is to allow entry into force after reaching a “critical mass” of parties, which
would make the treaty and its entry into force credible. The rationale for establishing a list of
significant countries the ratification of which is necessary for the entry into force is to make
the treaty meaningful.

c) Ratification

Document 1777 suggests the standard norm that the treaty shall be subject to ratification by
States signatories in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The relative
instruments would be deposited with the depositary States.

d) Depositaries

They are not identified in document CD 1777. According to article V the depositaries shall
inform all States signatories and acceding States promptly of the date of each signature, the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of
the treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.
This seems a standard provision.

x. Duration and withdrawal

a) Duration

The only provision on duration of an FMCT is contained in article VII para 2 of the
document CD/1777, which indicates a duration of 15 years from the entry into force. It also
indicates that: “No later than six months before the expiration of the treaty, the Parties shall
meet to consider whether it will be extended. By consensus of the Parties, this Treaty may be
extended”.
Existing documents indicate the irreversibility of FMCT commitments as a key feature of a
possible treaty. The compatibility of these two concepts deserves attention. The issue of
duration should also be seen in connection with duration of other treaties. For instance, the
NPT had an initial duration of 25 years.
Article VII para 2 also indicates that consensus of the Parties would be needed for an
extension. It is known that NPT required a simple majority for its extension.

b) Withdrawal

According to international law, any State is, in principle, entitled to withdraw from a Treaty,
by following the withdrawal procedure of such Treaty. Document CD/1777, article VII
states that “each Party has the right to withdraw from the treaty, if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the matter of the treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests, by giving notice of such withdrawal in writing to the depositary, no less than three months in advance of the date of withdrawal from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests”.
We have witnessed in recent years to some instances of withdrawal. I wonder if we can draw some lessons and conclusions for an FMCT.

xi. Eligibility for signature and arrangements for accession after entry into force.

No document other than 1777 addresses this question. According to article IV para 1, the treaty shall be open for signature until its entry into force. According to article IV para 2, the treaty shall remain open at any time for accession by States that have not signed it. No specific requirement is contemplated by the draft for signature or accession. These seem standard provisions.

xii. Review and amendment procedure

No specific provision on review or possibility of amendments are contained in any CD document.

a) Review

This seems an important issue, which is relevant to follow up, implementation and compliance. We know that most disarmament treaties have either a specific implementation mechanism, OPCW, CTBTO, IAEA, or at least a review (BTWC) mechanism. Some have both. Some have none. The risk in this case is that the treaty might fall into oblivion.

b) Amendment procedure

In CD/1777 (Article V, paragraph 2) amendments are mentioned in connection with the duties of the depositary (in connection with the duty to inform States Party of amendments), but no provision exists on how these amendments could be made. Amendment procedures could be envisaged according to procedures to be agreed upon. This needs to be further discussed.
Conclusive Synthesis by Ambassador Carlo Trezza, on Agenda item 2 during the 2007 CD session

Thursday, 8 February (morning):

1) Identification of issues falling under item 2 of the Agenda.

During the first session, dedicated to the identification of issues falling under item 2 of the Agenda, it was noted that the incumbent president had indicated in CD/2007 Conference Room Paper n.3 of 2 February 2007 (indicative timetable of formal and informal meetings of the CD) that “for practical reason the topic of FMCT will be discussed under agenda item 2”. No objection was expressed. Two Delegations indicated that, another issue, namely a possible Convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons, could fall under item 2.

2) General discussion on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The general discussion on an FMCT was intensive and constructive. Some Delegations recalled previous UN, CD, NPT documents regarding FMCT. For many Delegations a negotiation focused on fissile material production, ranks high among the CD priorities. The relevance of such a Treaty for the incoming NPT Review process as well as for a possible discipline of the nuclear fuel cycle was also mentioned. The existing unilateral moratoria on fissile material were mentioned with appreciation. Three delegations indicated a preference to engage in a debate under the denomination: Fissile Material Treaty.

Thursday, 8 February (afternoon):

3) Consideration of sub-issues to be dealt with within a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

No objection was raised to the draft outline for discussion which had been submitted by the coordinator and which had been previously accepted by the 6 Presidents. One Delegation suggested the addition of “National Implementation” as a sub-issue. One group of countries proposed Review and Amendment Procedure and Eligibility for signature and arrangements for accession after entry into force. The outline for discussion has been updated accordingly.

No objections were raised to the drafting of a possible preamble of a Treaty. Most existing disarmament Treaties contain a preambular paragraph. Such a preamble could indicate the purposes of a possible FMCT, the principles on which it is based and possible reference documents. The prevailing general view was that such a question could be better discussed at a later stage.


The definitions of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices contained in document CD/1777 were the main object of discussion. It was noted that such definitions coincide with the IAEA definitions. Some delegations indicated that such definitions should be updated. The possibility of including materials, other than plutonium and uranium, as fissile material to be subject to the Treaty was discussed. There was a general feeling that definitions should be further discussed by experts.


It was noted that the issue of the scope of a Treaty had to do with other existing sub-issues: definitions, stocks, and even compliance and verification. It could however encompass additional aspects such as transfers of fissile material, assistance in production, accountancy, disposition of excess fissile material, decommissioning of production facilities.

**Friday, 9 February (morning):**


It was generally accepted that only fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should fall within the scope of a Treaty. Naval and maritime propulsion, space propulsion, civil research reactors should in principle be exempted. The necessity of defining “nuclear weapons” and “nuclear explosive devices” was mentioned by some delegations in this context.

Several Delegations advocated the involvement of the IAEA in future CD deliberations on FMCT in particular with regard to definitions, stocks and verification. It was recalled that an IAEA representative had been invited to the 2006 session. No objections was expressed to renew such an invitation in 2007. The possible invitation of competent regional bodies such as e.g. EURATOM, ABACC, etc. was also suggested.

Monday 5 March (afternoon):

4) Discussion on possible other issues under item 2 of the Agenda

No other issue was raised under this item on this occasion.


It was recognized that transparency measures are related to the issues of stocks and verification. The existing IAEA safeguard regime for non nuclear-weapons States and for nuclear-weapons States were recalled. Transparency on fissile material inventories already in place by nuclear weapon States was seen by many as a significant confidence building measure. Publication of data on production, decommissioning or conversion of production facilities were also indicated as concrete transparency measure. Similarly, confirmation that fissile material declared as excess is not reverted back to weapon purposes was seen as a step for building confidence. Transparency measures on fissile material already undertaken by some NWS was noted with appreciation.


Useful clarifications were made on the issue of stocks. Several delegations indicated that monitoring variations of stocks could be an appropriate way to assess compliance with the treaty. Previous examples of monitoring of existing stocks of fissile material including material considered as excess of that identified for nuclear weapons were recalled. Different views were expressed on whether an FMCT should refer to past, present or future production. The problem of confidentiality on sizes, location and final destination of stocks was mentioned. The issue of stocks was seen by one delegation as pertinent to possible regional or international balances in nuclear arsenals.
Tuesday, 6 March (afternoon):


Verification remains a complex and difficult issue. No Delegation seems to oppose dealing with such an issue in a negotiating framework. The principle of verifiability “per se” was not challenged but rather its feasibility and effectiveness, including from the point of view of costs. Many Delegations believe that the key provisions of an FMCT should be subject to verification. The IAEA safeguards system was recalled as one - but not necessarily the only - instrument to ensure verification. The question of national versus multilateral means of verification was raised. The possibility of addressing this issue at expert level was also discussed.

ix) National implementation CD/1777.

The issue of national implementation was raised by one delegation. It was recognized that it would be pertinent to an FMCT Treaty and that national legislation could include administrative and criminal provisions. The establishment of a national authority and national points of contact or of focal points was also debated.

x) Settlement of disputes, entry into force, ratifications and depositaries: CD/1714-CD/1773-CD/1777.

For some Delegations, settlement of disputes is linked to the issue of compliance. They consider the relevant provisions contained in art. 3, paras 3, 4, and 5 in document CD/1777 mostly as a compliance mechanisms. The role of the Security Council as an instrument to ensure compliance and to deal with settlement of disputes was also discussed.

Entry into force: CD/1773 – CD/1777

Entry into force was recognized as a delicate issue which needs further deliberations. It was noted that a balance should be kept between the necessity to reach a “critical mass” of ratifying countries on one hand, and of the advisability –on the other- of ensuring the credibility of the Treaty and its entry into force through the involvement of all relevant countries. The experience of other similar treaties should be taken into account also in order to prevent long delays in the entry into force.
Wednesday, 7 March (afternoon)

xi) Duration and withdrawal: CD/1777.

It was noted that document CD/1777 indicates a duration of 15 years. Other similar treaties foresee a longer duration. It was also noted that NPT extension had to be agreed according to a majority criteria, whereas an FMCT -according to document CD/1777- would be extended by consensus.

It was noted that a withdrawal clause is a standard practice in disarmament treaties. The experience of recent withdrawal cases from other treaties could be taken into account.

xii) Eligibility for signature and arrangements for accession after entry into force: CD/1777.

According to document CD/1777, the Treaty shall remain open for accession at any time by States that have not signed it. No specific requirement is contemplated by the document for signature or accession. This seems to be a standard clause.

xiii) Review and amendment procedure.

The possibility of including a review process in the Treaty, in analogy with other disarmament treaties, was discussed. The purpose of such a process would be to ensure continuity, compliance and implementation as well as adaptation to the possible evolutions in the technical field. The periodicity of this review deserves further discussion. Several options of review on follow up procedures were indicated. Much would depend on the final nature of the Treaty. Amendment procedures could be envisaged according to procedures to be agreed upon.

5) Assessment of work done, next steps and future plan for part II.

Deliberations under agenda item 2 were clearly focussed on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They took place in a cooperative, constructive and interactive atmosphere with wide participation of Delegations, including experts from capitals. The large number of documents previously presented, including the draft text of a possible Treaty (CD/1777), were the principal terms of reference for deliberations. Some delegations have announced the presentation of further CD documents. There was a common understanding that deliberations on FMCT should continue also in Part II of the 2007 CD Session. A reference was made by two delegations to the 1995 report. Many Delegations indicated that an FMCT was now ripe for immediate negotiations. The necessity of keeping a balance with other issues to be dealt with in the CD was also recalled. No contrary view was expressed to allocate appropriate additional time to the FMCT issue during Part II of
this year’s CD deliberations and to the inclusion of experts in CD delegations. No objections were raised to extend invitations to competent international organizations (IAEA) and possible regional structures, to deal in particular with the issue of definitions of fissile material but also on issues such as stocks. The presence of legal experts was also advocated.
Annex III

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 3

entitled

"Prevention of an arms race in outer space"
submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 3
Ambassador Paul Meyer of Canada
The following is my assessment of the two rounds of informal discussions on PAROS and the way forward from my perspective as Coordinator for the agenda item three, entitled: “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”.

While participation in the informal meetings was not as wide spread as I would have liked, key concerned delegations were active and certain broad themes were generally supported. I also took into account relevant working papers and plenary statements on this subject that delegations have made.

My preliminary conclusions on the results of the informals to date, which I shared with delegates at the end of the March 9 meeting, were as follows:

1. While there is wide support for existing accords relevant to outer space security, there is recognition that their implementation and universalisation could be improved or enhanced. Many states believe that additional measures and/or agreements would help ensure the continued peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of humanity.

2. There was considerable interest by delegations in the contribution that transparency and confidence building measures could make in this regard. Several specific proposals were discussed. It was noted that such TCBMs could be complementary to eventual international legal instruments regarding PAROS.

3. The elements of a treaty for the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space (CD/1679) were reviewed in a comprehensive manner with the authors of the text providing further explanations and several delegations providing comments and/or questions regarding its contents.

4. While respecting their distinct mandates, there was wide support for establishing a dialogue between the CD and COPUOS on matters of common interest. Several delegates suggested that CD members could benefit from a briefing from the COPUOS chair or his representative.

In terms of a way ahead for consideration by the six Presidents, I would see two basic possibilities: either the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS with a mandate similar to that of the A5 proposal or the continuation of informal work on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space (CD/1679) coupled with further consideration of proposals for transparency and confidence building measures (CD/1778 and CD/1815 refer). In either case, I think PAROS is widely seen as one of the "core issues" which the CD will have to take up as part of its return to substantive work.
I remain at the disposal of the P6 for any further work on this issue that they may wish to assign me.

Paul Meyer
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Coordinator for CD Agenda item #3 on PAROS
Annex IV

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 4

entitled

"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 4
Ambassador Carlos Paranhos of Brazil
1. In line with the organizational framework based on the proposal by the six Presidents of 2007, two rounds of deliberations on Agenda item 4, “Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of use of nuclear weapons” took place on February 15 and 16, and on March 12 and 13 respectively under the facilitation of the Coordinator.

2. In accordance with the work plan proposed by the Coordinator (attachment 1), the discussions during this first round of informal consultations on NSA were centered on an overview of the existing framework, and on the interpretation and clarification of some key elements, like nature of the existing commitments, definition of aggression etc. In particular, the debate encompassed the following issues:

(a) the existing legal framework for NSA:

(i) United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995);
(ii) Declarations of Nuclear Weapon States;
(iii) Protocols to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties and their interpretative Statements, with a discussion of common and distinctive elements; in this connection, issues such as the notions of “aggression”, “deterrence”, and others were also addressed.

(b) new developments:

(i) Results of the NPT Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000;
(ii) UNGA Resolutions on NSAs;

3. The second round of informal consultations was originally planned to concentrate on the examination of possible proposals of elements that might be included in any new international arrangement(s) on NSA. However, on the basis of the discussions held in the first phase and taking into account the sensitivity and complexity of the NSA issue and the apparent lack of consensus at this stage to engage in more specific discussions on the question of a multilaterally legally binding instrument, the Coordinator decided to dedicate the second round on additional meetings to revisit the issues debated in the first round. In particular, he organized the discussions in four different clusters: (i) Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones; (ii) Global Legally-
Binding NSA; (iii) Other questions; and (iv) Towards an Ad Hoc Committee of the CD on NSA. A paper with issues and questions to be discussed was also circulated (attachment 2) and welcomed by all as a useful road map for the future deliberations in the CD.

4. Besides the debate held on the four clusters above, the Coordinator also invited two eminent experts to address the plenary on March 13: Professor Jozef Goldblat, Senior Resident Fellow, UNIDIR, and Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of UNIDIR. Both experts enriched the debate with thought provoking questions, which were pursued in the course of the discussion on NSA (attachments 3 and 4).

5. Although not a new topic for the CD, the discussions on NSA turned into a fair, interactive and open exchange by all, both NWS and NNWS, on the current approaches to and interpretations of NSA putting together old perspectives and new thoughts. The discussion was not, however, conducive so far to bridging the existing gaps and building an agreement on NSA. The Coordinator’s personal assessment of the deliberations is as follows:

a. The debate clearly indicated the importance of the issue of NSA in the context of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In particular, it was underlined that those who had agreed formally to renounce nuclear weapons are entitled to legally-binding commitments by the NWS that they will not be subject to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

b. The debate reconfirmed the persistence of the existing divergences on what would be the best possible approach to advance NSA: pursuing with the existing practice combining the unilateral declarations as noted in UNSC Res. 984, and the legally binding assurances provided through the nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs), or establishing an internationally negotiated, universal, and unconditional legally binding agreement on NSA;

c. The debate indicated that UNSC Res. 984 is an important step forward by the NWS, and reconfirmed the importance of the nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs) for ensuring NSA. It also underlined the limitations of each of these avenues and the prevailing feeling of dissatisfaction by the NNWS with the existing framework for NSA, especially with regard to their geographic limitation, conditionality, legal nature and real added value.

d. Notwithstanding their assessment of the efficiency of the current NSA framework, a clear majority of CD member states expressed the view on the need for a global legally-binding instrument to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
to be negotiated. The debate also showed out divergent views on what would be the most appropriate forum to deal with NSA (CD or NPT);

e. The debate showed different interpretation of some key notions in relation with NSA, such as aggression, self-defense, etc., as well as of the legal status of the existing unilateral declarations of the five NWS and the necessity of their reconfirmation.

6. Against this background, the Coordinator would like to recommend as follows:

a. A more structured round of substantive discussions on NSA should take place during the next session of the CD, based on a revised list of questions, with a view to build upon the 2007 discussions and to try to overcome the existing differences. Meanwhile, consultations on the various issues related to NSA, including on the topics to be included in a revised list of issues and questions should continue;

b. Future discussions should address possible elements, scope, potential beneficiaries and providers of NSA, form and forum of a legally binding treaty on NSA;

7. The Coordinator takes this opportunity to recall the A-5 (CD/1693/Rev.1) and the Amorim proposals (CD/1624) on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on NSA: “The Conference establishes for the duration of the current session an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 entitled ‘Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons’, to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument.”

(Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos)
Ambassador,
Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil, in charge of Disarmament
Attachment 1: Proposed work plan

Agenda item 4: “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

Coordinator: Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha PARANHOS (Brazil)

Objective: the purpose of these informal sessions would be to allow Member States an exchange of views, taking into account the need to build on the foundations of previous work on NSAs, on how this present session of the CD should address the issue of “effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

Week 4

Thursday, 15 February:

10h00 - Overview, taking stock of the issue: the coordinator will invite delegations to present their views on the existing framework providing assurances to non nuclear weapon States and on how best to address agenda item 4 during the present session of the CD.

15h00 – The second informal session could be devoted to a more focused discussion of the nature and scope of existing negative security assurances. In this context, the following list of issues, indicated in document CD/1554 (1 September 1998), which contains the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, might be considered by CD members:

- Declarations of Nuclear-Weapon States
- Protocols to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties and their interpretative statements

(a) Common and distinctive elements

(b) Needed clarifications: invasion; aggression; attack; dependent territories; security commitment; association or alliance
(c) New developments:

- Results of NPT Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000
- UNGA resolutions on NSAs

Friday, 16 February:

10h00 – This third informal session would be devoted to the continuation of the examination of issues discussed in the previous session, focused on the identification of possible ways of advancing the issue of NSAs.

Week 8

Monday, 12 March

15h00 – On the basis of the discussions held during Week 4, Members would also be invited to present proposals or to indicate elements that might be included in any new international arrangement(s) on NSAs, with an indication of format and of forum in which the security assurances would be provided.

Tuesday, 13 March

15h00 – Continuation of the discussion on elements that might be included in any new international arrangement(s) on NSAs.

Wednesday, 14 March

15h00 – Assessment of work to date and next steps.
Attachment 2

I. NWFZs

• Several NWS have said that a NWFZ is the correct framework for granting NSAs.

• What about States in regions where no zone is possible because of the existence of a NWS or a nuclear capable State?

• Also, a nuclear umbrella has been mentioned in the context of discussions on nuclear disarmament, but how does this apply to NSAs?

• How efficient is this framework if some of the zones have not entered into force and not all of the protocols to them have been ratified by NWS, or they have been but with reservations? One delegation has stated that around 100 countries are covered by NSAs through NWFZ treaties.

  o However, only two of the treaties, the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, have entered into effect and have ratifications by almost all of the NWS of their protocols,

  o Thus only 46 States are effectively covered by NSAs through NWFZs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Countries that are members of the CD, but have not ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Tunisia</td>
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</tbody>
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• Can a State be a member of more than one NWFZ?

  o What about North African States that have signed the Treaty of Pelindaba, but want to be part of a Middle East WMD Free Zone?

• Will there be any discussions between the States that are members of the Central Asian NWFZ and the NWS on ratifying the protocols to the treaty?

• There was mention of the need for using the WMD Commission's recommendations for establishing NWFZs, but this is a relatively recent document so is there any prospect for the NWS ratifying the zones that were established before this report?
• What are the discussions/prospects for establishing NWFZ in other parts of the world, if this is perceived as the best way to go?

II. Global Legally-Binding NSAs

• It has been mentioned that there is an issue with definitions for an agreement on NSAs
  • Who should give NSAs?
    o Only NPT NWS
    o All nuclear weapons possessors
  • Who should receive NSAs?
    o All NNWS members of the NPT
    o All NNWS members in compliance with the NPT
    o All

• Also, one delegation mentioned conditionality:
  • What would the NWS want from the NNWS to grant legally-binding NSAs, and what would the NNWS be willing to accept in order to get these NSAs?

• Malaysia mentioned negotiating NSA agreement that would take into account:
  • States that would receive NSA
  • States that would give NSA
  • Scope and nature of NSA
  • Elements that will need to be included
  • Format of NSA

III. Other Questions

• Would legally-binding NSAs serve to improve the international security environment through building confidence?

• A few delegations have expressed the view that military doctrines and new types of nuclear weapons need to be taken into account when discussing NSAs.
  • What is the perceived effect that these doctrines and new types of weapons will have on the granting of NSAs?
• What is the effect of terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, on NWS granting NSAs?

• Is there a real threat to NNWS from nuclear weapons, or is it a perceived threat as one delegation stated?

• What concrete steps could be taken to improve the international security environment that would complement, and/or facilitate legally-binding NSAs?

• The issue of proportionality of response has been brought up by one delegation (Cuba). Would it be inconsistent to respond to a conventional attack with a nuclear weapon?

• Some delegations have mentioned the need to focus on a pragmatic, or practical, approach.
  • What does this entail?
  • What are some preliminary steps that could be taken?

IV. Towards an Ad hoc Committee of the CD on NSA

• Several delegations have suggested the creation an ad hoc committee to discuss a global NSA agreement and possibly conduct negotiations
  • What questions would the ad hoc committee discuss?
  • What would be their mandate?
Thanks for the invitation to speak on a subject I have been studying for many years.

First, allow me to correct certain inaccuracies. There is a tendency to consider Negative Security Assurances as a measure linked directly, if not organically, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is wrong. The idea of not using nuclear weapons against denuclearized regions is much older than the NPT. It was launched many years earlier. In 1968 a conference of non-nuclear-weapon states was convened to obtain a formal non-use pledge from the big powers. Such a pledge would have been a desirable companion of the NPT. But the conference failed.

Incorrect is also the belief that the non-use postulate can be met through additional protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. In fact, only the protocols to the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco have entered fully into force. And this happened several decades after its signing. The protocols related to the 1985 Rarotonga Treaty and to the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty have not entered into force. The protocol to the 1995 Bangkok Treaty has not been signed, whereas that related to the 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty has not been agreed upon. Almost all signatories to the additional protocols have made interpretative statements equivalent to reservations. Some of them contradict the basic provisions of these protocols.

To use or not to use nuclear weapons against any country is a problem of a global nature rather than regional. The proper forum to deal with it is, therefore, this Conference. It is here that the issue of NSA figures on the agenda. And it is here that the nuclear-weapon powers have chosen to submit a formula for NSA. However, this formula, included in the unilateral statements made in April 1995 by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, was never a matter of multilateral discussion or even consultation with other members of the CD. Of the nuclear weapon states, parties to the NPT, only China undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones under any circumstance.

The statements of the four powers I have just mentioned were subsequently incorporated in the UN Security Council Resolution 984, but since they originated in the CD, they ought to be considered in the CD with a view to reaching a consensus document. Such has been the procedure ever since the establishment of the CD.
In the first place there is a need to clarify the conditions that must be met to render the existing assurances valid, as well as the exceptions that render them invalid.

According to the present formulation of the NSA, the nuclear-weapon powers would be free to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state in case of an attack on them or their allies, carried out or sustained in association with a nuclear-weapon state.

In this connection the following questions arise:

* Should a state that possesses nuclear weapons have the right to employ them pre-emptively, that is, in anticipation of an attack, or only after the attack has actually occurred?

* Should a nuclear response to an attack committed with chemical or biological weapons differ from a response to an attack committed with conventional weapons.

* What does the "association" of the attacking state with a nuclear-weapon state mean when it invalidates the NSA? Does it mean direct participation in hostilities or only supplies of arms and/or other military or non-military assistance?

* Is the right of self-defence limited by the international humanitarian law of armed conflict, in particular, by the requirement of proportionality?

* In case of a total ban on use of nuclear weapons, would retaliatory use against a violator of the ban be considered a breach? If not, should only first use be prohibited?

* Should the revised NSA be incorporated in a new SC resolution, the binding force of which is in doubt, or in a legally binding instrument, such as a convention?

A general remark

The question of who should "give" the NSA will not arise if the NSA measure takes the shape of a treaty open for signature or accession by all states, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. Just as the Partial Test Ban, which is adhered to by all states, whether nuclear or not nuclear.
Negative security Assurances
Professor Jozef Goldblat, Senior Resident Fellow, UNIDIR
13 March 2007

As a point of departure for the debate:

- The statements on negative security assurances (NSA) agreed to by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and made in the CD without formal consultations with other CD members.

These statements were subsequently incorporated in the UN Security Council Resolution 984, but since they originated in the CD they ought to be discussed in the CD with a view to reaching a consensus document. In the first place, there is a need to clarify the conditions that must be met in order to render the existing assurances valid, as well as the exceptions that render them invalid.

According to the present formulation of the NSA, the four nuclear-weapon powers, enumerated above, would be free to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state in case of an attack on them or their allies, carried out or sustained in association with a nuclear-weapon state.

In this connection the following questions arise:

- Should a state that possesses nuclear-weapons have the right to employ nuclear weapons pre-emptively, that is, in anticipation of an attack, or only after the attack has actually occurred?

- Should a nuclear response to an attack committed with chemical or biological weapons differ from a response to an attack committed with conventional weapons?

- What does the "association" of the attacking state with a nuclear- weapon state mean when it invalidates the NSA? Does it mean direct participation in hostilities or only supplies of arms and/or other military or non-military assistance?

- Is the right of self-defence limited by the international humanitarian law of armed conflict, in particular, by the requirement of proportionality?

- In case of a total ban on use of nuclear weapons, would retaliatory use against a violator of the ban be considered a breach? If not, should only first use be prohibited?

- Should the revised NSA be incorporated in a new SC resolution, the binding force of which is in doubt, or in a legally binding instrument, such as a convention?
Note: China undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones under any circumstance.
Annex V

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 5

entitled

"New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons"

submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 5

Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria
In my capacity as coordinator on CD Agenda Item 5, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", I have the honour to report on the work done in 2007.

In preparation for the first informal meeting on February 19th, 2007 I held a round of informal consultations with the majority of CD member states. The purpose of the meeting itself was to engage the debate by sharing general observations as well as specific remarks and suggestions with the view to identify the most appropriate way to deal with Item 5 and related matters.

Drawing from the contributions made by delegations at that meeting I listed as relevant the following topics in an informal “bullets paper”:

- A Radiological Weapons Ban;
- The so called “Dirty bomb” threat;
- State actors/actions and non state actors/actions;
- The role of the IAEA and international assistance;
- Effectiveness of the existing international instruments;
- The threat of radiological terrorism;
- A Universal International Agreement to Ban the Development and Manufacture of New Types and Systems of WMD (the preventive approach);
- Definitions of new types and systems of WMD;
- The need to keep Item 5 under active consideration without prejudice to “more pressing” issues under Items 1 to 4;
- The appointment of a Special Coordinator on Item 5 once the CD has started substantial work;

The paper was distributed for consideration by delegations at the opening of the second informal meeting on Item 5, held on February 20th. One delegation made the observation that uranium munitions should also be included in this list of topics selected as relevant for further discussion during the second part of the CD.

At the third informal meeting on Item 5, held on March 16th I summed up the topics listed outlining three broader issues to cover all of the above, as follows:

- Radiological weapons;
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;
- Procedural means of dealing with Item 5 once the CD has started substantial work.
No further observations were made and delegations approved by silence my suggestion to report to the 2007 Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament accordingly.

I received no request on any specific issue to be negotiated in the CD under item 5 in 2007.

Notwithstanding, it is my general conclusion at this stage that there is overall agreement to keep Item 5 under active consideration given that no prejudice is done to discussions and/or negotiations on priority issues related to Items 1 to 4 on the current Agenda of the CD.
Annex VI

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 6

entitled

"Comprehensive programme of disarmament"
submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 6
Ambassador Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia
REPORT OF THE INFORMAL MEETING ON AGENDA ITEM 6
"COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT"

Ambassador Dr. Makarim Wibisono

1. The informal meeting of the agenda item 6 "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" was conducted in two rounds of meeting. The first round was concluded on 22 February and the second one was concluded on 20 March 2007.

2. During the first round of discussion the meeting managed to come up with a list of issues raised by member states, as follows:

- The universalisation of Ottawa Convention (Anti personnel landmines)
- Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
- Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)/AVL
- Cluster Munitions
- Discussion of possible elements of the establishment of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
- Effort to curb the illicit and illegal transfer of the Small Arms and Light Weapons (i.e. illicit air transport of small and lights weapons) and ammunition.
- SALW (transfer controls)
- Issues which contribute to the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament.
  - Negative Security Assurances
  - Nuclear Disarmament
  - PAROS/PPWT
  - Confidence Building Measures (CBM)
  - SSOD 1
  - FMCT

- The issue of missiles in all its aspects
- The use of information and communication technology for military purposes which are contrary to the maintenance of international peace and security.
- Strengthening regimes of Non Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, including terrorism component.
- The appointment of Special Coordinator under agenda Item 6 once CD has started substantial work.
- Conventional arms control at the regional/sub-regional level

3. In the period between the two discussions, the Coordinator had also consultations with a number of CD members as well as with the Secretariat to seek further opinions on what steps to be taken with regard to the list.
4. During these consultations and at the second round of discussion the Coordinator proposed 3 alternatives on the status of the list:

a. To try to identify and focus on one issue in order to have a more detail and in depth discussion;
b. To try to shorten the list in order to avoid duplication and repetition;
c. To convey the list as it is to the President.

5. Based on those consultations, the Coordinator has come up with the preliminary findings as follows:

a. Alternative 1) seemed unlikely to be pursued further because of divergent of views of member states with regard to their respective priority.
b. Alternative 2) is possible and may worth to try, even though it may not be easy.
c. With regard to alternative 3), without prejudice to members’ opinion or position in this regards, the list seemed to be exhaustive at this stage and seemed to be the most acceptable alternative to members of the CD.

6. Therefore member states expressed their wish that the list of issues would be better conveyed to the President as it is. It is hoped that the current list could seriously be taken into account in the future discussions of the agenda item 6.

7. As an agenda item which serves the purpose to accommodate any emerging issues, the list covers a broad range of issues, which to some extent had also been raised in other discussions under different agenda items.

8. At this juncture, it seems that 4 core issues of the Conference - namely Nuclear Disarmament, FMCT, NSA and PAROS -- have drawn larger attention of the member states.

9. However, it would also appropriate to use this agenda item as a testing ground for any possible new emerging issues. The meeting of this agenda item could also serve as a forum to discuss them and the list could also serve as the treasury for future discussions. Member states could make use of this forum to have an exchange of views or inform each other on the measures that have been taken and the possibility to moving them forward.
Annex VII

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2007 session on agenda item 7

entitled

"Transparency in armaments"
submitted by the Co-ordinator on agenda item 7
Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom
Agenda Item 7: Transparency in Armaments

The following is submitted under the authority of Ambassador John Duncan, UK Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, in his capacity as co-ordinator for the Presidents of 2007 for agenda Item 7, "Transparency in Armaments".

The sessions and work plan applicable to agenda item 7, are attached at Annex A. Out of these 6 sessions, the sessions on Wednesday 28th February and Friday 23rd March did not take place due to lack of substantive discussion on any of the issues raised.

The first part of the exercise was dedicated to stock taking of issues previously raised under agenda item 7 and the identification of new issues. Having ascertained the issues delegations had raised in the first part, a list of possible issues for the second part was compiled and used as a basis for further discussion. This is attached at Annex B.

The list at Annex B is of the list of issues raised by individual CD members, which might be usefully discussed in the CD, and is not in any particular order of priority. It is not a consensus list as a number of States expressed reservations about whether the CD is the correct forum for discussion of particular issues. Further debate and discussion will be required to deepen and broaden understanding of the issues, without prejudice to any final outcome, before a consensus will be possible on which issues could be taken forward and how the CD might provide added value.

Recommendation

Many CD members consider that Item 7 remains relevant as an agenda item for the Membership to put forward information regarding their own policy and development on certain weapons, initiatives to increase the transparency in armaments and general information sharing.

I recommend to the P6 Presidencies for 2007 that the co-ordinator maintains his informal role under the Presidencies for the remainder of 2007 and continues to consult on the issues covered in the list.

I would suggest that there be 3 informal sessions during the second session of the Conference on Disarmament dedicated to this agenda item in order to allow CD members the opportunity to discuss the issues detailed at Annex B, or to raise new issues of concern.
If agreeable I would plan to produce a summary paper at the end of the second session of the Conference taking each of the issues in turn and identifying, where appropriate and on the basis of the discussions themselves, areas for further work.

J S Duncan
Annex A

Preliminary outline for discussions on Agenda Item 7: Transparency in Armaments

Co-ordinator:  H.E. John Duncan,
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament.

Proposed Work Plan

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Aims

The process will be member driven and aim to identify priority issues, which are to be considered under agenda item 7. The first three sessions will review existing issues and any additional issues which delegations wish to raise. The last three sessions will aim to identify whether there is consensus for further action under any of these headings, and what form of action this may take.
Issues that have previously been raised under Agenda item 7

Between 1993 and 1994, the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments examined such issues as:-

- the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms;
- military holdings (organisation, structure, size);
- procurements through national production;
- the transfer of conventional arms (including codes of conduct);
- transparency in the transfer of high technology for military applications;
- transparency in the holdings of weapons of mass destruction;
- confidence building measures to promote TIA;
- the export of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment;
- regional cooperation in the area of transparency;

The last report of is contained in CD/1281.
Annex B

Item 7: Transparency in Armaments

Issues raised under this agenda item during the 2007 session:

- An Arms Trade Treaty
- Cluster Munitions
- Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)
- Phosphorus Munitions
- Regional measures to improve TIA
- Scope of UN Arms Register
- The principal focus of agenda item 7
- The role of a Special Co-ordinator for this agenda item
- Transfer Ban on Arms to Terrorists
- Transparency in Nuclear Weapons
- Universalisation and implementation of existing agreements and arrangements

I have the honour to transmit to you the statement delivered on 21 March in Cherbourg by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy.

Please distribute this information as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Jean-François Dobelle
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament
SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Presentation of the nuclear submarine “Le Terrible”

Cherbourg - Friday 21 March 2008

Ladies and gentlemen,
Mr. President (thank you for your remarkable work),
Mr. Minister, dear Hervé Morin,
Mr. Minister, dear Jean-Marie Bockel,
Members of Parliament,
Mr. Mayor,
General - I don't know why I say “General”, as there must be several,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very proud to be here with you in Cherbourg to salute all those who built Le Terrible, the fourth and latest addition to our strategic fleet. Right here, in 1967, General de Gaulle came to pay tribute to those of your colleagues who had built Le Redoutable. Like your predecessors, you may take pride in this submarine - a symbol of France’s high technology and its resolve to remain master of its destiny. Very few countries in the world have the ability to realize such an industrial and technological achievement. It took decades of effort to master such know-how, which some of our partners have neglected and thus have difficulty replicating. I want to tell you today how proud France is of you. I have come here on behalf of France to pay tribute to your work and your great skills.

Our nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines are an essential part of our nuclear deterrent capability. This capability is the product of workers, technicians, engineers, men and women in uniform, and scientists - military and civilian. I have come to tell you that maintaining the capabilities required for deterrence at the highest level is an objective that is fundamental to our security.

I wish to pay tribute to the memory of the 11 French citizens - your colleagues, friends, husbands and fathers - who died in the Karachi attack on 8 May 2002. I know that their loved ones are here with us. I have told them that I will meet them within the next two weeks at the Elysée, along with the Defence Minister, to review the progress of the investigation. I want to convey my deepest sympathies to them. The nation has not forgotten them and will never forget them.

I know how much dedication and courage are shown by all those who confront danger in order to guarantee our security and peace, in Europe and throughout the world. I want to express to them, on behalf of all the French people, my support and gratitude. France is proud of its soldiers, and they have France’s trust.

The national tribute we paid last Monday to the soldiers of the First World War reminded us, as if it were necessary, that in the past, Europe was a battlefield - to put it bluntly, a field of ruins. Most of the major conflicts were fought between European States. Thanks to the construction of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, we have built a Europe of peace. Never in
history has our national security been so intimately tied to that of our allies and our European partners. Our common destiny lies with the European Union, and beyond that with all nations that share our values: peace, freedom, fraternity, the defence of the equal and irreducible dignity of human beings regardless of their origin, their beliefs or the colour of their skin.

But peace can never be taken for granted. Large-scale terrorism has shown us this. Today we are facing the assertiveness of new Powers, new ambitions, new threats and thus new rivalries. Added to that are the risks stemming from the competition for access to raw materials and energy, the diversion of technologies for aggressive purposes, and climate change. In this interdependent world, our interests have no borders, even though they are geographically defined.

The world has changed since the 1994 White Paper, which drew the conclusions from the end of the cold war and the Gulf War. It is different, more unstable, more changing, more complex. That does not mean it is necessarily more dangerous, it means it is less predictable than previously. Our vulnerabilities have therefore changed, and our strategy must be reassessed accordingly. It is not my wish - I do not have the right to wish - that France should prepare for the previous war, as it has done all too often in the past, or find itself unprepared in the face of a strategic surprise.

It is my responsibility to guarantee that our armed forces are always in a position to stand up to the threats facing our nation. I want to forge the defence policy that France needs, not a policy based on old habits or previous certainties. That is why I called for a new White Paper to be drawn up on defence and national security - not only on defence. Because from now on, it is just as likely that the security of the French people will be in question far from our borders as within our territory.

For the same reason, I want us to be able to confront all the problems directly. I owe our armed forces transparency and truth. I owe transparency and truth to the entire French people.

The truth is as follows: upon my arrival in office, I found that the financial outlook was particularly difficult. According to the Defence Ministry’s financial forecasts, to modernize the armed forces as agreed by 2015, we would have had to raise our defence procurement budget by 6 billion euros a year, an increase of 40 per cent. Who can tell me such an objective would be credible?

These financial forecasts represent an obstacle that is incompatible with the commitment I made to the French people and our European partners to straighten out the nation’s finances, which have been in the red for over 25 years.

I have no intention of continuing the methods of the past, those which placed me in this situation, because everyone loses thereby: the nation, which is legitimately concerned that its defence and security needs should be adequately met; the head of State, the Government and Parliament, which are facing the need for painful readjustments; and first and foremost the armed forces, which have repeatedly had to deal with delays in major weapons programmes and their consequences - ageing equipment and skyrocketing maintenance costs. I refuse to give way before a fait accompli and resign myself to having no room to manoeuvre. The duty of any
administration, civilian or military, is to do everything it can to preserve the President’s room to manoeuvre and the Government’s freedom to act. The duty of any political leader is to create room to manoeuvre in order to be able to exercise his or her decision-making ability fully.

I have chosen to build the future with a few simple guidelines: our strategy, our ambitions, our alliances, the European objective. And a principle, equally simple: I absolutely reject the idea of lowering our guard. Defence is the second-largest item in the State’s budget. It will remain so. It will not be reduced. I have already made that commitment and I solemnly renew it now. But I will offer choices, avoided for too long, to reconcile the protection of the French people, the country’s independence and its financial sovereignty.

I will not rely on 15-year-old assessments to guide the country’s military effort. I have called for a White Paper for the beginning of the twenty-first century which will put forward a global concept of defence and national security for our country and its interests for the 15 years to come. Taking into account the major tasks which our armed forces must accomplish, the White Paper must formulate clear guidelines that will allow us, together with the Defence Minister, to make strategic and political choices.

The White Paper Commission has acknowledged that the proposed model for the armed forces in 2015 is obsolete. Everybody knows it was unrealistic, and yet no one told the French people. Well, I am telling them. I refuse to accept this framework as a starting point, just to decide what we would have to give up. It is futile to endlessly pursue models that cannot be realized. How pointless it is to seek to build a relevant model while contenting oneself with the deterioration of obsolete models! In fact, can there be such a thing as an unchanging model for the armed forces for the defence of our country? When threats change, when our strategy evolves, is it not normal for our military effort to be modified too?

To ensure the protection of the French people, their defence structures must be as operational and efficient as possible. I will draw all the necessary conclusions from this with the maximum degree of realism.

We will carry out these reforms. The French people have given me this mandate. This exemplary process of reform and rationalization, already initiated by Hervé Morin, will be accomplished entirely for the benefit of our defence structures and those who serve them.

I have decided to initiate a process of deliberation so that we will be able to prepare for these reforms constructively and without taboos.

The White Paper Commission, chaired by Jean-Claude Mallet, brings together eminent figures from a wide variety of fields. Parliament has been closely associated with it from the outset and will be at each stage of deliberations. The committees of the Senate and the National Assembly will be consulted on the draft of the White Paper. The White Paper will be presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister. I would have liked to do this myself, as head of the armed forces, but for the moment the Constitution prevents me from doing so. I would like the forthcoming revision of the Constitution to correct what has become an anomaly and, more generally, to strengthen the prerogatives of Parliament, especially those that deal with our
national defence effort. This must be debated as much as is necessary. Parliament will rule on the
choices I will make, with the Prime Minister and the other Ministers, because at the end of the
process, a new military planning law will be submitted to it.

I will make my decisions when the time comes, and I will explain them to the nation. You
may rest assured that I will shoulder all my responsibilities, since what is most worrisome is not
the prospect of making choices, but the lack of decisions. Choices will be made so that our
defence policy is as useful and relevant as possible, the tool of great ambition for France and for
Europe.

My first duty as head of State and commander-in-chief is to ensure that in all
circumstances France, its territory, its people and its institutions are safe. And that in all
circumstances, our national independence and freedom to take decisions are preserved.

Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of that. It is the weighty responsibility of any
President of the Republic to take the measure of this reality. Today I would like to share my
thoughts on this matter with you.

Of course, over the 15-year period covered by the White Paper, France no longer runs the
risk of an invasion. There are, however, other threats to our security. Certain nuclear stockpiles
keep on growing. Nuclear proliferation, biological proliferation, chemical proliferation continue,
along with the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Today we must all be mindful of the fact that the nuclear missiles of even distant Powers
can reach Europe in less than half an hour. Currently only the great Powers have such
capabilities. But other countries, in Asia and the Middle East, are vigorously developing ballistic
capabilities.

I am thinking in particular of Iran. Iran is increasing the range of its missiles, while grave
suspicions surround its nuclear programme. It is indeed Europe’s security that is at stake.

In the face of proliferation, the international community must remain united, the
international community must remain resolute. Because we want peace, we must show no
weakness to those who violate international rules. But all those who abide by them are entitled to
fair access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

But we must also be prepared to confront other risks besides proliferation. The imagination
of our potential aggressors is boundless when it comes to exploiting the vulnerabilities of
Western societies. And tomorrow, technological breakthroughs may create new threats.

That is why we are so attached to our nuclear deterrent. It is strictly defensive. The use of
nuclear weapons would clearly be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, a

Our nuclear deterrent protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating
from a State - wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take. Our vital interests, of
course, include the elements that constitute our identity and our existence as a nation State, as
well as the free exercise of our sovereignty. My responsibility, as head of State, is to evaluate the
extent of these interests continuously, for in a changing world, they cannot remain static.
All those who would threaten our vital interests would expose themselves to severe retaliation by France resulting in damage they would find unacceptable and out of proportion to their objectives. Their centres of political, economic and military power would become priority targets.

It cannot be ruled out that an adversary might miscalculate the extent of our vital interests or our determination to safeguard them. Within the context of deterrence, it would be possible, in that event, to send a nuclear warning that would underscore our resolve. It would be aimed at re-establishing deterrence.

In order for deterrence to be credible, the head of State must have a wide range of options to deal with threats. Our nuclear forces have been, and will continue to be, adapted accordingly. The M51 intercontinental missile, which *Le Terrible* will carry as soon as it is commissioned in 2010, and the ASMPA missile, which the Rafale will carry starting this year, fit with our risk assessment over the period covered by the White Paper.

I am also convinced that it is essential to maintain two nuclear components, one sea-based and the other air-based. The characteristics of each, notably in terms of range and precision, make them complementary. The head of State must be able to count on them at all times in order to respond to any unexpected event.

In order to preserve our freedom of action, missile defence capabilities against a limited strike could be a useful complement to nuclear deterrence, without of course replacing it. Let us not lose sight of the fact that missile defence will never be effective enough to preserve our vital interests. On this issue, France has chosen a pragmatic approach. It is in this spirit that we are taking part in the collective effort within the Atlantic Alliance, dear Hervé Morin. We have solid technical know-how in this area that could be drawn on when the time comes.

Guaranteeing national security is expensive. Each year, the nuclear deterrent costs the French half what we spend on justice or transport. This cost must of course be kept under control as much as possible, in the financial context I mentioned earlier. But I am determined to shoulder this cost. It is neither a matter of prestige nor of rank, it is quite simply the nation’s life insurance policy.

Our deterrent also takes into account changes in the world, in our alliances and in the building of Europe.

Together with the United Kingdom, we have taken a major decision. It is our assessment that there is no situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.

As for the Atlantic Alliance, its security is also based on nuclear deterrence. British and French nuclear forces contribute to it. This has been part of NATO’s strategic concept since 1974, and it remains relevant today. I say to all our allies: France is and will remain true to its commitments under article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.
As for Europe, it is a fact. By their very existence, French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe’s security. Any aggressor who might consider challenging it must be mindful of this.

Let us, together, draw all the logical conclusions from this situation. I propose to engage those European partners who would so wish in an open dialogue on the role of deterrence and its contribution to our common security.

Our commitment to the security of our European partners is the natural expression of our ever-closer union. The Lisbon Treaty marks a historic step forward in this regard.

I would now like to turn to disarmament. It is a subject I would like to discuss with realism and clear-sightedness. When international security improves, France draws the necessary conclusions. It did so with the end of the cold war.

Rather than making speeches and promises that are not translated into deeds, France acts. We respect our international commitments, and notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. France has an exemplary record, unique in the world, with respect to nuclear disarmament. France was the first State, with the United Kingdom, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the first State to decide to shut down and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes; the only State to have transparently dismantled its nuclear testing facility in the Pacific; the only State to have dismantled its ground-launched nuclear missiles; the only State to have voluntarily reduced the number of its nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines by a third.

France has never engaged in the arms race. France never manufactured all the types of weapons that it was technologically capable of designing. France applies a principle of strict sufficiency: it maintains its stockpile at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context. I am dedicated to this principle. As soon as I assumed my duties, I asked for this strict sufficiency to be reassessed.

This has led me to decide on a new measure of disarmament: with respect to the airborne component, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft will be reduced by a third.

I have also decided that France could and should be more transparent with respect to its nuclear arsenal than anyone has ever been.

After this reduction, our stockpile will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half the maximum number of warheads we had during the cold war.

In giving this information, France is completely transparent because it has no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile.

Furthermore, I confirm that none of our weapons are targeted against anyone.

Finally, I have decided to invite international experts to observe the dismantling of our military fissile material production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule.
But let us not be naive; the very basis of collective security and disarmament is reciprocity.

Today, eight nations in the world have declared they have conducted nuclear tests. I am proposing to the international community an action plan which I call on the nuclear Powers to resolutely commit to by the time of the 2010 NPT Conference.

Thus I invite all countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, beginning with China and the United States, which signed it in 1996. It is time for ratification.

I urge the nuclear Powers to dismantle all their nuclear testing sites in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;

I call for the immediate launching of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes, and to establish without delay a moratorium on the production of such material;

I invite the five nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to reach agreement on transparency measures;

I propose opening negotiations on a treaty banning short-range and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles;

I ask all nations to accede to and implement the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, as France has done.

At the same time, the entire international community must mobilize in all other fields of disarmament. Here too, France will make its contribution.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I have come to address a simple message to the nation: its security will be assured against the threats in the world, and France will play its full role to defend peace and its values. France’s ambition must be worthy of its history.

This requires clear-mindedness concerning strategic realities and choices.

It requires having the courage to take the necessary decisions. You can count on me to do so.

Above all, it requires being clear and firm on the essentials. And what is essential is safeguarding the vital interests of France.

Here in Cherbourg, I offer you a guarantee. France will not lower its guard.

Thank you.
LETTER DATED 14 AUGUST 2008 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON BEHALF OF THE 2008
PRESIDENTS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE REPORTS OF THE
SEVEN COORDINATORS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON THE WORK DONE DURING THE 2008
SESSION ON AGENDA ITEMS 1 TO 7

On 5 February of this year, the six 2008 Presidents of the Conference had appointed the
following as Co-ordinators to work under the auspices of the 2008 Presidents:

Ambassador Martabit of Chile for agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on nuclear
disarmament, Ambassador Tarui of Japan for agenda items 1 and 2 with a focus on a fissile
material cut-off treaty, Ambassador Grinius of Canada for agenda item 3 entitled
“Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” Ambassador Mbaye of Senegal for agenda
item 4 entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,” Ambassador Draganov of Bulgaria for
agenda item 5 entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of
such weapons; radiological weapons,” Ambassador Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka for agenda
item 6 entitled “Comprehensive program of disarmament,” and Ambassador Puja of
Indonesia for agenda item 7 entitled “Transparency in armaments.”

In my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament and through you,
Mr. Secretary-General, and on behalf of all six 2008 Presidents, I would like to warmly thank all
the seven Co-ordinators for the important work done under their professional guidance. The
seven Co-ordinators’ reports on the first round of discussions between 5 February 2008 and
29 February 2008, submitted to the President, and attached to this letter in annexes I-VII, capture
their most valued work and should be one important point of reference for future activities of our
Conference. In response to requests from Conference members, the Co-ordinators held another
round of informal consultations on the seven agenda items between 31 July 2008 and
12 August 2008. The seven Co-ordinators presented oral reports on their findings on
13 August 2008, which reaffirmed the conclusions reached in the attached reports.
Consequently, I should be grateful if *this letter together with its seven annexed documents* could be issued as *one* official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member states of the Conference and non-member states participating in its work.

(Signed): The President of the Conference on Disarmament

Christina Rocca
Ambassador

Annexes: I to VII
The seven Co-ordinators’ written Reports to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2008 session on agenda items 1 to 7
Annex I

Report on the informal discussions on CD agenda item 1 “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and agenda item 2 “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

I have the pleasure of presenting to you my Report on the informal plenary meetings coordinated by Chile on agenda item 1 of the CD Agenda on “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and agenda item 2 on “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament.

This exercise was meant to provide an opportunity for all members of the Conference to share their views on these matters, to validate items identified previously, suggest new elements, if any, and determine what aspects would deserve special attention, all this with a view to facilitating the adoption of a Program of Work which will allow the CD to appropriately resume the work incumbent upon it.

Consequently, at the first meeting, which was held on the 5th of last February, the Coordination presented a working plan, in which due regard was paid to past efforts made in this respect, in particular by Ambassador Park, in his capacity of “friend of the Presidents” and by Ambassador Strommen, in his capacity of “coordinator” of item 1 of the Agenda under the P-6 format.

At the first meeting, the subject was introduced by the Head of UNIDIR, Mrs. Patricia Lewis, who, among other things, mentioned some practical steps that could be taken in the near future with a view to reducing the nuclear threat and how we can face the problem here in the CD and at the United Nations. Her useful remarks and suggestions, we are sure, will be carefully considered by the delegations. Her statement was followed by national and joint statements of a general nature.

The second meeting, that took place at 19 February 2008, was structured according to the listing of the items mentioned in the working plan, i.e.:

- convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer;
- threat of use or actual use of nuclear weapons and their elimination;
- ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- the establishment of a subsidiary body to take up this matter;
- principles on transparency, irreversibility and verification; role of this type of arms and the political concepts of security;
- and, finally, the de-alerting and de-creasing of the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems.
At this second meeting statements were made by a number of delegations and groups of
delegations.

On this occasion valuable information was provided, important reflections were shared and
interesting proposals were presented, which confirm the members’ interest in a wide range of
topics related to Nuclear Disarmament.

The proposals were collected by the Coordination and will be presented to you, Mr. President
and to the P-6 in an updated version of the summary elaborated by Ambassador Strommen last
year. The said summary maintains its structure, which consists of five main headings:

- convention prohibiting nuclear weapons;
- other legal instruments;
- ad hoc committee-phased programme nuclear disarmament;
- transparency and confidence building measures; and
- other specific measures.

It may be noted that the various conventions/legal instruments listed in the summary of proposal
generally reflect a certain degree of overlapping, or perhaps even duplication. In this regard,
delegations may wish to consider whether it would be possible, or desirable, to perhaps
streamline or narrow the list during future informal discussions with a view to further focussing
our deliberations on nuclear disarmament.

Delegations, except for a few, did not seem ready to enter into an interactive debate on
contrasting positions with a view to progressing towards an eventual negotiation. Although all
States consider Nuclear Disarmament to be an objective of primary importance, this does not
imply that they have a clear idea on how to tackle this matter. This situation, which has to do
with timing, priorities, linkage, resources, interests, definitions, among others, keeps on dividing
delegations and confirms the “deadlock” we are facing.

It was considered worthwhile to adopt a pragmatic step-by step approach, even if progress may
be slow. It was recognized that this does not mean abandoning more substantive and
comprehensive options.

We consider that in spite of the present circumstances there exists a margin of support or
convergence in favour of transparency and confidence building measures. These dimensions
could pave the way towards future work. We admit, however, that not everybody agrees on this
approach. The possibility of having a space where positions can be expressed and interactively
debated, as well as the continuity of the debate, definitely constitute a contribution in this
respect.
Delegations appreciate the sharing of information concerning Nuclear Disarmament, particularly if this information stems from nuclear weapon States. Their openness to dialogue and to answering questions is highly valued. Delegations recognize the importance of visits of personalities and of the information the latter convey on those occasions.

By way of conclusion, I would like to mention that the Chilean Coordination, without delving deeply into the different topics, has limited itself to highlighting the main elements of the different statements that were made in the two February sessions. We are open to listen to your comments and to collect your eventual suggestions.

Geneva, 6 March 2008
Appendix

Informal discussions on CD agenda item 1 “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and 2 “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

Summary of proposals made during the informal plenary meetings.

Co-ordinator, Ambassador Juan Martabit of Chile

Convention prohibiting nuclear weapons

- a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat of use or actual use of nuclear weapons and their elimination (as expressed in the SSOD1 final declaration and action plan)

- negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe

- establish a subsidiary body, preferably under item 2 of the agenda, to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

- negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- comprehensive overview over the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear weapons free world, including:
  - prohibition to acquire, develop, test, produce, stockpile, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons
  - control of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings
  - steps for destruction of all nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles
  - mechanisms for verifying destruction and ensuring compliance
  - international organisation to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under international control
  - disarmament and non-proliferation education
Other legal instruments

- negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons
- negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States
- negotiate an FMCT/FMT
- agreement on specific and legally binding measures to achieve the universalization of the NPT
- multilateral agreement to reduce the operational readiness of deployed nuclear systems.

Ad hoc committee - phased programme nuclear disarmament

- an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention.
- nuclear weapon states must fulfil disarmament obligations under the NPT
- multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals by a certain number or percentage
- reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

Transparency and Confidence Building Measures

- principles on transparency, irreversibility, verification of nuclear disarmament, including data sharing, international monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, registry
- NWS to provide information on number and types of nuclear weapons in current arsenals and projected levels in five years. Provide status on weapons and delivery systems removed from active service or dismantled, and conversion efforts
- regular (formalised) briefings to CD members by declared nuclear weapon states
- decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (General Assembly Resolution 62/36)
- de-alerting and de-activation of nuclear weapon systems
- compliance mechanism that could consist of technical assistance in destruction, procedures for national implementation, dispute resolution procedure, penalties for non-compliance, recourse to the UN Security Council, GA and ICJ for further action
- reduction/elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines
Other specific measures

- entry into force of the CTBT, maintaining the moratorium on nuclear test explosions
- implementation of NTP Review Conferences’ agreements (1995 and 2000), in particular the 13 practical steps and seize the opportunity of the 2010 Conference
- Dialogue between nuclear weapon states
- nuclear-weapon free zones
- establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East
- negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument
- the link between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
- consideration by an ad hoc committee of: simultaneous pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; prominence of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; asymmetric possession of WMD; terrorists and WMD; cooperation in the field of nuclear energy
- adopt a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the CD, and to establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate the four core issues
- reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons
Annex II

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on the informal meetings during the first part of the 2008 session by the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Sumio TARUI, Coordinator on Agenda Items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Geneva, 10 March 2008)

- The informal meetings took place on 6 and 20 February 2008. Preliminary remarks were made by the Coordinator on 6 February (Appendix I). The deliberations were based on the “Proposed Outline for the discussions on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Appendix II). General discussions took place both on 6 and 20 February 2008. Substantive discussions on each sub-issue were preceded by an introductory overview of the previous discussions in 2006 and 2007 (Appendix III).

- The President of the CD invited the IAEA to send an official to make a presentation on this subject including the aspect of verification, but the IAEA replied that due to time constraints it was impossible at that time for any relevant IAEA staff to travel to Geneva.

- The Coordinator’s personal summary and assessment of the substantive deliberations are as follows:

(a) In the general discussions on 6 and 20 February 2008, no delegation expressed opposition to negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Most delegations called for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, many of them stressing the need to commence at the earliest possible time or without delay. Delegations stressed the importance of an FMCT that would contribute to nuclear disarmament, as well as the need to include verification and stocks. While the need for clarity regarding the mandate on negotiations before its commencement was expressed, it was noted that the negotiations should be started without any preconditions on the outcome of the negotiations and that the differences over issues such as verifiability and the scope would be resolved in the negotiations. A reference was made by two delegations to the 1995 report (CD/1299). The need to agree on a comprehensive and balanced program of work was mentioned. One delegation explicitly indicated a preference to the abbreviation FMT, instead of FMCT.

(b) With regard to the consideration of sub-issues on 20 February 2008, no new positions were put forward except for some comments on the introductory remarks by the Coordinator (Annex 3). It was stressed that an FMCT would not require any additional burden beyond what the NPT non-nuclear-weapon States already subscribed to. The positions of delegations on the sub-issues were reiterated also in their general discussions. At the end of the consideration of the sub-issues, it was emphasized that since the key ingredients of any FMCT have been made quite clear, the question now is how to put those ingredients together to form an enduring treaty in the negotiations.
(c) In view of the work done in the two informal meetings as summarized above, the objective of the informal meetings, which was to revalidate the previous discussions, was overall achieved, without prejudice to the national positions in the actual negotiations. The overall atmosphere of the discussions was cordial and constructive. The Coordinator also has the impression that delegations are not keen on repeating their already well-known positions, but see merit in the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT itself, notwithstanding differences over the modality and the scope of such negotiations.

(d) Other than the issue of an FMCT, a few delegations in the two informal meetings touched upon issues such as nuclear disarmament in general, the early entry into force of the CTBT, the post-START treaty, missile defense, the 2010 NPT review process, the globalization of the INF Treaty, negative security assurances, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
Appendix I

Preliminary Remarks by the Coordinator for agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Ambassador Sumio TARUI (Geneva, 6 February 2008)

- Today is the first informal meeting for 2008 under agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I would like to thank the six Presidents (P6) for appointing me as the coordinator for these Agenda Items.

- As I was appointed the coordinator for these Agenda Items with a general focus on an FMCT on the 5 February 2008, I presented a proposed outline for the discussions to the President. The President directed the Secretariat to circulate it to all the CD Member States yesterday so that they could be prepared in advance to participate in the substantive discussions. Every delegation should now have a copy.

- As can be seen from the proposed outline, I basically followed last year’s structure for our discussions. The objectives of the sessions would be to revalidate the substantive discussions held in 2006 and 2007 and to refresh issues and sub-issues. Drawing from last year’s coordinator report on agenda item 2 to the President, as contained in CD/1827, Annex II, the proposed outline enumerates some major sub-issues.
Appendix II

Proposed Outline for the discussions on Agenda Items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
Coordinator Ambassador Sumio TARUI (Japan)

Note- The objectives of these sessions would be to revalidate the substantive discussions of last year, as reported to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Carlo Trezza of Italy, the Coordinator on agenda item 2 of 2007 (CD/1827, AnnexII), and to refresh issues and sub-issues within agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device (FMCT). The following is a proposed outline for the discussions on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on an FMCT.

Week 3
6 February, 2008 (Wednesday):
(1) General discussions on an FMCT

Week 5
20 February, 2008 (Wednesday):
[(l) General discussions on an FMCT (if necessary)]

(2) Consideration of major sub-issues to be dealt within an FMCT
   (i) Definition
   (ii) Scope
   (iii) Production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes
   (iv) Transparency
   (v) Stocks
   (vi) Compliance and Verification
   (vii) Other sub-issues

(3) Discussions on possible other issues under agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on an FMCT
Appendix III

 Introductory remarks on each sub-issue by the Coordinator

(i) Definition

- With regard to the definition of fissile material, at the broadest level, there were two major groups of positions. One group of countries sought terminology close to that used by the IAEA, and the other group sought to formulate a new definition for an FMCT. It seemed that the definition by the former group tended to be broader than the one by the latter group.

- In the group that sought terminology close to that used by the IAEA, there was a difference in opinion on what terms should be referenced in a treaty. One side supported the term “direct use material”, as used in the IAEA safeguards, and the other side supported the term “special fissionable material”, as stipulated in Article 20 of the IAEA Statue. The rationale behind a broad definition was that an FMCT should contain the broadest definition possible in order to be meaningful as a nuclear disarmament treaty.

- Furthermore, under “direct use material”, a view was expressed that both irradiated and un-irradiated direct use material should be included, whereas another view was expressed that irradiated plutonium should be excluded from “direct use material” and its scope should be limited to separated plutonium.

- The group that sought to come up with a new definition for an FMCT indicated that the definition of fissile material should be limited to purely weapon-grade fissile material. It was pointed out that the broader the definition is, the more difficult verification will be.

(ii) Scope

(Overview)

- The issue of scope is multifaceted. In 2006, for example, some delegations touched upon the scope of definitions for fissile material or the scope of safeguards, while others discussed the scope of core obligations within an FMCT. In 2007, the Coordinator, focusing on the scope of core obligations, summarized the views expressed by delegations as follows: (1) whether to ban only “future production”; (2) whether a possible prohibition of production should include an obligation to close-down or decommission facilities producing fissile material or to convert them to non-nuclear-weapon use; (3) whether the “reversion” of closed-down or decommissioned facilities back to production should be prohibited; and (4) whether the “diversion” of fissile material from non-nuclear weapon purposes to nuclear weapon purposes after the entry into force of an FMCT should be subject to a ban.
• A view was added to the Coordinator’s remark that a ban should also extend to: (1) the “reversion” back to nuclear weapon purposes of fissile material voluntarily declared as excess for national security needs by states possessing nuclear weapons; (2) the receipt of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes from another state; and (3) the assistance to another state in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. Furthermore, from the perspective of strengthening nuclear security, it was pointed out that it would be beneficial to examine newly introducing systems of state accounting and control and physical protection obligations on stocks of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes.

(iii) Production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes

• A view was put forward in last year’s discussions that an FMCT should not interfere with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since, among other things, some states might use HEU in the future for their nuclear power plants and research reactors. Also, in addition to naval vessels, commercial ships and spacecraft may also use HEU for future propulsion. Moreover, because such uses would come under the scope of IAEA safeguards, some countries indicated that the input of the IAEA would be valuable. There was no delegation that stated the production of fissile material for naval nuclear propulsion should be banned.

• As HEU can be used in both commercial and naval propulsion, a view was expressed that this point should be adequately considered when examining definitions.

(iv) Transparency

• A view was expressed that the issues of transparency, stocks and verification are connected and that since effective verification cannot be achieved, there is no need for a transparency provision.

• Another view was put forward that transparency for stocks would compromise physical security due to proliferation sensitive information. A question was raised regarding this view on how a declaration of the aggregate amount of fissile material would compromise physical security.

• It was also stated that a great deal of old past records on fissile material production are lost, and it would be difficult to accurately and comprehensively track down past production. On this point, it was argued that such records must have remained within military organizations via regulations on handling classified information.

• Apart from the verification issue, some delegations stated that it is necessary to at least report the aggregate amount of fissile material in order to provide a baseline for assessing treaty compliance.
(v) Stocks

- On the issue of stocks, traditionally, there has been the position that fissile material stocks should be comprehensively included in an FMCT and that a plan to force the future reduction of stocks is necessary.

- Another view is that stocks in some form should be included in the scope of an FMCT (e.g., ban the reversion of declared excess stocks back to nuclear weapon use; ban the conversion of civil stocks to weapon use; ban the transfer of stocks to a third country; state accounting and control obligations; reporting of aggregate stocks,” etc.). This closely relates to the issues of scope and transparency.

- The view that the scope of an FMCT should be limited to the future production and that the existing stocks should not be covered by such a treaty was reiterated.

- An explanation was given that stocks are not necessarily stored according to their intended purposes, and that it is possible for stocks to be completely inter-changed between nuclear weapon use and naval propulsion use. Many states gave a negative view that such a situation could lead to an actual future increase of production in nuclear weapons.

(vi) Compliance and Verification

- In relation to verification, most states take the position that the introduction of a verification mechanism is desirable, based on the principle of non-discrimination and irreversibility. A two-stage approach, similar to the NPT, was proposed to explore an agreement on verification arrangements separately and subsequent to agreement on the basic norm of an FMCT.

- One delegation explained how it reached its conclusion that “effective verification” is impossible. They demonstrated the level required for effective verification, and cited the difficulty of detecting undeclared activities due to the difficulty of monitoring nuclear weapon production facilities in a manner that would not compromise proliferation sensitive information. Additionally, the delegation noted that given that fissile material for naval propulsion purposes would be exempt from the scope of verification, it will be impossible to verify the non-diversion to nuclear weapon purposes of material produced after the entry into force of an FMCT. It was made clear that in its process of reaching such a conclusion, the delegation examined the issue from the presumption that FMCT verification should be possible.

(vii) Other sub-issues

    Purposes and possible preamble

- The purposes of the treaty are, among other things, to contribute to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to decrease the discriminatory nature of the NPT. An opinion was expressed that discussions on the preamble should take place after the content of the treaty was crystallized. The draft treaty (CD/1777) does not contain any preamble, but the drafter stated that they would welcome the insertion of a preamble and they are open to suggestions on its content.
The role of existing organizations (especially the IAEA)

- Many delegations expressed positive views regarding the role of the IAEA and requested input by IAEA experts. Nonetheless, a view was expressed that, while also indicating the positive side, an intense examination of the key issues of definitions, scope, verification and stockpiles is required more than exploring organizational matters such as the role of the IAEA.

Consultation mechanism

- Opinions were heard that as a preliminary stage to Security Council notification there needs to be a detailed consultation mechanism, technical input from IAEA experts would also be useful, and a consultation mechanism would be explored from an open standpoint.

National Implementation

- A position was put forward that national legislation to prevent illegal enrichment and reprocessing activities within states parties is necessary, as well as examining the establishment of points of contact (POC) in the event that an international verification system is introduced.

Settlement of disputes

- Regarding the meeting of states parties referred to in Article III paragraph 3 of the draft treaty (CD/1777), a question was raised as to its nature, the numbers required for a quorum and the status of its decisions. It was pointed out that Article III, paragraphs. 3 to 5 of the draft treaty is a compliance mechanism and that they are not a mechanism for dispute settlement, which is originally meant to deal with the problems surrounding the interpretation of the treaty text.

Entry into force

- Many delegations took the position that a careful examination is required on whether the ratification or accession of the non-NPT states parties should be a condition of the entry into force. This position was taken from the point of view of maintaining a balance between treaty credibility and entry into force achievability, and thus avoiding the mistakes of the CTBT. The draft treaty (CD/1777) requires only the ratification by the five nuclear weapons states for entry into force, but the drafter was open to discussion on this issue.

Duration

- It was pointed out that the duration of 15 years is too short from the perspective of irreversibility. A view was expressed that further discussions are required and this is an area of the draft treaty (CD/1777) that could potentially be revised in future negotiations.

Withdrawal

- An opinion was voiced that the discussions within the NPT on withdrawal should be referenced. Furthermore, the importance was stressed of creating a new standard to only recognize the right of withdrawal in the situation where a state party is in compliance with its treaty obligations. It was also stressed that a mechanism is necessary to judge whether withdrawal is illegal or not in the event of a violation.
Review

- Since new fissile material might emerge in the future through scientific progress, delegations called for the convening of a review conference every five years. In this connection, a view was expressed that the possibility of new fissile materials appearing cannot be ruled out, nonetheless, the current definitions pertain to fissile materials in actual use, and there is no need to incorporate a formal process for the examination of potential new fissile material.

Amendment

- A view was put forward that it is necessary to examine a simple amendment process that can decide changes through consensus among the states parties like in the CWC. In relation to this, it was pointed out that in the case of an FMCT, the possibility of utilizing such a simple amendment process is extremely low because there is a limitation from the perspective of the laws of physics. The position was expressed that the amendment of fissile material definitions is related to transparency and verification, and since it could influence the balance of the treaty, we should be exceedingly cautious.
Annex III

Report on the 2008 informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament on agenda item 3 “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (PAROS)

Ambassador Marius Grinius (CANADA)

Two informal meetings were held on 7 February and 21 February 2008. The objective of these sessions was to revalidate and refresh proposals identified as relevant to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), in the context of the 2007 report by my predecessor. A proposed outline of work was distributed to all members (see attached), which identified issues for discussion during the informal meetings and provided a list of recent CD documents that addressed the principal topics on PAROS. There was one amendment to the proposed agenda for 21 February 2008, to include a presentation by the Chair of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), Mr. Gerard Brachet, which was followed by a Questions and Answers session.

Based on the discussions from the informal meetings, I would make the following observations:

- There was strong recognition of the extent to which space activities impact many aspects of our daily lives. The preservation of the peaceful use and access to outer space now and for future generations was described as a collective responsibility of all.

- There was broad consensus that there are some deficiencies in the existing outer space architecture which could be strengthened through a number of means, such as: improving or enhancing the implementation and universalisation of existing agreements on outer space; developing transparency and confidence-building measures, including codes of conduct; and, possibly negotiating potential new legal measures.

- Some delegations made detailed suggestions for transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). Such TCBMs could be complementary to a potential future legal instrument on PAROS, or in the view of some, be sufficient on their own. Others suggested that TCBMs could be taken up in the context of the draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT). Work being done by the EU on a possible code of conduct could serve as a useful basis for further discussions.

- Following from the 2007 report of my predecessor, Ambassador Paul Meyer, which noted that there was wide support for establishing a dialogue between the CD and COPUOS on matters of common interest, an invitation on behalf of the CD President was extended to the Chair of COPUOS (Mr. Gerard Brachet) to brief CD members during the 2nd informal meeting. The presentation by the UN COPUOS Chair clarified the mandate, roles and responsibilities of COPUOS in relation to the CD’s responsibility to prevent an arms race in outer space. COPUOS has technical and legal expertise from which the CD can draw if

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1 While codes of conduct was the terminology use during the informal discussions, a plenary statement delivered by Slovenia on behalf of the EU indicated that the EU is working on a set of transparency and confidence building measures rather than a code of conduct.
there is agreement to pursue work on PAROS in the CD. Future collaboration will also ensure that there is complementarity and no duplication or overlap between the two organizations in their work.

- Many delegations welcomed the 12 February 2008 tabling, by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, of the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Several delegations expressed interest in continuing more substantive discussions on the draft treaty. At least one other delegation made clear its opposition to new binding space arms control agreements.

As Coordinator, I would observe that there is interest in continuing work on PAROS in two areas:

(a) On TCBMs, delegations are anticipating the ongoing work of the EU which may serve as a useful basis to focus discussions and identify which specific areas related to TCBMs on which the CD could usefully work; and,

(b) On substantive discussions/exchanges of views on the specific articles of the Russian-Chinese draft PPWT.

Views were expressed, however, that such substantive discussions should take place within the context of an agreed program of work in the CD. That is also my conclusion.

Marius R. Grinius
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament Coordinator for CD agenda item 3 on PAROS
10 March 2008
Outline for informal meetings at the Conference on Disarmament
agenda item 3 - Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)

Coordinator: Ambassador Marius GRINIUS (Canada)

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<th>Thursday 7 February 3-6 p.m.</th>
<th>Thursday 21 February 10 a.m.-1 p.m.</th>
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<td>- Adequacy of existing regime, means of enhancement</td>
<td>- Transparency and confidence-building measures</td>
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<td>- Assessment and next steps</td>
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The objective of these sessions would be to build upon and refresh proposals that have been identified as relevant to PAROS, and that continue to have the potential to become eventual multilateral agreements of the CD. The CD documents cited are recent working papers addressing the principal topics identified and are meant as an aid to delegations and do not represent an exhaustive listing of previous inputs (e.g. statements) to the CD on the subject of PAROS.

**Thursday 7 February (3 to 6 p.m.)**
- Consideration of the adequacy of the existing international legal regime providing for security in outer space and possible means of enhancing it (CD/1780, CD/1784 and CD/1829),

- Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs):
  - Information-based measures: information exchange, notification, observation
  - Behavioural Guidelines: debris mitigation, no first deployment pledges, ASAT test moratoria, traffic management, codes of conduct (CD/1778, CD/1786 and CD/1815)

- Elements of a treaty on the non-weaponisation of outer space:
  - scope, definitions, verification, key provisions (CD/1679, CD/1769, CD/1779, CD/1781, CD/1785, CD/1818)

**Thursday 21 February (10 a.m. to 1 p.m.)**
- Further consideration of TCBMs
- Further consideration of elements of a treaty on the non-weaponisation of outer space
- Assessment of work to-date, identification of updates to be made to the report of last year’s PAROS coordinator (CD/1827), and next steps.
Annex IV

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning the work of informal meetings devoted to consideration of agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

by

H.E. Mr. Babacar Carlos MBAYE, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Senegal, responsible for coordination of the work in question

In accordance with the organizational framework for work during the first part of the 2008 session of the Conference on Disarmament, two informal meetings were held to consider agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. These meetings took place on Tuesday 12 February 2008 and Thursday 21 February 2008, with the Coordinator in the chair.

For the purpose of organizing these meetings, the Coordinator prepared a work plan. A preliminary draft was submitted to the team of six Presidents (P-6) during the Presidential consultations held on 11 February 2008. The plan itself, a copy of which is annexed to this report, was subsequently presented to delegations at the start of the first informal plenary meeting on 12 February 2008.

In preparing this work plan, the Coordinator drew principally on the work carried out in 2007, under the guidance of Ambassador Carlos Antonio Da Rocha Paranhos, of Brazil, with the aim of building on the areas of consensus already achieved, so as to move forward towards consensus proposals on the other items on which divergences persisted.

In this way, bearing in mind the highly relevant recommendations drawn up by Ambassador Paranhos, the Coordinator proposed an approach based on the following points:

- General exchange of views;
- Examination/Evaluation of the existing legal framework relating to negative security assurances;
- Elements which might be selected with a view to strengthening negative security assurances;
- The question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament;
- Possible elements of a treaty on negative security assurances, including:
- Scope and form of the treaty;
- Potential beneficiaries and providers of assurances;
- Most suitable body for negotiation of the treaty; and

- Other matters.

Additionally, with the aim of gaining a clearer idea of what progress might be made during the present session, the Coordinator invited the members of the Conference on Disarmament to give their views on more specific issues, namely:

- Scope of Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995;
- Adoption of a legally binding international instrument to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and
- Which body would be most suitable for the negotiation of this instrument.

The Coordinator also contacted UNIDIR with a view to inviting one of the experts who cooperate with it, namely Mr. Jozef Goldblat, to give a presentation during one of the meetings devoted to consideration of item 4. The Coordinator took this decision bearing in mind the very useful information Mr. Goldblat had supplied to the Conference on Disarmament in 2006 and 2007 on the same issue. At the same time he wished to respond to the suggestion to this effect which he had received from one delegation.

Mr. Goldblat agreed to share his knowledge and his views. However, time constraints prevented the Coordinator from working with UNIDIR to see how to make use of the time he had available.

During the two meetings, many delegations took part in a broad and open discussion, which enabled the various viewpoints to be expressed. The Coordinator drew the following conclusions from this exchange of views:

1) The discussions revealed continuing diverging assessments of the effectiveness of the various existing instruments in the field of negative security assurances, including the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States, the conclusions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, their additional protocols and corresponding interpretative declarations.

Several delegations considered these assurances ineffective and hence unsatisfactory. It was emphasized, from this viewpoint, that the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, of which the Security Council took note in its resolution No. 984 of 11 April 1995, do not constitute adequate assurances, inter alia because of their non-binding and unilateral character.
In that regard, some delegations considered that negative security assurances should not be regarded as a favour conferred by the nuclear-weapon States on non-nuclear-weapon States, as a matter of goodwill, but as the fulfilment of a legal obligation stemming from the United Nations Charter and a quid pro quo for States which have opted to renounce nuclear weapons.

It was also emphasized that the granting of such assurances, in the framework of a legally binding international instrument, would be a welcome transitional measure to enable the imbalance arising out of the NPT to be remedied, pending the achievement of general nuclear disarmament, which those delegations considered to be the only satisfactory assurance.

Conversely, other delegations viewed the existing assurances as satisfactory - in particular one delegation which reaffirmed its attachment to the unilateral declarations and its opposition to any negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an international legal instrument relating to negative security assurances.

Another delegation considered that its unilateral declaration, of which the Security Council had taken note in its resolution 984 of 11 April 1995, offered a comprehensive, collective and concrete response to the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States in relation to negative security assurances, and that it preferred the granting of assurances within a regional framework, through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2) In relation to nuclear-weapon-free zones, delegations unanimously considered that progress has been made with their establishment. In that context, delegations called for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to combat instability in that region. Others welcomed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

However, it was emphasized that nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties do not on their own constitute adequate assurances, notably owing to their limited geographical scope and the fact that they are accompanied by interpretative declarations which have sometimes restricted their scope.

3) Concerning the negotiation of a legally binding international instrument on security assurances, with the exception of the delegations whose positions have been set out below, most of the speakers said that they were in favour.

Most of the delegations indicated that the adoption of such an instrument would be useful both for the nuclear-weapon States and for the non-nuclear-weapon States, insofar as it would make it possible to build trust and reduce the nuclear threat and the risk of proliferation.

4) The discussions once again highlighted the links between the issue of negative security assurances and other items on the CD agenda. Several speakers said that the opening of negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement on security assurances could help to prepare the ground for negotiations on the three (3) other fundamental issues on the agenda, namely the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for the production of weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) and general nuclear disarmament.
5) Nevertheless, the States that favour the conclusion of such a treaty do not all agree as to the most suitable body for undertaking the negotiations. Whereas some held that the negotiation of this instrument should take place within the Conference on Disarmament, others considered that it should take place in the NPT context.

6) Concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee on assurances within the Conference on Disarmament, several delegations expressed support for this proposal or placed on record their agreement in principle in this regard.

Overall, it was clear, following the two informal meetings devoted to item 4, that progress remains to be made in order to achieve consensus on key aspects of negative security assurances.

While taking note of the fact that no objections were raised to the principle of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on assurances within the CD, the Coordinator wishes to underline the importance of offering the member States every opportunity to express their views. With that in mind, priority in future discussions could be focused on specific points, including:

(i) The true scope of existing assurances and

(ii) Ways and means of making existing security assurances at the global level legally binding.

The organization of comprehensive discussions, on these two key issues among others, could help in identifying possible ways of achieving consensus on the best way to address the issue of negative security assurances.

Similarly, the clarifications provided by Mr. Jozef Goldblat lead the Coordinator to believe that the organization of a meeting with that expert, before the end of the 2008 session, might help to bring positions closer together.

Geneva, 10 March 2008

H.E. Mr. Babacar Carlos MBAYE
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Senegal
to the United Nations Office at Geneva
and the other International Organizations in Switzerland
Informal meetings on agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

Coordinator: Ambassador Babacar Carlos M’BAYE (Senegal)

PROPOSED WORK PLAN

The aim is to draw on the work accomplished last year and in preceding years to undertake a thorough and more closely targeted examination of how the Conference on Disarmament might best address the issue of effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

For this purpose, the following points might be examined in succession:

TUESDAY 12 FEBRUARY 2008: 3 p.m.-6 p.m.

- General exchange of views;
- Examination/Evaluation of the existing legal framework relating to negative security assurances;
- Elements which might be selected with a view to strengthening negative security assurances;
- The question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the CD; and
- Other matters.

THURSDAY 21 FEBRUARY 2008: 3 p.m.-6 p.m.

- Possible elements of a treaty on negative security assurances;
- Scope and form of the treaty;
- Potential beneficiaries and providers of assurances;
- Most suitable body for negotiation of the treaty and
- Other matters.
Annex V

Report of the informal debate on agenda item 5: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

In my capacity as coordinator on CD agenda item 5, entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” I have the honour to report on the work done during the first part of the 2008 CD session.

Delegations held two informal meetings under my chairmanship on 13 February 2008 and 29 February 2008 respectively, to discuss item 5 on the agenda, as per the provided schedule.

In all of the 2008 consultations so far delegations have validated the outcome of the CD previous proceedings under agenda item 5 in 2007. A number of further comments and observations on the topics already identified during the 2007 discussions were made.

Delegations wished to re-emphasize the relevance of three main themes:

- Radiological weapons;
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;
- Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

No specific proposals were submitted for consideration under agenda item 5 during these consultations.

The input offered by delegations clearly demonstrates that agenda item 5 merits further discussion since it is generally viewed as a vital component of the CD future work.

In conclusion, I would recommend that the CD keep item 5 under active consideration without prejudice to the discussions and/or negotiations on priority issues under agenda items 1 to 4 of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Petko Dragahov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Bulgaria
1. Two sessions of the informal debate on agenda item 6 were held on 14 and 27 February 2008.

2. During these informal debates, the delegations expressed their views on a wide range of issues, including possible ways to move forward.

3. During these informal debates, there were two broad approaches in dealing with agenda item 6. They were:
   - The holistic or philosophical approach.
   - The approach based on developing of an objective criterion.

4. The proponents of the holistic or philosophical approach were of the view that agenda item 6 should deal with any issue that the delegations wish to address in the context of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, ranging from nuclear to conventional weapons in order to achieve its final objective, which is general and complete disarmament.

5. They argued that such an approach would also contribute to achieve universality of instruments that have already been negotiated. Therefore, they were of the view that the issue of duplication should not prevent the Conference from considering any issue.

6. Some also argued that the philosophical or holistic approach would also contribute to the larger debate within and outside the Conference in identifying emerging global challenges to international peace and security and promoting interrelationships between disarmament and development, environment etc.

7. Those who believed in the approach based on developing of an objective criterion under which relevant issues could be identified mainly to avoid duplication, seemed to be less enthusiastic in taking a holistic or philosophical approach.

8. In this regard, they identified the following benchmarks, among others, that would help to develop such an objective criterion:
   - The relevance to the mandate of the CD.
   - Need to avoid duplication.
   - The rule of consensus.
The end-result of the consideration of any issue should be to negotiate a legally-binding instrument in accordance with the CD mandate. However, this end-result should not prevent any delegation from considering other aspects such as Confidence-Building Measures, transparency etc., which would also contribute eventually for the negotiation of legally-binding instruments.

- The relevance of a particular issue in the context of disarmament and arms control.

9. A summary of some views expressed by various delegations during the informal debate on agenda item 6 is appended as an annex to this report.

10. The Coordinator made an open invitation to interested delegations to consider preparing road-maps under the two broad approaches for consideration by the delegations in future discussions on the subject.
Appendix

1. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament must:
   - Address the root causes of insecurity emanating from disputes, conflicts and threat perceptions.
   - Seek to promote balance among States at regional level.

2. General and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the ultimate objective of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, with verification and irreversibility as the two basic principles. The elimination of the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, should be the immediate objective.

3. The following initiatives could be undertaken under the comprehensive programme of disarmament:
   - Legally binding instrument under which States would accept the legal commitment to implement a series of disarmament measures within a specific time period.
   - The issue of missiles, in all its aspects.
   - Development of confidence-building measures.
   - Increasing public support for disarmament.
   - Promoting interrelationship between disarmament and international security and disarmament and development.

4. A detailed and full list of all measures to be included in the comprehensive programme should be drawn out and they should be implemented on a step-by-step basis.

5. There is a need to evolve a new global security consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation. The new security consensus should:
   - Address existing and emerging global challenges to regional and international security.
   - Ensure equal rights of all countries to participate in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation on the basis of undiminished security for all.
   - Protect the legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of technologies of all countries.

6. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been on the agenda of the CD for a long time. The intent has been to elaborate a programme which would place measures of disarmament into a carefully considered plan, setting out objectives, priorities, and time frames, with a view to the achievement of disarmament on a progressive basis.
7. A comprehensive programme would consider not only nuclear disarmament, which remains the highest priority, but also other weapons and weapons systems which are crucial for maintaining peace and security and enhancing social and economic development in the world.

8. Agenda item 6 provides room for discussions on conventional arms and the CD has a role to play on that issue.

9. Agenda item 6 provides room for all delegations to raise any issue that they think appropriate for the CD to consider.

10. For practical reasons, the CD should narrow down the list by leaving the issues that are being dealt with under other processes. Eventually, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should achieve general and complete disarmament.

11. Issues such as the interrelationship between disarmament and development, multilateralism, and environment could also be discussed under the item 6.

12. Some of the issues identified are difficult to put into practice and therefore there should be more regional group level consultations to identify specific issues.

13. The CD needs to be both realistic and pragmatic in dealing with agenda item 6. One issue is not too important than the other but there is a need to find a way out to identify specific issues. In view of the above, there is a need to identify an objective criterion on the selection of issues under this agenda item.

14. Elements of any objective criteria could also include the following:

   - Duplication
   - Mandate of the CD
   - Consensus

15. The end result of the consideration of any particular issue should be to negotiate a legally-binding instrument in accordance with the CD mandate.

16. Disarmament means physical elimination of weapons. While the biological and chemical weapons have been addressed through legally-binding instruments, the CD has to continue to address the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the instruments of arms regulation and disarmament have to be dealt with under the CD mandate and it could well be one of the objective criteria.

17. Some of the issues such as anti-personnel mines have a humanitarian dimension and not an arms control/disarmament dimension. Therefore, this too could be taken into consideration when an objective criteria is being developed for the selection/narrowing down of issues under agenda item 6. Any issue taken into consideration under this item should be relevant to the CD’s mandate.
18. Exclusion of some issues runs contrary to the basic premise of agenda item 6. Since some legally-binding instruments have not yet attained the status of universality, there is a need to continue to address these issues under agenda item 6.

19. Comprehensive programme of work means a comprehensive approach towards achieving general and complete disarmament. A holistic approach would facilitate the consideration of issues such as confidence-building measures and transparency, which would facilitate to achieve general and complete disarmament on step-by-step basis.

20. New types of weapons in the categories of both nuclear and conventional weapons should also be dealt with under agenda item 6.
Annex VII

Report of the Coordinator for Agenda Item 7:
“Transparency in Armaments”
to the Presidency of the 2008 Conference on Disarmament
under the coordinatorship of
Ambassador of Indonesia, I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja

Based on the Organizational Framework for the 2008 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, two informal debates on agenda item 7: Transparency in Armaments (TIA) were held on Friday, 15 February 2008 and on Thursday, 28 February 2008.

To facilitate the discussions, the Coordinator circulated a “Proposed Outline for the Informal Debate”, which sets out the main objectives of this exercise which is to revalidate the issues under agenda item 7 that were previously raised during the substantive discussions at the 2007 Session contained in Annex VII of document CD/1827. The proposed outline is also attached with document CD/INF.54, which lists all the basic documents of the CD relating to the issue of Transparency in Armaments.

The first informal debate was dedicated to seeking delegates’ general views on whether the list of issues contained in Annex VII of CD/1827 would still be relevant and whether delegates felt the need to raise new issues of concern.

One delegation stressed that revalidating the achievements attained last year, would not be sufficient for this year’s work, since the CD works on an annual basis. It was also stated that transparency must not restrict the right of a State to acquire arms for self-defence and that measures to promote transparency in armaments should be voluntary and mutually agreed upon by all States. At least two delegations expressed their views on the appointment of a special coordinator for Transparency in Armaments.

During the second informal debate, several issues were raised. One delegation referred to its previous proposal on the “Transfer Ban on Arms to Terrorists” and expressed its intention to propose a new document. Some delegations, however, reaffirmed their reservations and discounted the appropriateness of dealing with such an issue within the CD while also disputing the interpretation of such a reference.

Issues such as Arms Trade Treaty, Cluster Munitions, MANPADS, Regional Measures to Improve Transparency in Armaments, Transparency in Nuclear Weapons were also raised.

One Member State expressed the opinion that transparency was a tool which could be used to have a picture of the destabilizing effects of conventional armaments build-ups and as an early-warning system for global armament trends. It was further mentioned that in global terms, military expenditure had risen over the years and that the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting on Military Expenditures need to improve their respective roles and capacity, among others, in order to prevent the transfer of sophisticated technologies to conflict-prone regions. The issue of the universalization of the United Nations Register continues to be a challenge.
A proposal to establish objective criteria for issues to be discussed under agenda item 7, such as those set up under agenda item 6 on Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, were also suggested. It was considered to be useful for future work under this agenda item. In this regard, it was recommended that the Coordinator discusses this matter with the Coordinator of agenda item 6.

Many delegations considered that agenda item 7 on Transparency in Armaments remains relevant as an agenda item for the Membership to put forward information regarding their own policy and development on certain weapons, initiatives to increase the transparency in armaments and general information sharing to enhancing confidence among Member States.

The Coordinator recommends that the list of issues raised under this agenda item during the 2007 session, as stipulated in Annex VII of document CD/1827 remain on the table for future deliberations. The proposed outline and the list of issues are attached to this report.
Appendix

Proposed outline for discussions at the Conference on Disarmament on agenda item 7:
Transparency in Armaments

Coordinator: Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja (Indonesia)

Objective

The objective of the discussions would be to revalidate issues under agenda item 7 raised
during the substantive discussions of CD 2007 as reported to the President of CD 2007 by
Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom (Coordinator of agenda item 7 of CD 2007).
The discussions would build on issues put forward previously by CD members as contained in
Annex VII of CD 1827 and to identify new issues that delegations may wish to raise.

Plan

As indicated in the organizational framework, the discussions on agenda item 7
(Transparency in Armaments) will be conducted on Friday, 15 February 2008 and Thursday,
28 February 2008.

Week 4

Friday, 15 February 2008 (10 a.m.-1 p.m.)

General discussion
Issues raised during 2007 session as contained in Annex VII of CD 1827:

- An Arms Trade Treaty
- Cluster Munitions
- Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)
- Posphorus munitions
- Regional measures to improve TIA
- Scope of United Nations Arms Register
- The principal focus of agenda item 7
- The role of a Special Coordinator for this agenda item
- Transfer Ban on Arms to Terrorists
- Transparency in nuclear weapons
- Universalization and implementation of existing agreements and arrangements

**Week 6**

**Thursday, 28 February 2008 (3-6 p.m.)**

Further discussion
Report

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LETTER DATED 18 DECEMBER 2008 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC TO THE CONFERENCE, TRANSMITTING A COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY THE FRENCH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, Mr. BERNARD KOUCHNER, ACCOMPANIED BY A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND BY THE STATEMENT ON STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 11 DECEMBER 2008

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to you by the French Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Mr Bernard Kouchner. The purpose of this correspondence is to request circulation as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament of (i) the letter addressed on 5 December 2008 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the President of the French Republic, the current President of the Council of the European Union, and (ii) the Statement on strengthening international security adopted on 11 December 2008 by the 27 States members of the European Union. These two documents are appended to the letter from Mr. Kouchner.

(Signed): Eric Danon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament
Sir,

On 5 December, the President of the French Republic, in his capacity as current President of the European Union, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations drawing his attention to disarmament initiatives which the European Union has presented to the United Nations this year.

The European proposals are ambitious, concrete and realistic. They are also a sign of Europe’s determination to continue to contribute actively to disarmament in parallel with the significant steps towards nuclear disarmament already taken by the two members of the Union which possess nuclear weapons. The European Union would now like the international community to join it in backing and carrying out this plan of action: if progress towards disarmament is to be made, a commitment from all States is needed.

As the current President of the European Union points out in his letter, Europe wishes to work for peace. This is true in disarmament matters, but also in countering terrorism, in resisting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them, in the safety of space activities and in crisis management. The European Union has sought to provide convincing responses to the new, more diverse, less visible and less predictable threats to its security. Thus it has just adopted a *Statement on strengthening international security* which will enable it to mobilize all the instruments available to it efficiently in tackling the complexity of modern-day challenges.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the letter of the current president of the European Union and the *Statement on strengthening international security* endorsed by the European Council on 11 December 2008. I think it important to bring these documents, addressing questions of non-proliferation, disarmament and security in space that are of direct interest to the Conference on Disarmament, to the attention of the Conference.

I should be grateful to you for taking the necessary steps to have this letter and the statement, with the accompanying translations into English, published and distributed together as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed): Bernard Kouchner
LETTER ADDRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS*

Sir,

The United Nations has an important role to play in the debate on disarmament. Europe wishes to be a full participant in that discussion. Accordingly, I should like to draw your attention to the proposals which the European Union presented at the United Nations this year.

On 23 September I told the United Nations General Assembly that the European Union wanted to act in the service of peace. This is true in the case of counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and crisis management.

It is also true with respect to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. This matter is of special interest to Europe, two of whose member States have nuclear weapons. Europe has already made great strides towards disarmament. Considering that its security will also benefit from the pursuit of global disarmament efforts, Europe stands ready to do more; we aspire to address all aspects of disarmament, as we are convinced of the need to work towards general disarmament. In this area, as in others, Europe intends to act in accordance with a coordinated political and strategic vision.

In 2010 the international non-proliferation regime will reach a milestone with the convening of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We should seize that opportunity to make progress towards a safer world in which all of the Treaty’s objectives, whether in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament or access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, can be met. With respect to disarmament, Europe wished to propose a clear way forward this year by presenting a number of practical, realistic initiatives at the United Nations General Assembly:

- Universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and completion of its verification regime, and dismantling, as soon as possible, of all nuclear testing facilities, in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community
- Immediate opening, without preconditions, of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and observance of an immediate moratorium on the production of such material
- Development of confidence-building and transparency measures by the nuclear Powers

Further progress in the discussions under way between the United States and the Russian Federation on the development of a legally binding post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) arrangement, and overall reduction of global nuclear weapon stockpiles pursuant to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular by the States with the biggest arsenals

- Inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those States that have them, in general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination

- Opening of consultations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles

- Universal subscription to and implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct

- Mobilization in all other areas of disarmament

Progress on the road to disarmament requires that the will to move forward be shared by all. Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, along with confidence-building, transparency and reciprocity, are essential elements of collective security.

I hope that the international community will join the European Union in supporting and carrying out this plan of action. It is an ambitious agenda that has a real prospect of leading to concrete advances towards disarmament.

Europe is counting on your support. I therefore ask that you convey to the international community, particularly within the United Nations, this initiative in support of a safer world.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed): Nicolas Sarkozy
STATEMENT ON STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. This statement gives further details of some of the principles and objectives set out in the European Security Strategy and the report on its implementation, with particular reference to counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation and disarmament.

2. It is our duty to mobilise all EU instruments effectively, to address the complexity of current crises, in particular through crisis prevention and management and post-conflict stabilisation. In addition to this contribution to security and development, Europe also has to face up to new threats to its security and to its values of democracy and liberty. These new threats are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. The EU has to provide credible responses to these threats, whatever their source, whatever their form, through prevention, deterrence and response, in close coordination with its principal partners in the world and with the relevant international organisations, in particular the United Nations, which has global responsibility for peace and security.

3. We have an unremitting determination to combat all manifestations of terrorism, in particular the threat posed by international terrorist organisations. We shall pursue this aim, with due regard for human rights, international humanitarian law and the right of asylum, by building a Europe safe from terrorism, cooperating on criminal matters and sharing information between European authorities more effectively. We shall upgrade our tools for the prevention and early detection of radicalisation and recruitment. We also need closer cooperation between the Member States of the EU on the prevention of terrorist financing.

4. We shall focus on use of the Internet by terrorist networks, through improved sharing of national information on the subject, through developing a European alert platform and through the amended version of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, which is to make recruitment and incitement to terrorism via the Internet a criminal offence.

5. We shall together with our partners step up cooperation on counter-terrorism, in particular with those parts of the world which are afflicted by terrorism and radicalisation (North Africa, South Asia and, in the longer term, the horn of Africa) and particularly with Pakistan and Afghanistan, for example along the lines of our thinking on how to cooperate with the countries of the Sahel, which are facing an increased terrorist threat which directly threatens EU interests.

6. We are united in our determination to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The EU acknowledges that major proliferation challenges have arisen in recent years and stresses that the international community must be ready to face up to them and to tackle them resolutely in future years. We shall step up the implementation of our 2003 strategy, which clearly sets out our commitment in this field.

7. We shall be firm in our response to proliferation crises. A negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is of cardinal importance for the EU, since if Iran were to acquire a military nuclear capability, this would constitute an unacceptable threat to our security, both regional and international. In order to achieve such a solution, we shall continue to engage in dialogue and additional measures to increase pressure on Iran will have to be considered should it fail to comply with the urgent requests of the United Nations Security Council.
8. If it is to be effective, our action against proliferation must also be based on resolute operational cooperation to obstruct illicit transfers, control exports even more effectively, counter illegal networks, take punitive action against proliferation financing and reduce the risk of a link-up between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The new lines for EU action to combat proliferation will be implemented without delay. They will boost the effectiveness of the EU’s 2003 strategy.

9. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime is a top priority for us; we shall continue our efforts with a view to the universalisation and effective implementation of non-proliferation rules and instruments, in particular through improving means of verification. It is important that the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses takes place in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. International efforts aimed at establishing multilateral mechanisms, by helping to strengthen energy security, can also offer a credible alternative to the development of national capabilities for sensitive fuel cycle technologies. We have taken specific measures along these lines, with our announcement that the European Union stands ready to contribute financially up to EUR 25 million to the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under the control of the IAEA as soon as institutional procedures have been achieved.

10. Europe’s security also benefits from continued global disarmament efforts. We welcome the nuclear disarmament measures taken by the two EU nuclear-weapon states and their initiatives in this field. We call on the international community to work to promote the concrete and realistic disarmament initiatives which the EU submitted at the United Nations General Assembly: universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, completion of its verification regime and the dismantling as soon as possible of all nuclear testing facilities in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community; the opening without delay and without preconditions of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and the introduction of an immediate moratorium on the production of such material; establishment of confidence and transparency measures by the nuclear powers; further progress in the current discussions between the United States and Russia on the development of a legally binding post-START arrangement, and an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, in particular by the states which possess the largest arsenals; inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those states which have them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination; start of consultations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles; accession to and implementation by all of the Hague Code of Conduct; and mobilisation in all other areas of disarmament.

11. We call more than ever for universal access to and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. In particular, the risk that terrorist organisations might acquire chemical and/or biological weapons and systems for delivering them represents a serious threat to international security. We reaffirm the EU’s political and financial support for chemical and biological disarmament through, amongst other things, the EU Joint Actions adopted in support of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia, in support of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention and of the World Health Organisation, which were developed under the 2003 Strategy.
12. On conventional disarmament, the EU supports the objective of banning cluster weapons that cause unacceptable harm to civilians and is ready to contribute to it. The EU reaffirms its deep concern at the grave humanitarian consequences of the use of cluster weapons against civilians. The vast majority of Member States signed the Oslo Convention on 3 December, but the largest military powers have not yet acceded to the convention. The EU plays a driving role in promoting the speedy adoption of a protocol on these weapons in the CCW forum.

13. We shall continue to combat the destabilising effects of illegal trade in and excessive concentration of conventional weapons. We welcome the adoption, by a very large majority, of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). We have adopted practical measures against the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, especially trafficking by air. We welcome the decision to include an article on small arms and light weapons in all agreements with third countries which have a political and security dimension. The adoption in the form of a common position of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which has proved its worth since it was introduced in 1998, would constitute significant progress.

14. Security of outer space activities, maintaining access to space and the need for surveillance and early-warning capabilities are priority issues for Europe. We call on our partners to support our draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, which proposes transparency and confidence-building measures to increase the security of activities in outer space. We shall be continuing our consultations with our partners on this important issue.

15. Drug trafficking networks have many links, especially with terrorist networks, making it ever more important for us to stop drugs being brought into Europe. We welcome the establishment of the Anti-Drug Coordination Centre for the Mediterranean, along the lines of the existing centre for the Atlantic, which will make it easier to coordinate our efforts to combat the phenomenon. In cooperation with our partners, we shall continue to step up our efforts to stop the diversion of precursors, especially to Afghanistan.

16. Piracy constitutes a growing threat to the interests of the international community. In response to acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, the European Union has decided to launch operation ATALANTA to help deter, prevent and punish acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and to protect WFP vessels and other vulnerable shipping.

17. In recent years, a number of EU countries have been faced with serious cyber-attacks and intrusions directed against public and private bodies. We are therefore pursuing our efforts to increase the protection and resilience of our networks, by increasing operational cooperation between Member States.

18. In conjunction with the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, this statement will enable the European Union better to address the challenges and threats which it will have to deal with in the coming years.
LETTER DATED 13 MARCH 2009 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO SUCCEED THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START I)*

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by Mr. D.A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, concerning the conclusion of an agreement with the United States of America to succeed the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which was read out by Mr. S.V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 7 March 2009 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could issue and circulate this letter and its annex as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Valery LOSHCHININ
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT BY DMITRY MEDVEDEV, PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN
AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO SUCCEED THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) expires on 5 December 2009. It is hard to overestimate the significance of this document in maintaining international peace and stability. The Treaty has played a historic role in ensuring strategic stability and security and in reducing the arsenals of strategic offensive arms. Its implementation has made the world more secure.

Today we are facing an urgent need to move forward on the road to nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation is fully committed to the goal of freeing the world from this most lethal weapon, in accordance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Already in 2005 we proposed to the United States of America that a new agreement be concluded to replace the START Treaty. It could be based on all the best elements that have been working effectively in the current Treaty and at the same time reflect the strategic realities of today.

In taking such a decision, we considered, inter alia, the fact that the reduction levels set by the START Treaty were already achieved in 2001. At present the number of strategic delivery vehicles and warheads attached to them is significantly lower. The START Treaty therefore not only no longer limits the nuclear missiles of the Russian Federation and the United States of America but actually allows them to increase the numbers of strategic offensive arms.

Our approach to this agreement is as follows. The future agreement must be legally binding. It is equally important that the document be forward-looking and limit not only warheads but also their strategic delivery vehicles: intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

We also consider it necessary to exclude the possibility of deploying strategic offensive arms outside national territories.

I should like to emphasize that the Russian Federation is open to dialogue and is prepared for negotiations with the new United States Administration. I fully share the commitment of the United States President, Mr. Obama, to the noble goal of saving the world from the nuclear threat and I see this as a rewarding area for joint work.

I believe that constructive cooperation in this area will contribute to a general improvement in relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

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I have the honour to draw your attention, and that of the Conference on Disarmament, to the visits to the former military facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule which France held for the representatives of over 40 countries which are members of this Conference on 16 September 2008 and for over 20 non-governmental experts on 16 March 2009.

These visits honour a pledge which was given by the President of the Republic in a speech on defence policy, nuclear deterrence and disarmament delivered at Cherbourg on 21 March 2008. In that speech, the President of the Republic presented some innovative proposals on disarmament and demonstrated his commitment to transparency by deciding, inter alia, to invite international experts to observe the dismantling of the former military facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule, which had been used for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

During the visits, the participants had access to the former uranium enrichment plant at Pierrelatte and, at the Marcoule site, they visited one of three plutonium production reactors being dismantled, together with the military reprocessing plant. They were thus able to see the practical and effective dimensions of the decision taken by France to cease all production of fissile material for its nuclear weapons and to dismantle the production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule.

The visit was an unprecedented demonstration of transparency on the part of a nuclear-weapon State. It was the first time that such a State had opened up its former facilities for the production of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.

The initiative is evidence of France’s determination to move forward with ending the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, which, in our view, is a priority for the disarmament process, given the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As was noted by the international experts who took part in the visit, the dismantlement of our facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule is an irreversible process.
This event also sends a signal about France’s determination to continue making an active and meaningful contribution, both nationally and internationally, to disarmament. Indeed, it was at the urging of the French presidency of the European Union that Europe was able, for the first time, to develop some ambitious disarmament initiatives. Thus, in the light of the upcoming 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and on the basis of the proposals made at Cherbourg, Europe presented a plan of action on disarmament, which was endorsed by 27 Heads of State and Government of the European Union in December 2008.

In the plan of action, France and its European Union partners call, inter alia, for the opening, without delay and without preconditions, of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and the introduction of an immediate moratorium on the production of such material. We also call on all the States concerned to dismantle their fissile material production facilities. France expresses the hope that the international community will join the European Union in supporting and implementing this practical and realistic plan of action.

As the President of the Republic made clear in his speech at Cherbourg, France’s commitment to disarmament is not just a matter of making speeches and promises; it is being translated into specific action. France pursues the transparency strategy as a confidence-building measure, as the visits to Pierrelatte and Marcoule again show. We now hope that others will join us on this path. The commitment of all States is needed if progress on disarmament is to be achieved. Trust, transparency and reciprocity are key to moving forward on this issue.

I should be grateful if you could have this letter issued as a document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Sophie MOAL-MAKAME
Chargée d’Affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament

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We have the honour to transmit herewith the Russian and English texts of the Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms, made in London on 1 April 2009.

We would be grateful if this letter and the attached document could be issued and circulated as official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed:) Valery Loschchinin (Signed:) Garold N. Larson
Ambassador Permanent Representative of the
Charge d’affaires Russian Federation to the
Permanent Mission Conference on Disarmament
of the United States of America
to the Conference on Disarmament


GE.09-60745
Joint Statement by
Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and
Barack Obama, President of the United States of America,
Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms

The President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, and the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitriy A. Medvedev, noted that the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), which expires in December 2009, has completely fulfilled its intended purpose and that the maximum levels for strategic offensive arms recorded in the Treaty were reached long ago. They have therefore decided to move further along the path of reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms in accordance with U.S. and Russian obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Presidents decided to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty. The United States and the Russian Federation intend to conclude this agreement before the Treaty expires in December. In this connection, they instructed their delegations at the negotiations to proceed on basis of the following:

- The subject of the new agreement will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms;

- In the future agreement the Parties will seek to record levels of reductions in strategic offensive arms that will be lower than those in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which is currently in effect;

- The new agreement will mutually enhance the security of the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces, and will include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing the START Treaty.

They directed their negotiators to report on progress achieved in working out the new agreement by July 2009.

We have the honour to transmit herewith the Russian and English texts of the Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, made in London on 1 April 2009.

We would be grateful if this letter and the attached document could be issued and circulated as official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed:) Valery Loshchinin
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed:) Garold N. Larson
Charge d’affaires
Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament


GE.09-60752
Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America

1. Reaffirming that the era when our countries viewed each other as enemies is long over, and recognizing our many common interests, we today established a substantive agenda for Russia and the United States to be developed over the coming months and years. We are resolved to work together to strengthen strategic stability, international security, and jointly meet contemporary global challenges, while also addressing disagreements openly and honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and acknowledgement of each other’s perspective.

2. We discussed measures to overcome the effects of the global economic crisis, strengthen the international monetary and financial system, restore economic growth, and advance regulatory efforts to ensure that such a crisis does not happen again.

3. We also discussed nuclear arms control and reduction. As leaders of the two largest nuclear weapons states, we agreed to work together to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations. We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks immediately on this new treaty and to report on results achieved in working out the new agreement by July.

4. While acknowledging that differences remain over the purposes of deployment of missile defense assets in Europe, we discussed new possibilities for mutual international cooperation in the field of missile defense, taking into account joint assessments of missile challenges and threats, aimed at enhancing the security of our countries, and that of our allies and partners.

5. The relationship between offensive and defensive arms will be discussed by the two governments.

6. We intend to carry out joint efforts to strengthen the international regime for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In this regard we strongly support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and are committed to its further strengthening. Together, we seek to secure nuclear weapons and materials, while promoting the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We support the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and stress the importance of the IAEA Safeguards system. We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards, as provided for in Article III of the NPT, and to the Additional Protocol and urge the ratification and implementation of these agreements. We will deepen cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism. We will seek to further promote the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which now unites 75 countries. We also support international negotiations for a verifiable treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. As a key measure of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, we underscored the importance of the entering into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In this respect, President Obama confirmed his commitment to work for American ratification of this Treaty. We applaud the achievements made through the Nuclear Security Initiative launched in Bratislava in 2005, including to minimize the civilian use of Highly
Enriched Uranium, and we seek to continue bilateral collaboration to improve and sustain nuclear security. We agreed to examine possible new initiatives to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy while strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We welcome the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and encourage efforts to develop mutually beneficial approaches with states considering nuclear energy or considering expansion of existing nuclear energy programs in conformity with their rights and obligations under the NPT. To facilitate cooperation in the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both sides will work to bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. To strengthen non-proliferation efforts, we also declare our intent to give new impetus to implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 on preventing non-state actors from obtaining WMD-related materials and technologies.

7. We agreed to work on a bilateral basis and at international forums to resolve regional conflicts.

8. We agreed that al-Qaida and other terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan pose a common threat to many nations, including the United States and Russia. We agreed to work toward and support a coordinated international response with the UN playing a key role. We also agreed that a similar coordinated and international approach should be applied to counter the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan, as well as illegal supplies of precursors to this country. Both sides agreed to work out new ways of cooperation to facilitate international efforts of stabilization, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, including in the regional context.

9. We support the continuation of the Six-Party Talks at an early date and agreed to continue to pursue the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with purposes and principles of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and subsequent consensus documents. We also expressed concern that a North Korean ballistic missile launch would be damaging to peace and stability in the region and agreed to urge the DPRK to exercise restraint and observe relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

10. While we recognize that under the NPT Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program, Iran needs to restore confidence in its exclusively peaceful nature. We underline that Iran, as any other Non-Nuclear Weapons State - Party to the NPT, has assumed the obligation under Article II of that Treaty in relation to its non-nuclear weapon status. We call on Iran to fully implement the relevant U.N. Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions including provision of required cooperation with the IAEA. We reiterated their commitment to pursue a comprehensive diplomatic solution, including direct diplomacy and through P5+1 negotiations, and urged Iran to seize this opportunity to address the international community’s concerns.

11. We also started a dialogue on security and stability in Europe. Although we disagree about the causes and sequence of the military actions of last August, we agreed that we must continue efforts toward a peaceful and lasting solution to the unstable situation today. Bearing in mind that significant differences remain between us, we nonetheless stress the importance of last year’s six-point accord of August 12, the September 8 agreement, and other relevant agreements, and pursuing effective cooperation in the Geneva discussions to bring stability to the region.
12. We agreed that the resumption of activities of the NATO-Russia Council is a positive step. We welcomed the participation of an American delegation at the special Conference on Afghanistan convened under the auspices of Shanghai Cooperation Organization last month.

13. We discussed our interest in exploring a comprehensive dialogue on strengthening Euro-Atlantic and European security, including existing commitments and President Medvedev’s June 2008 proposals on these issues. The OSCE is one of the key multilateral venues for this dialogue, as is the NATO-Russia Council.

14. We also agreed that our future meetings must include discussions of transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, corruption and narcotics, with the aim of enhancing our cooperation in countering these threats and strengthening international efforts in these fields, including through joint actions and initiatives.

15. We will strive to give rise to a new dynamic in our economic links including the launch of an intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation and the intensification of our business dialogue. Especially during these difficult economic times, our business leaders must pursue all opportunities for generating economic activity. We both pledged to instruct our governments to make efforts to finalize as soon as possible Russia’s accession into the World Trade Organization and continue working towards the creation of favorable conditions for the development of Russia-U.S. economic ties.

16. We also pledge to promote cooperation in implementing Global Energy Security Principles, adopted at the G-8 summit in Saint Petersburg in 2006, including improving energy efficiency and the development of clean energy technologies.

17. Today we have outlined a comprehensive and ambitious work plan for our two governments. We both affirmed a mutual desire to organize contacts between our two governments in a more structured and regular way. Greater institutionalized interactions between our ministries and departments make success more likely in meeting the ambitious goals that we have established today.

18. At the same time, we also discussed the desire for greater cooperation not only between our governments, but also between our societies -- more scientific cooperation, more students studying in each other’s country, more cultural exchanges, and more cooperation between our nongovernmental organizations. In our relations with each other, we also seek to be guided by the rule of law, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, and tolerance for different views.

19. We, the leaders of Russia and the United States, are ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations between our two countries. In just a few months we have worked hard to establish a new tone in our relations. Now it is time to get down to business and translate our warm words into actual achievements of benefit to Russia, the United States, and all those around the world interested in peace and prosperity.
Letter dated 15 September 2009 from the President of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of the 2009 Presidents addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the reports of the seven coordinators submitted to the President of the Conference on the work done during the 2009 session on agenda items 1 to 7

On 3 February of this year, the six 2009 Presidents of the Conference had appointed the following as Co-ordinators to work under the auspices of the 2009 Presidents:

Ambassador Carlos Portales of Chile for agenda items 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and 2 entitled “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters” with a general focus on nuclear disarmament;

Ambassador Giovanni Manfredi of Italy for agenda items 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and 2 entitled “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters” with a general focus on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;

Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada for agenda item 3 entitled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”;

Ambassador Babacar Carlos Mbaye of Senegal for agenda item 4 entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”;

Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria for agenda item 5 entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”;

Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka for agenda item 6 entitled “Comprehensive program of disarmament”;

Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja of Indonesia for agenda item 7 entitled “Transparency in armaments”.

In my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament and through you, Mr. Secretary-General, and on behalf of all six 2009 Presidents, I would like to warmly thank all the seven Co-ordinators for the important work done under their professional guidance. The seven Co-ordinators’ reports on the outcome of the discussions submitted to the 2009 Presidents and attached to this letter in annexes I to VII capture their most valued work and should be one important point of reference for future activities of our Conference.
Consequently, I would be grateful if this letter together with its seven annexed documents could be issued as one official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed) Christian Strohal
Ambassador
President of the Conference on Disarmament
Annex I

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda item 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, and item 2 entitled “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

Submitted by Ambassador Carlos Portales of Chile

I wish to inform that the meetings devoted to the Coordination conducted by Chile on Agenda items 1 and 2 of this Conference on Disarmament, with special focus on Nuclear Disarmament, according to schedule, took place on 9 and 23 February in informal plenary sessions.

This exercise provided the opportunity to all members of the Conference to exchange views on the matter, validate previously identified questions and raise new elements that require particular attention.

During the first session, after a brief introduction by the Coordination, several joint as well as national presentations were made on Nuclear Disarmament from a comprehensive point of view.

In the second session, the debate was conducted in accordance with a previously drawn-up thematic list featuring the following topics:

(i) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Elimination;
(ii) Nuclear Disarmament by stages;
(iii) Ad-hoc Committee to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
(iv) Subsidiary body to address this matter;
(v) Principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification;
(vi) Role of this type of weapons and the concepts of security policies;
(vii) Finally, De-alerting/decreasing the operational readiness or deactivation of Nuclear Weapons Systems.

On the whole, these two meetings reflected the large variety of positions and proposals that exist among delegations and groups of delegations with regard to Nuclear Disarmament.

Some nuclear States informed about their unilateral actions in favor of reducing nuclear arsenals. Others underscored the shared responsibility in the area of Nuclear Disarmament.

It was said that the first step towards Nuclear Disarmament is related to the initiation of negotiations on and the conclusion of a legally-binding agreement on fissile material.
Other ideas presented referred to what can be done in the meantime until complete Disarmament is attained, such as the creation of additional nuclear-weapon free zones, negative security and “no-first-use” assurances.

Special reference was made to the importance of the 13 practical steps adopted on the occasion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Finally, several initiatives and proposals were mentioned, all of which are known because they were either presented to the CD as official documents or included in the rolling document elaborated by the Coordination.

In both sessions it was insisted upon that Nuclear Disarmament is an objective of the highest importance. Nevertheless, situations related to timings, priorities, linkages, resources, interests, definitions and scope are persisting, creating divergences of opinion between members.

In any case, it seems obvious that a real nuclear disarmament can only be reached through an incremental approach, step by step, gradually, based upon a comprehensive framework and upon the principle of equitable security for all.

We appreciate, however, the positive atmosphere which we deem likely to favor the initiation of a more specific discussion. We believe that an interactive debate and a large-scale exchange of opinions could be helpful in this perspective.

We suggest, taking into account that lately we have heard a number of personalities and reflection groups offer alternative approaches tending towards reduction or limitation of the importance attributed to nuclear weapons, that it would be interesting for this forum to debate the notions contained in these proposals.

Why not consider, among others, the “Hoover Plan”, the “Global Zero Nuclear Initiative”, the ideas emanating from the “Evans-Kawaguchi Commission”, the activities in the framework of the “Luxemburg Forum” and the reflections of the “Munich Security Conference”?

We still think that there is a margin of support and convergence in favor of transparency and confidence-building measures. Although the provision of unilateral information by certain nuclear powers is valued, progress in terms of participation and scope would be appreciated.

We think that developing these two aspects could constitute the initial way towards a more ambitious project. The CD seems to be the appropriate forum to make an endeavor of this nature, in view of the fact that all nuclear-weapons States are members and that transparency is fundamental for the attainment of the objectives under this item of the Agenda.

Finally, the Coordination included in the summary of proposals made during the informal plenary meetings of the past year’s coordinations the following items:

- Establishment of multilateral centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services
- The proposal to negotiate a global legal regime governing the possession and use of missiles
- The proposal of giving a global character to the regime of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles (INF Treaty)
- Appointment of a special coordinator to assist in carrying out consultations on specific measures or a set of measures that have a potential of commanding consensus which can form the basis of a mandate for a possible Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament
• The UN Secretary-General plan for nuclear disarmament

The first three proposals were incorporated in the second part of the list under the heading “other legal instruments” and the two other ones under the last heading “other specific measures”. The structure of the said summary remained unaltered.

We may conclude stating that valuable information was shared, substantial reflections were made and important proposals were reiterated. The possibility of having a space for the presentation of national positions and priorities as well as for ongoing dialogue is an opportunity we all appreciate.
Appendix to Annex I

Informal discussions on CD agenda item 1

“Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and 2 “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament.

Summary of proposals made during the informal plenary meetings.
Co-ordinator, Ambassador Carlos Portales of Chile

Convention prohibiting nuclear weapons

- A convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat of use or actual use of nuclear weapons and their elimination (as expressed in the SSOD1 final declaration and action plan)
- Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe
- Establish a subsidiary body, preferably under item 2 of the agenda, to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons
- Negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
- Comprehensive overview over the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear weapons free world, including:
  - Prohibition to acquire, develop, test, produce, stockpile, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons
  - Control of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings
  - Steps for destruction of all nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles
  - Mechanisms for verifying destruction and ensuring compliance
  - International organization to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under international control
  - Disarmament and non-proliferation education

Other legal instruments

- Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons
- Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States
- Negotiate an FMCT/FMT
- Agreement on specific and legally binding measures to achieve the universalization of the NPT
- Multilateral agreement to reduce the operational readiness of deployed nuclear systems
- Establishment of multilateral centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services
- Global regime governing the possession and use of missiles
- Given a global character to the INF Treaty

**Ad hoc committee – phased programme nuclear disarmament**

- An ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention
- Nuclear weapon states must fulfill disarmament obligations under the NPT
- Multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals by a certain number or percentage
- Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

**Transparency and confidence-building measures**

- Principles on transparency, irreversibility, verification of nuclear disarmament, including data sharing, international monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, registry
- NWS to provide information on number and types of nuclear weapons in current arsenals and projected levels in five years. Provide status on weapons and delivery systems removed from active service or dismantled, and conversion efforts
- Regular (formalized) briefings to CD members by declared nuclear weapon states
- De-alerting/decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (UNGA Resolution 62/36)
- Compliance mechanism that could consist of technical assistance in destruction, procedures for national implementation, dispute resolution procedure, penalties for non-compliance, recourse to the UN Security Council, UNGA and ICJ for further action
- Reduction/elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines

**Other specific measures**

- Entry into force of the CTBT, maintaining the moratorium on nuclear test explosions
- Implementation of TNP Review Conferences’ agreements (1995 and 2000), in particular the 13 practical steps and seize the opportunity of the 2010 Conference
- Dialogue between nuclear states
- Establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East
- Nuclear-weapon free zones
- Negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument

• The link between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation

• Consideration by an ad hoc committee of; simultaneous pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; prominence of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; asymmetric possession of WMD; terrorists and WMD; cooperation in the field of nuclear energy

• Adopt a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the CD, and to establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate the four core issues

• Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons

• Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines

• Appointment of a special coordinator to assist in carrying out consultations on specific measures or a set of measures that have a potential of commanding consensus which can form the basis of a mandate for a possible Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament

• UN Secretary General plan for nuclear disarmament
Annex II

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda items on agenda item 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, and item 2 entitled “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

Submitted by Ambassador Giovanni Manfredi of Italy

1. **Procedural aspects**: I have been appointed Coordinator for agenda item 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition, of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, by the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Le Hoar Trung of Vietnam, on behalf of the six Presidents for the year 2009. To this end, I chaired two informal sessions on FMCT of the Conference, the first on Tuesday 10 February and the second on Tuesday 24 February. Both took place in a very positive atmosphere and exceptionally constructive manner, and for this I am grateful to all delegations.

   At the meeting on the 10th of February I circulated among the delegations the attached working non-paper with the aim of focusing the discussion on four topics that I considered particularly important in a new Treaty on fissile materials: the definition of fissile materials, the scope of the Treaty, stockpiles and plants, verification.

2. **Statements delivered by delegations**: the following delegations took the floor during the two aforementioned informal sessions: Canada, Egypt, Germany, Pakistan, Argentina; Australia; Japan; India; the Russian Federation, Turkey, France, Switzerland, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Syrian Arab Republic, Algeria, and Mexico.

3. **Outcome of the Discussions**:

   • **Definitions**: a large number of delegations expressed preference for the definition of fissile materials contained in art. XX of the IAEA Statute. Its use has proved reliable and experts in the field have already acquired sufficient familiarity with it, thus facilitating the drafting and implementation of a treaty on fissile materials. The matter is complicated by the need in the Treaty to exclude from its provisions (or to discipline differently) activities aimed at the production of fissile materials exclusively for civil uses. The issue is highly technical and would require, as several delegations underlined, the input from technical experts to allow the taking into account of the most recent scientific developments in this field.

   Certain delegations also pointed out the close linkage that exists between the issues of definitions and of verification. They observed that the adoption of excessively broad definitions may impair the conduct of verifications.

   • **Scope**: The contents of the discussions on this item indicate that it is no longer considered as controversial as was previously the case. A large number of delegations stressed that the Shannon Report (document CD/1299 of 1995) is still the only one formally approved by consensus by the Conference on Disarmament.
that concerns the scope of an FMCT. Though dating back fourteen years, they underlined that — by mentioning verification — it has nevertheless maintained its validity and usefulness. Other delegations expressed the opinion that the wording on the scope of an FMCT contained in document CD/1840 of 2008, that calls for negotiations without preconditions, also be taken into account and given due consideration. Other delegations, finally, expressed the opinion that, to allow the Conference to proceed expeditiously towards the beginning of negotiations on a Treaty, discussions on the mandate should not to be reopened.

- **Verification**: The question of verification no longer appeared as contentious as in, previous years. The majority of the delegations that took the floor expressed themselves in favor of an internationally verifiable Treaty. Some delegations, however, were still expecting specific instructions from their capitals and, consequently, were not yet in a position to announce a definitive position on the matter.

- **Stockpiles**: From the discussion in both informal sessions, the topic that appeared to be the most delicate and controversial for the prevalent number of delegations was the question of stockpiles: whether the Treaty should cover in some way existing stocks of fissile materials, or should only cover stocks manufactured after its entry into force. The question of stockpiles, to a number of delegations, represented a priority national security concern. No delegation, however, considered reaching an understanding on stockpiles as a necessary precondition for starting negotiations on an FMCT. Rather, negotiations on the Treaty, once started, could also include the topic of stockpiles.

- **Other items**:

  The importance of proceeding by consensus in negotiating the Treaty was underlined by some delegations, as was the necessity that these negotiations take place only within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, or a subgroup thereof set up in accordance with its Rules of Procedure.

  Some delegations, in light of the circumstance that items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament are treated together, affirmed that other issues should also be taken into consideration, in the appropriate fora, when dealing with FMCT, such as NSAs and Nuclear Weapons-free Zones, in particular in the Middle East.

  The importance of the link between an FMCT and the implementation of article VI of the NPT was also mentioned by a number of delegations. The existence of this link and the approaching date of the NPT Review Conference next year lends urgency to the need to commence negotiations on an FMCT.

4. **Conclusions**: What clearly emerges from two informal sessions of the Conference on Disarmament is that, in the opinion of the majority of delegations, a Treaty on Fissile Materials is, indeed, ripe for negotiations. The only seriously contentious issue remaining is that of fissile material stockpiles, that may be addressed within the framework of negotiations on the Treaty, once they have begun.
Appendix to Annex II

I. The President of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Le Hoai Trung of Vietnam, has informed me of the decision of the Presidents of the Conference to appoint me coordinator for agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the **prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices**.

To this end, our proposal is to build on the excellent work carried out by the previous coordinator, Ambassador Sumio Tarui of Japan, as summarized in his report, CD/1846 of August 15, 2008, annex II.

There are no objections in principle, on record, to the conclusion of a Treaty on Fissile Materials. The topic was first broached in the Baruch Plan in 1946 and received considerable impetus with General Assembly Resolution 48/75 (item L) of 1993 and the report by Ambassador Shannon of Canada (CD/1299 of 1995).

An FMCT represents an essential instrument to halt the spread of nuclear arsenals, as called for by the NPT. It would also make nuclear weapon reductions irreversible. More specifically, we need it as a tool both for non-proliferation and for nuclear disarmament.

II. Given the above, rather than engaging in a general debate on the need for an FMCT and on the political factors underpinning it, our proposal would be to concentrate on four key issues (presented as a set of questions), to see whether attitudes of CD member countries have evolved in the past year or show promise to do so in the near to medium term.

A. Definitions

Here, at least four schools of thought have so far emerged:

- **The US** proposed in CD/1777 (Art. II) to define fissile material as:
  
  - (a) Plutonium except plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80 percent or greater plutonium 238;
  
  - (b) Uranium containing a 20 percent or greater enrichment in the isotopes uranium 233 or uranium 235, separately or in combination; or
  
  - (c) Any material that contains the material defined in (a) or (b) above.

- **The IAEA** (art. XX of its Statute) uses the term “special fissionable material” rather than “fissile material”. More fittingly, the IAEA safeguards glossary at para 4.25 – considers “direct use material” i.e. “nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment”.

- **The Russian Federation** has proposed (definition found in Swiss WP CD/1771 of 2006) to consider as fissile material for the purposes of the Treaty Plutonium with more than 90% of Pu-239 and Uranium with more than 90 percent U-235.

- **Switzerland**, finally (CD/1771 of 2006), suggests Plutonium with a concentration of Pu-239 greater than 70 percent highly enriched Uranium containing more than 40% of U-235; as well as U-233 and Neptunium 237.

The above is not meant to be a definitive list of the various options so far tabled for definitions of fissile materials, but represents a useful sample for our discussions.
B. Scope

There are at least three documents that mention the scope of the Treaty.

- A/RES/48/75 of 1993 and CD/1299 (the Shannon Report) of 1995. Both stipulate a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

- CD/1840 of 2008, instead, provides for “negotiations without preconditions, on a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The provision for effective verification is missing, but mention has been added to negotiations without preconditions, to better allow delegations to spell out and pursue their national positions and priorities.

  - Could a possible solution be a combination of both formulae, to wit: “negotiations without preconditions, thus providing all delegations with the opportunity to actively pursue their respective positions and priorities and to submit proposals on any issue they deem relevant, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”?

  - Or should we opt for the Shannon/Res 48-75 wording?

  - Or is the wording of CD 1840 the most viable solution?

C. Stockpiles and plants

A constant topic of debate has been whether the scope of a future FMCT should be *ex tunc* or *ex nunc*, i.e.:

- Should the treaty only deal with fissile materials manufactured on and after its entry into force? (*ex nunc*)

- Or should it also contain clauses on existing stocks? (*ex tunc*)

- If we opt for *ex nunc* should the treaty contain provisions to allow its quick entry into force?

- Instead, if *ex tunc* is preferred, how far back do we go? All fissile material, or only that manufactured up to a specified number of years before the entry into force of the treaty?

  Similarly, should an FMCT also deal with the problem of nuclear fuel manufacturing plants?

  - More specifically, should it provide for the permanent obligatory decommissioning of military nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities?

  - Or should it also allow the permanent reconversion of military manufacturing plants into exclusively civilian facilities, with appropriate safeguards to prevent covert reconversions to military use in the future?

The general idea is to avoid the danger that the treaty lose in part its effectiveness between start of negotiations and entry into force.
D. Verification

This topic, which is directly related to the issue of mandate (see above), has always attracted the most attention for the obvious reason that there is little point in negotiating a treaty in the field of disarmament without including provisions to discourage laxity in how its obligations are carried out.

There are essentially two courses of action open to us in this respect:

- The American solution, as contained in CD/1777 of 2006 (a draft FMCT tabled by the US delegation which formally is still a valid document). Art III/2 reads “…no party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national means and methods in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law…”.

- Otherwise, we may opt for the IAEA solution, that is we may transpose in an FMCT the provisions on verification already existing and applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its Safeguards Agreements.

Both solutions have the merit of being well tested through numerous precedent; the IAEA one is the stricter; both have proven to be feasible.

An ancillary aspect of verification and stockpiles is the proposed exemption of nuclear fuel for the propulsion of naval vessels from fissile material stockpile calculations.

- Are there any objections in considering this nuclear fuel exempt from these calculations but not from the verification provisions?

- More broadly, are there any objections in extending such exemption also to other possible non-explosive uses of nuclear fuels (for example, civilian merchant vessels or outer space probes and satellites)?
Annex III

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda item 3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”

Submitted by Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada

1. Two informal meetings were held during the first 2009 session of the CD, on 10 and 27 February. In my preliminary remarks I outlined the objectives for these informal sessions, namely: to validate positions that have been identified over the last several years on PAROS; to open opportunities for delegations to present elements of change, new positions and/or ideas; and, to advance discussions on specific issues in order to prepare the ground for possible future work on PAROS. My approach for structuring the discussions was simple – to focus on those elements where delegations had expressed an interest in the previous year’s informal, and discuss them further. Those two elements were Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) and legally-binding instruments (draft agenda attached). In addition, I invited the new UNIDIR Director, Theresa Hitchens, to make a presentation to CD members at the beginning of the first informal session on 10 February 2009 which provided an overview of the historic and current state of play on PAROS, and ideas on voluntary and legally binding measures that could be explored by the CD.

2. The report that follows will provide you with my personal summary and impressions of the deliberations that took place during these informals. There is universal agreement on the pervasive role of space activities in all aspects of our daily lives and recognition of the need that the benefits and exploration of space remain accessible to all and for peaceful uses. Previous informal discussions suggested that many countries hold the view that the existing legal architecture governing space activities is not sufficient to address current and future security challenges in outer space. Most delegations agree that the CD has a role in addressing these gaps to outer space security.

3. The discussions during these informals were held in a constructive and engaging atmosphere. As indicated above, I invited UNIDIR Director Theresa Hitchens to deliver a presentation at the start of the first informal on 10 February 2009. The discussions that followed her presentation highlighted the following issues:

- Several delegations noted that the issue to be addressed is the placement or use of weapons in space and not the militarization of space, which has already occurred
- One delegation asked how the CD can better interact with civil society and NGOs, with another delegation noting the role that industry plays in outer space and the need to also engage them in discussions
- Cooperation with other relevant international organizations, such as the ITU and COPUOS, with responsibilities for space issues will be important
- Interest was expressed in UNIDIR’s preparations for their annual space seminar

4. There was a high degree of interaction on both agenda items: legally binding instruments and TCBMs. On legally binding instruments, the discussions focussed primarily on the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), document CD/1839:
Several delegations emphasized the necessity for a legally binding instrument, arguing that unilateral moratoria and regional initiatives are not viable alternatives for a legally binding instrument to prevent the weaponization of space.

Russia and China noted that they are preparing a document that responds to comments submitted and raised during the various formal and informal discussions on the draft PPWT, as well as those conveyed bilaterally. This document will include both general and article-specific questions. For example, the document will respond to questions related to whether the draft PPWT prohibits ASATs and their testing, questions on definitions, and provisions related to self-defence amongst others. It was not possible to circulate this document in time for the informal discussions.1

Many delegations supported continued discussions on the draft PPWT and welcomed the contributions that Russia and China have made to the PAROS debate. The forthcoming response document could serve as a basis for future discussions, particularly at the experts’ level.

One delegation noted their positive views on the PPWT but added that one area where the PPWT is deficient is the banning of ASAT weapons. Another delegation suggested that consideration should be given to an ASAT-ban treaty.

Several delegations expressed the view that to prevent the weaponization of space a legally binding instrument is needed. The CD would be the most appropriate forum to negotiate such a legally binding instrument and address the military dimension of outer space. One delegation contended that ad hoc arrangements were not the way forward.

5. With respect to transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), the following views were expressed:

- Most delegations support the view that TCBMs can foster greater trust and transparency and can be an important complementary or stand-alone measure. However, some delegations do not believe that TCBMs are sufficient on their own to fill the gaps in the legal regime, and therefore should not be a substitute for a legally binding instrument.

- The draft EU Code of Conduct, an initiative being pursued outside of the CD, was cited as one example of a TCBM.

- A few delegations noted that TCBMs that address the security aspect of outer space could be part of a broader PAROS treaty. It was also suggested that practical initiatives on TCBMs could also be implemented unilaterally.

- Another delegation suggested that a robust code of conduct can be an important precursor for making progress on the negotiation of future treaties. Such a security guarantee in the CD could be a declaration of legal principles, a code of conduct, or a treaty that would: (a) ban the placement of weapons in space, (b) prohibit the test and use of weapons on satellites so as to damage or destroy them, and (c) prohibit the use of satellites themselves as weapons.

6. My overall impression of the informal discussions is that there is a strong appetite to further substantial discussions on PAROS, including on the draft PPWT. Several delegations re encouraged by the possibility of a shift in position of the new US Administration, which could add a new element to the PAROS discussions. While no

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1 This was subsequently done in CD/1872 dated 18 August, 2009.
specific policy details have been revealed yet, there is certainly some optimism that there
are opportunities to move forward the PAROS debate.

7. Most delegations are interested in beginning substantive discussions within the
context of an agreed CD program of work. Should such work begin in the CD, there are
some divergent views on how the CD should approach addressing the security dimensions
of space. One view is to begin work on TCBMs as a step towards a legally binding
instrument. Another view is to include TCBMs as part of a future PAROS treaty. In either
case, I would reiterate my observation from last year’s informal discussion that any work
on PAROS in the CD will require close cooperation with other relevant international
organizations, such as COPUOS and the International Telecommunication Union, which
also have responsibilities for outer space.
Annex IV

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

Submitted by Ambassador Babacar Carlos Mbaye of Senegal

1. Organization and conduct of informal meetings

In accordance with the organizational framework for the work of the first part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, informal meetings on agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, (or “negative security assurances”) were held on 12 and 26 February 2009.

The work plan that I had proposed was as follows:

- 12 February: General exchange of views to allow delegations to recall, clarify or bring up to date their positions on negative security assurances
- 26 February: Thematic discussion for the submission of proposals on specific aspects of negotiating a possible legal instrument on security assurances with a view to preparing the future work of the Conference on this agenda item

The statements at both meetings were substantial and constructive.

I found that there were many statements in support of the legitimacy of the non-nuclear-weapon States’ call for negative security assurances.

- In this connection, it should be recalled that the non-nuclear-weapon States’ demand for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them was made before the NPT was concluded in 1968 and that the demand has been the subject of several Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice reaffirmed the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control.

- It was noted that statements by nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States were insufficient given that the statements were unilateral, conditional and revocable.

- In the same way, some delegations maintained that the assurances given in nuclear-weapon-free zones were insufficient, conditional and geographically limited. Nevertheless, it was affirmed that the creation of such zones in Africa, South-East Asia, Central Asia and South America and Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status constituted steps forward. In that spirit, some delegations called for the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and undertakings of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
• Furthermore, it was argued that granting negative security assurances would constitute a quid pro quo for States that renounced nuclear weapons and would help to combat proliferation. In that connection, it was affirmed that granting legally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would be a confidence-building measure and a step towards the implementation by nuclear-weapon States of article VI of the NPT concerning nuclear disarmament.

Several delegations argued in favour of the need to start negotiations on a legally binding, non-discriminatory and universal international instrument that would provide assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It was proposed to establish an ad hoc committee within the Conference on Disarmament to prepare for and conduct such negotiations, in accordance with document CD/1693 of 2003, known as the five Ambassadors’ proposal, which provided relevant guidance on the matter. Some delegations considered that the basic details of a possible treaty could be dealt with in due course during the negotiations. I would also mention that a delegation put forward the idea that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances could be reaffirmed to strengthen the current legal framework, if necessary by having more States align themselves with it.

2. Conclusions and recommendations of the Coordinator

• The discussions once again revealed just how complex negative security assurances were. Several topics remained subjects of debate when it came to which steps to take to find a solution to that delicate problem. For example, there was no consensus on the framework in which negotiations over a possible treaty on such assurances might be conducted.

• Therefore, I believe that the Conference should continue its consideration of the issue of negative security assurances under its agenda by giving it the priority and attention that such an important issue requires. Assurances are important not only in themselves but also because of the obvious links that exist between them and other items on the agenda. From this perspective, progress on negative security assurances could, I believe, ensure further progress on other matters included among the essential items currently under the Conference’s consideration.

• Lastly, with respect to our future work, it might be useful, in my view, to establish a special committee on security assurances with a mandate to review all aspects of the problem of negative security guarantees, including the negotiation of a relevant legally binding international instrument.
Annex V

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda item 5, entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”

Submitted by Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria

In my capacity as coordinator on agenda item 5, “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”, I have the honor to report on the work done in 2009.

In addition to the number of bilateral consultations, two rounds of multilateral informal consultations were held on February 16th and on March 2nd, with the purpose of enabling member countries to share observations and comments, and to make specific remarks on the issues identified as central to this agenda item during the discussions so far.

Delegations made use of the opportunity to update and validate their positions, indicating their continued interest in the topics, as previously listed in my initial 2007 report:

- A Radiological Weapons Ban
- The so called “Dirty bomb” threat
- State actors/actions and non state actors/actions
- The role of the IAEA and international assistance
- The effectiveness of existing international instruments
- The threat of radiological terrorism
- A Universal International Agreement to Ban the Development and Manufacture of New Types and Systems of WMD; The preventive approach
- Definitions of new types and systems of WMD
- The need to keep Item 5 under active consideration without prejudice to “pressing” issues under Items 1 to 4
- The appointment of a Special Coordinator on Item 5 once the CD has started substantial work

Several additional specific comments were made during this year’s session. One delegation raised the issue of “state terrorism”, while others pointed out that the focus of the discussion under Agenda Item 5 should be more on the nature of the weapon rather than the user’s characteristics. Emphasis was again placed on the prevention of the emergence of new WMD, since the prevention of arms race is, after all, the major goal of our disarmament efforts. UNGA resolution 63/36 on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was referred to and an appeal was made to strengthen the consensus around the issue.

During the two rounds of consultations delegations raised issues that fall within the already established in 2008 broader themes of general interest, namely:
Radiological weapons

New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The importance of prevention

Preventing terrorists from acquiring radiological materials and WMD

There is a widely shared understanding that the current work on agenda item 5 should include further elicitation of delegations' views on the main issues of concern and in-depth preparation for substantial work when the Program of work of the CD is adopted.

The input offered by delegations during the consultations clearly indicates that Item 5 should be kept on the CD agenda for review and update. Once the Conference starts substantive work, the appointment of a special coordinator on Agenda Item 5 would be the generally preferred and accepted option.

I therefore recommend that the CD keep item 5 under active consideration without prejudice to the discussions and/or negotiations on issues related to items 1 to 4 on the agenda of the CD session.
Annex VI

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda item 6 entitled “Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament”

Submitted by Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka

1. Two informal meetings were conducted on the agenda item 6 on 27 February 2009 and 3 March 2009. In view of the lack of contributions from member States to this item this year, two independent experts were invited to share their views at the informal meetings. In this regard, two thought-provoking contributions were made by Ms. Susi Snyder and Ambassador Sergey Batsanov at informal meetings held on 27 February and 3 March, respectively.

2. During the last year’s informal debate, the delegations came up with two broad approaches in dealing with the Item 6, namely the holistic or philosophical approach, and the pragmatic approach coupled with developing of an objective criterion. Delegations who took the floor during the 2009 informal debate also made reference to these two approaches and I believe that these two approaches are not contradictory but complementary to each other. As one delegation stated “the simultaneous pursuit of both approaches is the way forward for agenda item 6, which cuts across all agenda items covering nuclear and conventional disarmament as well as prevention of an arms race in outer space”.

3. However, one delegation pointed out that “Any proposal coming out from the deliberations under item 6 should be aimed at an outcome in the form of a legally binding instrument. A mandate of “substantive discussions” is contrary to such an approach”.

4. I was also pleased to note the remarks made by several delegations on the link between disarmament and development. Reference was also made in this regard to the programme of action recommended by the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. This is a subject I believe that most delegations would like to address in detail in future deliberations under this item.

5. Some delegations also emphasized the importance of bearing in mind the provisions of the UN Charter, the outcome of the SSOD-1 and its relation to this item, the principles of right to self defence, the need to uphold International Humanitarian Law, and the need to pursue on equal basis the disarmament objectives in the fields of nuclear and conventional weapons, and outer space. It was also mentioned that root-causes of insecurity must be addressed, while guaranteeing undiminished security for all. The need to develop confidence-building measures, and the need to promote the use of technology for peaceful purposes, disarmament and development, were also expressed.

6. As in the case of last year, several delegations also emphasized on the importance of conventional arms control, particularly in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Group of Governmental Experts, and illicit small arms and light weapons. I believe therefore that the discussion on item 6 during the last several years and this year has contributed to bring to the CD’s attention the urgent need for further and accelerated measures on conventional arms control, keeping in mind the increasing global defence expenditure which recorded its highest point in 2008. As one delegation pointed out nuclear disarmament will remain elusive if asymmetries in conventional arms continue to grow. Therefore, that delegation was of the view that there is a need to step up efforts to curb excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons as well as their
uncontrolled transfers. It was further viewed in this regard that a stable balance of conventional forces is essential to ensure strategic stability.

7. A summary of various points raised by delegations during the two informal debates is annexed to this report only for record purposes and to take the debate forward, without making any attribution to any particular delegation.

8. I have no specific recommendations to make with regard to any possible way forward on this item and no delegation ventured into proposing any such specific recommendations during the course of two informal debates. I am therefore in the hands of all delegations in this regard and will stand ready to carry-out further informal discussions in the future, if needed, and if President so desires.
Annex VII

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2009 session on agenda item 7 entitled “Transparency in Armaments”

Submitted by Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja of Indonesia

1. I have the honour to report, in my personal capacity and as mandated by you, on the discussions that took place during two informal meetings on Agenda Item 7: Transparency in Armaments. As you are aware, this report has been prepared under my own responsibility.

2. In preparation for the informal meetings on this agenda item, I circulated a proposed agenda through the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament.

3. I facilitated two informal discussions, on 17 February and 5 March 2009, which, in my view, took place in a constructive and encouraging atmosphere, although I have to admit that little real progress was achieved.

4. As indicated in the agenda, the first informal meeting was dedicated to general discussions. Briefly, I went over the issues that were raised in the previous discussions and took stock of the state of progress under this agenda item. I reminded delegations of the issues raised in the previous years as contained in document CD/1846 of 15 August 2008, and of the issues discussed during the additional informal meeting of 12 August 2008, on which the Coordinator had reported orally to the P6.

5. Subsequently, I invited delegations to provide and share further information on developments that are relevant to those issues, or any other new issue that could be discussed under agenda item 7.

6. In response, delegations have basically reaffirmed their views, positions, arguments and concerns on some of the issues that were previously discussed, including the effectiveness of existing transparency measures, increasing military expenditure, the inclusiveness of transparency in armaments, the possibility of appointing a special coordinator, and the ban on the transfer of arms to terrorists.

7. Several delegations emphasized the importance and relevance of the issue of Transparency in Armaments and support the retaining of the issue in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

8. Having observed the discussions during the first informal meeting, the coordinator, in an endeavor to seek a creative way to handle this issue, suggested to the delegations to make an effort to find a least common denominator, if possible, on any issue or issues from the list of issues that were discussed during the last two years. The intention was to at least highlight the convergence of views on any issue or issues that might enjoy support so that they could be taken up for future deliberations under agenda item 7.

9. At the second informal meeting, the coordinator proceeded with the meeting based on his suggestion that it try to find a common denominator on the issues. A question was raised by a delegation as to what criteria should be used in finding a common denominator. In responding to the query, the coordinator suggested four criteria as the basis for finding a common denominator, namely:

   • The issue most likely to lead to preventing the excessive accumulation of arms
• No objection from any member state towards that particular issue
• The issue is relevant to agenda item 7
• No duplication with discussions on that issue in other fora

10. On this basis, the coordinator presented a proposal that the issue of “increase in military expenditure and the necessity to make more effective the existing transparency measures”, which arose during last year’s discussions and was mentioned by several delegations during the first informal meeting on the 17 February 2009, be highlighted for future discussions, under agenda item 7. The proposal was made on the basis of the coordinator’s observation that the issue, to some extent, seemed to enjoy some level of acceptance and that no objection to it had been raised, as well as its relevance to the agenda. Meanwhile, as emphasized by the coordinator, the other issues would remain on the list as recorded and could be taken up whenever delegations deemed it necessary.

11. In commenting the suggestions of the coordinator, delegations were of the view that the proposal is inspiring in its effort to shed light on common positions, and in principle there was no objection to it. While some delegations had no difficulty in supporting the proposal, there were some doubts expressed that discussion on the suggested issue would give more weight to it while disregarding the other issues. Some delegations also questioned the mandate of the informal discussion under the role of the CD and commented on the work that was underway elsewhere, for instance under the framework of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, with regard to military expenditure.

12. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore the support of delegations towards the continuation of discussions on issues that are relevant to this agenda item. This will allow member states to share information regarding their policies and initiatives to increase transparency in armaments.

13. It was considered that discussion of these issues under this agenda item would enhance member states’ understanding in order to help update the Conference on current developments in the international security situation.

14. It is my sincere hope that, while we support the importance of maintaining the discussions under this agenda item 7, we can continually try to find innovative approaches to move transparency in armaments forward, with the ultimate objective to enhance our collective security. In this regard, it is pertinent that the more active role played by the presidents of the Conference is crucial.

We have the honour to transmit herewith the English language version of the synopsis of the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, entitled “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: a practical agenda for global policymakers”. The report was submitted to the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan in Tokyo on 15 December 2009.

We would be grateful if the synopsis could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed:) Caroline Millar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed:) Akio Suda
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament
ELIMINATING NUCLEAR THREATS

A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers

SYNOPSIS:

a comprehensive action agenda

This Synopsis is a highly abbreviated and selective distillation of the very much more detailed analysis and argument in the Commission’s Report. The references given are to sections and paragraphs in that full report, which is available online at www.icnnd.org.
SYNOPSIS:
A COMPREHENSIVE ACTION AGENDA

A. WHY THIS REPORT, AND WHY NOW

- Nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. They are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem of nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential impact.

- So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident, miscalculation or design. And any such use would be catastrophic. It is sheer luck that the world has escaped such catastrophe until now.

- Maintaining the status quo is not an option. The threats and risks associated with the failure to persuade existing nuclear-armed states to disarm, to prevent new states acquiring nuclear weapons, to stop any terrorist actor gaining access to such weapons, and to properly manage a rapid expansion in civil nuclear energy, defy complacency. They must be tackled with much more conviction and effectiveness than the world has managed so far.

- There have been many major international commission, panel, research institute and think tank reports addressing these issues. What makes this report distinctive is, hopefully, its timeliness; comprehensiveness; global consultative reach; attention to pragmatic realities as well as ambitious ideals; intended accessibility to non-specialist policymakers; and strong action orientation, reflected in the short, medium and longer term action agendas that bind together its specific policy proposals.

- With new U.S. and Russian leadership seriously committed to disarmament action, there is a new opportunity – the first since the immediate post-World War II and post-Cold War years – to halt, and reverse, the nuclear weapons tide once and for all. This report describes, not just rhetorically but in the detail that global policymakers need, how that opportunity can and should be seized. [Section 1]

B. NUCLEAR THREATS AND RISKS

- Existing Nuclear-Armed States. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined blast capacity
equivalent to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs. The U.S. and Russia together have over 22,000, and France, the UK, China, India, Pakistan and Israel around 1,000 between them. Nearly half of all warheads are still operationally deployed, and the U.S. and Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on dangerously high alert, ready to be launched immediately – within a decision window of just 4-8 minutes for each president – in the event of perceived attack. The command and control systems of the Cold War years were repeatedly strained by mistakes and false alarms. With more nuclear-armed states now, and more system vulnerabilities, the near miracle of no nuclear exchange cannot continue in perpetuity. [Section 2]

- **New Nuclear-Armed States.** The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system has been under severe strain in recent years, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) struggling with verification, compliance and enforcement failures, and backward steps occurring in the world’s most volatile regions. India and Pakistan joined the undeclared Israel as fully-fledged nuclear-armed states in 1998; North Korea is now likely to have some half-dozen nuclear explosive devices; and Iran probably now has weapon-making capability, with real potential for generating a regional proliferation surge should it choose to cross the weaponization red-line. [Section 3]

- **Nuclear Terrorism.** Terrorist groups exist with the intent, and capacity, to create massive nuclear destruction. With manageable technology long in the public domain, and black market sourcing, a Hiroshima-sized nuclear device could possibly be detonated from a truck or small boat inside any major city. A “dirty bomb”, combining conventional explosives with radioactive materials like medical isotopes, would be a much easier option: while not generating anything like the casualties of a fission or fusion bomb, it would have a psychological impact at least equal to 9/11. [Section 4]

- **Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.** The likely rapid expansion of civil nuclear energy in the decades ahead, not least in response to climate-change concerns, will present some additional proliferation and security risks. Particularly if accompanied by the construction of new national facilities for enrichment at the front end of the fuel cycle and reprocessing at the back end, it could mean a great deal more fissile material becoming potentially available for destructive purposes. [Section 5]

C. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

**BASIC THEMES**

- **Delegitimizing nuclear weapons.** The critical need is to finally transform perceptions of the role and utility of nuclear weapons, from occupying a central place in strategic thinking to being seen as quite marginal, and ultimately wholly unnecessary. There are good answers to all the familiar deterrence and other justifications for retaining nuclear
weapons.

• It is neither defensible nor sustainable for some states to argue that nuclear weapons are an indispensable, legitimate and open-ended guarantor of their own and allies’ security, but that others have no right to acquire them to protect their own perceived security needs.

• “Extended deterrence” does not have to mean extended nuclear deterrence. [Section 6]

• A phased approach. Achieving a nuclear weapon free world will be a long, complex and formidably difficult process, most realistically pursued as a two-phase process, with minimization the immediate goal and elimination the ultimate one. [Section 7]

• Short term (to 2012) and medium term (to 2025) efforts should focus on achieving as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, a “minimization point” characterised by very low numbers of warheads (less than 10 per cent of present arsenals), agreed “no first use” doctrine, and force deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine. [Sections 17, 18]

• Analysis and debate should commence now on the conditions necessary to move from the minimization point to elimination, even if a target date for getting to zero cannot at this stage be credibly specified. [Section 19]

KEY POLICIES

• Action Consensus. The 2010 NPT Review Conference should agree on a 20-point statement, “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament”, updating and extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000. [16.6-11; Box 16-1]

• Numbers. No later than 2025 U.S. and Russian arsenals should be reduced to a total of 500 nuclear warheads each, with at least no increases, and desirably significant reductions, in the arsenals – now totalling some 1,000 warheads – of the other nuclear-armed states. A global maximum of 2,000 warheads would represent a more than 90 per cent reduction in present arsenals. [18.1-3]

• All nuclear-armed states should now explicitly commit not to increase the number of their nuclear weapons. [17.15-16]

• Doctrine. Pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, every nuclear-armed state should make as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, an unequivocal “no first use” (NFU) declaration. [17.28]

• If not prepared to go so far now, each such state – and in particular the U.S. in its Nuclear Posture Review – should at the very least accept the principle that the “sole
The "purpose" of possessing nuclear weapons is to deter others from using such weapons against that state or its allies.

- Allied states affected by such declarations should be given firm assurances that they will not be exposed to other unacceptable risks, including from biological and chemical weapons. [17.28-32]

- New and unequivocal negative security assurances (NSAs) should be given by all nuclear-armed states, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against NPT-compliant non-nuclear weapon states. [17.33-39]

- **Force Deployment and Alert Status.** Changes should be made as soon as possible to ensure that, while remaining demonstrably survivable to a disarming first strike, nuclear forces are not instantly useable. Stability should be maximized by deployments and launch alert status being transparent. [7.12-15; 17.40-50]

- The decision-making fuse for the launch of any nuclear weapons must be lengthened, and weapons taken off launch-on-warning alert as soon as possible. [17.43]

- **Parallel Security Issues.** Missile defence should be revisited, with a view to allowing the further development of theatre ballistic missile defence systems, including potential joint operations in areas of mutual concern, but setting severe limits on strategic ballistic missile defences. [2.30-34; 18.28-30]

- Conventional arms imbalances, both quantitative and qualitative, between the nuclear-armed states, and in particular the relative scale of U.S. capability, need to be seriously addressed if this issue is not to become a significant impediment to future bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. [18.34-36]

- Continuing strong efforts should be made to develop more effective ways of defending against potential biological attacks including building a workable verification regime, and to promote universal adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. [17.29; 18.32-33]

- Ongoing attempts to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) should be strongly supported. [18.31]

- **Testing.** All states that have not already done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) unconditionally and without delay. U.S. ratification is a critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an immediate impact on other hold-out states, and add major new momentum to both disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

- Pending the CTBT’s entry into force, all states should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. [Section 11]
• **Availability of Fissile Material.** All nuclear-armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the negotiation and entry into force as soon as possible of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

• On the question of pre-existing stocks, a phased approach should be adopted, with the first priority a cap on production; then an effort to ensure that all fissile material other than in weapons becomes subject to irreversible, verified non-explosive use commitments; and with fissile material released through dismantlement being brought under these commitments as weapon reductions are agreed.

• As an interim step, all nuclear-armed states should voluntarily declare their fissile material stocks and the amount they regard as excess to their weapons needs, place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable, and convert it as soon as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. [*Section 12*]

**D. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NON-PROLIFERATION**

**BASIC THEMES**

• Nuclear non-proliferation efforts should focus both on the demand side – persuading states that nuclear weapons will not advance their national security or other interests – and the supply side, through maintaining and strengthening a comprehensive array of measures designed to make it as difficult as possible for states to buy or build such weapons. [*Section 8*]

**KEY POLICIES**

• **NPT Safeguards and Verification.** All states should accept the application of the IAEA Additional Protocol. To encourage universal take-up, acceptance of it should be a condition of all nuclear exports. [*9.7*]

• The Additional Protocol and its annexes should be updated and strengthened to make clear the IAEA’s right to investigate possible weaponization activity, and by adding specific reference to dual-use items, reporting on export denials, shorter notice periods and the right to interview specific individuals. [*9.8-9*]

• **NPT Compliance and Enforcement.** In determining compliance, the IAEA should confine itself essentially to technical criteria, applying them with consistency and credibility, and leaving the political consequences for the Security Council to determine. [*9.15*]

• The UN Security Council should severely discourage withdrawal from the NPT by
making it clear that this will be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [9.20]

- A state withdrawing from the NPT should not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material provided before withdrawal should so far as possible be returned, with this being enforced by the Security Council. [9.21-22]

**Strengthening the IAEA.** The IAEA should make full use of the authority already available to it, including special inspections, and states should be prepared to strengthen its authority as deficiencies are identified. [9.24]

- The IAEA should be given a one-off injection of funds to refurbish the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory; a significant increase in its regular budget support, without a “zero real growth” constraint; and sufficient security of future funding to enable effective medium to long term planning. [9.25-27]

**Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms.** The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT, taking into account factors such as ratification of the CTBT, willingness to end unsafeguarded fissile material production, and states’ record in securing nuclear facilities and materials and controlling nuclear-related exports. [10.3-9]

- The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system as a neutral organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make both generic and specific recommendations or decisions concerning the interdiction of suspected materials being carried to or from countries of proliferation concern. [10.10-12]

**Extending Obligations to Non-NPT States.** Recognising the reality that the three nuclear-armed states now outside the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – are not likely to become members any time soon, every effort should be made to achieve their participation in parallel instruments and arrangements which apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. [10.13-16]

- Provided they satisfy strong objective criteria demonstrating commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and sign up to specific future commitments in this respect, these states should have access to nuclear materials and technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an NPT member. [10.17]

- These states should participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations on the same basis as the nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT, and not be expected to accept different treatment because of their non-membership of that treaty. [10.18]
Priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The primary focus should be on reaching agreement on:

- measures to strengthen NPT safeguards and verification, compliance and enforcement, and the IAEA (as above);
- forward movement on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, with the UN Secretary-General convening an early conference of all relevant states to address creative and fresh ways to implement the 1995 resolution;
- strengthened implementation of nuclear security measures (see Meeting Terrorism Challenge below); and
- further support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. [Section 16]

E. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

BASIC THEMES

- Effectively countering terrorism of any kind involves a complex mix of nationally and internationally coordinated protection and policing strategies (most immediately important in dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism), and also political, peacebuilding and psychological strategies (necessary to address the underlying causes of terrorist behaviour).

- At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and in related policy deliberations, the main need is to focus on the effective implementation of existing agreed measures rather than the development of new ones. [Section 13; Box 13-1]

KEY POLICIES

- All states should agree to take effective measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, including by adopting and implementing the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerating delivery of the Cooperative Threat Reduction and associated programs worldwide, and making a greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing. [13.5-16]

- On the control of material useable for “dirty bombs”, further efforts need to be made to cooperatively implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, with assistance to states in updating legislation and licensing practice and promoting awareness among users.[13.17-21]
• Strong support should be given to the emerging science of nuclear forensics, designed to identify the sources of materials found in illicit trafficking or used in nuclear explosions. [13.22-25]

F. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY

BASIC THEMES

• The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should continue to be strongly supported as one of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT, along with disarmament and non-proliferation. Increased resources should be provided, including through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy for human development.

• Proliferation resistance should be endorsed by governments and industry as an essential objective in the design and operation of nuclear facilities, and promoted through both institutional and technical measures – neither is sufficient without the other. [Section 14]

KEY POLICIES

• Nuclear Energy Management. Support should be given to the initiative launched at the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit for international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure, designed to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing the relevant measures. [14.4-6]

• New technologies for spent fuel treatment should be developed to avoid current forms of reprocessing altogether. [12.26]

• The increasing use of plutonium recycle, and the prospective introduction of fast neutron reactors, must be pursued in ways which enhance non-proliferation objectives and avoid adding to proliferation and terrorism risks. [14.9-15]

• International measures such as spent fuel take-back arrangements by fuel suppliers, are desirable to avoid increasing spent fuel accumulations in a large number of states. [14.13]
• **Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle** – in particular through fuel banks and multilateral management of enrichment, reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities – should be strongly supported. Such arrangements would play an invaluable role in building global confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provide an important foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons, for which a necessary requirement will be multilateral verification and control of all sensitive fuel cycle activities. [Section 15]

G. MOBILIZING AND SUSTAINING POLITICAL WILL

**BASIC THEMES**

• The will to do something difficult, sensitive or expensive will rarely be a given in international or domestic politics. It usually has to be painfully and laboriously constructed, case by case, context by context, with four main elements needing to come together:
  - **leadership**: without which inertia will always prevail – top down (from the major nuclear-armed states, particularly the U.S. and Russia), from peer groups (like-minded states worldwide) and bottom up (from civil society);
  - **knowledge**: both specialist and general, of the nature, magnitude and urgency of the nuclear problem: requiring better education and training in schools and universities, and stronger advocacy directed to policymakers, and those in the media and elsewhere who most influence them;
  - **strategy**: having a confident sense that there is a productive way forward: not just general objectives, but realistic action plans with detailed paths mapped and target benchmarks set; and
  - **process**: having the institutional and organisational means at hand – “campaign treaties”, or other research and advocacy structures – to advance the relevant strategy in practice. [Section 20]

**KEY POLICIES**

• **Nuclear Weapons Convention.** Work should commence now, supported by interested governments, on further refining and developing the concepts in the model convention now in circulation, making its provisions as workable and realistic as possible, with the objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum. [20.38-44]
• **Report Card.** To help sustain political will over time, a regular “report card” should be published in which a distinguished international panel, with appropriately professional and broad based research support, would evaluate the performance of both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states against the action agendas identified in this report. [20.49-50]

• **Monitoring and Advocacy Centre.** Consideration should be given to the establishment of a “Global Centre on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” to act as a focal point and clearing house for the work being done on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues by many different institutions and organizations in many different countries, to provide research and advocacy support both for like-minded governments and for civil society organisations, and to prepare the “report card” described above. [20.51-54]
THE COMPREHENSIVE ACTION AGENDA

THE SHORT TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2012: ACHIEVING INITIAL BENCHMARKS

**On Disarmament**

- Early agreement on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on treaty, with the U.S. and Russia agreeing to deep reductions in deployed strategic weapons, addressing the issue of strategic missile defence and commencing negotiations on further deep cuts in all classes of weapons.

- Early movement on nuclear doctrine, with all nuclear-armed states declaring at least that the sole purpose of retaining the nuclear weapons they have is to deter others from using such weapons against them or their allies (while giving firm assurances to such allies that they will not be exposed to unacceptable risk from other sources, including in particular chemical and biological weapons).

- All nuclear-armed states to give strong negative security assurances to complying non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against them.

- Early action on nuclear force postures, with particular attention to the negotiated removal to the extent possible of weapons from “launch-on-warning” status.

- Early commitment by all nuclear-armed states to not increasing their nuclear arsenals.

- Prepare the ground for a multilateral disarmament process by all nuclear-armed states conducting relevant studies; engaging in strategic dialogues with the U.S., Russia and each other; and commencing a joint dialogue within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament work program.

**On Non-Proliferation**

- A positive outcome for the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, with member states reaching agreement on measures to strengthen the NPT regime, including improved safeguards, verification, compliance and enforcement; measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA; “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament” statement on disarmament issues; and measures to advance the implementation of the Middle East and other existing and proposed Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.

- Satisfactory negotiated resolution of the North Korea and Iran nuclear program problems.
Movement toward strengthening non-proliferation regimes outside the NPT, and applying equivalent disciplines to NPT non-members.

**On Both Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**

- Bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- Conclude negotiations on an Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

**On Nuclear Security**

- Bring into force the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerate implementation of the cooperative threat reduction and associated programs designed to secure dangerous nuclear weapons, materials and technology worldwide, and achieve greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing.

**On Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

- Movement toward greater multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and government-industry cooperation on proliferation-resistant technologies and other measures designed to reduce any risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.
- Promotion of international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing relevant measures.

[Section 17]

**THE MEDIUM TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2025: GETTING TO THE MINIMIZATION POINT**

- Progressive achievement of interim disarmament objectives, culminating by 2025 in a “minimization point” characterized by:
  - low numbers: a world with no more than 2,000 nuclear warheads (less than 10 per cent of today’s arsenals);
  - agreed doctrine: every nuclear-armed state committed to no first use;
  - credible force postures: verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine.
- Progressive resolution of parallel security issues likely to impact on nuclear disarmament negotiations:
  - missile delivery systems and strategic missile defence;
  - space based weapons systems;
biological weapons;
conventional arms imbalances.

- Development and building of support for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention to legally underpin the ultimate transition to a nuclear weapon free world.

- Complete implementation (to extent already not achieved by 2012) of short-term objectives crucial for both disarmament and non-proliferation:
  - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in force;
  - Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiated and in force, and a further agreement negotiated to put all fissile material not in weapons under international safeguards;
  - Measures to strengthen the NPT regime and the IAEA agreed and in force;
  - Nuclear security measures in force, and cooperative threat reduction and associated programs fully implemented;
  - Progressive implementation of measures to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.

THE LONGER TERM ACTION AGENDA BEYOND 2025: GETTING TO ZERO

- Create political conditions, regionally and globally, sufficiently cooperative and stable for the prospect of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons are seen as having no remaining deterrent utility.

- Create the military conditions in which conventional arms imbalances, missile defence systems or any other national or intergovernmental-organisation capability is not seen as so inherently destabilizing as to justify the retention of a nuclear deterrent capability.

- Create verification conditions that will ensure confidence that any violation of the prohibition of nuclear weapons would be readily detected.

- Create the international legal regime and enforcement conditions that will ensure that any state breaching its prohibition obligations not to retain, acquire or develop nuclear weapons will be effectively penalized.

- Create fuel cycle management conditions that will ensure complete confidence that no state has the capacity to misuse uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing for weapons development purposes.
• Create personnel oversight conditions to ensure confidence that individuals’ know-how in the design and building of nuclear weapons will not be misapplied in violation of prohibition obligations.

[Section 19]
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

Origins and Mandate. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament was initially proposed by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd following his visit in June 2008 to the Hiroshima peace memorial, and agreed in July 2008 by Prime Minister Rudd and then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. The Commission was launched in New York in September 2008 by Prime Minister Rudd and then Prime Minister Taro Aso as a joint initiative of the Australian and Japanese Governments. The activities of the Commission have been embraced and supported by the present Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.

The Commission’s stated aim was to reinvigorate, at a high political level, global debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in the context both of the forthcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, and beyond. It was designed to build upon, and take further in a sharply practical and action-oriented way, the work of distinguished earlier commissions and panels, notably the 1996 Canberra Commission, the 1999 Tokyo Forum, the 2004 UN High-level Panel, the 2006 Blix Commission, and the 2008 Zedillo Commission on the future of the IAEA.

Although initiated by two governments, and primarily funded by the government of Australia, the Commission is a completely independent body, with its members appointed in their personal capacity rather than as representatives of their respective countries.

Commissioners and Advisory Board. The Australian and Japanese prime ministers jointly invited to head the Commission as its Co-chairs former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi. They were joined as Commissioners by thirteen eminent and outstanding individuals from around the world, including former heads of state and ministers, military strategists and disarmament experts, all uniquely placed to bring fresh and imaginative vision to the undertaking: Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa), François Heisbourg (France), Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan), Brajesh Mishra (India), Klaus Naumann (Germany), William Perry (United States), Wang Yingfan (China), Shirley Williams (United Kingdom), Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia, replacing the late Ali Alatas) and Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico).

The Commission has been greatly assisted in its work by an Advisory Board of 27 distinguished experts from around the globe whose members were consulted individually and, in many cases, participated in one or more Commission meetings: Nobuyasu Abe (Japan), Shlomo Ben-Ami (Israel), Hans Blix (Sweden), Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), John Carlson (Australia), Nabil Fahmy (Egypt), Louise Fréchette (Canada), Lawrence Freedman (UK), Roberto García Moritán (Argentina), Han Sung-Joo (South Korea), Prasad Kariyawasam (Sri Lanka), Henry Kissinger (United States), Shunsuke Kondo (Japan), Anne Lauvergeon...
(France), Martine Letts (Australia), Patricia Lewis (Ireland), Andrea Margelletti (Italy), Sam Nunn (United States), Robert O’Neill (Australia), George Perkovich (U.S.), V.R. Raghavan (India), George Robertson (United Kingdom), Michel Rocard (France), Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland), Yukio Satoh (Japan), George Shultz (U.S.), and Hans van den Broek (Netherlands).

**Research Support and Administration.** The Commission appointed nine Associated Research Centres to lead the effort in their respective countries or regions: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington DC and Moscow), Centre for International Governance and Innovation (Waterloo, Canada), Delhi Policy Group (New Delhi), Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (San Jose, Costa Rica), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Paris), Japan Institute of International Affairs (Tokyo), King’s College (London), Lowy Institute for International Policy (Sydney) and Tsinghua University (Beijing). From these Research Centres and other consultants worldwide over 50 pieces of new research were commissioned, most available on www.icnnd.org. Research Coordinator for the Commission was former Australian ambassador Ken Berry.

The work of the Commission was supported by a small Secretariat operating from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, headed by Commission Secretary Ian Biggs and a parallel unit in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, headed by Toshio Sano.

**Consultations.** Four major Regional Meetings were held, attended by a total of 89 regional participants – from government, universities and research institutes, and where appropriate the nuclear energy sector – from 25 countries: in Latin America (Santiago, 2-3 May 2009), North East Asia (Beijing, 22-23 May 2009), the Middle East (Cairo, 29-30 September 2009) and South Asia (New Delhi, 3-4 October 2009). A day-long round-table with representatives of the world’s nuclear power industry from six continents was held in association with the Commission’s meeting in Moscow on 22 June 2009. Regular dialogue with civil society was sustained through the Commission’s two NGO Advisers, Akira Kawasaki of Peace Boat and Tilman Ruff of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and meetings in Washington DC and Hiroshima, including with atomic bomb victims (hibakusha). The Co-chairs and other Commissioners also had many individual consultations and briefings in key capitals, and with, inter alia, the UN in New York and Geneva, and the IAEA and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna.

**Commission Meetings and Report.** The Commission’s first meeting in Sydney (19-21 October 2008) considered its mandate, work plan, and general approach, focusing on the value that it could add to previous and current work by others. Its second and third meetings in Washington DC (13-15 February 2009), and Moscow (19-21 June 2009) agreed on a detailed structure for its report and systematically discussed all relevant policy issues. Drafts of different sections of the report were then commissioned from a range of experts, including from among the Commissioners, Advisory Board and Secretariat members. A draft prepared
by the Co-chairs themselves on the basis of those inputs was reviewed in detail, and a final text
unanimously agreed, by the fourth Commission meeting in Hiroshima on 17-20 October 2009.
The Commission will continue in existence until at least mid-2010, to enable follow-up
advocacy on its report, and a review, after the 2010 NPT Review Conference, of the state of
play and appropriate next steps.

A fuller account of how the Commission worked, and those who assisted it, may be found in
Annex C of the full report, and at www.icnnd.org

Members of the Commission

**Gareth Evans (Australia) (Co-chair)**
Professor Evans was Australia’s Resources and Energy Minister (1984-87) and Foreign
Minister (1988-96). He initiated the Canberra Commission (1996) and was a member of the
UN High-level Panel (2004), Blix Commission (2006) and Zedillo Commission on the IAEA
(2008). He was President (2000-09) and is now President Emeritus of the International Crisis
Group, and is currently an Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

**Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan) (Co-chair)**
Ms Kawaguchi has been a Member of the House of Councillors for the Liberal Democratic
Party since 2005. She was Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, responsible for foreign
affairs (2004-05), Minister for Foreign Affairs (2002-04) and Minister for the Environment
(2000-02). Previously she was a Managing Director of Suntory Ltd, a senior official at the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Minister at the Embassy of Japan to the United
States, and an economist at the World Bank.

**Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia)**
HRH Prince Turki was Director General of Intelligence from 1977 to 2001, and Ambassador to
the United Kingdom and Ireland from 2002 to 2005, and to the United States from 2005 to
2007. He is currently Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal Center for Research and
Islamic studies in Riyadh.

**Alexei Arbatov (Russia)**
Dr Arbatov was a member of the Russian Duma and Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence
Committee from 1994 to 2003. He is currently a Scholar-in-Residence and Chair of the Non-
proliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)
Dr Brundtland was Prime Minister of Norway for ten years between 1981 and 1996. She chaired the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) and was Director General of the World Health Organization from 1998 to 2003. She is currently the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Climate Change.

Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa)
Dr Ginwala was Speaker of South Africa’s National Assembly from 1994 to 2004. She was Chancellor of the University of KwaZulu-Natal from 2004 until June 2009.

François Heisbourg (France)
Mr Heisbourg is Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Special Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and was a member of the French Presidential Commission that produced the 2008 Defence and National Security White Paper.

Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan)
General Karamat was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Army Staff between 1996 and 1998 and Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States from 2004 to 2006. He is currently Director of the Spearhead Research Institute.

Brajesh Mishra (India)
Mr Mishra was India’s Ambassador in Geneva, Jakarta and then New York from 1973 to 1981, and National Security Adviser and Principal Secretary to former Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee from 1998 to 2004.

Klaus Naumann (Germany)
General Naumann was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999 and Chief of the Defence Staff in Germany from 1991 to 1996. He was a Member of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000) and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).

William Perry (United States)
Dr Perry was the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997. He is currently a Professor at Stanford University in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies.

Wang Yingfan (China)
Ambassador Wang was China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2003, and Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress from 2003 to 2008.
Shirley Williams (United Kingdom)
Baroness Williams was Leader of the Liberal Democrat Party in the House of Lords from 2001 to 2004. She is currently Professor Emeritus of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and an adviser to Prime Minister Gordon Brown on nuclear proliferation issues.

Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia)
Ambassador Wiryono was Director General of Political Affairs in Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs from 1990-1993. He has served as Indonesia’s Ambassador to Australia, France and Austria, as Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna and on the Board of Governors for the IAEA.

Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico)
Dr Zedillo was President of Mexico from 1994 to 2000. He is currently Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and Professor at Yale University in international
Islamic Republic of Iran

Working paper

The position paper of the G-21 on nuclear disarmament

1. The G-21 reiterates its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their proliferation will remain.

2. The Group would like to recall in this regard that the very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 1(1) of 1946, adopted unanimously, called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals.

3. It would also like to recall that the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 accorded the highest priority to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

4. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 1996, concluded that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

5. The Millennium Declaration in 2000 also reaffirmed the commitment of the member States of the United Nations to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons.

6. Therefore, the Group, as it stated in previous statements to the Conference on Disarmament, reiterates that "achieving total nuclear disarmament remains its highest priority."

7. The G-21 would like to draw attention to the following contributions of the Group to the deliberations on nuclear disarmament in this Conference:

   (a) Working Paper on Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament submitted on 12 July 1979 (CD/36/Rev.1);

   (b) Working Paper on Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament submitted on 9 July 1980 (CD/116);

   (c) Working Paper submitted on 4 February 1983 (CD/341);

   (d) Draft Mandate of an Ad hoc Committee on Item 2 of the Agenda submitted on 18 March 1988 (CD/819);
8. The G-21 has noted a number of official recent statements made by States, including some nuclear-weapon states, as well as by statesmen and scholars on issues related to nuclear disarmament and on their vision for a nuclear weapons free world. The Group, while believing that the implications of these initiatives need to be further investigated, hopes that they will lead to new opportunities to make serious progress on nuclear disarmament, including in the CD.

9. Stressing its strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, the Group reaffirms its readiness to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention.

10. Therefore, the Group is of the view that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time.

11. In this regard, the Group stresses that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures.

12. The G-21 notes the measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encourages them to take further such measures. While reiterating its deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the G-21 underlines the importance of effective step-by-step implementation of concrete measures in order to achieve a nuclear weapons free world.

13. The G-21 reaffirms that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

14. As stated in its Plenary Statement on 2 February 2010, the G-21 would like to highlight that in the Final Document of the 2009 Sharm-El Sheikh Summit, the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement "reaffirmed the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and reiterated their call on the CD on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work by, inter-alia, establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and as the highest priority. They emphasized the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. They reaffirmed the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

15. The G-21 State Parties to the NPT note with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference that was convened in New York between 3-28 May 2010. They welcome the endorsement by the Review Conference of the convening in 2012 of a conference to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirming the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the
placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and hope that this would lead to the full implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The G-21 State Parties to the NPT further note the fact that nuclear weapon States agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to report on their undertakings related to nuclear disarmament to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, and that the 2015 Review Conference would take stock and consider next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty; they reiterate their call on the nuclear weapon States to accept a specified framework of time for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons that is legally-binding. Furthermore, they are encouraged with the commitment of nuclear-weapons States to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and express their hope that this would lead to the full and unequivocal implementation of the practical steps for nuclear disarmament. They also recall that all States Parties of the NPT agreed, among others, that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.

16. The G-21 emphasizes that progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects is essential to strengthening international peace and security. The Group reaffirms that efforts toward nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security.

17. There is also a genuine and urgent need to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their elimination. In this regard, the Group recalls its strong support of the objectives of the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/41 of 2 December 2008 on "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems" as well as the UN General Assembly Resolution 64/37 of 2 December 2009 entitled "Reducing nuclear danger as practical steps to enhance the level of confidence and transparency in the process of disarmament and non-proliferation.

18. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and, legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context, the Group recalls paragraph 32 and 59 of the Final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which underscored the need for effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

19. The G-21 stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all NWS, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realised, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the NWS, to nuclear disarmament would be essential.

20. The G-21 reaffirms the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and expresses its determination to promote' multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in these areas. In this regard, the Group strongly supports the objectives of UN General Assembly Resolution: 64/34 of 2009 on the "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation".

21. Therefore, the G-21 calls for renewed efforts to resolve the current impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament, particularly in the adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is the Group's
sincere hope that at this year's session, the Conference will be able to achieve consensus on the much-needed programme of work to move forward the disarmament agenda.

22. In view of the Group's strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, the G-21 reiterates the following concrete steps to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament:

   (a) Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

   (b) Elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines;

   (c) Adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, such as de-alerting of nuclear-weapons and decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems;

   (d) Negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

   (e) Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

   (f) Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified frame work of time.

23. The Group of 21 expresses the hope that it will be possible for the CD to promptly commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament as part of its programme of work.
Letter dated 14 September 2010 from the President of the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the reports of the seven Coordinators submitted to the President of the Conference on the work done during the 2010 session on agenda items 1 to 7

On June 2010, the Conference on Disarmament agreed upon the schedule of informal meetings on its seven agenda items and the nomination of the coordinators, which are contained in document CD/WP.560.

According to CD/WP.560, the informal meetings on agenda items 1 and 2 were chaired and coordinated by Sweden (first four meetings) and Algeria (last four meetings), agenda item 3 by Brazil; agenda item 4 by Bangladesh, agenda item 5 by Belarus, agenda item 6 by Indonesia, and agenda item 7 by Finland. These seven coordinators submitted to the President of the Conference oral reports on the discussions on their respective agenda items.

In my capacity as President of the Conference and through you, Mr. Secretary-General, and on behalf of all six Presidents, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the seven coordinators for the important work done under their professional guidance. The seven coordinator’s reports attached to this letter in annexes I to VII reflect serious debates and inputs which should enrich future discussions as relevant references for the work of the Conference.

Consequently, I would be grateful if this letter, together with its seven annexed document could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed) Anatole Fabien Marie Nkou
Ambassador
President of the Conference on Disarmament
Annex I

Text of the oral report of the Coordinator to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on the informal meetings on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

Submitted by Mr. Idriss Jazaïry, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Algeria

1. Pursuant to Decisions CD/WP.560 and CD/WP.560/Amend.1, informal debates were held on items 1 (Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament) and 2 (Prevention of Nuclear War, including all matters related thereto) of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament. The four sessions devoted to this theme took place on 28 June, 29 June (two sessions) and 13 July 2010.

2. Based on the work of the last thirteen years on this issue, and with the aim of fostering the start of the related substantive work in the context of an agreed programme of work for the Conference, the views of the delegations were sought on the five following areas:

(a) Concept of nuclear disarmament;
(b) Legal framework;
(c) Other related legal instruments;
(d) Mandate of the Conference on Disarmament; and
(e) Transparency and confidence building measures.

3. In order to facilitate the proceedings, the following documents were distributed to the delegations:

(a) A non-paper prepared by the Co-ordinator highlighting some landmarks related to nuclear disarmament;
(b) The conclusions of the three last years relevant Coordinators;
(c) The Secretariat’s listing of the official documents of the CD on nuclear disarmament since 1993.

The delegations were provided with summaries of the four meetings.

4. At the first meeting, useful introductory remarks were made on various aspects of the issue of nuclear disarmament. A valuable presentation was made on the Model Convention on the Nuclear Weapons. This working paper presented officially by States at the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as at the NPT Review Conference, contains legal, technical and political matters that should be addressed in order to establish and maintain a total ban on nuclear weapons.

5. All delegations who expressed themselves renewed their commitment to achieving a nuclear weapons free world. The Group of 21, referring to the 15th Non Aligned Movement Summit of Sharm El Sheikh, stated that is time to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to attain this goal. The following preliminary ideas were stressed or discussed:

(a) Practicability and relevance of the call for nuclear disarmament;
(b) Priority to be given to nuclear disarmament as well as to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a legally binding nuclear disarmament instrument in a time-bound framework with specified deadlines to eliminate nuclear weapons, including on the basis of the Model Convention on nuclear weapons;

(c) While pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament, measures should be taken to reduce the nuclear danger;

(d) Interdependence between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament;

(e) Need for a structured discussion with the aim of achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons by or beyond 2025;

(f) Feasibility of establishing a timetable for nuclear disarmament, as is the case in many other areas such as the eradication of poverty;

(g) Need for ending the legacy of the Cold War represented by the nuclear weapons, the doctrine based on deterrence and the granting of “nuclear umbrellas” and on the stationing of nuclear warheads in non-nuclear States;

(h) Concerns expressed regarding the absence of progress in nuclear disarmament and the continuing modernization and development of nuclear weapons with a call for a move towards irreversible and verifiable multilateral nuclear disarmament.

6. Some Nuclear States recalled their unilateral actions in favour of reducing nuclear arsenals. They underscored the importance of the rich debate that took place on the issue of nuclear disarmament during the last NPT Review Conference. They reiterated their preference for an approach based on a framework of agreements whose components are mutually reinforcing rather than on a convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons.

7. Starting with the second session, the debate became more focused. The question arose on how to address the issue of nuclear disarmament and whether a legal framework was needed. There was no unanimity on a particular option in this regard.

8. Based on a set of views, especially from those States that are in favour of an immediate comprehensive nuclear disarmament, it was said that the Conference on Disarmament should proceed without delay with negotiations on a binding multilateral instrument banning nuclear weapons.

9. For several delegations that echoed this position, the call for a nuclear weapons free world will remain valid so long as full nuclear disarmament is not achieved. Several arguments were put forward in support of this vision:

(a) The root causes of problems and conflicts lie in the possession of nuclear weapons which must be totally eliminate;

(b) Nuclear disarmament is an international legal obligation under article 6 of the NPT, a treaty which is currently the only multilateral disarmament instrument. Article 6 should then be implemented without further delay. The States members should show willingness to move in that direction to end the current impasse on the issue of nuclear disarmament. Given the fact that several past commitments in favour of implementation of article 6 have not been honoured, the modest progress achieved so far justifies the need for a global effort;

(c) A balance was supposed to be maintained in the implementation of the three pillars of the NPT. Non-nuclear States renounced nuclear weapons with the understanding that this would lead to such a balance. However, this has not been the case so far and it is not acceptable that discrimination continue;
(d) The NPT is not a universal treaty. This calls for a new framework to include all States, assume their legitimate concerns and ensure a universal commitment that goes beyond the scope of the obligation of the present article 6 of the NPT;

(e) It had not been possible to conclude a nuclear weapon convention so far, this had not to be an excuse to give up the pursuit of such an agreement in the future;

(f) States members accepted to conclude conventions on chemical weapons and biological weapons. What prevents them from concluding a convention on nuclear weapons?

10. According to a second set of views, it was important to create the appropriate conditions, in terms of maturity, for negotiations on a nuclear ban convention. Some proponents of this approach were somewhat cautious as to the practicability of pursuing the goal of a nuclear weapons free world, arguing that the so-called “Global Zero” option has rather an academic and theoretical concept and cannot therefore be reasonably pursued as a goal by States.

11. It was felt preferable to move along a pragmatic and progressive path by adopting a “step by step” approach through selecting feasible measures that lead to significant reductions in the numbers of nuclear warheads.

12. The entry into force of the CTBT, the negotiations on an FMCT and the enhancement of the level of confidence, in particular in terms of information on measures taken within the framework of bilateral or plurilateral disarmament, were referred to as examples of practical steps in this regard.

13. The views expressed in support of this approach were based on the following main arguments:

(a) Realism, pragmatism and gradualism should prevail while addressing nuclear disarmament issue;

(b) It is a fact that throughout the last sixty years, all the significant reductions in the number of nuclear warheads have been made not in a multilateral perspective, but bilaterally or unilaterally;

(c) There should therefore be negotiations on a framework of agreements with mutually reinforcing components that would allow further reductions of the existing nuclear arsenals. This gradual approach is one of the two recognised options by the UN Secretary-General in his plan for nuclear disarmament;

(d) The Conference on Disarmament should take inspiration from the work of the last NPT Review Conference where the States Parties took obvious practical measures that accompany nuclear disarmament;

(e) Article 6 of the NPT is actually a framework obligation under which all States Parties have to work for a safer world. This requirement is so general that it goes beyond nuclear disarmament from which it can not be dissociated, encompassing as it does the goal of general and complete disarmament pursued in article 6;

(f) Nuclear disarmament should not be seen as an end in itself. Accordingly, it is not the option of “Global Zero” which should be pursued but the ways and means that lead to achieving an ever safer world;

(g) Nuclear disarmament might be sought only if it is a prerequisite for achieving such a safer world. This does not seem to have been the case hitherto. Indeed, disarmament progress achieved so far appear as the consequence of the prevailing peace and not the cause. In other words, more efforts in terms of conflict resolution lead to further disarmament measures.
14. In addition to the above-mentioned trends, some delegations, showing more flexibility on the issue of the legal framework, believe that what should be important is not the shape of the legal framework but its impact on the goal of the “Global Zero”. Therefore they averred that the Conference on Disarmament could carry out its mandate by taking into account all the approaches that promote this goal.

15. The third session was devoted to the issue of the mandate that could be assigned to the Conference on Disarmament. This is a critical issue because it is related to the programme of work of the Conference which is facing serious difficulties.

16. Given the present stalemate in the Conference, and in order not to confine the debate to academic assumptions, the participating delegations were invited to comment on a number of options regarding the mandate of the Conference including the proposals which are being considered as well as the alternative contained in the final document of the last NPT Review Conference.

17. Few comments were heard in this regard. Similar to what has been witnessed for the legal framework, the reactions were not homogeneous.

18. Several delegations supporting the approach of a total and immediate ban on nuclear weapons demanded that the Conference on Disarmament be provided with a negotiating mandate. They believed that this mandate should be as broad as possible because the negotiations could result in one or more instruments. It was believed by them also that any programme of work had to be based on such a mandate. In addition, this mandate should not be stripped of its substance through pre-conditions, it was emphasized. Another view was expressed that agenda item 2 is an equally important item and accordingly should be part of any proposal on CD’s programme of work. In addition, it was emphasized that while preparing a proposal on the CD’s programme of work, all the related CD agenda items should be treated on an equal footing.

19. Some delegations in favour of the gradualist approach stressed the fact that negotiation should not be an end in itself. The whole process must be assessed, accordingly, in a spirit of pragmatism and realism.

20. Other issues raised related to the other instruments that could accompany nuclear disarmament, including the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle-East, as well as transparency and confidence building measures. They were not discussed extensively. However, the elements that have previously been identified in this regard seemed to still be valid. Specifically, the establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones was seen as a contribution to nuclear disarmament.

21. In conclusion, the four sessions devoted to the theme of nuclear disarmament proved a very useful exercise since they provided Member States with a renewed opportunity to share their views on different matters related to one of the topics that are commonly seen as “core issues” in the Conference on Disarmament.

22. The atmosphere during the meetings was positive and constructive. The debates were rich, focused and interactive. This was indicative of the extent of work that awaits the Conference on Disarmament when it will approach its substantive work on the issue.

23. However, the views are still divided on many fundamental related issues including the legal framework and the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament.

24. But an encouraging point to note is that differences and disagreements do not relate in all cases to the fact that some States possess nuclear weapons and others do not.

25. Views were expressed on various issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament, but the prospects for substantive discussions can not be dissociated from the context of an agreed
programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament which is still unfortunately out of reach.

26. Finally, we believe that frequent informal discussions on this topic in the Conference were helpful in narrowing differences and enhancing mutual understanding between member States.
Appendix I of annex I

Work Plan presented by the Co-ordinator for the informal debate on Agenda item 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

1. At the inaugural session of the informal debates on items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament, the Co-ordinator referred to the content of Decisions CD/WP.560 and CD/WP.560/Amend.1. He made the following introductory remarks:

   - Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that use nuclear reactions. They are considered as weapons of mass destruction, like the chemical and biological weapons;

   - The negative effects of nuclear weapons do not, moreover, distinguish between military and civilian targets and undermine in a sustainable manner the environment;

   - Because of their extensive destructive power, they are considered as a separate category of weapons of mass destruction;

   - The first nuclear weapons were developed during the Second World War. The disastrous nuclear explosions of 6 and 9 August 1945 sparked a frantic race by States towards achieving nuclear weapons status.

   - In reaction to these global developments, nuclear weapons have been the subject of a number of international legal instruments of mitigation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The latter is not yet in force but it is likely to take effect in the near future;

   - Exports of nuclear materials are also subject to international controls. These controls are administered by three organizations: the Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Control Regime of missile technology;

   - At the regional level, the nuclear weapon-free zones are part of this overall issue of nuclear disarmament / non-proliferation. They aim generally rather to non-proliferation in areas that were not nuclear. In the specific case of the Middle East, the realization of the nuclear weapon-free zone is however suggested within the dimension of nuclear disarmament rather than non-proliferation;

   - At the bilateral level, during the Cold War, several bilateral arms control initiatives related to nuclear weapons have been concluded. These initiatives have been continued and strengthened after the end of the East-West ideological confrontation;

   - Throughout recent years, calls have increased in favour of banning nuclear weapons. The realization of a world without nuclear weapons has become a widely shared aspiration. This was translated recently by the three main resolutions adopted by the 64th session of the UNGA under number 53, 57 and 59, as well as by the final document adopted at the recently held NPT Review Conference;

   - A Model of Nuclear Weapons Convention, prepared by experts on disarmament and nuclear analysts, was submitted in 1996 and adapted in 2007 by States within the framework of the NPT and the General Assembly;

   - The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament treaties, has included nuclear disarmament in its agenda. However, it has never been able to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, as it is regularly asked to;
l) In addition to the absence of a programme of work, the lack of progress stems somewhat from the differing approaches maintained by the nuclear and non-nuclear States;

(m) Throughout the last thirteen years, working papers were presented to facilitate discussion on this topic. Official statements were made in plenary. Useful informal debates took place under the guidance of Co-ordinators.

2. On this basis, the Co-ordinator identified five discussion areas on which the delegations were invited to express their views:
   (a) Main highlights of nuclear disarmament;
   (b) The legal framework that could govern the prohibition of nuclear weapons;
   (c) Other legal instruments relating to nuclear disarmament;
   (d) The mandate in the programme of work on nuclear disarmament within the Conference on Disarmament;
   (e) Transparency and confidence building measures.

3. The aim was to stimulate the debate on the key issue of nuclear disarmament and facilitate the launch of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament within the context of the efforts being made for the adoption of a programme of work.

4. Following general comments made at the first meeting, and in order to concentrate the debate on concrete measures, the Co-ordinator proposed to focus during the remaining sessions on more specific issues.

5. With regard to the issue of the legal framework, he suggested, under the first approach that advocates the conclusion of a legal instrument, examining the different aspects of the Model Convention on nuclear weapons. These aspects relate to the following:
   (a) General obligations;
   (b) Declarations;
   (c) Calendar of nuclear disarmament;
   (d) Verification;
   (e) National Implementation Measures;
   (f) Rights and obligations of individuals;
   (g) Agency responsible for implementation;
   (h) Nuclear material;
   (i) Cooperation, compliance and settlement of disputes;
   (j) Links with other international agreements;
   (k) Financing;
   (l) Optional protocol on assistance in the field of energy.

6. Under the second approach based on a framework of agreements with mutual reinforcing components, some previously indentified instruments were recalled:
   (a) A global agreement among nuclear weapon States on “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons;
   (b) A universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States;
(c) A treaty on fissile material;
(d) An agreement on specific and legally binding measures to achieve the universalization of the NPT;
(e) A multilateral agreement to reduce the operational readiness of deployed nuclear systems;
(f) An agreement on the establishment of multilateral centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services;
(g) A global regime governing the possession and use of missiles;
(h) An agreement giving a global character to the INF Treaty;
(i) A nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle-East

7. The Co-ordinator commented on the timeframe for nuclear disarmament. He recalled the suggested idea of a “minimization” threshold for nuclear weapons by 2025 to be followed by their “elimination” thereafter and the views expressed at the NPT Review Conference to not set a mandatory calendar.

8. After reviewing the legal framework, the Co-ordinator suggested to place the discussion within the context of the work of the Conference on Disarmament and try to address the issue of the mandate to be assigned to the Conference with regard to nuclear disarmament in the context of the adoption of the much-awaited programme of work.

9. The two following elements were mentioned in order to guide the discussions:
(a) Document CD/WP.559 containing the draft programme of work under consideration in the CD proposes the establishment of a working group under agenda item 1 in order to exchange views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of a multilateral character;
(b) The last NPT Review Conference which more concisely invited the Conference on Disarmament to simply establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, as part of an agreed comprehensive and balanced program of work. “Action 6: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work”.

10. The four meetings were held within the above-suggested parameters.
Appendix II of annex I

Non paper prepared by the Coordinator for the informal debate on Agenda item 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

1. Within the framework of Decision CD/WP.560 of 7 June 2010, the debate during this four session debate deals with an issue that is commonly termed a “core-issue”: agenda item 1 and 2 of the Conference on Disarmament, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament.

2. The negotiations on nuclear disarmament have not witnessed in recent years progress similar to that attained before the end of 1996, when the Conference on Disarmament was able to negotiate the CTBT whose long-awaited entry into force is coming within reach.

3. However, this debate remains relevant. Increased calls for the realization of the goal of Nuclear Weapons Free World are a testimony in this regard.

4. Indeed, each of the substantive agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament is linked in an essential manner to this goal.

5. Under the last version of the draft program of work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Conference is supposed to initiate an exchange of views and information on practical measures for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of a multilateral character.

6. This is a broad and complex mandate, but a mandate that could adequately meet the challenges posed by the continued existence of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the Nuclear Weapons States and by the continuing threat of development of new generations of weapons as well as by traditional and new threats posed by nuclear proliferation.

7. Nuclear disarmament is an obligation under international law, as provided for, several decades ago, by Article VI of the NPT. The International Court of Justice recalled this obligation unanimously in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

8. Unequivocal commitments have been made in the framework of the NPT Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000 by the Nuclear Weapons States to achieve a complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This commitment was reaffirmed in the Final Document of the Review Conference of May 2010. It was agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, as part of an overall and balanced program of work. It was agreed that the nuclear disarmament process and other measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework which, a majority of States parties believe, should include specified timelines.

9. Nuclear disarmament is part of the goal of general and complete disarmament pursued in Article VI of the NPT as well as in numerous U.N resolutions, beginning by the outcome document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

10. More recently, in resolution 64/47, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to start substantive work, based on the current global dynamics in favour of nuclear disarmament, on the progress already made and on the active participation of its members in its deliberations. In resolution 64/53, the General Assembly reiterates its call
upon the Conference to establish, in early 2010, as soon as possible and as a priority, an ad
hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to begin negotiations on a phased program of
nuclear disarmament with the objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons within a
specified timeframe.

11. The Secretary General of the United Nations presented a five-point plan for nuclear
disarmament, which provides, inter alia, for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention
or an agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments, supported
by a strong verification system.

12. Several laudable initiatives have been taken unilaterally and bilaterally in the
direction of the objective of nuclear disarmament. However, these are still insufficient in
the view of many member States. They need, therefore, to be pursued and completed, at the
multilateral level, by more significant, verifiable and irreversible actions.

13. Nuclear disarmament remains the only viable option that guarantees security for all
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. No country in the world should remain
in possession of such weapons.

14. As such, it is necessary to commence multilateral negotiations on the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons, preferably within a specified time horizon.

15. The negotiations should lead to a complete ban on the possession, development,
stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons by all countries and provide for the destruction of
these weapons.

16. Any move in this regard, in order to be effective, should aim at legally binding,
verifiable, universal standards that could effectively contribute to the preservation of peace
and security worldwide.

17. The standards to be promoted in this area should provide security for all States in a
sense that their respective concerns are taken into account based on the principle of
undiminished security for all.

18. These standards should finally reflect the interdependence between disarmament,
non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Annex II

Oral Report on the first four informal sessions of the Conference on Disarmament on Agenda items 1 and 2 during the second part of the 2010 session

Submitted by Mr. Magnus Hellgren, Minister, Permanent Mission of Sweden

1. The first four informal sessions on agenda items 1 and 2, in accordance with the schedule agreed in WP.560 and WP.560/Amend.1, were held on 8 June (2 sessions), 22 June and 23 June, under my chairmanship/coordinatorship.

2. In accordance with WP.560, the chair/coordinator is required to report orally, in his personal capacity, on the discussions of the agenda items to the CD President, who will finalize the reports and transmit them through a letter to the Conference. The following constitutes my oral report.

3. The informal discussions during the four sessions covered many aspects of Agenda items 1 (“Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”) and 2 (“Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”). Several delegations made interventions referring to their overall approach and priorities related to these agenda items, focusing on both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and their interrelationship. Some specific proposals were mentioned, such as a Nuclear Weapons Convention and Reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons.

4. The vast majority of interventions in the discussions during these four sessions focussed on one particular aspect related to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, that is the proposed treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT).

5. The informal discussions on FMCT benefitted from the fact that several delegations had been reinforced by fissile material experts from capitals, both governmental experts and in some cases independent national experts.

6. The informal discussions were also stimulated by a number of expert presentations and the circulation of formal and informal papers related to the issue of fissile materials. Those included:

   (a) A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues (UNIDIR publication);

   (b) Proposal on the structure of a treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (CD/1888, submitted by Brazil);

   (c) Suggestions for the substance of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (non-paper by Australia);

   (d) FMCT — Outline of possible verification provisions (non-paper by Australia);

   (e) A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Draft for discussion prepared by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (CD/1878);

   (f) Towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Issues, options and recommendations (non-paper by Mr. Bruno Pellaud, adviser to the Swiss Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament);
(g) Presentation on the dismantlement of the former fissile material production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule (Power point presentation by the French delegation);

7. The discussion on fissile materials during these informal sessions also highly benefitted from the work done in previous years on this topic, most recently during the 2009 session of the Conference on Disarmament under the coordinatorship of Ambassador Giovanni Manfredi of Italy, as reported in CD/1877, annex II.

8. The discussions on fissile materials inter alia covered the following sub-issues:

(a) What is the value of an FMCT?
(b) What would be the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives of such a treaty?
(c) Scope: new production/existing stocks;
(d) Definitions: What is fissile material? What is production?
(e) Verification: objectives, scope, legal arrangements, IAEA role;
(f) Organisational issues: implementation, decision-making, secretariat, entry-into-force, etc.

9. The discussions were held in an informal and inter-active mode, with active engagement of a very large number of CD member States from all regional groups. It is my personal assessment that the constructive exchanges during these four sessions contributed to further deepening the understanding among delegations of each others perspectives/positions on aspects of agenda items 1 and 2, in particular on issues related to fissile materials. The informal discussions and the contributions (oral and written) of experts helped inform the consideration by CD member States of key topics and thus contributed to their preparations for future treaty negotiations.
Annex III

Report on informal meetings on Agenda item 3 “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” — PAROS

Presented by Mr. de Macedo Soares Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament

1. Four informal meetings were scheduled in order to discuss Agenda item 3 “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” — PAROS, in accordance with document CD/WP.560 (as amended by WP.560/Amend.1), adopted by the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on June 7th, 2010.

2. Coordination of these informal meetings was conducted by the Permanent Representation of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament.

3. The meetings were held on June 9th, 14th and 30th and on July 5th, 2010.

4. In the first informal meeting, the Coordination offered a short presentation on international instruments related to outer space and a brief retrospective of the treatment of PAROS within the Conference on Disarmament. The delegations of Russian Federation and China introduced the discussions on a draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects — PPWT, based on document CD/1839. Speakers: China, Russian Federation, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Indonesia, Algeria, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Belarus, Malaysia, United States of America, India, Pakistan and Switzerland.

5. In the second informal meeting, by invitation of the Coordinator, the Delegation of Spain, on behalf of the European Union, made a presentation on the European Union’s draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Speakers: Spain, Brazil, Russian Federation, Pakistan, China, Ireland, Germany, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Algeria and United States of America.

6. In the third informal meeting, at the Coordinator’s invitation, two experts on outer space — Mr. Attila Matas, of the International Telecommunications Union — ITU, and Ms. Theresa Hitchens, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research — UNIDIR — addressed the CD on specific aspects related to the subject. Speakers: India (on behalf of the Group of 21), Brazil, Syrian Arab Republic, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Canada.

7. In the fourth informal meeting, the Delegation of the United States of America offered a presentation on the “National Space Policy”. Speakers: Netherlands, United States of America, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Russian Federation, Canada, India, China, Pakistan, Ukraine.

8. Throughout all the meetings there were substantive discussions on many aspects of PAROS and there was an ample range of views on key elements of a potential instrument.

General remarks on the uses of outer space

9. Delegations expressed that outer space should be used solely for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all countries and not become an arena for competitive strategic policies. Most member States believe that the placement of weapons in outer space could deepen global insecurity, affecting all countries. An arms race could be a destabilizing factor regardless of the category of weapons.
10. Recent technological advancements can lead to production of sophisticated space weapons, such as anti-satellites, which could become a threat to the security and safety of outer space. The development of new and unforeseen weapons may require review of present parameters of space security.

**Considerations on the negotiation of an instrument**

11. There was a general view that current international instruments are not sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. Many delegations believe that a specific international legal instrument is needed to strengthen or complement existing regimes. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, for example, addresses only nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (Article 4). In this respect, it was pointed out in the discussions that a legally binding instrument should have to take into account, not only the existing regulations, but also the fast development of technologies in order to have adequate specific language for new types of threats or weapons in space.

12. One delegation expressed that it could accept space-related arms control provisions only if based on the principles of equitability and verifiability and as long as it enhances the security of its country and of its allies.

**Objectives of an instrument:**

13. Delegations indicated their views of what should be the objectives of a PAROS instrument. According to interventions of different member States, the main goals should be: to prohibit the placement of weapons; to prevent military use of outer space; to forbid the destruction or damage of satellites from ground-based platforms; to ensure that space property is protected; and to assure that global satellite services operate without threats or risk of disruption.

**Coordination among international organizations**

14. Member States pointed out that, since there are different organizations regulating the use of outer space, there should be compatibility among instruments and coordination between the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies, such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the United Nations General Assembly. There should be exchange of information among these bodies on each other’s activities on the subject.

**Readiness for negotiations**

15. There were different views on the readiness (“ripeness”) of the subject in the CD. Some delegations stated that it is urgent to start negotiations on a PAROS instrument, which in their view would be ripe for action. In that sense, the CD should move to the negotiation track. A majority of States support the early commencement of negotiations. The establishment of a Working Group could be the first concrete step to bring together all perspectives and proposals with a view to an instrument.

16. Some Delegations, on the other hand, believe that the present circumstances show that conditions for negotiations of a legally-binding instrument are not yet given. They believe that the first step could be the establishment of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs).

**Possible modalities of instruments**

17. Discussions among Member States pointed in different possible directions to arrive at a PAROS instrument. There were two basic possibilities: a legally binding treaty, and Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs). There were also discussions
on the option to adhere voluntarily to other existing mechanisms, such as the European Union’s draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

18. There was also an extensive exchange of views on the validity of legally binding instruments vis-à-vis voluntary regimes.

Conclusion

19. In all four of the informal meetings there were substantive debates on the many approaches to the subject and on the options of an instrument, which still remains in consideration in the CD. Even though the discussions were not conclusive, there was considerable interest on the matter and it seems that member States are willing to further discuss the subject with an expectation to arrive at more concrete steps on the Item 3 of the agenda — PAROS.
Annex IV

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) concerning the work of the open-ended informal meetings devoted to consideration of agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

Submitted by Mr. Md. Abdul Hannan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh

1. Pursuant to the mandate contained in document CD/WP.560 of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), four open-ended informal meetings were held under my coordinatorship to consider agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. These meetings took place on Wednesday 16 June, Friday 25 June, Thursday 1 July and Friday 16 July of 2010.

2. In order to assist a structured discussion, I had prepared and circulated a list of possible discussion topics on the subject in the form of a non-paper. A copy of the non-paper is enclosed with this report (appendix I). In preparing the non-paper, I drew from the work carried out on this subject in 2008, under coordinatorship of H.E. Mr. Babacar Carlos MBAYE, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Senegal and in 2007, under the guidance of Ambassador Carlos Antonio Da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil.

3. In the first open-ended informal meeting, I briefed the delegations about my plan for conducting the four informal meetings. According to this plan, the discussion during the first informal meeting was centered on general exchange of views on Negative Security Assurances (NSAs). In order to stimulate our discussion, I explored the possibility of inviting some experts to make presentations on NSAs in the subsequent two meetings. Two well known Geneva-based experts on NSAs Professor Jozef Goldblat and Dr. John H. King agreed and their presentations, made on 25 June and 1 July 2010 respectively, were very informative and thought provoking. The delegations were appreciative of both presentations. The final informal meeting was devoted to discussions on the practical steps that might be taken in the CD in the future. At the last meeting, I also conveyed to the delegations the salient points of my oral report to the President of CD.

4. During his presentation, Professor Jozef Goldblat observed that the use or non-use of nuclear weapons against any country was a problem of global nature rather than regional. Professor Goldblat disagreed with the argument of retaining or using nuclear weapons to counter biological and chemical weapons. In this regard, he suggested that all possessors of nuclear weapons should exclude nuclear retaliation to an attack carried out with non-nuclear weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. As regards who will provide assurance of “no use” of nuclear weapons to whom, Professor Goldblat was of the view that everybody should provide assurances to everybody. Such non-use posture would minimize the importance of nuclear superiority, which would clear the way towards substantial reductions of nuclear forces, eventually leading to complete nuclear disarmament. He noted that the proper forum to deal with NSA should be the Conference on Disarmament. A copy of the presentation is enclosed (appendix II).

5. In his presentation, Dr. John H. King said that NSAs were declaratory arms control rather than substantive arms control that depended on goodwill and intentions of NSAs providers. He particularly noted that non-compliance of NSAs were relatively more
dangerous than other Treaties like Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a possible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Dr. King was of the view that all nuclear powers might use the ultimate escape clause of “supreme national interest” or “extreme circumstances” in case of changing their minds. He also observed that a Treaty on NSAs would help prepare the ground for a Nuclear Weapons Disarmament Convention and was of the view that such a Treaty would involve States that are not NPT members and would cause increased pressure from non-nuclear weapon States for nuclear disarmament. Dr. King finally drew the conclusion that a nuclear disarmament treaty would be the ultimate NSA. A copy of Dr. King’s presentation is enclosed (appendix III).

6. During the informal open-ended meetings, delegations took part in a very comprehensive, interactive and open discussion that would contribute to the work of CD. I was really encouraged and impressed by the level of engagement and participation. I consider that this would be helpful in furthering our understanding of various positions and views that delegations have on such a multidimensional issue as NSAs.

7. Delegations discussed the pros and cons of the existing instruments on NSAs and expressed diverse views on the effectiveness of such instruments. These instruments include the relevant resolutions of Security Council of the United Nations and the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the unilateral declarations by nuclear weapon States, the outcomes of NPT Review Conferences, and the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and their protocols.

8. Many delegations shared the view that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee for NSAs. Pending this ultimate goal of a nuclear weapon free world, non-nuclear weapon States should have a legitimate right to a legally binding assurance for NSAs.

9. One delegation mentioned that all nuclear weapon States should make commitment for not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States any time under any circumstances.

10. However, some delegations supported the decision taken in the 2010 NPT Review Conference outcome concerning NSAs. Some delegations identified the unilateral declarations by nuclear weapon States in mid-90s as important steps towards NSAs.

11. Some delegations noted the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) as positive steps and important measures for guaranteeing NSAs, although not all nuclear weapon States have ratified the protocols of NWFZs. Delegations welcomed the existing NWFZs established by treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, Semipalatinsk and Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status and stressed the need for establishment of more NWFZs. One delegation considered NWFZs as interim arrangements to reach NSAs.

12. Conversely, others argued that security assurances should not be granted in the context of NWFZs because the idea of NWFZs may not be applicable to specific regions such as in the Middle East or South Asia. Therefore, they called for conclusion of a universal, unconditional and non-discriminatory legally binding instrument on NSAs. Delegations were of the view that such instruments will remove lack of trust between non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear weapon States, reduce nuclear danger, lay the foundation for negotiation and facilitate negotiation on other key issues of CD.

13. Concerning appropriate forum for negotiation of NSAs, most delegations were of the view that CD should be the most appropriate forum for negotiating a universal treaty on NSAs because it would be more inclusive.
14. One delegation mentioned that States pledging to denounce nuclear weapons should have guarantee for NSAs. For the States who have voluntarily given up nuclear weapons, NSAs should be provided under NPT, another delegation argued.

15. One delegation, however, questioned the necessity of a legally binding instrument on NSAs, while a number of other delegations disagreed on its nature and scope.

16. Some delegations viewed positively the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review mentioning that it gave added assurance of “no-use” of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States and NWFZs.

17. Although there was no final agreement on any particular issue or area, the discussion had led to a good exchange of ideas and clarifications that would help subsequent work of CD on the issue of NSAs. Delegations offered their views on various aspects of NSAs, including the scope of any possible international framework, its nature and necessity as well as its beneficiaries. Useful discussion was held on how and where NSAs are to be provided and by whom to whom.

18. I am personally optimistic that the useful exchange of views that we had during the four open-ended informal meetings would be helpful in taking forward the issue of NSAs formally through further work in the Conference on Disarmament.
Appendix I of annex IV

Non-paper
Open-ended Informal Meetings on NSA

Possible Discussion Topics

a) Existing framework
   (ii) 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”
   (iii) Unilateral declaration by NWS
   (iv) UNGA First Committee Resolutions on NSA
   (v) NWFZ Treaties
   (vi) Report of CD Ad hoc committees and working group chairs/coordinators

b) Recent developments that may have implications for future work on NSAs
   (i) Declaration/ outcome of 2010 NPT Review Conference
   (ii) 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review
   (iii) Accession by NWS to Protocols of NWFZ Treaties

c) Elements of a possible legally-binding instrument
   (i) Definition of important terms: NWS, NNWS, negative and positive security assurances
   (ii) NSA by regional (NWFZs) or global legally-binding instrument(s)?
   (iii) Scope and structure of any legally binding instrument
   (iv) Appropriate body/ forum for negotiation
Appendix II of annex IV

Ban on use — a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament by Mr. Jozef Goldblat

1. Although there is no evidence that the existence of nuclear weapons has prevented the outbreak of another world conflict, there is a fairly widespread belief that nuclear deterrence helped to maintain peace over several decades. At present, however, in the radically different post-Cold War international political climate, deliberate employment of nuclear weapons against any adversary is difficult to imagine. It is, therefore, surprising that the strategic doctrines, those concerning nuclear weapons and the declared readiness to use them remain basically unchanged.

2. Thanks for the invitation to speak on a subject I have been studying for many years.

3. First, allow me to correct certain inaccuracies. There is a tendency to consider Negative Security Assurances (NSA) as a measure linked directly, if not organically, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is wrong. The idea of not using nuclear weapons against denuclearized regions is much older than the NPT. It was launched in 1957 by the Rapacki Plan concerning Central Europe. And in 1968 a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States was convened to obtain a formal non-use pledge from the big powers. Such a pledge would have been a desirable companion of the NPT. But the conference failed.

4. Incorrect is also the belief that the non-use postulate can be met through additional protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. In fact, only the protocols to the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco regarding Latin America have entered fully into force. And this happened several decades after its signing. The protocols related to the 1985 Rarotonga Treaty regarding South Pacific and to the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty regarding Africa have not entered into force. The protocol to the 1995 Bangkok Treaty regarding Southeast Asia has not been signed, whereas that related to the 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty regarding Central Asia has not been agreed upon. Almost all signatories to the additional protocols have made interpretative statements equivalent to reservations. Some of them contradict the basic provisions of these protocols.

5. In any event, to use or not to use nuclear weapons against any country is a problem of a global nature rather than regional. The proper forum to deal with it is, therefore, this Conference. It is here that the issue of NSA figures on the agenda. And it is here that the nuclear-weapon powers have chosen to submit a formula for NSA. However, this formula, included in the unilateral statements made in April 1995 by France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, was never a matter of multilateral discussion or even consultation with other participants in

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1 Mr. Jozef Goldblat is Vice-President of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI) and Resident Senior Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. He lectures at universities and is the author of books, essays and newspaper and journal articles on truce supervision, arms race and disarmament problems. From 1969 to 1989 he directed the arms control and disarmament research programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In 2006 he received the GCSP (Geneva Centre for Security Policy) Award for his achievements in the field of international and human security and was granted, by the President of Poland, the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit for his contribution to the cause of international peace. In 2007 the President of the Republic of Italy bestowed upon Jozef Goldblat the title of the Knight of the Order to the Merit of the Italian Republic for the promotion of international peace and security through disarmament, arms reduction and non-proliferation.
the CD. Of the nuclear weapon States, parties to the NPT, only China undertook never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Of the non-NPT nuclear-weapon possessors only India was prepared to provide such assurances.

6. The statements of the four powers I have mentioned were subsequently incorporated in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 984. But since they originated in the CD, they ought to be considered in the CD with a view to reaching a consensus document. Such has been the procedure ever since the establishment of the CD.

7. In the first place there is a need to clarify the conditions that must be met to render the existing assurances valid, as well as the exceptions that render them invalid.

8. According to the present official formulation of the NSA, the nuclear-weapon powers would be free to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State in case of an attack on them or their allies, carried out or sustained in association with a nuclear-weapon State.

9. In this connection, the following problems arise:

(a) Should a State that possesses nuclear weapons have the right to employ them pre-emptively, that is, in anticipation of an attack, or only after the attack has actually occurred?

(b) What does “association” of the attacking State with a nuclear-weapon State mean when it invalidates the NSA? Does it mean direct participation in hostilities or only supplies of arms and/or other military or non-military assistance?

(c) Is the right of self-defence limited by the international humanitarian law of armed conflict, in particular, by the requirement of proportionality?

(d) In case of a total ban on use of nuclear weapons, would retaliatory use against a violator of the ban be considered a breach? If not, should only first use be prohibited?

(e) Should the revised NSA be incorporated in a new Security Council resolution, the binding force of which is in doubt, or in a legally binding instrument, such as a convention?

10. Some analysts argue that nuclear weapons are needed to counter biological and chemical weapons. Though classified as weapons of mass destruction, along with nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons have several important distinctive features. Under certain exceptional circumstances, the use of biological weapons could produce widespread fatalities and play a strategic role in war. This, however, is no more than a supposition; nobody in modern times has used bacteria or viruses to wage a war. Moreover, only one biological agent has so far been identified as a potential warfare agent, and reliable means to deliver it to multiple targets remain to be devised. In any event, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to recognize each unusual outbreak of a disease as an aggression committed with biological means of warfare. There would be no «signature» of the user. Attacks with biological weapons cannot, therefore, be deterred with threats of nuclear retaliation.

11. However, the probability of large-scale BW attacks can be reduced by strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. A world-wide network of epidemiological surveillance could alert the world community to outbreaks of unusual diseases. Other measures might include vaccination to prevent contamination, as well as the development of therapy techniques to apply after contamination. Effective civil defence could diminish the effectiveness of biological weapons to the point where they no longer appear worthwhile.
12. Chemical weapons are militarily useful mainly as tactical weapons. Consequently, the level of destruction they may cause cannot exceed a relatively limited theatre of war. Though used on several occasions in the past, chemical weapons have never played a decisive role for the outcome of hostilities. The probability of these weapons being used can be reduced by strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention. People could be protected from the effects of chemical weapons with masks, protective clothes and decontaminants; there exist warning systems with sensors capable of detecting chemical warfare.

13. Upon signing a new nuclear weapons limitation treaty, in April 2010, President Obama promulgated a modified version of the US strategic doctrine. From now on, the sole US objective in keeping nuclear weapons is to deter their use by an adversary. Nuclear riposte to an attack carried out with non-nuclear weapons, including biological and chemical weapons, has thus been excluded. This initiative has made a contribution to the humanitarian law of armed conflict. To be of real value, it should be followed by all the possessors of nuclear weapons.

14. During the debate on the subject of no use, a question was asked: Who would provide assurances, and to whom? The answer to this question is simple: everybody to everybody, if the assurances take the shape of a treaty open for signature or accession by all States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. Just as with the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which may be adhered to by all States, whether nuclear or non-nuclear.

15. The possibility to resort to nuclear weapons will not disappear after the conclusion of the proposed treaty. Nevertheless, a global ban on the use of these weapons would reinforce the firebreak separating conventional and nuclear warfare. It would, thereby, diminish the risk of nuclear war and weaken the political force of explicit or implicit threats to initiate such a war. Indeed, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, in so far as it consists in threatening a nuclear attack in response to a non-nuclear attack, would have to be declared invalid. In discarding the war-fighting functions of nuclear weapons, the non-use posture would minimize the importance of nuclear superiority, whether quantitative or qualitative. It would, therefore, clear the way toward substantial reductions of nuclear forces and, eventually, to complete nuclear disarmament.
Appendix III of annex IV

Speaking Notes
Negative Security Assurances
CD Informal Meeting, 1 July 2010
by Mr. John H. King

I. Negative Security Assurances — General

A. Long an item on CD agenda. Much interest in the subject. But only limited progress, and not in the CD.
   1. CD has tried to negotiate a NSA treaty for more than two decades
      Advantage is coverage would be universal – not just for members of one treaty regime or another
   2. Except for 1998, no AHC on this subject since 1994
   3. Problem is procedural (CD linkage) and substantive (problems with NSAs)

B. Strong arguments to negotiate NSAs in the NPT context as part of NWFZ treaties
   1. Latter has seen some success, indicating fewer problems in such forums
   2. NSA protocols ratified by nuclear powers for Tlatelolco Treaty; US announced at the NPT revcon it will seek ratification for NSA protocols for SpNWFZ and Pelindaba. Other NFWZ treaties (Bangkok, Central Asia) have problems to be worked out.

C. But my bottom line after much consideration is: CD should negotiate an agreement on NSAs, but not for the reasons you may think.

II. There are major problems with NSAs

A. Emphasize the have/have not status of NPT members
   1. Only nuclear powers can give NSAs. All other powers cannot and must accept them
   2. This can act as an incentive to acquire nuclear weapons and end subordinate status
   3. Thus, paradoxically and perversely, NSAs can undermine the NPT

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1 Mr. John King is currently the Coordinator for Disarmament Education and Training at the Geneva office of the UN-mandated University for Peace. He is also adjunct professor of International Relations at Webster University in Geneva. After military service with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, he joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1971, serving in a variety of posts specializing in European political military affairs. He also served in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as the Deputy Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, and then in Geneva as Chief of Staff (Executive Secretary) for the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (1989-2000). In this role he had major negotiating responsibility for the Chemical Weapons Convention and later on, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He was also served on U.S. delegations to various Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty meetings and review conferences. Mr. King is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and holds a Ph.D. degree in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
B. Verifiability

1. **NSAs are declaratory arms control rather than substantive arms control**
   
   (a) Are a statement of policy or intent rather than a concrete arms control agreement dealing with hardware that have physical elements that are visible and controllable;
   
   (b) Depend on good will and intentions of NSA providers. But intentions can change while capabilities are always there;
   
   (c) Thus NSAs difficult to encapsulate in a credible treaty. NWFZ protocols on NSAs are just a sentence or two.

C. Relative dangers of NSA treaty non-compliance

1. **Non-compliance with other treaties is relatively non-catastrophic**
   
   (a) CTBT: a test is conducted illegally — no destruction, perhaps radiation. CTBTO can detect, monitor results;
   
   (b) FMCT: material produced, stored illegally. An implementing organization can detect and verify. No physical damage done;
   
   (c) Nuclear Weapons Convention: hardware can be detected and verified, with countermeasures taken before any destruction occurs.

2. **This is not so with NSAs**
   
   (a) First inkling of non-compliance is an attack with nuclear weapons. Destruction and subsequent consequences will be uncontrollable;
   
   (b) Although non-complying State may first signal intentions, it may also use surprise. Stated intentions will be hard to verify;

3. **Therefore, non-compliance with NSA treaty is qualitatively & quantitatively much greater than with other disarmament treaties**

D. All these problems also exist for NSA’s first cousin — the No First Use pledge (NFU)

III. Position of the nuclear powers on NSAs — how credible are they?

A. NSAs (and NFU pledges) are given in good faith; nuclear powers intend to respect them. Intent is sealed in a legal bargain (NWFZ protocols)

B. But there are loopholes

1. **US NSA statement has evolved from 1995 to now. Some conditionalities have been removed. A positive step. But reversible**

2. **Other NWS have stated varying conditions on NSAs. Some have stated none, which a pessimist would find worrying**

3. **But all nuclear powers have the ultimate escape clause of supreme national interest. This trumps even legally binding obligations**
   
   (a) Acheson quote from Cuban Missile crisis: “The survival of nations is not a matter of international law”.
   
   (b) Quote from April 2010 US Nuclear Policy Review: “The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the
vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” Translation: the US reserves the right to change its mind on NSAs whenever it sees fit to do so:

(i) What are “extreme circumstances” — undescribed
(ii) What are “vital interests of the US” — undescribed
(iii) Who determines what they are? Who approves? — unstated

d) I’m not singling out the US. Of all the nuclear powers, it is perhaps the most open, honest and transparent on this point.

d) And if the US is saying this, one can only assume the other nuclear powers have similar policies, stated or unstated. Imprudent to think otherwise.

4. The conditionality of NSA pledges, far from diluting the political or military utility of nuclear weapons, does just the opposite – they reconfirm the important role of nuclear weapons in the national security, foreign policy and defence strategy of the nuclear weapon States. (Kissinger quote from 1957 book, Nuclear Weapons & Foreign Policy: “Absolute security for any country means absolute insecurity for all the rest”.)

IV. This situation is perhaps the single most important incentive for non-nuclear weapon States to acquire nuclear weapons. That almost no State has succumbed to the temptation so far is a tribute to the continuing effectiveness of and respect for the NPT as well as the existing system of international alliances and defence guarantees, among other reasons.

So: NSAs are declaratory, unequal, unverifiable, have major conditions/ambiguities and loopholes, and have catastrophic consequences in case of non-compliance.

This being the case, and I believe that most disarmament specialists understand these problems, then why are they so important? Why do so many people want NSAs, especially in treaty form?

V. Reasons for legally binding NSAs negotiated by the CD

A. Need to build further respect for the rule of law and the international institutions created to bring order to an anarchic international system

1. Essential to increase prospects for peaceful resolution of disputes
2. Treaties and the international legal standards they establish are a crucial part of this process
3. Part of a process for the international delegitimization of nuclear weapons
4. Involves the entire international community, not just members of a non-universal treaty regime

B. Increasing the binding nature of the web of international laws, treaties and institutions is the main hope for non-nuclear powers to maintain and improve their security

1. The number of such treaties is constantly increasing
2. The number of inter-state conflicts is constantly decreasing (many reasons for this, actually)
3. The greater legitimization and effectiveness of legal means of restraining State behavior provides confidence to the international community that moral and civilized constraints will work in limiting resort to military force

4. Such legal limitations are the main resource for many States to assert restraints over larger powers and thus visibly improve their security

5. This web of laws and institutions provides a rallying point for States to pull together to pool influence and power to confront nuclear States and others threatening security

C. A treaty on NSAs would become an essential part of this web

1. The legal importance of a treaty and consequent greater observance of its terms by nuclear powers would limit the disadvantages I described

2. Nuclear powers would be ever more forced to narrow and possibly eliminate the conditions they currently place on the NSAs they have given

3. It would be yet further proof of the validity and effectiveness of the NPT

D. A treaty on NSAs would help importantly to prepare the ground for a Nuclear Weapons Disarmament Convention

1. It would involve States that are not NPT members

2. Nuclear weapons would be further delegitimized

3. The Treaty would cause increased NNWS pressure for nuclear disarmament

4. In the end, the only way to be absolutely certain that no State is attacked with nuclear weapons is to be absolutely certain that no State has any

5. A nuclear disarmament treaty is the ultimate NSA.
Annex V

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2010 session on agenda item 5, entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”

Submitted by Mr. Mikhail Khvostov, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belarus

1. I have been appointed as coordinator for agenda item 5 “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”. According to schedule the informal meetings took place on 17 June, 24 June, 1 July and 8 July.

2. While preparing to these meetings I tried to build on the excellent work carried out by the previous coordinator, Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria, as summarized in his report, CD/1877 of 15 December 2009 (annex 5).

3. To facilitate the delegations in preparation to the debates on this item I also prepared and distributed Background information paper on the issues identified as central to this agenda item during the discussions in previous years, including:
   (a) Prohibition of the new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD);
   (b) Radiological weapons;
   (c) Nuclear terrorism.

4. For information and reference purposes I also circulated the copy of the document of the Committee on the Conference on Disarmament CCD/511/Rev.1 of 8 August 1977, containing draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. I also prepared excerpt from the occasional paper “Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction”, published in February 2006 by the Research Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington DC, containing evolution of the term weapons of mass destruction and highlighting the existing international definitions of this term (available at www.ndu.edu/wmdcenter/docuploaded/op4carus.pdf).

5. The first informal meeting was dedicated to general discussions on the different matters under this agenda item. Briefly, I went over the issues that were raised in the previous years, outlining the main points from the Background information paper. Delegations made use of the opportunity to update and validate their positions and touched upon the following specific issues:
   (a) Universal International Agreement to Ban the Development and Manufacture of New Types and Systems of WMD;
   (b) Viewpoints of the delegations on concrete types of new WMD, i.e. phosphor weapon, depleted uranium, disruptive activity in the area of information and communication technologies;
   (c) Possible legal approaches for prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction (framework agreement/additional protocols);
   (d) Radiological Weapons Ban;
   (e) So called “dirty bomb” threat and radiological terrorism;
(f) Effectiveness of existing international instruments;

(g) Definitions of new types and systems of WMD;

(h) Need to keep Item 5 under active consideration without prejudice to other agenda items;

(i) Appointment of a Special Coordinator on Item 5 once the CD has started substantial work.

6. Some delegations emphasized the importance to uphold norms of International Humanitarian Law while developing new weapons and new systems of such weapons. Particular reference was made by one delegation to Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions of 1949, obliging the State to evaluate the legality of new types of weapons.

7. Some delegations stressed the importance of radiological weapons issue, which has been for more than 10 years in the past under consideration of the Conference. One delegation suggested that the Conference could upgrade discussions on this issue.

8. Several international initiatives to protect and secure nuclear materials in order to prevent them from falling in the hands of the terrorists were recalled, such as: resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction” and “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources”, International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, IAEA Revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Amendments to the Convention on Physical Protection of the Nuclear material, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Nuclear Security Summit, held on 12-13 April 2010 in Washington was also mentioned in this context.

9. As coordinator I put forward proposals to invite experts which could be in position to enrich further discussions on this agenda item. While many delegations had no difficulty in supporting the proposals and some articulated the areas and fora the experts can be relevant (experts on information security issues, experts from IAEA and 1540 Committee), there were some doubts expressed that experts’ attendance could disregard the other issues under this item and be seen as intrusion to the sphere of the competence of the Governments. I therefore assured the delegations that any participation of experts in further informal meetings under this item would pose no limitations or prejudice on the positions of the delegations on any issue under this agenda item.

10. Some delegations reminded that according to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/36 the Conference on Disarmament should, without prejudice to further overview of its agenda, keep the matter under review, as appropriate, with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons. An appeal was made to strengthen the consensus around this issue in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Several delegations suggested that this agenda item was ripe to start negotiations on it. Delegations in principle supported my suggestion that possible legal basis to ban new WMD might look as framework agreement and additional protocols to the agreement on WMD already identified.

11. The delegations agreed in principle that in order to identify new WMD and new types of such weapons that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of WMD already known they should have on their disposal clear definition of WMD. At the second and the third meetings the informal documents mentioned above were distributed for this purpose and the discussion was launched on relevance and sufficiency of the existing definitions.
12. At the fourth meeting I took stock of the debates which took place on 17 and 24 June and 1 July and summarized the progress under this agenda item. I also outlined orally some elements mentioned here above.

13. My overall assessment of the progress on this agenda item, assessing observations and comments expressed by the delegations, is that apart from validation the known position on different aspects of the topic, there were some fresh inflows to the debates. I would like to take this opportunity to underscore the support of delegations towards the continuation of discussions on issues that are relevant to this agenda item. I am therefore in the hands of all delegations in this regard and will stand ready to carry-out further informal discussions in the future, if needed, and if President so desires.
Annex VI

Report of the Coordinator on agenda Item 6: “Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament”

Submitted by Mr. Desra Percaya, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia

Proceedings

1. Based on the organizational framework contained in document no. CD/WP.560 dated 7 June 2010 and Amend. 1 dated 11 June 2010, I have the honour to report back to you, in my personal capacity and as mandated by the President, on the informal meetings on agenda Item 6: Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. As you are aware, this report has been prepared under my own responsibility.

2. I facilitated four informal meetings on 15 and 24 June, 6 and 15 July 2010, respectively.

3. At the opening of the meeting, I recalled the purpose of holding these informal meetings. Subsequently, I briefly shared with delegations the main points of the previous reports, inter alia, CD/1827, CD/1846 and CD/1877. Following this, in subsequent meetings, I presented non-papers on the historical background and summaries of the discussions on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. These non-papers were circulated to all in attendance.

4. This approach was taken to refresh the institutional memory of the participants on the issues and concerns raised in the previous informal meetings held over the past years.

Substantive discussions

5. It was acknowledged that the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament must be strengthened, and that this principle should be of a global applicability and relevance.

6. It was emphasized that the primary objective of agenda Item 6 was to formulate a comprehensive “programme” of disarmament with clear objectives, priorities and time frames, and not simply to focus on “comprehensive disarmament”.

7. Delegations were aware of the broad nature of the issues under this agenda item which ranges from nuclear to conventional disarmament, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Delegations were presented with a broad spectrum of issues to discuss under this agenda item. It was understood that the discussions on this item this year should be further developed and the objective should be built on the issues previously put forward by the Member States, and to identify new issues, if any.

8. Two approaches were put forward at the informal debate held the previous year: The “holistic or philosophical approach” and the “pragmatic approach coupled with developing of an objective criterion.” Delegations had an in-depth discussion on this aspect. They also had the opportunity for an exchange of views on the following aspects: Objectives, Principles, Definitions, Scope, Obstacles, Follow-up Mechanism, and Time frame. These sub-themes were discussed in broad terms at which delegations tried to describe and define the various issues but stopping short of attempting to undertake a drafting exercise.

9. It was emphasized that in addressing the issue on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, one has to take into account the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, and the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 (SSOD I), as the first international document adopted by consensus. The Special Session underscored the need to prepare a comprehensive programme of disarmament through agreed procedures. Such a Programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

10. The importance of convening an SSOD IV was mentioned by a number of delegations during the informal meetings. It was considered that the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament was not only urgent, but also relevant and necessary.

11. The principle of undiminished security was discussed, while relevant in the context of the reduction of the conventional armed forces and conventional armaments, it had implications which should be carefully assessed in the context of WMD, in particular nuclear weapons. It was also noted that the notion of “undiminished security”, as reflected in SSOD I, may have focused merely on the reduction of conventional weapons and not necessarily WMD.

12. The importance of the accession to and implementation of UN-based instruments adopted by consensus, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme of Action, the proposed Arms Trade Treaty, were highlighted as essential aspects for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

13. The importance of addressing the root causes of armed conflicts and threat perceptions was raised, which included the necessity to promote balance among States at regional level, and the significance of upholding the principles enshrined in the results of SSOD I. These principles include multilateralism; universality; non-discrimination; justice; preserving security for all; and verification measures, whilst the rights of States to peaceful uses in different areas should not be hampered.

14. Delegations also raised the issue on the relationship between disarmament and development, which was considered as an important focus under this item. It was stated that the rights of States to development should be respected. This is an issue that most delegations are keen on addressing in detail in future deliberations under this item.

15. The Coordinator did not submit any specific recommendations with regard to any possible way forward on this item, and no delegation endeavoured to propose any specific recommendations during the course of the four informal meetings.
Annex VII

Oral report by the Chair/Coordinator
on agenda item 7: “Transparency in Armaments”

Submitted by Mr. Hannu Himanen, Ambassador
and Permanent Representative of Finland

1. As the Chair/Coordinator on item 7, and on the basis of the mandate contained in
document WP.560, this constitutes my oral report to the President of the Conference. I do
this in my personal capacity. This report aims at a fair and balanced reflection of the views
expressed in the discussion in the course of four informal meetings on agenda item 7. The
meetings were held as per the agreed schedule on 18 June, 21 June, 9 July and 12 July 2010.

2. There is a general recognition of the importance and positive potential of
transparency, in broad terms and as a general notion. The positive confidence-building
potential of transparency in armaments is seen as significant.

3. While no attempt to define transparency in exact terms was made, there seems to be
a broadly shared understanding that transparency should not be equated to disarmament,
even though it often has a clear and supporting role in agreed disarmament negotiations as
well as bilateral and multilateral arrangements concerning disarmament.

4. Transparency should not be seen as an attempt to diminish the security of States or
to restrict or diminish the inherent right of States to self-defence and their right to determine
their national security interests, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations.

5. Transparency is not an end in itself, but should always be seen as a means to an end.

6. While it is to be recognized that, since 1991 until now, altogether some 170 countries
have contributed information at least once to the United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms, there is some concern over the diminished rate of reporting by States. It would be
useful to analyse reasons behind this lack of enthusiasm and seek to identify ways of
making the register more relevant. The scope of the Register would deserve closer attention
in this connection.

7. On a more general note, the scope and definitions of existing transparency
arrangements would also need to be looked at. A number of delegations specifically call for
extended coverage of the United Nations Register so as to include all types of armaments in
the reporting requirements. Specifically, weapons of mass destruction as well as small arms
and light weapons were mentioned in the discussion concerning the scope of transparency
measures.

8. Representatives of some nuclear-weapon States emphasize the significance of
voluntary, unilateral transparency measures taken by them concerning their nuclear arsenals
and other weapons of mass destruction.

9. In this connection, some delegations, while recognising the importance of such
unilateral transparency measures, underline the need to harmonize or standardize the
information given to make it more accessible and useful. While the value of standardisation
is not questioned as such, some representatives point out that negotiated reporting standards
might lead to lowering common standards and, in effect, less transparency.

10. Regional aspects of transparency are broadly seen as significant. Regional
transparency initiatives are to be encouraged. In the context of the regional dimension of
transparency, regional transparency arrangements are often tailor-made to correspond to the
needs of the region in question. While the Conference on Disarmament is not seen as a forum for substantive regional negotiations, the Conference could give guidance and direction to regional transparency arrangements.

11. Transparency in armaments is seen to have continued significance for the Conference on Disarmament’s substantive agenda, and the Conference should continue to work on this item.
Letter dated 13 May 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of the Berlin statement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issued by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates on 30 April 2011

I have the honour to transmit to you on behalf of the “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI) the text of the Berlin Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, issued by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates on 30 April 2011.

I would be grateful if the joint statement would be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all CD member States and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Hellmut Hoffmann
Ambassador
Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Berlin statement by Foreign Ministers on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates reaffirm our joint intention to work towards achieving nuclear disarmament and a strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime, as set out in the joint statement adopted at our first meeting in New York on September 22, 2010. Recognizing the danger to humanity posed by the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons and the necessity to address increased proliferation risks, to decrease nuclear arsenals, to strengthen nuclear security and to improve nuclear safety, we consider it urgent to reduce nuclear risks and achieve tangible progress on the path towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

2. We base our efforts on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The consensus outcome of the NPT Review Conference 2010 sets a practical agenda with an Action plan covering all three pillars of the Treaty, as well as the objective of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We are determined to promote and support implementation of the commitments made by all NPT member states, and advocate further progress through practical contributions and proposals.

3. We welcome and support the renewed call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only guarantee against their use or threat of use, and consequently see the need to further reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons as well as their role in security strategies, concepts, doctrines and policies. We are encouraged by recent developments, in particular the entry-into-force of the US-Russian New START Treaty and the stated intention of both parties to continue the process of reductions, stressing the need to include all categories of nuclear weapons. We strongly hope that all other states possessing nuclear weapons will follow suit, while applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the nuclear disarmament process.

4. We recognize States parties’ right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as embodied in the NPT. We join the international call for elevating the safety of nuclear power plants to the highest level and strengthening nuclear safety measures worldwide in view of the recent events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. We support the discussions which have begun already at national and regional levels as well as at international fora and organizations, in particular the IAEA. We welcome the invitation by IAEA Director General Amano to a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in Vienna from June 20 to 24, 2011.

5. Now is the time to revitalize and reinforce multilateral efforts, recognizing that today's global security problems more than ever require co-operative and multilateral solutions. Many items of the agenda laid out in the Action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference can only be implemented through a successful multilateral effort. For more than a decade, the multilateral disarmament machinery has not lived up to the expectations of the international community in addressing pressing security challenges through effective multilateral arms control and disarmament, foregoing enormous possibilities to promote international stability, facilitate development and increase security for all. The message from the high-level-meeting convened by the UN Secretary General on 24 September 2010 in New York is clear: the international community will not accept more time being lost. We are united in the demand to revitalize the multilateral disarmament machinery.
6. The consensus reached last year by the NPT Review Conference on the forward-looking Action plan proves that co-operative, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can work if there is the necessary political will. Our objective is to maintain the momentum of that successful outcome and to expedite its implementation. With that purpose we have adopted the following concrete proposals for action on key elements of the Action plan.

Proposal I: There is consensus among NPT member states that the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons must be stopped. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would curb the risk of future nuclear arms races and reduce the danger of non-state actors getting such material into their hands. Such a treaty would complement ongoing efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear material across the globe. It is an indispensable step on the way towards a nuclear weapon free world. We are deeply disappointed that one year after the NPT Review Conference, which called in its Action plan for the immediate negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, this has not been implemented. While acknowledging that the security requirements of all states must be addressed in the course of negotiations, we underline that there is no reason and no excuse for further delay.

On 26 January, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for the establishment of informal processes to help build confidence for an FMCT and return the CD to its program of work. We have initiated intensive efforts to overcome the current deadlock. In Geneva, in the margins of the CD, Australia and Japan are co-hosting a series of discussions among experts to examine technical aspects of an FMCT in order to build momentum towards negotiations. Working in Vienna, in an effort led by Germany, we have developed a paper on the effective verification of an FMCT, which lists questions to be addressed by scientific experts and contains input for their deliberations. We consider that the establishment of a group of scientific experts with the assignment to examine technical aspects of an FMCT could facilitate and contribute to the start of negotiations.

Building on those initiatives we will continue to press for the immediate commencement of negotiations. Our preference remains to negotiate an FMCT within the CD. However, if the CD, in its 2011 substantive session, remains unable to find agreement on launching FMCT negotiations, we will ask the UN General Assembly, which is already seized of the matter under agenda item 162 entitled “Follow-up to the high-level meeting held on 24 September 2010: Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”, to address the issue and consider ways to proceed with the aim of beginning negotiations.

Proposal II: Entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another major objective on the multilateral agenda. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. We are encouraged by the commitment expressed by the United States and by Indonesia to ensure ratification of the Treaty. We believe that an effective end to nuclear testing will enhance and not weaken our national as well as global security and would significantly bolster the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 15 years ago the Treaty was opened for signature, and the number of signatories and ratifications has steadily increased. We are committed to universalizing the Treaty and to promoting its early entry-into-force. Utilizing various diplomatic opportunities we will urge states that have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty and promptly complete the steps necessary to bring it into force. We are committed to support the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT-Organization in setting up an effective monitoring and verification system and commend the work already accomplished.
Proposal III: At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapon states committed themselves to accelerate progress on concrete steps leading to nuclear disarmament, and to report back to NPT member states. Additionally, as a confidence-building measure, the Conference encouraged the nuclear weapon states to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form. We are developing a draft of a standard reporting form which could be used by the nuclear weapon states in meeting that commitment. We will invite the nuclear weapon states to examine our proposal at their Paris meeting in June. It sets out our expectations regarding information that we would like to see all states possessing nuclear weapons provide. We believe that reporting on the basis of a standardized format, as encouraged in the Action plan adopted by the Review Conference, would build international confidence and help to create a climate conducive to further disarmament. We consider it essential to increase transparency and accountability in the nuclear disarmament process.

Proposal IV: We underline that an effective non-proliferation regime is a joint security interest of all nations. We recognize the important role of the IAEA in verifying states’ compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. We highlight the fact that with the entry into force of the IAEA Additional Protocols for the United Arab Emirates in December 2010 and for Mexico in March 2011, all countries belonging to our cross-regional initiative implement Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which we regard as the necessary verification standard. We call on all states, in line with the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols in order to give the IAEA the additional authority it needs credibly to deter and detect violations of non-proliferation obligations. We will continue to advocate bilaterally and multilaterally for the universal application of the Additional Protocol in our respective regions. We offer to share experiences and best practices in the conclusion and implementation of the Additional Protocol with all interested parties, and are ready to provide legal, and other, assistance.

7. We will take stock of progress on today's proposals at our next meeting in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September. The 2012 ministerial meeting of our initiative will be hosted by Turkey.

We will continue to work on other key items of the Action plan adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as identified in our joint statement of September 22, 2010. In particular, we intend to promote the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free-zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among states of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the UN Disarmament Commission, convinced that such zones strengthen global as well as regional peace and security, reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this respect, we underline the crucial need to promote the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in line with pending requirements for the organization in 2012 of the special conference agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

We will also work on specific actions aimed at reinforcing states’ export control systems which play an important non-proliferation role.

We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, based on our conviction that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens.
8. We are encouraged by the interest our initiative has met across regions and groupings. We are grateful to all states who want to join our efforts and support our proposals. Only such a broad effort will succeed in building the necessary bridges and in achieving meaningful progress towards the mutually reinforcing objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Berlin, 30 April 2011
Letter dated 1 September 2011 from the President of the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the reports of the five Coordinators submitted to the President of the Conference on the work done during the 2011 session on agenda items 1 to 7

In March 2011, the Conference on Disarmament agreed upon a schedule of informal meetings on its seven substantive agenda items and the nomination of the chairs/coordinators, which are contained in document CD/WP.565/Rev.1 (CD/1907).

According to CD/WP.565/Rev.1 (CD/1907), the informal meetings on agenda items 1 and 2 were chaired and coordinated by Sri Lanka (first 2 meetings) and Italy (last 2 meetings), on agenda item 3 by Brazil; on agenda item 4 by Senegal, and on agenda items 5, 6 and 7 by Belarus.

In my capacity as President of the Conference and on behalf of all six Presidents, I would like to express through you, Mr. Secretary-General, my sincere gratitude to all the five coordinators for the important work done under their professional guidance. The five coordinators’ reports attached to this letter in annexes I to V reflect serious debates and inputs which should enrich future discussions as relevant references for the work of the Conference.

Consequently, I would be grateful if this letter, together with its five annexed documents could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed) Rodolfo Reyes Rodríguez
Ambassador
President of the Conference on Disarmament
Annex I

Text of the oral report of the Coordinator to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on the informal meetings on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament

Submitted by Ms. Kshenuka Senewiratne, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka

1. Pursuant to Decisions CD/WP.566/Rev1 and CD/1907, informal debates were held on items 1 (Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament) and 2 (Prevention of Nuclear War, including all matters related thereto) of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament. The session devoted to this theme took place on 29 March 2010.

2. In accordance with CD/1907, the chair/coordinator is required to report orally, in his/her personal capacity, on the discussions of the agenda items to the CD President, who will finalize the reports and transmit them through a letter to the Conference. The following constitutes my oral report.

3. At the outset I would like to note that this report is based on past work done on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore since several participants referred to their interventions made in the thematic debate on this issue that took place on 1 February 2010 it is suggested that this report should be read in conjunction with the verbatim records of the above-mentioned meeting of the conference on disarmament.

4. At the session of the informal debates on items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament, I stressed the following points in my introductory remarks:

   (a) The progress made in the field of disarmament bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally;
   (b) The overall consensus amongst members of the importance of nuclear disarmament and the importance stressed by several groups and members of the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiation of a legally binding instrument;
   (c) The link of each of the substantive agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament with the ultimate objective of Nuclear Disarmament.

5. On this basis, and in the interest of advancing our discussions I proposed an indicative guideline for discussion on which the delegations were invited to express their views:

   (a) General comments on nuclear disarmament;
   (b) General comments on nuclear disarmament in a future program of work;
   (c) Focused comments on how best to advance the topic of nuclear disarmament in the CD.

6. The aim was to stimulate the debate on the key issue of nuclear disarmament while building on common understandings and attempt to identify a way to move forward in achieving the objective of Nuclear Disarmament.
General comments on nuclear disarmament

7. The debate under this item focused on the question how to best address the issue of nuclear disarmament and whether a legal framework was needed. It reflected the large variety of positions and proposals that exist among delegations and groups of delegations with regard to Nuclear Disarmament.

8. A number of measures to be taken to reduce nuclear danger while pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament were mentioned, including reduction of nuclear dangers arising from accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, increasing restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, de-alerting of nuclear weapons, reduction of importance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and in military alliances. Moreover, the priority for negotiations on nuclear disarmament was affirmed by the international community at the UNGA First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I).

9. Several delegations mentioned the importance of appropriate conditions to achieve the goal of nuclear weapons free world. Transparency, mutual confidence, trust, dialogue and reinforcement of non-proliferation regimes were mentioned in this regard.

10. Several states recalled the importance of the final document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Non Proliferation Treaty and the action plan contained therein while reiterating their preference for an approach based on a framework of agreements whose components are mutually reinforcing. In this regard it was said that the action plan is a road map. Some referenced to the special responsibility of the Nuclear Weapon States in implementing the action plan and a call was made for transparency in efforts made in this regard. Some Nuclear Weapon States stated their willingness to pursue this action plan.

11. Other states stressed the relevance of a first step in the form of a commitment, preferably a binding legal commitment, through an international instrument, to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time bound framework, including on the basis of a Nuclear Weapon Convention, banning the production, development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and to provide for their complete elimination within a specified timeframe.

12. Reference was made to previous efforts relating to nuclear disarmament initiatives including the Rajiv Gandhi Action, documents CD/1899, CD/1816, CD/1571 and the Hoover Plan.

13. Concerns were expressed regarding the absence of progress in nuclear disarmament and the continuing modernization and development of nuclear weapons. Delegations recalled article 6 of the NPT under which nuclear weapon states have an international legal obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament.

14. Calls were made to revisit the doctrines based on deterrence and the granting of nuclear umbrellas and on the stationing of nuclear warheads in non-nuclear weapon states. One delegation called for the abandonment of development of missile defense systems. On the latter some Nuclear Weapon States said that a mechanism would be jointly developed by the relevant nuclear weapon states.

15. Other issues raised as relating to nuclear disarmament were the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East and Negative Security Assurances.

General comments on nuclear disarmament in a future program of work

16. Several states reiterated that disarmament is the priority for the Conference on Disarmament and negotiations on a binding multilateral instrument banning nuclear weapons should be pursued without delay. Several delegations supported the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this issue. Some specified to have this body in the framework of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Another view was expressed
to revive the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to discuss the issue of nuclear disarmament.

17. Several states recalled the final document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Non Proliferation Treaty and more specifically to the various measures taken relevant to the Program of Work of the Conference on Disarmament. Reference was also made to CD/1864 and relevant UN general assembly resolutions.

**Focused comments on how best to advance the topic of nuclear disarmament in the CD**

18. Delegations valued the discussions held so far on this issue but indicated they constituted no substitute for negotiations.

19. It was said that previous reductions in nuclear warheads had been made through bilateral or unilateral efforts due to certain strategic contexts. One delegation focused on the importance of the regional context in relation to nuclear disarmament. Other views expressed stated that the causality of the regional context with the issue of nuclear disarmament was not proven and that the global perspective remained the most relevant.

20. The importance of the CTBT, in conjunction with an FMCT, for the objective of nuclear disarmament was noted. One delegation stated that the issue of stocks in an FMCT would constitute a significant difference in this regard and queried the position of the nuclear weapon states vis-à-vis the issue of stocks in an FMCT.

21. It was noted that due to its composition the Conference on Disarmament can play a vital role in achieving nuclear disarmament in the 21st century. Delegations expressed disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament could not establish a body with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament. Further work thereto was suggested.

22. In conclusion I wish to state that the meeting witnessed a fruitful exchange of views and that the discussion, while giving an opportunity to delegations to reiterate their national positions and priorities, contributed towards the further understanding of positions.
Annex II


Submitted by Mr. Giovanni Manfredi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, May 13, 2011

As you know, the Conference on Disarmament decided, at the plenary meeting of March 29, 2011, to appoint me co-ordinator of the informal sessions concerning “(agenda items 1, 2) with a general focus on FMCT”. The meetings in question will take place on Tuesday afternoon May 17 and Wednesday morning May 18, 2011 (cfr. Doc CD/1907 of 29 March 2011). I wish to thank the President of the Conference, H.E. Ambassador Wang Qun, for his initiative in this regard.

I thought it useful to write beforehand to all Permanent Representatives and Heads of Delegation at the Conference on Disarmament to share a few thoughts in this regard. To begin with, especially as we are dealing with informal sessions of the Conference, the full application of the rule providing for complete freedom of delegations in the contents of their statements is not put into question. I believe this to be essential in ensuring the widest possible effective participation by all CD members at the informal sessions.

However, I am also convinced that it is in our collective interest to carry forward the work of the Conference, as it appears in the agenda we adopted last January. Our shared commitment in this regard was amply reiterated during the several CD sessions that took place since the start of the year.

In this respect, as the added value of further general discussions appears quite limited, we could more productively devote the limited time at our disposal to two specific aspects of the treaty. Without in any way trying to announce an agenda for our informal sessions, I would suggest that one topic could be FMCT’s structure. Whether it should or should not be, for example, a framework treaty with attached protocols on the major issues. We may also address questions such as the choices we have as to the mechanisms for its entry into force; the advantages and disadvantages of a date of expiry; whether or not to provide for its renewal and for permanent organisms to supervise its implementation, and so forth. The whole area offers rich opportunities for constructive debate in matters not yet really addressed by the Conference on Disarmament. The other area where we could usefully undertake further in-depth discussions and analysis is definitions. There are essentially two reasons for this. In the first place, if the treaty is to address the question of fissile materials, it stands to reason that we must, to start with, clearly determine what they are for the purposes of the treaty.

Furthermore, any serious discussion of the technicalities inherent in the definition of fissile materials inevitably entails also addressing issues such as verification, production and stockpiling that constitute the core of any FMCT. Therefore, a substantive debate on definitions would represent a potentially important contribution to further progress on the topic of FMCT by the Conference on Disarmament.

A substantial bibliography already exists of recent CD documents on these questions. For example, Documents CD/1906 of 14 March 2011, CD/1899 (annex II) of 14 September 2010, CD/1895 and 1896 both of 14 September 2010, CD/1888 of 14 June 2010, and CD/1878 of 15 December 2010, come to mind. If our informal discussions could
avail themselves of members’ working papers as well as past deliberations by the Conference, building on possible solutions that appear to emerge in reading these reports, surely our informal sessions will have usefully contributed in furthering the Conference’s substantive work for this year.

(Signed) Giovanni Manfredi
Report

Introduction

1. Pursuant to the decisions of the Conference on Disarmament as contained in document n. CD/1907, two informal sessions took place on May 17 and 18, 2011, on items 1 and 2 of the Agenda with a general focus on FMCT.

2. In light of the outcomes of preceding discussions on this topic and in order to both avoid repetitions and to ensure the greatest degree of factuality to the debate, the discussions were focused on two specific aspects of FMCT, namely: structure and definitions.

3. To facilitate the debate and to allow delegations to better prepare their statements, the Coordinator sent on May 13, 2011, the attached letter illustrating his suggestions on how the two sessions could be conducted and listing the principal Conference documents that could serve as background material.

4. The Coordinator stressed, however, that delegations were free to deal with any relevant topic as provided in the Rules of Procedure. In the event, the meeting of 17 May was mainly dedicated to the question of the structure of an FMCT, while the one on 18 May was focused on definitions. However, several delegations also gave general statements on the aims and role of FMCT within the broader context of nuclear disarmament.

5. The presence of experts from capitals represented an added value to the work and allowed the two meetings to examine also in greater detail specific legal and technical aspects of the Treaty.

General aspects

6. Numerous references were made during both sessions to the “Shannon Report” and to the “Shannon Mandate” contained therein (document n. CD/1299 of 24 March 1995), whose continued validity was not put into question. The principles that an FMCT should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively and internationally verifiable, in particular, were reaffirmed. Several delegations expressed the opinion that the Shannon Mandate allows negotiations on all pertinent aspects of the Treaty.

Structure

7. In discussing FMCT’s structure, various possible solutions were examined and their respective advantages and disadvantages identified. From a legal point of view, international treaties may be divided into two general types:

   (a) Treaties with a single text (for example, NPT, CWC);

   (b) Treaties with a main text accompanied by attached protocols, annexes or addenda. In this type of treaty the main text and its attachments may be negotiated in parallel and have a single entry into force mechanism (for example, CTBT), or the main text and its attachments may be negotiated separately and contain different entry into force provisions (for example, CCW).

8. In this regard, frequent reference was made to a Brazilian proposal (document n. CD/1888 of 14 June 2010, cited in the above-mentioned Coordinator’s letter), that provided for a framework treaty with scope, definitions and final clauses, accompanied by two protocols. One of them would concern the ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and the other the rules governing existing fissile materials. Both protocols would also contain the relevant appropriate verification provisions. A structure of this kind
allows the adoption of a gradual approach by facilitating negotiations on the less controversial elements with a view to progress in later stages to the more difficult ones. A solution of this sort, however, may also present two potential problems. In the first place, by postponing negotiations on the more controversial issues one risks being confronted later by a deadlock on one or both protocols. The other drawback in this approach is that it may produce an excessively weak FMCT, especially if accession to both protocols is not mandatory and could be done separately.

9. An FMCT modelled on the BWC was also deemed unsuitable by most delegations as it would be lacking verification provisions.

10. Delegations also examined the NPT solution, namely a concise main text with a system of verifications subsequently agreed upon based on the IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols. Many delegations, however, pointed out that while negotiations on the central treaty would be facilitated, reaching an understanding on verifications and implementation provisions at a later date would be much more uncertain, to the possible detriment of the Treaty’s credibility and effectiveness.

11. The CWC model (a very detailed text containing also the necessary annexes on materials, verifications and other technical questions) was considered to have the advantage of entry into force in its entirety, but the disadvantage of foreseeable lengthy and complicated negotiations.

12. Finally, the CCW solution (a framework treaty with additional protocols negotiated at a later date) was not considered to be appropriate for FMCT by most delegations.

13. No objections were made during the discussions to the proposal that an FMCT should have no date of expiry.

14. Considerable attention was devoted during the debate to entry into force provisions that were considered key elements in the Treaty’s effectiveness, allowing it to contribute to a credible halt in worldwide production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The CTBT precedent, as a potential basis of reference, was considered flawed. Many delegations believed that a new solution was therefore necessary, one that could involve from the start of negotiations all NWS and States possessing nuclear weapons, avoiding — however — the adoption of clauses that would allow one country or a small minority of them to stall for an indefinite period the entry into force of the Treaty. Others believed, instead, that negotiations could begin with the participation of the P-5.

Definitions

15. In discussing definitions, the scope of FMCT emerged as one of its principal and defining factors. There was general agreement that the Treaty is meant to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, safeguarding — however — the right to use such material for peaceful purposes. Consequently, definitions should take into account all materials used to this end. Some delegations pointed out that they should not be excessively limited and so rigid as to be unable account for technological development. Neither, however, should they be so wide as to include materials whose use for non-peaceful purposes is largely improbable, but whose inclusion in the Treaty would increase the relevant verification costs to an unacceptable degree. Delegations also considered desirable that the Treaty contain provisions to simplify the modification of definitions in line with technological progress.

16. The discussions on the topic of definitions also brought out the requirement to carefully study the need to include transuranium elements, such as Americium and Plutonium that seem to be to an increasing degree suitable for weaponization. More
importantly, definitions should be gauged in relation to the verification system provided for in the Treaty.

17. Several delegations further held that within the scope of the clauses on definitions, provision must also be made for the permitted uses of fissile materials in order to avoid that FMCT interfere with the unalienable right of countries to exploit nuclear resources both for peaceful ends and for military uses, such as nuclear propulsion, that are not directly linked with the manufacture of warheads and other weapons.

18. Given that the primary purpose of FMCT will be the banning of production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, negotiations on the Treaty, as most delegates pointed out, will inevitably also touch upon fissile materials already in existence before the Treaty’s entry into force. In this regard, at least three options are available:

(a) Consider existing stocks simply for the purpose of transparency;
(b) Partially apply to them verification measures;
(c) Provide for the control and gradual reduction of stocks as one of the paths to effective nuclear disarmament.

19. The debate brought out the widely held opinion that the implementation of verification mechanisms, and possibly even their definition, could be entrusted to IAEA, with the understanding that its human and financial resources would have to be appropriately strengthened. Several delegations underlined the need that verifications be also aimed at manufacturing plants. In a more general sense, careful attention should be devoted to the effectiveness of the verification provisions to avoid undermining the credibility of the whole Treaty. To this end, and also with the aim of assessing the Treaty’s overall feasibility, the effectiveness of verification must also include a cost/benefit analysis of the whole system.

20. Taking into account the above-mentioned requirements, most delegations were of the opinion that definitions and verifications should be inspired as much as possible either on art. XX of the IAEA Statute, or on the principles of “direct use” contained therein, as well as on its comprehensive safeguards system. Very likely, also, adjustments would have to be made to take into account FMCT’s specificities.

Conclusions

21. The two informal sessions of the Conference on Disarmament devoted to FMCT, of course, had no negotiating mandate and neither were any hard and fast conclusions expected of them. However, from the trends of the discussions, a few indications on delegations’ preferences on the various issues seemed to stand out that in the future may be useful in facilitating negotiations.

22. In the first place, it was generally accepted that an FMCT should have no date of expiry. It was also recognized that the Shannon Report and Mandate continued to represent a valid basis for the start of negotiations.

23. The question of stockpiles was addressed in depth on various occasions during the informal meetings, confirming the opinion that, should negotiations begin, it would constitute one of their most contentious issues. As in the past, some delegations insisted that the FMCT should limit itself to banning future production of fissile materials, while others reiterated the need to add at least a minimum of provisions regarding present stocks. In spite of this difference, however, it was also generally understood that the question would inevitably surface during negotiations, and that the Shannon Mandate — as it stood — allowed this.
24. Discussions on the structure of the Treaty were lengthy and detailed. In general, preference was expressed to avoid the pitfalls inherent in the CCW model, as well as those of the CTBT concerning its entry into force provisions. No delegation objected to the need for the Treaty to contain provisions allowing for the prompt and flexible revision of its more technical clauses (definitions and verification) in line with scientific and technological advances. These clauses could be contained in an annex to the Treaty, forming an integral part of it, negotiated in parallel with the central text.

25. Considerable attention was also devoted to the topic of definitions and verifications. In general, the usefulness of basing definitions on IAEA criteria and verifications on its comprehensive safeguards system was recognized. Preoccupations were, however, voiced on the extra burdens to the Agency’s budget that this would entail. Hence, there exists a clear need to provide FMCT with financial assessment clauses if we are to conclude a feasible and credible Treaty, able to contribute both to non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament.
Annex III

Report on informal meeting on Agenda item 3: Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)

Presented by Mr. Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament

1. In accordance with document CD/1907 (WP 565/Rev.1), adopted by the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on March 29th 2011, an informal meeting was scheduled in order to discuss Agenda item 3 “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” – PAROS. The meeting was held on March 31st and was coordinated by the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares.

2. Interventions were made by the delegations of Russia, China, Brazil, Belarus, India, Algeria, USA, Iran, Australia, Syria, Chile, Ireland, Egypt, Republic of Korea, Germany, France and Pakistan.

3. The Coordinator offered a short document with key background topics on the issue. It highlighted the Ad-Hoc Committee on PAROS established by the CD, which met from 1985 to 1994, and mentioned recent proposals for a Program of Work of the CD which contained paragraphs on the establishment of Working Groups on Agenda Item 3. The document also reminded participants of a draft legal instrument on PAROS (CD 1839) and of Resolution A/RES/65/68 which created a GGE on Confidence Building Measures to meet in 2012. Finally, the background paper referred to other international institutions related to outer space, such as ITU and COPUOS.

4. Many delegations highlighted the growing global dependence on space technologies and the importance of keeping outer space safe for peaceful activities. They referred to the increase of space debris, to the growing possibility of satellite collisions, as well as to the development of space-related weapon technology that threatens outer space security. Delegations expressed that outer space should be used solely for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all countries and should not become an arena for competitive strategic policies. Some referred to outer space as a common heritage of humankind. Most member States believe that the placement of weapons in outer space could deepen global insecurity, affecting all countries.

5. There was a general recognition that current international instruments are not sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. Many delegations believe that a specific international legal instrument is needed to strengthen or complement existing regimes. Some interventions commented on the need to adopt a preventive approach for avoiding an arms race in outer space.

6. Member States pointed out that, since there are different organizations regulating the use of outer space, there should be compatibility among instruments and coordination between the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies, such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the United Nations General Assembly. There should be cooperation and exchange of information among these bodies on each other’s activities on the subject.

7. The experience and solid political and legal basis of the CD in considering the issue of an arms race in outer space was highlighted. Many CD member States believe that PAROS is a topic to be naturally considered by that body since it is an issue within its thematic competence. Most delegations reiterated their support for a Program of Work of the CD which would initiate negotiations or substantive discussions on PAROS.
8. The great majority of member States supported the establishment of a Working group on PAROS within the CD. There was no consensus, however, on the nature or the mandate for the Working Group. Some member States defended that it should carry out substantive discussions on the issue, others supported that it starts negotiations of a legally-binding instrument on PAROS.

9. Many delegations expressed that the proposal of a draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT, based on document CD/1839) constitutes a good basis for negotiation and should be further analyzed in the Working Group. It was mentioned that the PPWT offers an initial framework to develop definition, scope and verification for a legally-binding text. However, the means to verify the compliance of such a treaty were questioned by some member States, which do not consider the draft a good basis for negotiation.

10. Many interventions supported recent progress in transparency and confidence-building, such as the EU draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities. Most delegations emphasized that such measures cannot substitute a legally-binding instrument. The majority acknowledged that confidence building measures and a legally-binding instrument are not mutually exclusive. Others pointed out that TCBMs do not replace verification but may function as a start towards a step-by-step approach on preventing the weaponization of outer space. Some participants believe TCBMs should be discussed only within the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) created by UNGA Resolution A/RES/65/68, or within COPUOS.

11. The debate was a reflection of the wealth of ideas on the issue and that PAROS is a concern for all delegations. There were varying views on the measures to be taken to address the matter. Many expressed hope that informal debates may contribute to the formulation of a Program of Work that includes a discussion on PAROS, preferably with the establishment of a subsidiary body. The coordinator suggested that such a working work group should decide on whether to negotiate or have just substantive discussions. The group should determine if negotiations would start on the basis of existing proposals or not.
Annex IV

Short summary on negative security assurances (NSA), from the Senegalese Coordination

Submitted by Mr. Fodé Seck, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Senegal

Geneva, 16 May 2011

In accordance with the decision taken on 29 March 2011, I have the honour of coordinating informal meetings on item 4 of the agenda, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, also known as negative security assurances.

I should like to express my gratitude to the President of the Conference, Mr. Wang Qun, for taking this initiative and entrusting me with this task.

This discussion not only follows up on the work done under the presidencies of Canada and Chile, but also on the efforts made in previous years, including under the coordination of Ambassador Hannan of Bangladesh, in 2010, and my predecessor, Ambassador Mbaye.

The idea behind this thematic discussion is essentially to collect proposals on specific aspects of negotiating a possible legal instrument on security assurances with a view to preparing the future work of the Conference on this agenda item.

By way of introduction, I should mention that the non-nuclear-weapons States’ demand for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them has been the subject of several United Nations Security Council resolutions.

It has been noted on numerous occasions that statements by nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States are insufficient, given that the statements are unilateral, conditional and revocable.

In the same way, some delegations have maintained that the assurances given in nuclear-weapon-free zones are insufficient, conditional and geographically limited. Nevertheless, it has been affirmed that the creation of such zones in Africa, South-East Asia, Central Asia and South America and Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status have constituted steps forward.

Furthermore, it has been argued that granting negative security assurances would constitute a quid pro quo for States that renounced nuclear weapons and would help to combat proliferation. In that connection, it has been affirmed that granting legally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would be a confidence-building measure and a step towards the implementation by nuclear-weapon States of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, relating to nuclear disarmament.

In addition, the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that it is the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States so as to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The Conference also recalled United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use
of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the relevant protocols established pursuant to
nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognizing that treaty-based security assurances are available
to such zones.

Without prejudice to efforts within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the Conference resolved that:

- Action 7: All States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the
  context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately
  begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
  weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to hold
discussions substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating
recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an
internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invited the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in
September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

- Action 8: All nuclear-weapon States committed to fully respect their existing
  commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that
  had not yet done so were encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-
  weapon States parties to the Treaty.

- Action 9: The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where
  appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the
  region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations
  Disarmament Commission, was encouraged. All concerned States were encouraged
to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to
constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the
relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties,
which included negative security assurances. The concerned States were encouraged
to review any related reservations.

- Past discussions have revealed just how complex negative security assurances are.
  Several topics remain subjects of debate when it comes to which steps to take to find
  a solution to that delicate problem. For example, there has been no consensus on the
  framework in which negotiations over a possible treaty on such assurances might be
  conducted.

- Therefore, I believe that the Conference should continue its consideration of the
  issue of negative security assurances under its agenda by giving it the priority and
  attention that such an important issue requires. Assurances are important not only in
  themselves, but also because of the obvious links that exist between them and other
  items on the agenda.

- Progress on negative security assurances could, I believe, ensure further progress on
  other matters included among the essential items currently under the Conference’s
  consideration.

- Lastly, I should like to inform you that a compilation of documents relating to this
  agenda item is available on the United Nations website, under the symbol
  CD/INF.51.

(Signed) Fodé Seck
Short summary from on negative security assurances (NSA), from the Senegalese Coordination

1. At the suggestion of the representative of China, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Senegal coordinated discussion of item 4 of the agenda for informal discussions in the Conference, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, or “negative security assurances”.

2. The contributions that followed the meeting’s opening statement, a copy of which is annexed, underscored:

   (a) The need for non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain more certain and credible guarantees from the nuclear powers, as existing ones were considered insufficient;

   (b) The urgent need to begin negotiations with a view to adopting a legally binding treaty for negative security assurances.
Annex V

Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on the outcome of informal discussion the 2011 session on CD Agenda items 5 “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”, 6 “Comprehensive programme of disarmament” and 7 “Transparency in armaments”

Submitted by Mr. Mikhail Khvostov, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belarus

1. I have been appointed as coordinator for Agenda items 5, 6 and 7. According to schedule, contained in the CD/1907 the informal meeting on these three CD Agenda items took place on 25 May 2011.

2. While preparing to these meetings I took into account experience from 2010 when I chaired the discussion on informal meetings on Agenda item 5. I also took note of the important work done in 2010 under the professional guidance of Ambassador Desra Percaya of Indonesia as coordinator for Agenda item 6 and Ambassador Hannu Himanen of Finland as coordinators for Agenda item 7. To recall the delegations on substance of informal discussions on the mentioned Agenda items I distributed the extras from CD/1899, containing the transcripts of oral reports by the coordinators on Agenda item 5, 6 and 7.

3. To facilitate the delegations in preparation to the debates I asked UNIDIR to share with the CD delegations the recent papers on the three mentioned CD Agenda items within the research project “Conference on Disarmament: Breaking the Ice”. The mentioned UNIDIR resources are available at the following links:

4. For the purpose of stimulation the debated I proposed the following plan for the meeting, containing bullets general for all three agenda items:

   (a) Update or validation of the positions of delegations from 2010 CD informal meetings and from two thematic CD plenary meetings of 17 February 2011 and 17 March 2011;

   (b) Relevance of Agenda items 5, 6 and 7 for the CD and assessment of the added value of their discussion;

   (c) Agenda items 5, 6 and 7 as they are reflected in the latest versions of the CD Programme of Work (appointment of the Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate way to deal with the issue);

   (d) Are there any fresh ideas or tendencies in the disarmament agenda to be discussed under Agenda item 5, 6 and 7;

   (e) How the processes, decisions and deliberations in other international forums can contribute to the discussion on the agenda item 5, 6 and 7 in the Conference;

   (f) Specific recommendations with regard to possible way forward on these items.
5. Delegations made use of the proposed plan and undertook deliberations of more general character. In certain cases the positions of delegations from two thematic CD plenary meetings of 17 February 2011 and 17 March 2011 have been validated.

6. Some delegations referred to relevance of items 5, 6 and 7 and importance to keep the opportunity open for the discussion in the CD on new tendencies in the disarmament agenda. The importance to ensure convergence between the CD discussion on these three items and relative processes on other forums has been underlined. Some other delegations suggested that the items were outdated and having modest relevance for the CD in comparison to the developments in other international forums and processes.

7. In the course of the discussion on Agenda item 5 “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” the delegations made use of the opportunity to update and validate their positions and touched upon the following specific issues:
   
   (a) Necessity to review periodically the utilization of growth of technology in development of new weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
   
   (b) Possible legal approaches for prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction;
   
   (c) Concrete types of weapons, having the same serious and indiscriminative effects as of the already prohibited WMD;
   
   (d) Radiological Weapons Ban;
   
   (e) So-called “dirty bomb” threat and radiological terrorism;
   
   (f) UN General Assembly resolutions calling the CD to keep the issue under active consideration.

8. In the course of the discussion on Agenda item 6 “Comprehensive programme of disarmament” the delegations made use of the opportunity to update and validate their positions and touched upon the following specific issues:

   (a) Role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament;

   (b) Charter of the United Nations, and the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 (SSOD I) as a guidance to elaborate Comprehensive programme of disarmament;

   (c) Principle of “undiminished” security and its applicability in reduction of the conventional armaments and in the context of WMD;

   (d) Relationship between disarmament and development.

9. In the course of the discussion on Agenda item 7 “Transparency in armaments” the delegations made use of the opportunity to update and validate their positions and touched upon the following specific issues:

   (a) Confidence-building potential of transparency in armaments;

   (b) Supporting role of transparency in armaments in disarmament and arms control negotiations;

   (c) United Nations Register and possible ways of modification of its scope;

   (d) Unilateral transparency measures concerning nuclear arsenals and other WMD;

   (e) Regional aspects of transparency;
(f) Norm banning the transfers of weapons to terrorists.

10. The Coordinator did not submit any specific recommendations with regard to any possible way forward on the items under discussions, and no delegation endeavoured to propose any specific recommendations during the course of the informal meeting. However these items are seen to Coordinator as having continued significance for the CD substantive agenda, and the Conference should continue to work on this item.
Nigeria
on behalf of member States of G-21

Working paper

Nuclear Disarmament

1. The Group of 21 maintains that the Conference on Disarmament remains the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and in that context, the Group stresses that its highest priority continues to be nuclear disarmament.

2. The Group reiterates its deep concern at the greatest danger both to mankind and to the survival of civilization by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their use and proliferation will remain.

3. We would like to recall, in this regard, that the very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 1(1) of 1946, adopted unanimously, called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals.

4. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 1996, concluded that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

5. The Millennium Declaration in 2000 also reaffirmed the commitment of member States of the United Nations to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons.

6. The Group, while noting, the steps taken by nuclear-weapon States for the reduction of their arsenals, reiterates its deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear weapon states towards accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Group stresses the importance of effective implementation of concrete measures leading to a nuclear weapons free world.

7. The Group, stressing its strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, underscores the urgent need to commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in the CD, without delay. In this context, the Group reaffirms its full readiness to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time.
8. In this regard, the Group emphasizes that fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility shall be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures.

9. The Group reaffirms that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

10. The G-21 emphasizes that progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in all its aspects, is essential to strengthening international peace and security. The Group reaffirms that efforts toward nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security.

11. The Group expresses its concerns about strategic defence doctrines of NWS and a group of States which set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and in this regard, there is therefore a genuine and urgent need to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their elimination. In this regard, the Group recalls its strong support of the objectives of the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/65/71 of 8 December 2010 on "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons Systems", as well as the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/65/60 of 8 December 2010 entitled "Reducing Nuclear Danger".

12. The Group reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of such weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and, legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

13. The G-21 stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all nuclear weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential.

14. The Group reaffirms the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and expresses its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in these areas. In this regard, the Group strongly supports the objectives of the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/65/64 of 8 December 2010 on the "Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-proliferation".

15. The Group recalls the Final Documents of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly—the First Special Session on Disarmament—and the 2009 Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit Declaration and Final Document of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Final Document of the 16th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Bali, in May 2011, and reiterates its positions as conveyed in its previous statements to the CD.

16. The G21 State Parties to the NPT note with satisfaction the successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and call for the implementation of its Plan of Action on all the three pillars of the Treaty and the Middle East, particularly on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East (deleted: “including the endorsement of”), and express deep concern over the lack of momentum since its adoption towards convening a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and urge the UN Secretary General and cosponsors of the 1995 resolution to immediately take all necessary steps for that purpose, as well as recalling in this context the reaffirmation of
the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The G21 State Parties to the NPT are encouraged with the commitment of Nuclear Weapons States to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and take note of the fact that Nuclear Weapons States agreed to report on their undertakings related to nuclear disarmament to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, and that the 2015 Review Conference would take stock and consider next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

17. I would like to reiterate the Group's readiness to make constructive contributions to the work of the Conference, and in this regard I recall the contents of documents CD/36/Rev.1; CD/116; CD/341; CD/819; CD/1388; CD/1462; CD/1570; CD/1571, presented by the G-21 towards this end.

18. In view of the Group's strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, the G-21 reiterates the following concrete steps to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament:

(a) Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

(b) Elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines;

(c) Adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, such as de-alerting of nuclear-weapons and decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons Systems;

(d) Negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(e) Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(f) Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time.