Revised
Possible approaches to education and awareness-raising among life scientists

Submitted by Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Switzerland (on behalf of the “JACKSNNZ”\(^1\)), and Kenya, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

I. Introduction

1. Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) requires States Parties to “take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.” The article may be considered a linchpin, linking the general obligations of Articles I and III specifically with the domestic provisions of States Parties and thus setting the base for national implementation measures (see also other working papers such as BWC/CONF.VI/WP.3). Moreover, the wording of Article IV is wide-ranging and implies that, in addition to the necessary legal steps, other measures are also necessary for effective national implementation.

2. The Meetings of Experts during the First Intersessional Process (2003-2005) provided an ideal platform for considerations related to the oversight, development of appropriate workplace security culture (including codes of conduct), and education and awareness-raising among life scientists as important implementation measures at the national level. The exchanges underscored a common understanding of the pivotal role life scientists play in the effective prevention of the misuse of biotechnology and biological agents. This understanding is reflected in the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6), where the Conference calls upon States Parties to ensure the safety and security of microbiological or other biological agents or toxins (Part II, paragraph 11(iii)), and simultaneously urges the States Parties “to promote training and education programmes for those granted access to biological agents and toxins, in order to raise awareness of the risks, as well as of the obligations of States Parties under the Convention” (Part II, paragraph 14). Such training and education is fundamental to ensuring the conditions whereby States Parties can develop and apply “scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes” as required under Article X of the BWC.

3. Moreover, the Sixth Review Conference encouraged States Parties “to take necessary measures to promote awareness amongst relevant professionals of the need to

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\(^1\) In this paper ‘life scientists’ refers to individuals involved in the scientific study of living organisms and their products, and encompasses individuals trained in non-life sciences fields (such as engineering, computer science and physics) who engage in life sciences work as well as individuals who engage in life sciences work outside of formal institutional structures (for example amateur biologists).

\(^2\) “JACKSNNZ” is an informal grouping comprising Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand.
report activities conducted within their territory or under their jurisdiction or under their control that could constitute a violation of the Convention or related national criminal law.” (Part II, para.15). In this context, the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference also highlights the relevance of such national implementation measures with regard to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and the elimination or prevention of the proliferation of, in this case, biological weapons.

4. During the Second Intersessional Process (2007-2010), further considerations of biosafety and biosecurity\(^3\), as well as of oversight, education and awareness-raising, enabled exchanges on possible approaches to engage and enlist life scientists. Discussions highlighted that life scientists’ participation in the debates on biosafety and biosecurity would increase their awareness of potential risks, and of the Convention’s obligations. Additionally, discussions highlighted the possible contributions they could provide as life science practitioners in academic, industrial and governmental institutions to promoting biosafety and biosecurity. In this regard, the Japanese working paper on behalf of JACKSNNZ (BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.21) highlights three effective means for the prevention of the misuse of biotechnology, namely, Oversight/Management and Control, Education and Awareness-raising, and Codes of Conduct for Scientists. The document also emphasizes the importance of involving national stakeholders in all stages of the design and implementation of oversight frameworks, and the need to ensure that such measures do not cause unnecessary burdens and do not unduly restrict permitted biological activities. Consequently, in the Meeting of States Parties 2008, States Parties recognized the importance of awareness among those working in the biological sciences, noted that formal requirements for educational formats could assist in raising awareness and the Convention’s implementation, and agreed on the value of education and awareness programmes (BWC/MSP/2008/5, paragraphs 25, 26 and 27).

5. Based on these considerations and the common understanding highlighted above, various States Parties undertook individual efforts on the national level. In the case of Australia, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, the overall aim of the activities, which were also carried out by experts of the University of Bradford (UK) as well as the University of Exeter (UK), was a stimulation of debate and reflection among researchers on life-sciences, security and the potentially destructive application of their activities. A first series of examples highlighting experiences and key-findings made by these States Parties were presented in an information paper submitted by Australia, Japan and Switzerland (on behalf of the JACKSNNZ) and Sweden to the Preparatory Committee of the Seventh Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VII/PC/INF.4). In the case of Canada, Kenya, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, efforts on the national level, in various cases in cooperation with civil society, have similarly led to a substantial number of experiences and key-findings. At the national and international level, a number of scientific organizations have undertaken efforts to encourage increased education and awareness-raising efforts. Informal evidence suggests that the number of activities is increasing thanks to the efforts of dedicated individuals and organizations\(^4\).

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3 In this paper, the terms biosafety and biosecurity are used as defined by the WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance (2006): “Laboratory biosafety describes the containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent the unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release” and “Laboratory biosecurity describes the protection, control and accountability for valuable biological materials […] within laboratories, in order to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release”.

4 See, for example, the information presented in National Research Council, 2011, Challenges and Opportunities for Education about Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences, Washington, DC: National
6. Based on the collection of national experiences, this working paper intends to highlight key-findings and preliminary conclusions on possible approaches to education and awareness-raising among life scientists (section II). This will be the fundament for possible considerations and decisions by the States Parties at the Seventh Review Conference as suggested by the States Parties submitting this working paper (section III). The collection of national experiences is annexed to this working paper.

II. Examples of experiences made by States Parties: key findings and preliminary conclusions

7. The analysis of the various experiences made by States Parties (see Annex) seems to reveal a number of key-findings:

(a) Existing curricula and/or training at universities or research facilities do often contain references to aspects related to (bio-)safety, but rarely contain any aspects related to (bio-) security.

(b) While the existence of a well-developed sense for aspects related to (bio-) safety among students and practising life scientists has been repeatedly confirmed, there is, in general, a limited level of awareness of the risk of malevolent misuse of the biological sciences.

(c) Life scientists do not often consciously consider the possibility that their specific work could be of relevance to a biological weapons programme or otherwise misused to cause harm to people, animals, or plants or to render critical resources unusable. Yet when made aware that their research work could be linked to security issues, it was noted that a majority of those scientists consider awareness-raising activities as important and agree that researchers share responsibility.

(d) Life scientists’ awareness of international regimes such as the BWC or relevant national legislation is often limited at best.

(e) The various national experiences also indicate similarities in the way authorities address these challenges, as the examples refer, inter alia, to:

(i) approaches to nationally coordinated outreach among the scientific communities in collaboration with educational institutions;

(ii) the establishment of relevant networks with focal points; or

(iii) the parallel introduction of guidelines, educational modules and similar tools for researchers.

Such measures, however, will likely only have a limited impact if they cannot be sustained over time.

8. Continued academic research on bioethics and awareness of biosecurity risks seem to confirm a generally limited level of awareness among life scientists in numerous institutions in numerous countries\(^5\). Analysis of the reasons for this lack of awareness

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include, *inter alia*, the lack of university courses covering aspects related to the BWC and related (bio-)security issues, either because the curriculum developers do not consider the topic to be important or have difficulty fitting teaching material on biosecurity into what they claim is an already overcrowded curriculum, or because of a lack of expertise and access to relevant teaching material.

9. The experiences of particular States Parties as well as the complementary findings of academic research on awareness of bioethics confirm that further initiatives by the States Parties to the BWC are needed in order to enhance the implementation of the Convention through education of and awareness-raising among life scientists as a preventive national implementation measure. The States Parties submitting this working paper therefore particularly encourage considerations of the following aspects in the run-up and during the forthcoming Review Conference.

III. Possible considerations by States Parties at the Seventh Review Conference

10. States Parties, with a view to enhance the implementation of the Convention through education of and awareness-raising among life scientists as a preventive measure in the spirit of Article IV of the Convention, could consider:

   (a) that the frequent lack of awareness of aspects related to biosecurity and the obligations of the Convention among life scientists has to be addressed more urgently, strategically, and comprehensively;

   (b) that these efforts could serve, *inter alia*, as a basis for individual educational and awareness-raising activities by the States Parties on their national level as well as cooperation at an international level;

   (c) that such activities could, *inter alia*, lead to the sustainable introduction of specific educational modules and activities related to the Convention, also for example as part of an ongoing awareness-raising program;

   (d) that the stakeholders for such awareness-raising activities and intersessional programmes on dual-use\(^6\), biosafety and biosecurity education should involve, *inter alia*, relevant Government Ministries, Industry, Research Institutions, Academia, Funding Bodies, Editors of Scientific Journals and relevant Scientific Societies in all stages of the design and implementation of oversight frameworks. The form and nature of such activities should clearly be developed and implemented by each State Party based on its national rules, regulations and as a complement to its existing outreach activities (i.e. ‘no one size fits all’).

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\(^6\) In the context of this paper, the term “dual-use” refers to the possibility that biological materials, knowledge, facilities and technologies associated with peaceful purposes may be misused for belligerent purposes. While the dual-use character itself does not automatically imply a misuse, the references to “dual-use education” in particular focus on educational modules highlighting the potential for a malevolent misuse of well-intended research results, facilitated by the dual-use character of such results.
(e) that effective, non-mandatory (if deemed appropriate) awareness-raising activities could be developed and implemented, at low cost, containing various concrete measures, including:

(i) explaining the risks associated with the potential misuse of the biological sciences and biotechnology;

(ii) covering the moral and ethical obligations of the Convention incumbent on those using the biological sciences;

(iii) providing guidance on the types of activities which could be contrary to the aims of the Convention and relevant national laws and regulations and international law;

(iv) supporting accessible teaching materials, train-the-trainer programmes, seminars, workshops, publications, and audio-visual materials;

(v) addressing leading scientists and those with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications at a senior level, as well as future generations of scientists, with the aim of fostering and promoting a culture of responsibility;

(vi) integrating the efforts into existing efforts at the international, regional and national levels;

(f) that activities in dual-use, biosafety and biosecurity education and relevant regulations should not cause unnecessary burdens and do not unduly restrict permitted biological activities. Scientists and all other stakeholders could prevent the possible misuse of biological science by fostering and promoting a culture of responsibility and security through biosecurity and bio-ethics education.

(g) that States Parties should inform on their awareness-raising activities on dual-use, biosafety and biosecurity education in a more comprehensive manner than in the past. (It is recognized that reports on these activities by States Parties could already be included in CBMs under ‘Other Measures’ in CBM Measure E the ‘Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures’ as measures undertaken to ensure effective national implementation of the BWC. With the publication of this information, inter alia in CBM returns, those States Parties which are at a more advanced stage in the implementation of their dual-use, biosafety and biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities would be able to identify, and offer appropriate cooperation to, States Parties at a less advanced stage in such activities.)

(h) that the intersessional period between the Seventh and the Eighth Review Conference should be used for further exchanges and developments of the topic among States Parties as well as States Parties in collaboration with international organisations and non-governmental organisations. As part of this, States Parties could develop and share targets, and outcomes for awareness-raising activities, and be encouraged to designate a national point of contact for relevant education and sensitisation activities.

11. The States Parties submitting this working paper encourage all States Parties to the BWC to agree that the proposals mentioned above could be included in the Decisions and Recommendations section of the Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference.
Examples of experiences by States Parties

Australia

1. Australia commenced its outreach and awareness-raising on BWC-related issues in 1990, with a set of Guidelines developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to raise the awareness of industry and researchers about the risk of inadvertent involvement in the biological weapons programs of other countries. These Guidelines have been circulated to biological industry, universities, relevant professional associations and government agencies.

2. At the BWC Meeting of Experts in 2005, Australia reported that amongst its scientific community, there was a low level of awareness of the risk of misuse of the biological sciences to assist in the development of biological weapons. One problem identified is that many scientists working in the ‘dual-use’ areas simply do not consider the possibility that their work could inadvertently assist in a biological weapons program.

3. To address this challenge, the Guidelines have been complemented in recent years by more prioritised outreach and awareness-raising activities by Australian government agencies to target those parts of the scientific community which are most directly affected by the BWC and biosecurity-related legislation, as discussed below.

4. An education and awareness-raising program has been developed by Australia’s Department of Health and Ageing to promote recognition and understanding of the security sensitive biological agents (SSBAs) regulatory scheme established in November 2008, and to ensure that the regulated community is able to comply with their obligations. Briefings on the BWC and associated legislation, including the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976, are included in the SSBA outreach activities.

5. Australia’s Defence Export Control Office (DECO), as the agency responsible for the Customs Act 1901 and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 and their associated regulations, undertakes regular outreach seminars to provide information on the obligations related to exports of dual-use biological materials, equipment and technology. DECO also provides a range of publications which provide information on specific areas of export controls.

6. In 2006, Australia’s National Framework for the Development of Ethical Principles in Gene Technology (‘National Framework’) was published to provide a national reference point for ethical considerations relevant to environmental and health issues in gene technology, GMOs and genetically modified products. Many of these considerations are relevant to the prohibitions outlined by the BWC, or strongly complement the objectives of the Convention and/or the promotion of sound biosecurity/biosafety practices. The National Framework can play a role in helping gene technology practitioners determine in a straightforward and non-prescriptive manner how to best carry out their activities without the risk of contravening the provisions of the BWC.

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7 Raising Awareness: Approaches and Opportunities for Outreach, working paper submitted by Australia, BWC/MSP/2005/MX/WP.29.
7. In 2009, members of Australia’s National Centre for Biosecurity (a collaboration of the University of Sydney and the Australian National University) conducted a pilot series of four interactive seminars for Australian scientists and students on the potential security risks of laboratory research on pathogens micro-organisms, including the relevance of the BWC. This series of seminars, funded by the US-based Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, was based on the program developed in the United Kingdom by University of Bradford and University of Exeter.

8. In recognition of the high levels of cooperation necessary between Government officials and the relevant scientific communities to achieve progress in awareness-raising activities, there has been engagement by Government officials with a number of Australian universities, as well as the Australian Academy of Science, the National Centre for Biosecurity and relevant scientific societies, to develop a program to enable more effective outreach activities.

**Canada**

9. As Canada raised in its opening statement at the 2008 Meeting of States Parties, oversight, education, and awareness-raising among life scientists is essential for full implementation of the BTWC. As part of our ongoing commitments, Canada will be undertaking the following activity to educate and promote BTWC awareness and compliance in 2012.

10. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the University of Bradford, United Kingdom (UoB) are collaborating in the development and delivery of a curriculum for a university-level accredited pilot course on Applied Dual-use Biosecurity; Biosafety and Bioethics to be in Ottawa in 2012. With the aim of promoting BTWC awareness and compliance in Canada, the objectives of this course are to develop a foundation of the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity in the trainee such that increased awareness in regards to the ethical, legal and social relevance of dual-use biosecurity, as well as the responsible conduct of research can provide a foundation for the development of policies and procedures to enhance responsibility and prevent the malicious or misuse of pathogens and toxins.

11. This course will also assist in compliance promotion, and therefore, compliance with those undertaking activities with human pathogens and toxins, within the sphere of oversight of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), one of Canada’s primary tools in BTWC compliance. This course is intended for those with low-level knowledge of biosafety, but a high level of responsibility with respect to compliance with the HPTA.

12. Dependent on a successful delivery of the first course, future plans include expansion into a 60 UK credit Post-graduate Certificate for delivery across Canada, and potentially the transition to a full MA programme (180 UK credits) accessible by the global community.

**Japan**

13. Japan expressed in its working paper submitted to the Meeting of Experts in 2008 (BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.21) that education and awareness-raising among scientists are basic means for preventing the misuse of biotechnology, while recognizing the importance to respect the autonomous responsibility of scientists without obstructing scientific development. In the same working paper, though, Japan also acknowledged that ‘the development of educational programmes at the governmental level has not seen great progress’.
14. In order to mitigate such deficiencies, the National Defense Medical College (NDMC) in Japan and the University of Bradford in the UK conducted collaborative research to analyse the current state of biosecurity education in Japan. The research found that there was a lack of educational topics on biosecurity despite a certain level of presence on dual-use references, mainly due to an absence of space in the existing curricula, an absence of time and resources to develop new curricula, an absence of expertise as well as doubt about the need for biosecurity education. Parallel to this survey, the NDMC and the University of Bradford also jointly developed an online learning module in applied dual-use biosecurity education.

15. In addition to the efforts by the NDMC, other universities and institutions in Japan are taking various approaches to tackle bio-threats. These approaches include a course on bio-ethics and the social responsibility of scientists conducted by Waseda University, a project on anti-bioterrorism conducted by Keio University, and a table-top exercise on response measures in the event of bioterrorism by Jikei Medical University. The University of Tokyo has also launched a Global Health Leadership Program aimed at cultivating human resources capable of addressing global health challenges from cross-sectional perspectives including life ethics. In August 2011, the Science Council of Japan hosted a symposium on "Emerging risks posed by the development of life sciences and the role of scientists" where presentation were made by the leading life scientists in Japan followed by discussions including on the necessity of a code of conduct.

16. Encouraged by such individual activities, a wide range of measures are required for preventing the misuse of biotechnology. It is, therefore, important to share best practices among scientists and institutions at national and international levels and to examine how to apply and implement such practices appropriately.

Kenya

17. In Kenyan universities or research facilities there are already references to aspects related to biosafety. However, these aspects rarely address issues related to biosecurity or dual-use issues. The level of awareness of the risk of misuse of bioscience research is very limited and in instances where the term Biosecurity is used, it is usually in reference to other issues, e.g. Food security or sustainability. Consequently, in the recently drafted Biosecurity policy, emphasis was put on the need to create awareness among the life science community on Biosecurity and also develop education programmes on the same.

18. University of Nairobi and the University of Bradford in the UK are in the early stages of planning a collaborative research to analyse the current state of biosecurity education in Kenya and the East African Region. The research results will be used to guide development of subsequent Dual-use biosecurity education programmes and curricula.

19. University of Nairobi, in collaboration with the University of Bradford plans to conduct an online Biosecurity Education course for the life science community in East Africa. In the planned programme, experts will be invited to Nairobi where an intensive one week dual-use biosecurity education course will be delivered online by the University of Bradford.

20. The University of Nairobi, Centre of Biotechnology and Bioinformatics (CEBIB), is reviewing its curricular to introduce Dual-Use Biosecurity Education in its Masters Biotechnology course.

Republic of Korea

21. The Ministry of Health & Welfare has exerted efforts to strengthen national biosafety and biosecurity supervision through comprehensive legislative acts such as the 2005 amendment of ‘Act on the Prevention of Infectious Disease’ and the 2008 enactment of ‘Act on the Transnational Transportation of Genetically Modified Organisms.’ The two legislations serve as a basis for various permission and control measures of highly dangerous pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis and living modified microorganisms containing genes of highly dangerous pathogens that have a high potential of being used in bio-terrorist attacks. The Ministry is also working to establish and strengthen biosafety and biosecurity culture in the domestic biomedicine field.

22. The recent outbreaks of infectious diseases such as AI (Avian Influenza) and PI (Pandemic Influenza) caused by new and mutated pathogens, as well as the growing possibility of bioterrorism have magnified the importance of biosafety and biosecurity. Add to this the increased probability of biomedical laboratory workers being infected by highly dangerous pathogens and living modified microorganisms containing the genes of such pathogens. Against this backdrop, the Republic of Korea has reorganized its legislative systems and amended biosafety guidelines to reinforce biosafety management in biomedical research. Such efforts have been led by the Ministry of Health & Welfare and the Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC). The two organizations are also working to develop and provide education and awareness-raising programs for scientists and workers in the bio-field.

23. To strengthen institutional capacities for biosafety and biosecurity at biomedical research laboratories, the KCDC has worked with Korea Human Resource Development Institute for Health & Welfare (KOHI) to develop an education program for public officers and researchers working in the field of biomedical science. The program has offered ‘Laboratory Biological Safety Course’ since 2006, and provides information on laboratory bio-risk management, risk assessment, and biosecurity control management.

24. Heightened international concern regarding the use of modern biotechnology and the increased use of highly dangerous pathogens in biomedical laboratories have led to calls for the establishment of a national and international regulatory framework for biosafety, as well as national oversight and management measures for highly dangerous pathogens. The ‘Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act’ was enacted following the comprehensive amendment of ‘Act on the Prevention of Infectious Disease’ and provides that all institutions working with highly dangerous pathogens should have biosafety-level laboratories. The Act also calls for related facilities to implement legal and administrative national security mandates that encompass the concept of biosecurity.

Sweden

25. In Sweden, no formal survey on awareness of obligations under the BWC or of potential risks related to misuse of biological sciences/biotechnology among life scientists has been carried out to date. Although biosafety aspects are considered in national life science fora, it has become apparent from networking, discussions and informal information gathering that dual-use and biosecurity issues are less well cared for.
26. As a result of contacts generated over time at BWC- and related meetings a series of awareness-raising seminars were arranged and conducted by experts of the University of Bradford (UK) and the University of Exeter (UK) in 2009, at three academic institutions in Sweden. In conjunction with these seminars, an informal network was established with the aim of developing a national education approach, covering biosecurity and dual-use aspects within life science, adapted to local education and curriculum at each academic institution. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Ministry of Education took positions in the margins of this initiative.

27. The informal network has agreed to endorse the establishment of biosafety/biosecurity committees at all academic institutions that undertake education and research in relevant fields, as one area of specific importance and with great significance for future work also in dual-use education. These committees were suggested to have comprehensive responsibility for biosafety and biosecurity and, also, an advisory role in matters involving genetic modifications and education related to biosafety and biosecurity. Furthermore, the Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics at Uppsala University was identified as a crucial element in any initiative to develop national bioethics, dual-use and biosecurity education. Existing educational programmes, which to some extent have started to include these topics in for instance biotechnology/engineering programs and biomedicine master programs, were identified as useful starting points for the formation of national networks with great potential for future implementation of dual-use education in Sweden.

28. Regarding awareness raising and dual-use education it has become evident that, from a European perspective, there is a convergence of BWC- and EU CBRN Action Plan\(^9\)- related national commitments. The initiated bottom-up approach in this area is promising, but will require dedicated durable top-down support including provision of financial resources in order to establish a sustainable framework for facilitating the establishment of national biosecurity education in conjunction with related international efforts.

**Switzerland**

29. In Switzerland, initial surveys on awareness of potential security risks among life scientists revealed, in the vast majority of cases, a well-developed sense for aspects related to biosafety, but a considerably limited knowledge of aspects related to biosecurity. Moreover, most life scientists seem to be unaware of the BWC’s obligations as well as the obligations’ relevance to their work. In the same context, existing national legislation relevant for the domain of natural scientific research in general or biological research in particular seemed to be unknown to many.

30. Based on these findings, the Swiss government started to sensitize researchers with a brochure in 2008 (“Biology for Peace”) and accompanied a series of awareness-raising seminars conducted by experts of the University of Bradford (UK) as well as the University of Exeter (UK) at various academic institutions in Switzerland in 2009. Further awareness-raising sessions organized and conducted by the Swiss government itself took place in 2010. The analysis of reactions by the attending audience revealed:

   (a) that life scientists consider awareness-raising on aspects related to security as important (some even spoke of an “eye-opener”),

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\(^9\) EU CBRN Action Plan:
(b) that, due to the general academic autonomy and freedom of research and teaching in Switzerland, a governmental imposition of content within the curriculum would be met with scepticism,

(c) that particularly legally binding top-down approaches would therefore be inappropriate,

(d) that it is important to consider existing patterns of cooperation among researchers, institutions, and authorities, and that these existing patterns provide ideal platforms for an outreach, and

(e) that awareness-raising activities in the regular study and work environment of life scientists similarly provide an ideal base.

31. These lessons learned provide the base for possible ways forward, such as the inclusion of educational modules on biosecurity for biosafety officers in research facilities, or the encouragement to introduce educational modules on biosecurity in academic courses for future life scientists.

Ukraine

32. In 2004 Commission on Biosafety and Biosecurity (CBB) at the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) was established by the Decree of the President of Ukraine. CBB serves as advisory body to NSDCU headed by the President of Ukraine and it deals, inter alia, with all issues of national obligations relevant to the BWC.

33. In the frame of the “Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program” the Ukrainian Ministry of Health and US Department of Defence have signed in 2005 an Implementation Agreement on cooperation in Biological Threat Reduction. Successful implementation of this Agreement? Including provisions on biological research, biological threat detection and response, will provide fundamentals for Biosecurity (physical safeguard of pathogens’ collections) and for prevention and eradication of infectious diseases in Ukraine.

34. Since BWC States Parties Meeting in 2005 Ukrainian delegation permanently stresses on the necessity to raise awareness and education amongst life scientists and professionals in the field of Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical industry on dual use issues and on Biosafety and Biosecurity. Ukraine also reported that amongst its scientific community, there was a low level of awareness of the risk of misuse of the biological sciences’ results.

35. National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU) and CBB in cooperation with Bradford and Exeter Universities (UK) have organised an interactive Seminar in 2007 on Biosafety education including the relevance of the BWC for Ukrainian scientists and students. NASU and CBB, under the patronage of Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine, have also conducted an International Conference on Biosafety and on national implementation of BWC in 2009. Another International Conference on Biosafety and on national implementation of BWC under the patronage of BWC Implementation Support Unit in Geneva is planned to be organised in Ukraine in spring 2012. The detailed list of activity of different interested authorities of Ukraine in this field, inter alia, is traditionally reported through providing annual declarations on Confidence Building Measures in the frame of BWC.

36. In February 2009 NSDCU held a special meeting on Biosafety and Biosecurity when the whole range of Biosafety problems was addressed. State Programme on Biosafety and
Biosecurity is under final approval now by the Ukrainian Government now. This State Programme includes issues of Biosafety and Biosecurity education and awareness rising.

37. National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU), which is the main scientific Institution in Ukraine responsible, inter alia, for strategic planning and expertise of fundamental research in the country, has adopted in 2009 National Code of Ethics for Scientists (including Bioethics for Life Scientists) in. This National Code has been circulated to government agencies, universities, research institutes, biological and pharmaceutical industry, relevant professional associations etc. National Committee on Bioethics was established in Ukraine and this Committee organizes National Congresses (with wide international participation) on Bioethics each two years.

38. Ukrainian Biochemical Society (UBS), which unites scholars in the field of Biochemistry, Molecular and Cell Biology, has organised special sessions and/or lectures on Biosafety and Biosecurity during IX (2006) and X (2010) Ukrainian Biochemical Congresses, VII (2009) and VIII (2011) International Parnas Conferences on Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, as well as during III (2010) Ukrainian-German Symposium on Nanotechnologies. UBS also launched an initiative to create special Committee dedicated to Biosafety education at the Federation of European Biochemical Societies.

39. Ukraine’s State Export Control Administration (USECA) undertakes regular outreach seminars to provide information on the obligations related to exports of dual-use biological and chemical materials, equipment and technology. UECA takes part in meetings of states parties to the Australia Group.

40. NASU in cooperation with the Canadian Global Partnership Program and the UK University of Bradford is conducting a collaborative research survey now (2011-2012) on the current state of Biosecurity education, of BWC awareness and of dual use issues in Ukrainian Universities and Medical Schools. A Conference and series of seminars are envisaged discussing the results of the survey, and the brochure to be published as recommendations to the education on Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine.

**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

41. Since 2003 the UK has held five Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention-related seminars for academics, research councils, professional and trade organisations, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. These seminars assisted the UK’s preparations for the intersessional meetings on codes of conduct issues by ensuring that we had, and continue to have, a clear sense of the views of relevant stakeholders as well as their advice. Our most recent event took place in March 2008 and was devoted primarily to oversight, education and awareness-raising. While previous seminars largely focussed on the theory and general principles, the March 2008 seminar concentrated on the practicalities such as:

(a) What are the emerging lessons from work on elaborating codes of conduct and practice?

(b) What are the problems that have been encountered during the promulgation and implementation of codes of conduct? What are the solutions?

(c) How can we develop effective and practical oversight mechanisms for research?

(d) How can we develop educational programmes? (There have been many statements calling for such programmes, but specifics on what that education should cover are often absent).
42. At the 2008 Meeting of Experts we also presented a paper on examples of UK approaches to the oversight of emerging technologies, focussing on nanotechnologies and synthetic biology, which had been included in the UK contribution on scientific and technological developments to the Sixth Review Conference. This suggested that these approaches might be relevant for other States Parties as they grapple with the complex issues that are associated with dual-use technology.

43. We would note that there are still considerable difficulties in convincing some members of the academic community that oversight and awareness in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are issues deserving attention and action. We had, for instance, developed plans, in collaboration with two universities, for a series of awareness raising seminars in 2009 at various UK universities. These would have addressed CWC issues such as the problems posed by the governance of dual-use technology and codes of conduct, oversight, awareness raising and education, but it was not possible to proceed because of a lack of interest on the part of universities.

44. A more recent initiative in the chemical context however comes from the UK’s National Counter Terrorism Security Office. This is an awareness-raising project aimed at universities known as REVISE (REducing Vulnerability In the Scientific Environment) that seeks to inform academics and laboratory personnel about the potential dual use of everyday lab-based resources and the terrorist aspiration to acquire them without attracting attention. It encourages those responsible for laboratory security to introduce a culture change within the laboratory environment which in turn develops baseline levels of access control, challenge culture and stock control.

45. We have also taken opportunities where they arise to address awareness raising with the academic and industrial communities – for instance presentations at the annual Institute of Safety in Technology and Research’s Biosafety Section’s autumn symposium in 2008 and at other conferences addressing relevant biological science issues, and at seminars organised by the chemical industry.

46. Within the UK, the University of Bradford has devoted considerable efforts to developing educational material to support awareness-raising and education. The University’s Education Module Resource (EMR) offers content that includes history and national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, dual-use issues in the contemporary life sciences, and responsible conduct in scientific research. The EMR is freely available online and the content can be tailored in order to fit it into different educational contexts. It is currently available in English, Japanese, Russian, French and Romanian/Moldovan, and will shortly be available in Spanish, Urdu, Polish, Portuguese, Arabic and other languages. In order to facilitate development of best practice so that biosecurity education can be assimilated and implemented in different academic contexts in different regions, the University of Bradford has tested the EMR at universities in Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK.

47. The UK Global Partnership Programme is currently funding Bradford University to develop a National Series for a number of specific countries including in the Former Soviet Union. This series includes the essential values of the current EMR, but the themes, contents and learning outcomes for educational contexts are designed to be country specific. The main objective is to provide user friendly educational resources for use in the immediate introduction of short educational programmes for higher education. By providing detailed teaching guidelines (MS Word) and teaching material (Power Point) for a facilitator (not necessarily an expert of biosecurity issues), the National Series will help a range of universities and other educational institutes to implement biosecurity education programmes.
48. The University of Bradford is also the only higher education institution globally currently offering university-accredited training in biosecurity, via its Train-the-Trainer programme, which is offered in 6-week and 12-week versions at UK Masters level. This innovative provision uses online teaching technology and allows classes of students to take part in the programme via web connections for twice-weekly classes and seminars. Assessment is via online group presentations and by traditional written assignments. Now in its second year, the programme has attracted praise from students and sponsors and has accredited participants in over 20 countries. Students have included lecturers, science professionals, security personnel, military personnel and government policy-makers. Bradford is also currently planning a full Masters degree in Applied Dual Use Biosecurity to begin in September 2012, which will be provided online using the same technology, teaching and assessment techniques as the Train-the-Trainer programme.

**United States of America**

A. Overview

49. Managing security risks associated with life-sciences research is a shared responsibility of all those engaged in the life sciences, including the researcher, institution, local community, national government, and international community. Biosafety/Biosecurity education and awareness-raising across the life sciences communities is a critical component of effective risk management and is also a shared responsibility.

50. Over the past 10 years the U.S. government, academic and scientific institutions, industry and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have worked together to develop, implement and raise awareness about biosecurity and biosecurity education. Diverse groups, including the biosafety community, scientific societies, and pertinent professional and institutional associations have also played critical roles in advancing the dialogue and engaging stakeholders on these issues.

51. These education and awareness-raising efforts have sought to expand the robust culture of responsibility that already exists within the life-sciences community to include biosecurity. They have focused on raising awareness about the threat of/potential for misuse and on developing and making available the tools, information and resources needed to empower the life sciences communities to manage security risks associated with life-sciences research.

52. Recent advances in science and technology have expanded the ‘individual researchers’ beyond the traditional life-sciences communities to include groups such as engineers, informaticists, amateur biologists and researchers conducting work outside traditional institutions. In response the U.S. Government has expanded its educational target audiences to include these communities.

53. Below is a summary of U.S. government and non-government biosafety/biosecurity outreach, training and awareness-raising activities. While not exhaustive, the list is representative of the diverse efforts the United States conducts and resources available.

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10 This work is supported by funding from the US Department of State.

11 For example the National Institutes of Health Policy on the responsible conduct of research requires all trainees, fellows, participants, and scholars receiving support through any NIH training, career development award (individual or institutional), research education grant, and dissertation research grant receive instruction in responsible conduct of research:
B. United States Government

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA): manages a program to address concerns about dual use research and research done for legitimate purpose that could yield information, products or technologies that could be misused by those who would intend to harm national security or public health. http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/index.html

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB): is a Federal advisory committee (managed by NIH OBA) that provides advice to the United States government (USG) regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research. A key charge to the NSABB is to provide recommendations on the development of programs for outreach, education, and training on dual use research issues for all scientists and laboratory workers at federally funded institutions. http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/about_nsabb.html

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Biological Science Outreach: FBI conducts outreach to the scientific community (academia and industry) to raise awareness the biosecurity roles and responsibilities of law enforcement, research institutions, and community stakeholders and build a culture of responsibility and trust between the scientific and security communities. http://academicbiosecurityworkshop.org

U.S. Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP): BEP’s mission is to engage biological scientists and combat bioterrorism worldwide by providing assistance to improve biosecurity, biosafety, pathogen surveillance, and infectious disease surveillance and response. http://www.bepstate.net/

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP): CBEP aims to cooperatively assist partner nation governments to counter the threat of bioterrorism and prevent proliferation of biological weapons technology, pathogens and expertise. CBEP provides education and training to enhance clinical, laboratory and epidemiological safety and security and works to strengthen the partner nation’s disease detection, diagnostic and reporting systems.

C. U.S. Government outreach to emerging life sciences communities

FBI Synthetic Biology Program: FBI outreach to public and private synthetic biology companies to raise awareness about the potential security risks inherent to the industry, and work with the companies to develop common standards and best practices for risk management. The international component of this program fosters dialogue between international companies and their respective government/law enforcement agencies to develop processes to mitigate the risk of misuse of harmful DNA sequences.

FBI Amateur (Do-It-Yourself) Biology Initiative: FBI outreach to amateur biologists and biologists that conduct projects outside the traditional research setting to promote a culture of responsibility by raising the level of awareness regarding potential security vulnerabilities and exploitation, developing lines of communication between members of the community and their respective local FBI WMD Coordinator who serves as a resource to assist community members in the development of a safety and security best practices.

D. Training programs

The National Biosafety and Biocontainment Training Program (NBBTP): http://www.nbbtp.org
Emory University - Biosafety Training Course: Biosafety Level 4: This five-day training offers participants the opportunity to learn and practice new skills for BSL4 laboratories. http://www.sph.emory.edu/CPHPR/biosafetytraining/bsl4.html

University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) - National Biocontainment Training Center (NBTC) dedicated to preparing the worldwide community of infectious disease scientists to work safely in high-containment research laboratories: http://www.utmb.edu/nbtc/

Select Agent Program Training Workshops: U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conduct a yearly training workshop to inform individuals of their legal responsibilities for implementing the Select Agent Regulations. http://www.selectagents.gov/Training.html

Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Training Program: developed jointly by the FBI and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to improve efforts to identify and investigate potential overt or covert biological threats. Initially designed as a domestic program, FBI and CDC have expanded this training to international partner countries.

The Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) and the Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP): applied epidemiology programs offered by CDC to help foreign countries develop, set up, and implement dynamic public health strategies to improve and strengthen their public health system and infrastructure. The FE(L)TP programs include biosafety and bioethics training in support of epidemiological activities. http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/fetp/

E. On-line resources

1. Education/training


   The CDC Online Training Course: provides education regarding key principles for securing biological agents in research laboratories and biomedical facilities where loss, theft, release or intentional misuse of the agent might have significant public health or economic consequences. http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/biosecuritytraining/page1024.html

   The FDA's Food Defense and Emergency Response-Training: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) works with other government agencies and private sector organizations to help reduce the risk of tampering or other malicious, criminal, or terrorist actions on the food and cosmetic supply. Web-based training and additional educational resources: http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/default.htm


   Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Case Studies in Dual-Use Biological Research: http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse/

      Dual Use Dilemma in Biological Research, Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefense (SERCEB): http://www.serceb.org/dualuse.htm
Biosecurity: Risks, Responses and Responsibilities, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/biochem/biosecurity_educational_materials

The Life Sciences, Biosecurity and Dual Use Research: Dual Use Role Playing Simulation, University of Exeter (UK), University of Bradford (UK), and University of Texas at Dallas (USA).
http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/codesofconduct/BiosecuritySeminar/Education/index.htm

Biology and Security, Student Pugwash USA (USA)

BSL-3 Facility Inspection videos. These informational videos are for entities or individuals who currently possess, store, or transfer Select Agents and those who are planning to begin work with Select Agents or toxins. http://www.selectagents.gov/FIV.html

Emergency Preparedness and Biodefense: NIH Videocasting and Podcasting. Seminars and training events broadcasted live to a world-wide audience over the Internet and also recorded and made available for viewers to watch at their convenience as an on-demand video or a downloadable podcast. http://videocast.nih.gov/PastEvents.asp?c=58

Global Biorisk Management Curriculum Development (GBRMC): CBEP is developing and implementing a biorisk management curriculum to address biosafety and biosecurity training. Users of the training materials can participate in a virtual network of trainers via a web-based portal, and provide lessons learned, updates, and feedback for the continual improvement of the materials. The network of trainers currently consists of over 100 biosafety professionals active in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

2. Awareness-raising

The Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy website: established to inform the public, academic and private sector research communities about government policies related to the safe and secure conduct of biological research and the technologies arising out of the application of the life sciences. http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/nstc/biosecurity

The S3 (Science, Safety, and Security) website: provides information on biosafety, biosecurity, biocontainment, and biorisk management. http://www.phe.gov/about/OPP/Pages/bwc.aspx


Biological Risk Management and Nonproliferation website: established by HHS, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) for increased awareness of BWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540). http://www.phe.gov/about/OPP/Pages/bwc.aspx

The FBI's International Biosecurity and Prevention Forum (IBPF) Currently under development this website is intended to provide an international forum for the coordination and sharing of information and best practices related to the prevention and response to the misuse of biological agents as weapons of mass destruction.
F. International efforts

1. U.S. Government-supported

The International Centers for Excellence in Research (ICER) program: An NIH/National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Disease (NIAID) program to develop and sustain research programs in resource-poor countries through partnerships with local scientists. NIAID has developed core programs at the ICER sites and, over time, has facilitated the expansion of research capacity by training young scientists, improving laboratory and clinical infrastructure, and enhancing information technology capabilities. http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/Pages/internationalCenters.aspx

International workshops and tabletop exercises with BWC-relevant lessons learned: HHS/ASPR co-organized with DOD three international workshops and tabletop exercises in 2010–2011 strengthening the core capacities required by the WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs) and existing national measures consistent with the obligations under the BWC and UNSCR 1540 to deter, prevent, and respond to biological incidents or threats.

“Applied Dual-Use Biosecurity Education Train-the-Trainer Course” run by Bradford University - (Bursaries for participation provided by BEP since 2009. The program is taught on line and over the four semesters of funding, will reach 60 students from over 20 countries

American National Academy of Sciences project (2011): Develop Global Norms and Educational Standards Against the Misuse of Biotechnology, aims to develop said standards. (BEP funded)

American National Academy of Sciences in 2011 project (2011): Implementing an International Faculty Development Project on Dual Use Education. (BEP funded)

Landau Network Centro Volt a’s survey-based work on biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics education in Morocco and Pakistan. This work included the workshop referenced in the LNCV text (see para 23), as well as activities to develop educational programs to rectify knowledge gaps elucidated in the survey. (BEP funded since 2009)

CWA 15793-Laboratory Biorisk Management standard Set requirements necessary to control risks associated with the handling or storage and disposal of biological agents and toxins in laboratories and facilities. (CBEP and BEP support implementation of the CWA and supported the development of and participation by international representatives in the development of the accompanying guidance document)

WHO Biorisk Management Advanced Trainer Program (BRM ATP) aims to increase the number of qualified trainers who train and educate others in biorisk management. (Department of State funded development and initial implementation)

2. Non-U.S. Government

AAAS: Responsible Bioscience for a Safe and Security Society These workshops incorporate ethical and risk management (including security risks) in special sessions and throughout the meeting and address underlying issues associated with international scientific cooperation/collaboration. http://cstsp.aas.org/InternationalMeeting/home.html
G. Studies, reports and articles


Professional and Graduate-Level Programs on Dual Use Research and Biosecurity for Scientists Working in the Biological Sciences. 2008. AAAS. http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=1899


