What can this OEWG we have created achieve? Can we come to a shared understanding of this in time to succeed in developing proposals that Heads of Government and State can reflect upon on 26 September and that the First Committee can act upon in October/November?

Each country and each grouping is projecting its set of hopes and fears upon the OEWG. The way in which of the words “step-by-step” and “big-bang” are used almost as curse words exemplifies this. Some countries have suggested this is a false dichotomy, yearning for a way out of polarization. This is certainly a helpful sentiment, but how does one move from a yearning to actual practice?

Mayors for Peace would like to suggest that “planning in good faith” should be our core guiding concept at this time.

Regarding polarization, there is no process that does not include at least some planning.
- Even something as flimsy as, “The plan is to take this step and then pause to figure out what the next step should be.” is a plan. It is liable to be excruciatingly slow, it may lead up a blind alley, but if it were pursued in relentless good faith, like a mouse in a maze, it might get to the reward.
- Even something as grandiose as, “The plan is to do absolutely nothing until we have every detail work out on paper.” is a plan. It is also likely to be slow in developing, it may well prove not to be so perfect in practice, but if pursued in good faith, it might get the job done.

A more natural form of planning is to start with a sketch, proceed to a broad-strokes picture, rework some parts in greater detail, while all the time taking steps that are consist with the plan in its current stage of development. In this way, the plan and it realization develop in concert and ultimately merge into a set of agreements that constitute the establishment of nuclear weapon free world. How much is concretely set in place during the process, and how much should be left to implement after the wrap-up agreement will become apparent as the work progresses.

This, in crude terms, is how project management operates.

We have a joint project: to establish a nuclear weapon free world. Put in negative form: we need to extricate the world from the dangers imposed upon it during the Cold War. This is the project identified in the UNGA’s first resolution after the world was confronted with the realities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, only the Cold War has made it a tougher job in two key ways:
- Nuclear proliferation: in 1946, there were only two or three countries to be concerned about; now we have at least nine. So we must address proliferation. Of course, it would be outstanding if this could be whittled back down to the NPT five. Of course, it is important that the number is contained and that proliferation is reversed, universally. But if we can deal with five we can deal
with nine or ten for that matter. The key thing is that we all agree it is a non-trivial matter and it must be systematically addressed as we good forward.

- Nuclear 'umbrellas': NATO and the Warsaw pact did not exist in 1945, now we have NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as well as a slew of bilateral arrangements. Of course, the reliance of these relationships on nuclear weapons, particularly the first use of nuclear weapons to address a conventional threat is a problem. At what stage, in the course of achieving a nuclear weapon free world, no-first-use becomes policy and the umbrellas are permanently closed is clearly an important matter. It may happen early in the process or late in the process, but it is beyond dispute that it must happen. It is, thus, perfectly legitimate to keep it under regular discussion and to ensure it does not become a last-minute sticking point.

These examples underscore the flexibility required to open up space for serious project planning to get underway. Planning can only succeed in an atmosphere of good faith. The perspectives of others must be accorded respectful consideration. We are all pulling in the same direction, bringing useful ideas and skills to bear on the challenge. The OEWG is an opportunity to build up a reserve of good faith, and that includes leaving the door open for those who are not yet present. We are at the beginning of a new beginning. Past resentments and disappointments should be set aside. There will be new ones, but hopefully they will be caught and dealt with before they become real obstacles to steady progress. Mr. Chairman,

Good faith cannot be commanded into existence. Mutual trust takes time to mature. This process must go on – to let it stop in August would be a terrible betrayal of humanity. Only a certain shallow depth of planning can occur in the remaining days. Perhaps the main recommendation from the Working Group for 2014 should be on the next, deeper stage of planning – and whether it might as well include some concrete actions. Perhaps you should look to engage experts in project planning and management, as this is not necessarily a forte of diplomats.

We are talking about collaboration: negotiations in the best sense of the word.

It is necessary to distinguish between the good faith of individuals and the good faith of nations. In the diplomatic sphere the state is a unitary entity. In your work you deal with the governments you are dealt. But civil society is not bound by this restriction. Every nation is a complex mix of civil society and governmental leadership. Civil society can question leadership policies. Change does not, however, come overnight. Occasionally the government administration itself has to change and civil society can be a key to that process.

On this issue, the starting point in nearly all countries is that:
   a) there is very broad public support for the establishment of a NWFW; and
   b) the public wants and expects their governments to act in good faith to that end.

No government benefits from being seen as obstructionist, out of line with world opinion, and in bad company. But that requires being actually being seen. Those governments seeking the engagement of others must openly express not only their dismay at the current negative attitude but also their high expectations of a more forthcoming response upon further consideration. This can serve as a powerful point of reference for the domestic debates, significantly improving the odds of civil society turning reluctant governments around.

A classic example of this is the Partial Test Ban Treaty amendment effort. The proposal to convert the Treaty into a CTBT was submitted by non-nuclear-weapon states parties on the 25th anniversary of the Treaty in 1988. This, plus the backing of one-third of the states parties within six months, signaled to the public in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, that the rest of the world was deeply dissatisfied with the way this issue was being sidelined in the Conference on Disarmament, and
that they were hopeful that an unconventional approach to the matter might elicit a better response. Despite opposition from the US and UK, the January 1991 Amendment Conference concluded by empowering its President, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, to reconvene the Conference “when more propitious circumstances prevail.” Indeed, in July 1993, he announced that he would convene preparatory consultations at UN headquarters to that end.

In the United States, mayors, members of Congress, and civil society had spoken out in favor of the PTBT Amendment Conference and made the test ban a significant issue in the 1992 presidential elections. But in 1993, the new Clinton Administration was dithering over whether to strike a bilateral ‘low-yield-threshold’ deal with the Russians or to take the multilateral route to a comprehensive ban. The combination of external options and internal pressure encouraged the right course of action. Thus, on the morning the collective July PTBT consultations were to begin in New York, word arrived from Geneva that the United States had finally agreed to multilateral negotiations on a CTBT in the CD.

The key lesson is to make the most of the current mandate and to recommend to the 2013 First Committee, among other points, a more advanced mandate for a Working Group in 2014 and perhaps 2015. For domestic public pressure to mount in the nuclear armed states and their allies, the effort must be sustained internationally. We trust that this is the intention of the states gathered here today, as it is the surest way forward. We are keen to be your partners in this undertaking, each fulfilling an essential function in overcoming the reluctance of some states to move onward to a NWFW.

Mr. Chairman, to summarize.

The nuclear weapons threat presents a challenge to each and every one of us. We either rise to that challenge together or risk suffering the greatest setback in human history -- quite possible our very demise. We will succeed only if we collaborate with a special focus on planning – not one fixed plan, but a process of planning and action intertwined. To get the relationships among the various tasks right, all aspects of the potential solution need to be given regular attention as part of the continuous planning and acting.

None of the above will occur without a concerted effort to cultivate an atmosphere of good faith. We would not find ourselves where we are today if good faith had prevailed since the end of the Cold War. Reykjavik gave us a glimpse of what is possible. But we must seize this opportunity to put that behind us and assiduously cultivate good faith in our words and deeds. We believe that where governments are stuck in old ways, civil society will intervene.

But that will take time. So, for now, you need to persevere: take the planning forward as best and as far as you can. The latecomers will be able to catch up with you!

Thank you.