- PROTOCOL V -

REPORTING FORMS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 10, PARAGRAPH 2 (b) OF THE PROTOCOL AND THE
DECISION OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING
PARTIES TO PROTOCOL V

(As adopted by the First Conference at its second plenary meeting on 5 November 2007)

HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY: Australia

NATIONAL POINT(S) OF CONTACT (Organisation, telephones, fax, e-mail):
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DATE OF SUBMISSION: 31/3/2015 (dd/mm/yyyy)

This information can be available to other interested parties and relevant organizations

☑ YES
☐ NO

☐ Partially, only the following forms:

A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ G ☐ H ☐ I ☐

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
FORM A: Steps taken to implement Article 3 of the Protocol: Clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war

High Contracting Party: Australia

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<th>Reporting for time period from:</th>
<th>01/01/2014</th>
<th>to 31/12/2014</th>
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Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 3:

In addition to guidance contained within overarching military doctrine, Australian Defence Force (ADF) Operational Orders for major operations have an Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) annex detailing the requirements for dealing with ERW.

Current ADF operational guidance with regards to Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and ERW is to pro-actively deal with ERW in theatres of operations even before active hostilities have formally ceased. The intent of this policy is to mitigate the threat posed by UXO, by destroying items as they are found, subject to the tactical situation, rather than dealing with them after the close of active hostilities (as required by Article 3).

While recognising that measuring the actual level of ERW created in an operational environment is difficult, the ADF has a very low rate of malfunctioned ordnance during operations (through advanced ammunition manufacture, quality control mechanisms, detailed logistic planning and storage requirements).

Regardless of whether the provisions of Protocol V are applicable as a matter of law to those areas where the ADF was operating, all UXO items found by the ADF on operations in 2014 were identified, documented, collected and/or where possible destroyed. Risk assessments of the threat posed by the ERW are an integral part of the decision making and disposal process.

Any other relevant information:

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
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FORM B: Steps taken to implement Article 4 of the Protocol: Recording, retaining and transmission of information

High Contracting Party: Australia

Reporting for time period from: 01/01/2014 [dd/mm/yyyy] to 31/12/2014 [dd/mm/yyyy]

Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 4 and the Technical Annex:

Regardless of whether the provisions of Protocol V are applicable as a matter of law to those areas where the ADF was operating in 2014, the ADF made provision for the tracking and recording of every use of explosive ordnance.

Orders were routinely issued to ensure that detailed electronic reports, including Explosive Ordnance Disposal databases, are maintained by all relevant commands and are populated with information from Australian military forces in the field. These orders required that the information be submitted to ADF command headquarters in the theatre of operations, and back to Australia.

The ADF operational level headquarters in Australia has a standing requirement to maintain a comprehensive register that includes reporting of ERW incidents. This register includes where possible: the nature, type, quantity and condition of the Unexploded Ordnance or Abandoned Explosive Ordnance; any actions taken to mark, clear, remove and/or destroy these items; their location; and an assessment of the threat posed.

The register also aims to provide detailed information about: reporting steps taken; any future action required to deal with the items; and any warnings issued or risk education provided to military forces or the local community.

ERW registers at every ADF command level are intended to inform the requirements for protective equipment, risk education, and information on ERW to be provided when visitors enter ADF areas of operations.

Any other relevant information:

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
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FORM C: Steps taken to implement Article 5 of the Protocol: Other precautions for the protection of the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects from the risks and effects of explosive remnants of war

High Contracting Party: Australia

Reporting for time period from: 01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014

Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 5 and the Technical Annex:
Regardles of whether the provisions of Protocol V are applicable as a matter of law to those areas where the ADF was operating in 2014, the ADF undertook all practicable precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects from the risks and effects of ERW. This was the case irrespective of whether the particular area of operations was under the control of the ADF.

Warnings, cording, evacuation and other safeguards as required were implemented prior to any recovery or destruction of ERW. For example, this occurred for the Multi National Base – Tarin Kot Heavy Weapons Range, which was cleared of ERW in accordance with International Security Assistance Force policy in late 2013 irrespective of whether Protocol V applied to ADF operations in Afghanistan as a matter or law.

The ADF exercise a duty of care to all local nationals within any area affected by ERW.

Risk education was (and will continue to be) conducted by the ADF to warn local civilians of the dangers of ERW, and advice on the reporting processes will enable civilians to report ERW when they are found.

Any other relevant information:

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**FORM D:** Steps taken to implement Article 6 of the Protocol: Provisions for the protection of humanitarian missions and organizations from the effects of explosive remnants of war

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Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 6:

Regardless of whether the provisions of Protocol V are applicable as a matter of law to those areas where the ADF was operating in 2014, the ADF provided information to humanitarian missions and organisations on the location of ERW within the humanitarian missions’ and organisations’ area of operations. This was the case irrespective of whether the particular area of operations was under the control of the ADF.

Any other relevant information:

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- PROTOCOL V -

FORM E: Steps taken to implement Article 7 and Article 8 of the Protocol:
Assistance with respect to existing explosive remnants of war and cooperation and assistance

High Contracting Party: Australia

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Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 7 and Article 8:
The ADF exchanges information on a regular basis with the Defence establishments of Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States as part of the Technical Co-operation Program. In relation to the removal of ERW, this information concerns the equipment capabilities, procedures employed, and results of tests, trials, exercises, and operations. This information allows the participating nations to increase their knowledge of the problems involved with the removal of ERW and improve relevant skills and techniques. The ADF also provides a range of technical assistance and training to regional countries affected by ERW, including through cooperative ERW clearance, removal, and destruction activities, as listed below.

From 22 October to 8 November 2014, the Australian Defence Force conducted explosive ordnance removal activities in the remote community of Torokina, Bougainville during OPERATION RENDER SAFE in conjunction with other contributing nations (United Kingdom, New Zealand, United States, Canadian Armed Forces and Solomon Islands Police Force). The activity focused on the safe removal of WWII-era unexploded ordnance and also involved initial community engagement, search, and then render safe and disposal operations.

For the 2014 reporting period Defence provided the following training to international students:

a. ADF Explosive Ordnance Introductory training was provided to two Papua New Guinea Army and two Malaysian Air Force personnel.
b. Nine positions were offered on the Regimental Officer Basic Course (Engineers) in 2014. The training was provided to two PNG Defence Force personnel, and two New Zealand Defence Force personnel.
c. Two positions were offered on the Search Advisor course, with none accepted.

[Please also refer to Australia’s Report for CCW Amended Protocol II Form B.]

Mine action is an important element of Australia’s aid program. Through its Mine Action Strategy for the Australian aid program, Australia committed $100 million to mine action over the five years from 2010-14. The goal of the strategy was to reduce the threat and socio-economic impact of landmines, cluster munitions and other ERW. The intended outcomes are: improved quality of life for victims; reduced number of deaths and injuries; enhanced capacity of countries to manage their mine action programs; and effective leadership and advocacy by Australia on mine action. Australia focuses on assisting significantly affected countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with flexibility to respond to other emerging needs and priorities.

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As a party to Protocol V, Australia's international cooperation and assistance in mine action addresses the impact of explosive remnants of war including landmines and cluster munitions. In 2014, Australia provided AUD 7,325,715 in international cooperation and assistance in mine action. Further details of Australia's mine action assistance are as follows:

Cambodia, Mine Clearance and Capacity Development, AUD 2,000,000
Laos, Mine Clearance/Mine Risk Education, Capacity building, AUD 600,000
Lebanon, Battle Area Clearance, AUD 355,000
Mozambique, Clearance for Completion, AUD 400,000
Palau, Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War, AUD 1,012,454
Vietnam, Victim assistance, AUD 250,000
Global Programs, Core Support to GICHD and the APMBC ISU, AUD 600,000
Global Programs, Geneva Call, Reducing the Threat and Impact of Landmines, AUD 209,162
Global Programs, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, AUD 200,000
Global Programs, ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled, Victim assistance AUD 750,000
Global Programs, ICRC Special Mine Action Appeal, AUD 500,000
Global Programs, Core Support to UNMAS for UN Coordination, AUD 280,000
Global Programs, Mines Advisory Group, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Innovation in Mine Action, AUD 169,099

TOTAL: 7,325,715

Any other relevant information:

FORM E(a): Steps taken by States which have ERW victims to implement the relevant provisions of Article 8(2): Victim Assistance

High Contracting Party:

Reporting for time period from: [dd/mm/yyyy] to [dd/mm/yyyy]

Steps taken to implement the relevant provisions of Article 8(2):

Other relevant information, guided by the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance:

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
FORM F: Steps taken to implement Article 9 of the Protocol: Generic preventive measures

High Contracting Party: Australia

Reporting for time period from: 01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014

Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 9 and the Technical Annex:

The ADF maintains Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with ERW – such as marking, reporting, transporting, and storing ordnance. These procedures comply with Article 9.

The ADF has developed and implemented procedures to minimize the occurrence of ERW, and will continue to improve these procedures into the future. Current ADF procedures include, but are not limited to: training for all personnel in the Law of Armed Conflict; and, training of specific personnel in Explosive Ordnance Disposal and standard operating procedures that reduce risk to personnel (including civilians) and the environment.

The Defence Explosive Ordnance Committee (DEOC) continues as the senior advisory committee supporting the Vice Chief of Defence Force as the single point of accountability for the Defence-wide management of Explosive Ordnance (EO). The DEOC reports annually to the Defence Committee.

Defence compliance with the technical aspects of this Protocol is achieved through Technical Regulations. Technical Regulatory Authorities (TRA) are accountable to Service Chiefs and provide appropriate assurance through established regulatory frameworks and auditing compliance within those frameworks. The TRA provides technical integrity regulation through regular compliance audit, ongoing liaison and established steering groups and working groups.

The Explosive Ordnance Safety Assurance Board (EOSAB) provides the Vice Chief of the Defence Force with assurance of appropriate EO safety management in Defence. The EOSAB is Chaired by the Director General Explosive Ordnance (DGEQO) in Joint Logistics Command, with Air Force taking the lead TRA role. The EOSAB provides a key technical compliance assurance mechanism for introducing EO into Service, and for sustainment of in-Service EO. The EOSAB is also responsible for reviewing ADF compliance with EO safety policy. The EOSAB convened four scheduled meetings during the 2014 reporting period.

Defence, through the Defence Materiel Organisation, undertakes and commissions research as well as employing procedures in order to obtain the highest possible reliability and safety of EO. This is achieved by ongoing engagement with industry and research organisations, as well as by the work undertaken by EO specialists within the Defence Materiel Organisation and other parts of Defence.

Any other relevant information:

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Defence mandates, and ensures compliance to, munitions manufacturing management and munitions management through the regulatory documents listed below.

Regulatory Documents:

a. DI(G) LOG 4-1-001 Defence Explosive Ordnance Manual, 2 Mar 2012;
b. DEFLOGMAN Pt 2 Volume 9 Chapter 1 Management of Explosive Ordnance, 2014;
c. DI(G) LOG 4-1-006 Safety of Explosive Ordnance, 20 Mar 2006;
d. DEOP 102 (AM1) Technical Integrity of Explosive Ordnance, AL1 13 Jan 2012;
e. DEFLOGMAN Pt 2 Volume 9 Chapter 4Insensitive Munitions, 2 Mar 2012;
f. DI(G) LOG 4-5-012 Regulation of the technical integrity of Australian Defence Force materiel, 10 Sep 2010;
g. DI(G) OPS 32-1—Appropriation and import of Defence related materiel during Australian Defence Force operations, 29 Nov 2006;
h. DI(G) ADMIN 59-1—Management of Defence Training Areas, 9 Nov 2012;
i. DI(G) ADMIN 63-1—Management of land affected by unexploded ordnance, 23 Sep 2004;
k. DEOP 102 Technical Integrity of Explosive Ordnance AL1 13 Jan 2012;
l. NATO AASTP-2—Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives;
m. NATO AASTP-3—Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Hazard Classification of Military Ammunition and Explosives;
n. Allied Ordnance Publication (AOP) 15—Guidance on the Assessment of the Safety and Suitability for Service of Non-Nuclear Munitions for NATO Armed Forces; and
o. eDEOP 101 Department of Defence Explosives Regulations.

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FORM G: Steps taken to implement Article 11 of the Protocol: Compliance

High Contracting Party: Australia

Reporting for time period from: 01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014

Steps taken to implement the provisions of Article 11:
The ADF has issued instructions to operational commands, which comply with the Protocol, namely:

a. ADF orders and instructions follow current EO management processes with respect to security, licensed storage and operational life;
b. all ammunition technical staff to be conversant with ADF policy, orders and instructions as well as all current domestic EO management regulations for the storage, distribution, handling and maintenance of EO;
c. the Senior Ammunition Technical Representative to ensure that EO was stored, transported, managed and disposed of safely by Task Groups in accordance with current ADF legal and policy requirements; and

d. EO incidents, particularly malfunctions, were to be reported on occurrence.

Furthermore, specific Protocol V requirements and procedures for dealing with ERW are covered in pre-deployment and ongoing training. These instructions and procedures are reviewed regularly to ensure their continuing relevance and applicability to current Government direction, including compliance with Protocol V.

Any other relevant information:

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
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FORM H: Other relevant matters

High Contracting Party: Australia

Reporting for time period from: 01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014
[dd/mm/yyyy] [dd/mm/yyyy]

Any other relevant information:

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS