

Coordinators' Report on Improvised Explosive Devices

Submitted by the Coordinators¹

A. Introduction

1. The Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II (the Group) met in Geneva on 1 and 2 April 2014 and continued discussions on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) corresponding to its mandate as contained in paragraph 19 of the final document of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II (CCW/AP.II/CONF.15/8).

2. The Coordinator and Co-Coordinator (the Coordinators) wrote to the High Contracting Parties on 29 January and 6 March 2014 to inform on the substantive preparations for the Group's meeting to focus on five sub-topics². Consistent with the mandate, the Coordinators divided the discussion in the Group into informal break-out sessions for two areas of work on developing best practices: exploring the possibility of an information exchange database; and examining ways to reduce the risk of military munitions, ERW, commercial explosives or chemical precursors being used for IEDs. The purpose of organizing the work in this manner was to facilitate a more interactive and productive discussion.

3. Although this was the sixth year this issue has been addressed by the Group, major challenges of addressing IEDs under Amended Protocol II remain. This year, the Coordinators also organized a focused discussion on the way forward on IEDs by providing options for future work.

B. Information exchange on IEDs

4. Continuing the practice of previous sessions the Group heard presentations on general case studies by experts on experiences with IED incidents, their prevention, including public awareness and/or risk education campaigns, and their humanitarian effects. This session aimed to provide a context for the following session on developing best practices. The Coordinators express their gratitude to the following experts who conveyed presentations:

- Lt. Colonel Charles Giraud, Division of Arms Control, Ministry of Defence, France;
- Mr. Joseph Huber, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS);
- Mr. Steve Smith and Mr. Iain Overton, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV);
- Ms. Joanna Wright, independent researcher and contributor to the Small Arms Survey 2013 Yearbook.

¹ Ms. Namdi Payne of Australia, Coordinator, and Navy Captain Erwan Roche of France, Co-Coordinator

² The five sub-topics were: information exchange on IEDs; developing best practices by exploring the possibility of a database, portal or platform as a tool for improving information sharing; developing best practices on ways to reduce the risk of military stocks, explosive remnants of war (ERW), or commercial explosive stocks from being used for IEDs; international cooperation and assistance; and assistance for victims of IEDs.

5. The presentations continued to refer to the increasing scale of the IED threat around the world. AOAV found that over a three-year period (2011-2013) there had been a 69 per cent increase of civilian victims either killed or injured by IEDs globally, from 13,179 to 22,289 victims. AOAV's research concluded that attacks in populated areas have become increasingly evident, rising from 51 per cent to 62 per cent of IED incidents. The study by Small Arms Survey showed that in 2011 the highest number of civilian fatalities and casualties from IEDs occurred in Iraq, followed by Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2012, Syria replaced Afghanistan among the most affected countries. Despite this change, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), casualties of IED incidents in Afghanistan increased in 2012 and 2013.

6. The presentation from UNMAS referred to its experiences in Mali and Somalia. While it continued to implement traditional humanitarian mine action activities, UNMAS had in recent years adapted its strategy to the changing nature of conflicts and explosives threat. One of UNMAS' three strategic areas was to provide technical assistance for explosive threat mitigation for UN missions. UNMAS found that the IED threat in these countries was mainly based on familiar technology and tactics, rather than innovation and emerging threats. However, UNMAS expected emerging IED threats will take on many characteristics similar to the IED threat encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq.

7. The deployment of a technical laboratory to theatre of operations was identified as a practical counter-IED measure. France shared its experience on the operational value of the EU Multinational Theatre Exploitation Laboratory (MNTTEL) to analyse elements of IED incidents and help mitigate the threat. The laboratory would be equipped for forensics analysis, chemical analysis, and the ability to identify electronic components. Each deployment would be unique as the type and scale of IED incidents differed from one country to another, hence there were no fixed laboratory models. In 2011, the EU successfully deployed the laboratory to Afghanistan comprising a 15-member team representing nine countries, which helped strengthen the ISAF missions.

8. The presentations also noted some efforts to tackle this problem including stigmatization, through raising public awareness, involving faith groups, and other pressure points. The stigmatization of the use of IEDs by non-State actors could be facilitated by increasing community awareness of the economic, social and physical impacts of IEDs on civilians, particularly in locations where violence through suicide attacks was becoming normalized. Assistance to victims was also a key part of the IED response.

9. One participant emphasised the complex global demand and supply chain for precursor materials and components. Some participants said that enhanced cooperation and assistance was essential to counter-IEDs, while another recognised the value of increased information exchange. The World Customs Organization (WCO) updated the Group of Experts on its Global Shield programme, which monitored the illicit movement of explosive precursors and chemicals to identify potential diversion by criminal organizations. In 2013, the programme successfully facilitated 50 seizures totalling 115 tons of solid precursor chemicals, more than 12,000 bleachers of liquid precursor explosives and 20 components.

C. Best practices on possible database for information exchange

10. Building on the work in 2013 to begin developing best practices, consistent with the scope of Amended Protocol II, to help overcome the challenges to responding to the IED threat, this year discussions explored three specific areas of best practice. Firstly, the Group explored the possibility of a database, portal or platform as a tool for improving information sharing on the diversion and illicit use of material that can be used for IEDs and other means of reducing the threat of IEDs. A non-paper by Australia titled “The Concept of an IED Information Exchange Database” reflecting on gaps in existing IED databases and information sharing arrangements and whether a possible IED information exchange tool under Amended Protocol II could be a suitable option to take forward.

11. The Coordinators convey their gratitude to Brigadier Wayne Budd, Commander of the Australian Defence Force Counter-IED Task Force, who presented, as an example, an audio-visual demonstration of an information exchange tool recently developed for Australia and currently being trialled. The idea for Australia’s trial IED tool was to help Australia, as well as the international professional counter-IED network, have a better understanding of the IED threat and what effort was required to globally share IED-related knowledge. Australia’s trial IED tool comprised a customized web portal for the data capture of IED events, including search and discovery, visualization, and collaboration features, to enable users to search for IED incidents as well as information on national points of contact on each incident to allow follow-up if necessary.

12. Subsequently, the Group was divided into three small break-out groups each assigned to discuss a certain topic on the theme of possible information exchange database, portal or platform, as follows:

- Group 1: Possible categories of information for a database or an experts portal
- Group 2: Issues concerning hosting and access to a possible database or experts portal
- Group 3: Possible outputs, if any, for a database

13. The rapporteurs’ summaries of the small break-out group discussions are contained in the annex of this report.

14. Following the break-out discussions, the Group of Experts were invited to share views in plenary on a possible database, portal or platform as a tool for information exchange. One participant questioned the legal basis to establish and submit information to such a database, given Amended Protocol II applied only to situations of armed conflict, including non-international armed conflict. Some participants stressed that some unsettled questions remained, including on handling sensitive information and to avoid the exploitation of the information by extremists or terrorist groups. These participants also said that if there was agreement to create a database, it should be voluntary in nature so that a disproportional burden of implementation is not inflicted on High Contracting Parties. A question was raised as to which party would judge the correctness of the information submitted to the database. Some participants agreed that the Group of Experts would require more discussion on the issue of a possible database.

15. One participant expressed caution on the entity which could host the database. There could be some constraints for governments to release official information if it were hosted by a private company, even if it were unclassified information. Therefore, that participant preferred to have a

High Contracting Party or an international organization such as Interpol to host the database. In addition, the participant suggested that a careful stocktaking of existing databases at the regional or international levels be undertaken in order to avoid duplication of previous and ongoing efforts – one example was the International Bomb Data Centre Working Group (IBDCWG).

16. The Coordinator responded that there was no suggestion that this concept, if accepted, would be a new obligatory reporting requirement for implementation of Amended Protocol II. However, it was appropriate for High Contracting Parties to discuss particular measures or best practices they considered might be helpful to address the IED threat, including whether a database, portal or platform should be adopted on key aspects such as an Amended Protocol II list of IED subject matter experts.

D. Best practices on risk reduction

17. Building on the work in 2013 to begin developing best practices, the Group also examined ways to reduce the risk of military munitions stocks, explosive remnants of war, commercial explosives stocks, or chemical precursors, being used for IEDs. Expert presentations explored the sources and ways of diversion from these materials for use in IEDs and practical measures to minimize such risks. The Coordinators express their gratitude to the following experts who conveyed presentations:

- Major Kevin O’Connell, United States Army, Operations Officer, JIEDDO, Department of Defence, USA
- Ms. Claire Arnould, Project Leader on Explosives, *Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN)*, France
- Ms. Frederique Gautier, UN Security Council, 1267 Committee
- Mr. Samuel Paunila, Advisor, Operations, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

18. The presentation by the United States focused on commercial grade explosives (CGE), the diversion of which was more common than home-made or military explosives. Some experts agreed that authorities needed to implement proper vetting and accountability of end-users to disrupt, degrade and deny the illegal sale and distribution of CGE to nefarious actors. This would involve not only governments but also efforts by the civilian industry as well as law enforcement investigative elements. Research and development was also necessary to find ways to produce less dangerous or more effectively controlled products, such as the introduction of blasting caps with digital coding. A focus on stronger controls for commercial materials would help make it more expensive and difficult to create IEDs.

19. The presentation by France elaborated on chemical precursors, notably commercially available chemical substances which could be diverted for the manufacture of home-made explosives, and measures to restrict the general public to their access. It focused on the European Union regulation on the Marketing and Use of Explosives Precursors (Regulatory no. 98/2013, adopted in February 2013), which allows for the increased oversight of the use of a number of chemical products.

20. France was also involved in chemical marking, a project spearheaded by the EU to improve the detectability of precursors for explosives. The challenge was to produce a marker that would not

change the original properties of the substance, and not cause harm to the environment or from a health perspective. Fluorescent markers to enable remote detection and markers able to detect vapours are two types currently under research. Caution is being taken as implanting markers could increase the price of the substance. France also reported that it has been working on manuals for law enforcement agencies. A comprehensive document which would include pictures and details of the properties of the substances is currently in process, to be located at strategic venues such as police stations and customs offices.

21. The representative of the United Nations Security Council's Monitoring Team outlined the scope of tasks of the sanctions committees against Al-Qaida (Resolution 1267/1999) and against the Afghan insurgency/Taliban (Resolution 1988/2011). Three sanction measures implemented and monitored by the Team include assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. This sanction regime has a world-wide application and does not apply to one specific State but to listed non-State actors. The Monitoring Team noted that IED is a primary weapon of choice of Al-Qaida and Taliban. It believed that at least 90 countries are affected by IEDs, whose technology and manufacturing techniques are spreading rapidly. Innovation in design and execution of IED attacks remains a major challenge.

22. The GICHD focused on military ordnance and explosive remnants of war as sources for IEDs. The three basic components of an IED sourcing military ordnance comprise a trigger, a detonator and a main charge. In conflict areas IED components are scavenged from conventional munitions stockpiles, unexploded and abandoned ordnance (artillery shells, mortar bombs, aircraft bombs, rockets, cluster munitions, hand grenades, plastic explosives, etc.).

23. Subsequently, the Group was divided into three small break-out groups each assigned to discuss a certain topic on risk reduction:

- Group 1: ERW and military stockpiles
- Group 2: Civilian explosives and detonators
- Group 3: Chemical precursors

24. The rapporteurs' summaries of the small break-out group discussions are contained in the annex of this report.

E. Best practices in promoting international cooperation and assistance

25. Building on the work in 2013 to begin developing best practices, the Coordinator led a discussion to promote international cooperation and assistance to assist in strengthening national capacities of the High Contracting Parties, when requested, to address the IED threat. Presentations examined how best practices are shared and promoted through technical training and risk education. The Coordinators express their gratitude to the following experts who conveyed presentations:

- Mr. Maher Al Daouk, First Lieutenant, Directorate General of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon
- Colonel Michael Minor, Armed Forces, Canada

- Colonel Peter Pauels, Permanent Mission of Germany
- Mr. DSP Haruna Ismaila, Police Force, Nigeria
- Colonel Alexander Semiglazov, Engineering Corps, Armed Forces, Russian Federation

26. The presentation by Lebanon focused on measures undertaken by the government against IED incidents, which encompass the eradication of the sources of explosives i.e. preventing the entry of fertilizers containing 33.5% nitrogen component; limiting the import of explosives; obliging owners of privately-owned quarries and crushers to keep records of the use of explosives; and intelligence (information gathering, prosecuting persons funding terrorist operations, etc.). The measures taken include: tight security measures (nightly checkpoints, constant patrols, tracking stolen cars); precautionary measures (setting road blocks and concrete barriers around sensitive areas); logistics and training (increasing the number of explosives experts, purchasing equipment and materiel to fight against IEDs); awareness programs (community policing for the dissemination of knowledge to establish confidence between the citizens and security personnel). The Internal Security Forces also have received grants consisting of counter-IED equipment such as robotic mobile x-ray machines, as well as various overseas training courses.

27. The presentations reiterated that IEDs are not confined to situations of armed conflict. Canada reported that outside of Afghanistan there were on average around 1,200 detonations per month across 123 countries resulting in 40,000 casualties per year. It pointed out IEDs were the weapon of choice used by over 40 regional, transnational and interconnected networks that are disproportionately powerful. Canada experienced two planned attacks in 2013 alone, which led the government to permanently establish in 2017 the Canadian Armed Forces Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force. It recognized the importance of international information sharing as groups that used IEDs were supported by global ideological and criminal networks. It also noted that young people from Canada that go to war-torn areas may return with improved knowledge of bomb-making techniques hence inter-agency cooperation would enable effective multinational collaboration in improving global security. Canada, Germany and Nigeria noted that a synchronised effort with international partners and key allies would be crucial to help mitigate the threat.

28. The presentations also acknowledged that IED attacks do not distinguish between civilian and military targets. Germany emphasized that protection from these lethal attacks could be achieved through capacity building of personal equipment; vehicle protection; communication and information; training; EOD, demining, IED and mine clearance capacity; infrastructure protection; cooperation and contact with security forces; personal behaviour; and medical care.

29. In the context of the humanitarian response to IED attacks, Optima Group shared its views on training and capacity building. It was noted that a simple tactical IED using the basic components could have far reaching effects politically and strategically, as it could force a State to spend an exorbitant amount of funds on changing regulations and upgrading the level of equipment of its security forces. The IED should not only be viewed as a tactical weapon but also as a powerful influence and psychological tool. Also, it noted that the improvised nature of IEDs made it very adaptable in terms of the size, form and effect of an attack on a particular target. Therefore, it recommended that States must obtain a clear picture of the local threat including trends or prevalence of a particular modus operandi of the terrorist groups in order to successfully attack and defeat the network.

30. The presentations recognized the efforts of different States to enhance international cooperation in addressing the IED problem. On the one hand, recent events in Nigeria have indicated an emerging security trend in the form of terrorist group attacks using sophisticated IEDs constructed with components scavenged from conventional munitions and standard consumer electronics, such as mobile phones. USA provided assistance to the Nigerian Police through the analysis of various mobile phones recovered during investigations. On the other hand, the Russian Federation in December 2013 established an international mine action centre of the Armed Forces supported by a number of countries. The centre would accomplish *inter alia* the following tasks: training specialists; decontaminating land and objects during UN peace keeping and humanitarian operations; preparing mine detection experts and of experts in automated systems; sending Russian specialists to participate in international demining groups; and preparing units of international forces for the detection and neutralisation of mines. While the most significant problem encountered by Nigeria was the lack of internationally integrated databases, the Russian centre would improve information exchange on counter-IED through joint efforts with other States and organisations including NATO.

F. IEDs and Victim assistance

31. In this final segment, the Co-coordinator continued consideration of this issue and of the useful links to relevant implementation efforts in CCW Protocol V, including the 2008 Plan of Action on Victim Assistance.

32. The Coordinators express their gratitude to Ms. Sara Sekkenes, Advisor, Conflict Prevention and recovery – Partnerships, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who conveyed a presentation.

33. UNDP shared its experience working with communities in Yemen over the last 18 months focusing on incidents involving IEDs. The devices employed, were intended to drive the population away and turning whole communities into victims. Roads, houses, schools and other public and social services were left booby-trapped. These explosive remnants of war, whose components have the potential of the being sourced for new IEDs, currently remain on the ground as opposition forces were driven out and pose a significant threat to clearance personnel. The resilience of these communities to live amongst these daily threats should continue to be strengthened. It also noted that one of the most significant challenges faced by the clearance community today was to ensure they have the necessary level of training and equipment to deal with their normal tasks within a booby-trapped environment and live IEDs.

34. Cambodia shared its national experience and stressed that assistance to IED victims needed to include actions that target the provision of services in public policy areas, such as health, rehabilitation, psychological support, adequate standard of living and social protection, education, as well as work and employment. Cambodia believed that assistance to IED victims must systematically include actions to improve accessibility, empowerment and awareness-raising. Both Cambodia and Colombia shared the view that assistance to IED victims needed to integrate specific and cross-cutting actions to advance human rights principles, especially those on non-discrimination, and to pay special attention to vulnerable groups.

G. Ideas for future work

35. The High Contracting Parties noted the synthesis of the work done by the Group of Experts since 2009, as well as the reflection on the possible future direction of the work of the Group of Experts proposed by the Co-Coordinator in a food-for-thought paper (CCW/AP.II/CONF.16/WP.1).

The Coordinators invited delegations to provide views on possible work during future meetings of the Group of Experts. Several ideas were expressed, including:

- an interest in continuing information sharing, including through more focused sessions, the theme of which should be decided by the annual conference of the High Contracting Parties;
- as a potential thematic discussion, an interest in discussing further the idea of a questionnaire on national counter-IED frameworks, provided that the content of the questionnaire was agreed in advance and its completion by High Contracting Parties should remain on a voluntary basis;
- the question of the dissemination of information on the manufacture of IEDs on the internet;
- an interest in discussing further the idea of an information exchange database, portal or platform;
- an interest in discussing the non-explosive precursors, including commercially available non-explosive materials or elements which can be used in IEDs.

H. Recommendations

36. The Sixteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons may wish to take the following decisions:

- a. The High Contracting Parties note the compilation of existing guidelines, best practices and other recommendations aiming at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs, currently posted on the CCW website, and request that the Implementation Support Unit, in consultation with the Coordinator and the High Contracting Parties, maintain and update the compilation on an ongoing basis as new relevant guidelines, best practices, recommendations and other comments are published;
- b. The Group of Experts continue to narrow and sharpen information exchange on national measures and best practices on one or several of the following topics:
 - (i) prevent the diversion of commercial grade explosives for use in IEDs;
 - (ii) prevent the diversion of commercially-available detonators and other non-explosive materials of elements from being used in IEDs;
 - (iii) raising public awareness and/or risk education campaigns; and/or

- (iv) enhance information sharing on detection and counter measures techniques, in light of the significance of the CCW framework, its norms and implementation with respect to the IED threat;
- c. The Group of Experts continue, consistent with the scope of Amended Protocol II, developing best practices aimed at helping to address the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs, including by:
 - (i) considering a one-time questionnaire, which would be voluntary in nature, on national counter-IED frameworks, which would be circulated after the Group of Experts meeting with a view to enhancing international cooperation and assistance and strengthening national capacities of High Contracting Parties, including through the establishment of a network of national points of contact; and
 - (ii) exploring the possibility of an information exchange database, portal or platform as a voluntary tool to improve information sharing, among a network of national and any other agreed points of contact, on the diversion and illicit use of material that can be used for IEDs and other means of reducing the threat of IEDs,

while bearing in mind commercial confidentiality, national security requirements, the legitimate interests in trade of such materials; and taking into account existing and related work of international and regional organisations, including those referred to in the compilation.

Annex

Rapporteurs' summaries of the small break-out group discussions

Small break-out groups were organized during the meeting of the Group of Experts in order to further explore what best practices could be developed within the framework of the CCW Amended Protocol II on two issues: (1) exploring the possibility of an information exchange database, portal or platform as a tool for improving information sharing, and (2) risk reduction. Below are some general principles that came out of the meetings of the break-out groups.

A. Segment 1: Exploring the possibility of an information exchange database, portal or platform as a tool for improving information sharing

Group 1

Topic: Possible categories of information for a database

Leader: Australia

Rapporteur: Canada

- A database should have as much transparency as possible, be as inclusive as possible, but without prejudicing national security, national policy and jurisdictional barriers.
- Discussion focused on the concept of an unclassified database that would allow experts to speak to one another in order to enable them to address the IED threat and, if agreed, to further share classified information.
- What categories of information for the database would be useful and what information can be shared? Some States had concerns over the sharing of battle damage assessment or Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) of attacks, including the training to counter such attacks, and other counter measures. There was a general consensus that basic information should be widely available to experts but carefully controlled with various modalities to protect access to that information. Indeed, should nefarious actors have access to that information, it would put in jeopardy the national security of any country.
- The issue on the release of investigative police reporting and other similar reports was discussed. In many countries these are considered classified until there has been a conviction or a non-conviction.
- The notion that IED incidents were being under-reported was discussed hence information on civilian casualties would be useful to organizations in the field. Today States rely on public information as well as on bilateral exchanges. The concept of the United Nations looking into this could be a way to pull those pieces of information together in a more unified way.
- Some States agreed that the best practices of handling IEDs, as well as the basic training that could occur, should be entered in the database, but there was no consensus.

- What categories of information would be more resource-intensive? The example of police investigations and technical reporting were discussed. Some participants argued that those might be best reside outside the database, but contact numbers would be important.
- Which categories of information need to be updated over time? Basically, all types of information could be updated over time. This is important for States as far as they undergo proper investigations, etc. Some allocation of time would be needed before the entire database could be populated. Nonetheless, there should be fields of information that could be completed in a timely fashion.
- The notion of having a common lexicon was agreed to ensure that States were speaking the same universal language, and that terminologies used in different languages have identical meaning. Drop-down menus were cited as a way to address this issue. Supplemental information could also be provided.
- A participant was concerned over the language used by the database, as it would exist in English only for the moment. States would need to investigate the modalities that are used by other organizations that have similar information sharing arrangements, such as WHO and ICAO. The rapid advancement of technology should allow for translating features to be used in the database.
- Would it be useful to have a list of APT States Parties subject-matter experts and their contact details? There was general consensus that this would be a good idea.

Group 2: Issues concerning access to the database

Chair: Germany

Rapporteur: Spain

- Where could the database be hosted? Some delegations raised the sensitivity of the information gathered. Several options were discussed. The database could be in the ISU or in a State Party that would step up to the plate and offer to host it. Other options include, for example, hosted by an international agency or a private enterprise, but it could lead to additional costs, as well as issues of privacy and confidentiality. The example of the database of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was also raised as it was considered very effective and offered excellent privacy features.
- Who should have access? Access should be restricted, and some States stated that there should be a closed list of persons (a limit of 20 persons) having access from each High Contracting Party. Some delegations mentioned that it was not particularly important how many users have access to the database since it would not have classified information. The possibility of including international agencies was discussed, which would increase the base of international actors.
- Different forms of access: who should only have read-only access and who should be able to enter new information or new data into the database? There was agreement on having different levels of authorization based on the competences. The group also looked at

whether it would be appropriate to have time-restricted access and to change the access codes over time and to ensure that we followed up to see how it was being used and under what authorization.

- On the concept of unclassified data, one delegation pointed out that one of the security measures that is being used in other sectors, for example for internet financial transactions, could also be used as a basis to build sensitive but unclassified database.
- Would it be appropriate to have a roster of IED experts? There was consensus that this could be extremely useful. Some delegations were willing to offer names for an initial roster of experts at the national level.

Group 3: Possible outputs for a database

Chair: France

Rapporteur: United Kingdom

- Creation of a database was a process rather than a product. The CCW should perhaps evaluate output and agree access to the system by appropriate international organisations;
- An information exchange database offered an opportunity for better, more efficient sharing of information - avoiding redundancy or duplication of effort;
- We should bear in mind the Australian tool is a trial, but that trial, as an example, may inform and potentially meet the requirements of the international community over time, should it be implemented. An example may be in identifying key elements in the IED supply chain and in marking technologies;
- Security was of significant concern to many delegates. Restricted access and access control were considered as vital.
- While the information itself was to be at an unclassified level, a database provided a platform through which deeper investigation might be carried out between interested parties. This may particularly be the case where there is sensitive information provided by national security authorities;
- It was not considered that the database would produce global reports. Input of data was to be entirely voluntary. The intent was for the information to be exploited as necessary by authorised users from States Parties. The database was not envisaged as a replacement for existing national systems;
- On veracity of information, it was evident in the construct of a database that the user initiating the event input was responsible for the quality and accuracy of the input, and for subsequent updates;
- The system may be useful in providing national points of contact, and at a number of levels beyond the traditional CCW expert community founded on ministries of foreign affairs and

departments of defence. Consideration could be given to a standalone list of experts outside the database in any case. Similar exchanges of information and lists of experts exist in other fora. The Wassenaar Arrangement was cited as an example; and,

- A database could host national policies, domestic regulatory controls and capabilities to allow better understanding and the continued sharing of good practice.

B. Segment 2: Best practices on risk reduction

Group 1: Military stocks and explosive remnants of war

Chair: Croatia

Rapporteur: Switzerland

- The Group saw a significant value of further exchanging views in this area and welcomed the synergies that have been established between Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, which should be further developed. This merits an examination of how the full implementation of Protocol V could contribute to the reducing of materials for producing IEDs.
- With regards to the links between the different Protocols, one participant pointed out that the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II could run the risk of duplicating the work of Protocol V, particularly on the security of military stockpiles. It was of the opinion that warehouses of military stockpiles and munitions must first function properly and be properly and efficiently secured, thus reducing the risk of the munitions from becoming ERW. The CCW should avoid duplicating discussions on the same issues.
- On the question of implementing the Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) concept connected with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs), the Group agreed that the High Contracting Parties should review their internal regulations and incorporate IATGs into them. One participant warned that the problem with ERW was that they should be destroyed immediately after the end of hostilities because the more the time passes between the conflict and the process of eliminating ERW, the larger the threat they pose to nations, including the risk to have elements of those ERW used for the manufacture of IEDs. Another participant concurred that the risk of diversion was at the highest soon after the end of an armed conflict.
- On the issue of organizing regional workshops under the framework of APII, it was stated that the EU could take this idea into consideration. It was proposed to consider not only workshops, but also to take into account some different regional centres to be used as some sort of focal points for the counter-IED.
- A participant pointed out that one should take into account that the CCW is an IHL mechanism that sets rules to all sides in the armed conflict. Moreover, it cautioned the Group on the concept of preventing the non-State actors from gaining access to the

explosives within the context of IHL-based instruments such as the APII and CCW, would not solve the question out of armed conflicts.

Group 2: Civilian explosives and detonators

Chair: Australia

Rapporteur: Netherlands

- The interest in exploring the important existing normative framework with regard to civilian explosive was discussed. It was suggested that the compilation of existing guidelines, best practices and other recommendations established by the ISU could be extended to normative text related to the control of civilian explosives. It was also suggested that the Group might be interested in hearing further from the international technical commission on explosives established under the MARPLEX Convention, as well as from industries on the techniques of detection of explosives.
- It was also suggested that the Group might be interested in exploring the question of the control, traceability and detectability of detonators.
- The point was made that raising awareness of the development in this field to governments was valuable. It was concluded that there was no lack of a desire to do things, but rather a lack of information. Therefore, any opportunity to increase awareness was considered to be good. If the community is able to speak with one voice via the CCW, this message would be strengthened and gaps must be identified with regard to awareness.
- It was noted that, as for chemicals, there was a large list of materials used as detonators that were not designed to. This should be discussed in the future.
- The idea on setting up an exploratory group under APII was raised. The group could further discuss the restriction of use, control, and production of low voltage detonators.
- Many practices already exist for storage of civilian explosives. One point ripe for discussion would be the classification of blasting machines for safer storage. In this regard, the link could be made with the UN working group on the transportation of dangerous goods in order to understand what was happening in that field.
- On how to make commercial-use products safer, an example was given of fertilizers where now more would be needed in order to make it as an explosive. One should go about a more proactive approach. It was pointed out that terrorists would eventually find other means to get ahead of the game. However, the availability of resources to do so would depend on how quickly the government could respond. Therefore, one should move away from the easiest way to make explosions to the more difficult ones. This would make it harder to convert and, therefore, would make it more difficult for terrorists as they would spend more time and money to achieve their goals.
- Finally, one participant pointed out that in APII the High Contracting Parties often talk at a high level, but the real difference was made on the ground.

Group 3: Chemical precursors

Chair: France

Rapporteur: Austria

- The group mainly discussed the question of regulation and behaviour, notably the European Union regulation and its implementation.
- Participants clearly indicated that there was a need to share information on best practices. But it was considered too early to discuss the output of the EU regulation because it had yet to be implemented (it will be in September 2014).
- Briefly mentioned was the issue on how to deal with nano, chemical or biological materials that stood outside of the framework of the CCW. It showed that there was a need for much interaction on this matter due to the multidimensional character of the whole issue.
- It was also mentioned that it there was a need to strike a balance between regulation and good behaviour. Although there are international agreements and guidelines, there is a need for national regulation and good practices. This should be done at all levels in order to avoid over regulation and to provide guidance for the industries.
- On the international level there seemed to be a slow process in creating regulations compared to the rapidly moving situation on the ground. One example was mentioned by the World Customs Organization on the necessity to educate and train people on the ground so that they know what was happening when a sack of fertilizer disappeared, for instance.