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Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66 (d)
General and complete disarmament: measures to uphold
the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

South Africa:* draft resolution

Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 55/33 J of 20 November 2000,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

Emphasizing the necessity of easing international tension and strengthening trust and confidence between States,

Welcoming also the initiatives by some States Parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

1. Takes note of the note by the Secretary-General contained in document A/57/96;

2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at

* On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.
Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;

3. *Calls upon* those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw those reservations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66
General and complete disarmament

South Africa:* draft resolution

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

The General Assembly,

Determined to foster strict respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 56/24 of 29 November 2001 on “Multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism” and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Millennium Declaration, which states, inter alia, that the responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally and that as the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role,

Convinced that in the globalization era and the information revolution, arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament problems are more than ever the concern of all countries in the world, which are affected one way or another by these

* On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.
problems and therefore should have the possibility to participate in the negotiations that arise to tackle them,

Bearing in mind the existence of a wide structure of arms and disarmament regulation agreements resulting from non-discriminatory multilateral negotiations with the participation of a large number of countries regardless of their size and power,

Aware of the need to further advance in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament on the basis of universal, multilateral, non-discriminatory negotiations with the goal of reaching general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament,

Recognizing that the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons is among the most immediate threats against international peace and security which need to be dealt with, with the highest priority,

Considering that the multilateral disarmament agreements provide the mechanism for the States Parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, the provisions of the agreements and that such consultations and cooperation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

Stressing that international cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue and confidence-building measures would essentially contribute to the creation of multilateral and bilateral friendly relations among peoples and nations,

Being concerned about the continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament, and recognizing that the resort to unilateral actions by the Member States in resolving their security concerns would jeopardize international peace and security and undermines confidence in the international security system as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself,

Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations,

1. Reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope;

2. Reaffirms further multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns;

3. Urges the participation of all interested States in multilateral negotiations on arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament in a non-discriminatory manner;

4. Underlines the importance of preserving the existing agreements on arms regulation and disarmament, which constitute an expression of the results of the
international cooperation and multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges facing mankind;

5. **Calls once again upon** all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;

6. **Requests** the States Parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on their implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in those instruments, and refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another, to resolve their concerns;

7. **Requests** the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States on the issue of promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;

8. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled “Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation”.
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66
General and complete disarmament

Chairman’s revised draft resolution

Disarmament, non-proliferation and international peace and security

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter, in particular the purpose of the United Nations, to maintain international peace and security,

Noting that the heads of State and Government resolved in the United Nations Millennium Declaration\(^1\) to strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs, and to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim,

Bearing in mind that, in his report entitled “Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change”,\(^2\) the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations must align its activities with the priorities defined by the Millennium Declaration,

Recalling that the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration”,\(^3\) highlighted the important contributions, inter alia, of disarmament, arms control and the rule of law in advancing its goals,

Convinced that full compliance with all disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and their verification measures by States parties is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, and reaffirming the efforts of the United Nations in that regard,

\(^1\) Resolution 55/2.
\(^2\) A/57/387.
\(^3\) A/56/326.
Emphasizing that additional progress is urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism,

Determined to build a common response to global threats in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to promote and to achieve the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation;

2. Emphasizes the necessity for States Parties to pursue additional cooperative measures, as appropriate, that can strengthen comprehensive multilateral treaties in the field of disarmament;

3. Reaffirms the value of multilateralism in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope;

4. Stresses the need for all States parties to disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to comply in full with all the provisions of such agreements, in the interest of international peace and security;

5. Reaffirms that progress is urgently needed in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism;

6. Urges Member States to actively contribute to the substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 2003;

7. Encourages additional efforts by Member States to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament reaches agreement on a substantive programme of work at the earliest possible time;

8. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the functioning of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66 (m)
General and complete disarmament: regional disarmament

Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Sri Lanka, Sudan and Turkey: draft resolution

Regional disarmament

*The General Assembly,*


Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations,

Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,¹

Taking note of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session,²

Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

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¹ Resolution S-10/2.
Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament at the regional and subregional levels,

Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of all States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

1. Stresses that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;

2. Affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

3. Calls upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels;

4. Welcomes the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;

5. Supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional and subregional levels;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled “Regional disarmament”.

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Australia and Japan: draft resolution

A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,


Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and welcoming the decision of the Republic of Cuba to accede to the Treaty,

Recognizing the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States on reduction of their nuclear weapons unilaterally or through their negotiations, including the completion of the reductions of strategic offensive weapons according to the START I Treaty and the recent signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament and the efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by the international community,

Also reaffirming the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace and security,

Welcoming the continuation of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions since the recent nuclear tests,
Welcoming the successful adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and stressing the importance of implementing its conclusions,

Welcoming the constructive start of the strengthened review process at the first session, in April 2002, of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference to be held in 2005,

Also welcoming the successful convening of a series of seminars aiming at further reinforcement of IAEA safeguards, held in Latin America, Central Asia, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, and sharing the hope that the conference to be held in Tokyo in December this year will further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including universalization of its safeguards agreements and their additional protocols, through making utmost use of the outcomes from the aforementioned seminars,

Encouraging the Russian Federation and the United States of America to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States,

Also welcoming the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in November 2001 in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty,

Recognizing the importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or related materials, radioactive materials, equipment and technology,

Stressing the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations, and noting with satisfaction the submission of the report of the group of governmental experts on this issue by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly,

1. Reaffirms the importance of achieving the universality of the NPT, and calls upon States not parties to the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions;

2. Also reaffirms the importance for all States parties to the NPT to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;

3. Stresses the central importance of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament:

(a) The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty;

(b) The establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2003 session to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in
1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to the conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

(c) The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2003 session in the context of establishing a programme of work;

(d) The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

(e) An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the NPT are committed under article VI;

(f) Deep reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international security;

(g) Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

(i) Further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(ii) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the NPT and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

(iii) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(iv) Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(v) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(vi) The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

(b) Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

4. Recognizes also that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process of working towards achieving their elimination;
5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States to keep the Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;

6. *Emphasizes* the importance of a successful Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2005 as the second Preparatory Committee will be convened in 2003;

7. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes;

8. *Stresses* the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including IAEA safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

9. *Calls upon* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons, while ensuring that such policies are consistent with States’ obligations under the NPT;

10. *Calls upon* all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists;

11. *Welcomes* the adoption and stresses the importance of resolution GC(46)/RES/12, which recommends that the Director General, the Board of Governors and member States of the IAEA continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted at the IAEA General Conference, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;

12. *Encourages* the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66 (s)
General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament

Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Panama, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Tonga, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe:
draft resolution

Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,


Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Bearing in mind that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972\(^1\) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993\(^2\) have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development,

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\(^1\) Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

testing, production, stockpiling, loan transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date,

Recognizing that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressing the need to take concrete practical steps towards achieving this goal,

Bearing in mind paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,3 the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

Noting the reiteration by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons4 of their conviction that the Treaty is a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the reaffirmation by the States parties of the importance of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty,5 the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,6 the decision on the extension of the Treaty7 and the resolution on the Middle East,8 adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

Welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I),9 to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,

Reiterating its call for an early entry into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,7

Noting with appreciation the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the “Moscow Treaty”) by the Russian Federation and the United States of America as a significant step towards reducing their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, while calling for further irreversible deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals,

Also noting with appreciation the unilateral measures by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitations, and encouraging them to take further such measures,

3 Resolution S-10/2.
6 The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 16: 1991 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.1.IX.1), appendix II.
7 See resolution 50/245.
Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,\textsuperscript{8} issued on 8 July 1996, and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Mindful of paragraph 114 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998,\textsuperscript{9} calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations in 1998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

Recalling paragraph 72 of the Final Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena, Colombia, on 8 and 9 April 2000,\textsuperscript{10}

Bearing in mind the principles and guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session of 1999,\textsuperscript{11}

Welcoming the United Nations Millennium Declaration,\textsuperscript{12} in which heads of State and Government resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should refrain from the use or the threat use of nuclear-weapons in settling their disputes in international relations,

Seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it,

\textsuperscript{8} A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1996, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{10} A/54/917-S/2000/580, annex.
\textsuperscript{11} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), annex I.
\textsuperscript{12} See resolution 55/2.
1. **Recognizes** that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of these weapons;

2. **Also recognizes** that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

3. **Urges** the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

4. **Also urges** the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and de-activate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems;

5. **Reiterates its call upon** the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons;

6. **Calls upon** the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

7. **Urges** the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament;

8. **Underlines** the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

9. **Welcomes** the positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 24 April to 19 May 2000;\(^{13}\)

10. **Also welcomes** the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty,\(^{14}\) and the reaffirmation by the States parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,\(^{15}\) and calls for the full and effective implementation of the steps set out in the Final Document;

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\(^{14}\) *Ibid., Part I, art. VI, para. 15:6.*

\(^{15}\) *Ibid., art. VII, para. 2.*
11. Also urges the nuclear-weapon States to carry out further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

12. Calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator\(^\text{16}\) and the mandate contained therein;

13. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;

14. Calls for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;

15. Also calls for the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

16. Expresses its regret that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at its 2002 session, as called for in General Assembly resolution 56/24 R;

17. Reiterates its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2003 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons;

18. Calls for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

20. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled “Nuclear disarmament”.

\(^{16}\text{CD/1299.}\)
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66
General and complete disarmament

Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, and Zambia: draft resolution

The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The General Assembly,


Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,

Recalling the 1998 report of the Conference on Disarmament, in which, inter alia, the Conference records that, in proceeding to take a decision on this matter, that decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 and that intensive consultations will be pursued to seek the views of the members of the Conference on Disarmament on
appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, taking into consideration all proposals and views in that respect.¹

1. **Recalls** the decision of the Conference on Disarmament¹ to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator² and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

2. **Urges** the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty.

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² CD/1299.
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 67 (d)
Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of
the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly:
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Sudan, Tuvalu, Viet Nam and Zambia: draft resolution

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the
survival of mankind,

Bearing in mind the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of
8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Convinced that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the
nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination
of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security,

Conscious that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United
States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the
improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special
Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively
participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among
States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could
be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

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1 Resolution S-10/2.

Determined to achieve an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction,

Stressing that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 2002 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject as called for in General Assembly resolution 56/25 B of 29 November 2001,

1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.
Fifty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 66 (t)
General and complete disarmament: follow-up to the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tonga, Uruguay, Viet
Nam and Zambia: draft resolution

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, 51/45 M of 10
Q of 1 December 1999, 55/33 X of 20 November 2000 and 56/24 S of 29 November
2001,

Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to
all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on
Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total
elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced
again,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the
total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free
world,

Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹ particularly to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^2\)

Emphasizing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^3\)

Recalling the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the increasing number of States that have signed and ratified the Treaty,

Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic Treaty\(^4\) and the treaties of Tlatelolco,\(^5\) Rarotonga,\(^6\) Bangkok\(^7\) and Pelindaba\(^8\) are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,

Noting the signing of the Strategic Offensives Reduction Treaty (SORT), or Moscow Treaty, by the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 24 May 2002, following the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty, and urging them to take further steps under the Moscow Treaty as well as through bilateral arrangements or agreements and unilateral decisions towards the irreversible reduction of their nuclear arsenals,

Stressing the importance of strengthening all existing nuclear-related disarmament, arms control and reduction measures,

Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference during its 2002 session,

Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,


\(^5\) Ibid., vol. 634, No. 9068.

\(^6\) See United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 10:1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.7), appendix VII.

\(^7\) Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

\(^8\) A/50/426, annex.
Expressing its deep concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of the thirteen steps to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,

Taking note of the relevant portions of the note by the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of resolution 56/24 S,

1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

3. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its fifty-eighth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled in “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

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9 A/57/95 and Add.1-2.
General Assembly

Fifty-eighth session
First Committee
Agenda item 73 (f)
General and complete disarmament: promotion
of multilateralism in the area of disarmament
and non-proliferation

Malaysia:* draft resolution

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament
and non-proliferation

The General Assembly,

Determined to foster strict respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 56/24 T of 29 November 2001 on multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism and other relevant resolutions, as well as its resolution 57/63 of 22 November 2002 on promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation,

Recalling also the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, as enshrined in the Charter,

Recalling further the United Nations Millennium Declaration,¹ which states, inter alia, that the responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally and that, as the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role,

* On behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
¹ See resolution 55/2.
Convinced that in the globalization era and with the information revolution, arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament problems are more than ever the concern of all countries in the world, which are affected in one way or another by these problems and, therefore, should have the possibility to participate in the negotiations that arise to tackle them,

Bearing in mind the existence of a broad structure of disarmament and arms regulation agreements resulting from non-discriminatory and transparent multilateral negotiations with the participation of a large number of countries, regardless of their size and power,

Aware of the need to advance further in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament on the basis of universal, multilateral, non-discriminatory and transparent negotiations with the goal of reaching general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament,

Recognizing also that the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, are among the most immediate threats to international peace and security which need to be dealt with, with the highest priority,

Considering that the multilateral disarmament agreements provide the mechanism for States parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, the provisions of the agreements and that such consultations and cooperation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter,

Stressing that international cooperation, the peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue and confidence-building measures would contribute essentially to the creation of multilateral and bilateral friendly relations among peoples and nations,

Being concerned at the continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament, and recognizing that a resort to unilateral actions by Member States in resolving their security concerns would jeopardize international peace and security and undermine confidence in the international security system as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself,

Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament, and determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations,

1. Reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope;

2. Also reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns;

3. Urges the participation of all interested States in multilateral negotiations on arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner;
4. Underlines the importance of preserving the existing agreements on arms regulation and disarmament, which constitute an expression of the results of international cooperation and multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges facing mankind;

5. Calls once again upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;

6. Requests the States parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in those instruments, and to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another to resolve their concerns;

7. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies of Member States on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, submitted pursuant to resolution 57/63;\(^2\)

8. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled “Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation”.

\(^2\) See A/58/176 and Add.1.
Fifty-ninth session  
First Committee  
Agenda item 65 (t)  
General and complete disarmament: towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda

Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden: draft resolution

Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 58/51 of 8 December 2003, and mindful of the upcoming 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Expressing its grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used and at the lack of implementation of binding obligations and agreed steps towards nuclear disarmament, and reaffirming that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts,

Recalling the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments made under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^1\) and noting that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

1. Calls upon all States to fully comply with commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race;

2. Also calls upon all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\(^1\) and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

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3. *Calls upon* all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;\(^2\)

4. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapons States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies;

5. *Agrees* urgently to strengthen efforts towards both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the resumption in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the special coordinator in 1995\(^3\) and the mandate contained therein, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, as well as the completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapons States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification;

6. *Calls for* the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament;

7. *Underlines* the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification capabilities;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”, and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

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3 See CD/1299.
Fifty-ninth session
First Committee
Agenda item 65 (x)
General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament

Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe: revised draft resolution

Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,


Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Bearing in mind that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 19721 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 19932 have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear

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1 Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.
A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1

weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date,

*Recognizing* that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressing the need to take concrete practical steps towards achieving this goal,

*Bearing in mind* paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

*Reaffirming* the conviction of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the Treaty is a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the importance of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on the extension of the Treaty and the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Stressing* the importance of the thirteen steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as agreed to by the States parties in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Reiterating* the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

*Reiterating its call* for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,

*Stressing* the importance of the forthcoming 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the need for a positive and substantive outcome of the Conference in a manner that will preserve the integrity of the three pillars of the Treaty regime, that is, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

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3 Resolution S-10/2.
7 See resolution 50/245.
Noting with appreciation the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I),\(^8\) to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,

Noting with appreciation the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the Moscow Treaty”) between the United States of America and the Russian Federation\(^9\) as a significant step towards reducing their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, while calling for further irreversible deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals,

Noting with appreciation also the unilateral measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to take further such measures,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,\(^10\) and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Mindful of paragraph 74 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Kuala Lumpur from 20 to 25 February 2003,\(^11\) calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

Recalling paragraph 61 of the Final Document of the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 17 to 19 August 2004,

Reaffirming the specific mandate conferred by the General Assembly in its decision 52/492 of 8 September 1998 upon the United Nations Disarmament Commission to discuss the subject of nuclear disarmament as one of its main substantive agenda items,

\(^8\) See UN Yearbook of Disarmament, 1991, appendix II.
\(^9\) A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.

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\(^8\) The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 16: 1991 (United Nations publications, Sales No. E.92.IX.1), appendix II.
\(^9\) See CD/1674.
\(^10\) A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.
Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which heads of State and Government resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should refrain from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in settling their disputes in international relations,

Seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it,

1. Recognizes that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of these weapons;

2. Reaffirms that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the two processes must go hand in hand and that there is a genuine need for a systematic and progressive process of nuclear disarmament;

3. Welcomes and encourages the efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, which is an effective measure for limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons geographically and contributes to the cause of nuclear disarmament;

4. Recognizes that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

5. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

6. Also urges the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems;

7. Reiterates its call upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons;

8. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

See resolution 55/2.
9. **Urges** the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament;

10. **Underlines** the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

11. **Underscores** the importance of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 24 April to 19 May 2000, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty, and the reaffirmation by the States parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

12. **Calls** for the full and effective implementation of the thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

13. **Urges** the nuclear-weapon States to carry out further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

14. **Calls** for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein;

15. **Urges** the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;

16. **Calls** for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;

17. **Also calls** for the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

18. **Expresses its regret** that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at its 2004 session, as called for in General Assembly resolution 58/56;

19. **Reiterates its call** upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2005 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons;

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14 **Ibid., section entitled “Article VII and the security of non-nuclear weapon States”, para. 2.**

15 **CD/1299.**
20. *Calls* for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament;

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

22. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled “Nuclear disarmament”.

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Sixty-first session
First Committee
Agenda item 90
General and complete disarmament

Australia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, Japan, Lithuania, Nepal, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland: draft resolution

Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling, the need for all States to take further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with a view to achieving a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, and renewing the determination to do so,

Noting that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling its resolution 60/65 of 8 December 2005,

Convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war and nuclear terrorism,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons¹ as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and expressing regret over the lack of agreement on substantive issues at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as over the elimination of references to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the World Summit Outcome² in 2005, the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,

Recalling the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

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² See resolution 60/1.
Weapons and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing,

Reaffirming that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and thereby ensuring international peace and security,

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, nuclear weapons, including that caused by proliferation networks,

Condemning the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006,

1. Reaffirms the importance of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons complying with their obligations under all the articles of the Treaty;

2. Stresses the importance of an effective Treaty review process, and calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to work together to ensure that the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007 is held constructively, in order to facilitate the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty;

3. Reaffirms the importance of the universality of the Treaty, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions, and pending their accession to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in support of the Treaty;

4. Encourages further steps leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, and emphasizes the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency in a way that promotes international stability and undiminished security for all, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

5. Encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty, while welcoming the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States, on nuclear arms reductions;

6. Encourages States to continue to pursue efforts, within the framework of international cooperation, contributing to the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials;

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5 See CD/1674.
7. **Calls for** the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

8. **Stresses** the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

9. **Urges** all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\(^6\) at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force, stresses the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty, and reaffirms the importance of the continued development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty;

10. **Calls upon** the Conference on Disarmament to immediately resume its substantive work to its fullest, considering the developments of this year in the Conference;

11. **Emphasizes** the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices pending the entry into force of the Treaty;

12. **Calls upon** all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

13. **Stresses** the importance of further efforts for non-proliferation, including the universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards agreements and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997\(^7\) and the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004;

14. **Encourages** all States to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session,\(^8\) and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking to that end;

15. **Encourages** the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

\(^6\) See resolution 50/245.

\(^7\) International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

\(^8\) A/57/124.
Sixty-third session
First Committee
Agenda item 89
General and complete disarmament

Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Philippines, Switzerland, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine: draft resolution

Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the need for all States to take further practical steps and effective
measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with a view to achieving
a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, and renewing the determination
to do so,

Noting that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament
process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control,

Recalling its resolution 62/37 of 5 December 2007,

Convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war and nuclear
terrorism,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons\(^1\) as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation regime, and expressing regret over the lack of agreement on
substantive issues at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as over the elimination of references
to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the World Summit Outcome in
2005,\(^2\) the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, Japan,

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\(^*\) Reissued for technical reasons.
\(^2\) See resolution 60/1.
Recalling the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty,

Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing,

Reaffirming that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, which is, inter alia, essential to international peace and security,

Taking note of concrete proposals and initiatives on nuclear disarmament, including those put forward or undertaken by nuclear-weapon States, including recently by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, nuclear weapons, including that caused by proliferation networks,

Recognizing the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 with regard to the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006, while taking note of the progress achieved by the Six-Party Talks,

1. Reaffirms the importance of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons complying with their obligations under all the articles of the Treaty;

2. Stresses the importance of an effective Treaty review process, welcoming the substantive discussions held at the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 2008, and calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to work together to ensure that the third session of the Preparatory Committee, in 2009, is held constructively, in order to facilitate the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

3. Reaffirms the importance of the universality of the Treaty, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions, and pending their accession to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in support of the Treaty;

4. Encourages further steps leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, and emphasizes the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency in a way that promotes international stability and undiminished security for all, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

5. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to undertake reductions of nuclear weapons in a transparent manner, and invites all nuclear-weapon States to agree on
transparency and confidence-building measures, while noting in this regard the increased transparency recently demonstrated by nuclear-weapon States on their nuclear arsenals, including the current number of their nuclear warheads;

6. *Encourages* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions,\(^5\) which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty, including through the conclusion of a legally binding successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which is due to expire in 2009, while welcoming the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States of America, on nuclear arms reductions;

7. *Encourages* States to continue to pursue efforts, within the framework of international cooperation, contributing to the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials;

8. *Calls for* the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

9. *Stresses* the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

10. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\(^6\) at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force, stresses the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty, and reaffirms the importance of the continued development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty;

11. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to immediately resume its substantive work to its fullest, considering the developments of this year in the Conference;

12. *Emphasizes* the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and its early conclusion, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices pending the entry into force of the Treaty;

13. *Calls upon* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

14. *Stresses* the importance of further efforts for non-proliferation, including the universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive

\(^5\) See CD/1674.
\(^6\) See resolution 50/245.
safeguards agreements, while also strongly encouraging further works for achieving the universalization of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997,\(^7\) and the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004;

15. *Encourages* all States to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session,\(^8\) and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking to that end;

16. *Encourages* the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament;

17. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fourth session the item entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

\(^7\) International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

\(^8\) A/57/124.
“Evolving a new Global Consensus on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”

The consensus underpinning the disarmament and non-proliferation regime has eroded over a period of time due to several negative developments. The most visible and recent manifestations of this erosion were the absence of any agreement on disarmament at the 2005 UN Summit, the absence of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and the absence of outcome at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Recognizing the negative impact of this erosion on and implications for international and regional security and stability and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and taking into account the importance and urgency of the need to reconcile and reverse the negative trends, Pakistan has, in the last two years, proposed to rebuild a new global consensus on disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation, and related security matters.

Pakistan believes that such a consensus can be evolved on the basis of the universally recognized principles of equity and non-discrimination. It should also be responsive to the legitimate national security and economic interests of all States and should advance international and regional peace and security.

The United Nations, which has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament, is uniquely placed to undertake efforts, in consultation with Member States, to identify elements of such a new consensus and consider ways and means of convening, at an appropriate time, a Special Session of the General Assembly or an International Conference under its auspices.

Pakistan hopes that the UN Secretary General and Member States shall actively consider this proposal. Pakistan looks forward to continuing a dialogue on this important issue.
Letter dated 17 December 2007 from the Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to submit the enclosed document, which is an updated version of the Model Nuclear Weapons convention submitted by Costa Rica in 1997 and circulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as document A/C.1/52/7 (see annex). This revised model takes into account relevant technical, legal and political developments since 1997.

The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has been drafted — and subsequently updated — by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts. It is submitted as a work in progress setting forth legal, technical and political elements for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear proliferation continue to endanger all peoples and nations. These risks can be reduced and eliminated through the adoption of legally binding, verifiable and enforceable instruments culminating in a comprehensive prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons under effective controls.

The delegations submitting this Model Nuclear Weapons Convention do not suggest that an actual convention or package of agreements will exactly replicate this model. Rather, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention is a useful tool in the exploration, development, negotiation and achievement of such an instrument or instruments.

The 1997 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has assisted informal deliberations undertaken by governments, academics, technical experts, non-governmental organizations and others on the issues of, and possibilities for, nuclear disarmament. The delegations submitting this updated Model Nuclear Weapons Convention hope and expect that such deliberations will be stepped up in earnest and will evolve into actual negotiations.

In this respect, we note the obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996, to “pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on...”
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”.

We note also the United Nations resolutions adopted annually since 1996 calling for the implementation of this obligation through “multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination”. Such negotiations can include the achievement of initial disarmament steps — whether unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral — culminating in a convention or comprehensive package of instruments.

We kindly request you to have the present letter and the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated as a document of the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 98.

(Signed) Jorge Urbina
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

(Signed) Hamidon Ali
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations
Annex

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Elimination

April 2007

Updated from the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated in November 1997 as United Nations document A/C.1/52/7
MODEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION

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Notes:

1. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has been prepared by a consortium of scientists, lawyers, disarmament experts, academics and officials as a discussion document to assist in deliberations and possible negotiations leading to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It outlines legal, technical and political elements which could be utilized in an actual nuclear weapons convention or package/framework of agreements. The drafters do not assume that the final agreed convention or package of agreements would be exactly the same as in this Model. The drafters do however believe that this Model demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of nuclear disarmament. For discussion on these issues see Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, IPPNW, Cambridge USA, 2007.

2. [Square brackets] refers to text which has not been agreed by all the drafters or which suggests alternative approaches.

The text makes reference to a “Verification Annex” which would form an integral part of a negotiated NWC, but is not included in this Model NWC.
Summary of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention

General Obligations

The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibits development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. States possessing nuclear weapons will be required to destroy their arsenals according to a series of phases. The Convention also prohibits the production of weapons usable fissile material and requires delivery vehicles to be destroyed or converted to make them non-nuclear capable.

Declarations

States parties to the Convention will be required to declare all nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles they possess or control, and the locations of these.

Phases for elimination

The Convention outlines a series of five phases for the elimination of nuclear weapons beginning with taking nuclear weapons off alert, removing weapons from deployment, removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles, disabling the warheads, removing and disfiguring the “pits” and placing the fissile material under international control. In the initial phases the U.S. and Russia are required to make the deepest cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

Verification

Verification will include declarations and reports from States, routine inspections, challenge inspections, on-site sensors, satellite photography, radionuclide sampling and other remote sensors, information sharing with other organizations, and citizen reporting. Persons reporting suspected violations of the convention will be provided protection through the Convention including the right of asylum.

An International Monitoring System will be established under the Convention to gather information, and will make most of this information available through a registry. Information which may jeopardize commercial secrets or national security will be kept confidential.

National Implementation Measures

States parties are required to adopt necessary legislative measures to implement their obligations under the Convention to provide for prosecution of persons committing crimes and protection for persons reporting violations of the Convention.

States are also required to establish a national authority to be responsible for national tasks in implementation.
Rights and Obligations of Persons

The Convention applies rights and obligations to individuals and legal entities as well as States. Individuals have an obligation to report violations of the Convention and the right to protection if they do so. Procedures for the apprehension and fair trial of individuals accused of committing crimes under the treaty are provided.

Agency

An agency would be established to implement the Convention. It will be responsible for verification, ensuring compliance, and decision making, and will comprise a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat.

Nuclear Material

The Convention prohibits the production of any fissionable or fusionable material which can be used directly to make a nuclear weapon, including plutonium (other than that in spent fuel) and highly enriched uranium. Low enriched uranium would be permitted for nuclear energy purposes.

Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement

Provisions are included for consultation, cooperation and fact-finding to clarify and resolve questions of interpretation with respect to compliance and other matters. A legal dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice by mutual consent of States Parties. The Agency may also recommend to the United Nations General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on a legal dispute.

The Convention provides for a series of graduated responses for non-compliance beginning with consultation and clarification, negotiation, and, if required, sanctions or recourse to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council for action.

Relation with other international agreements

The Model NWC would build on existing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regimes and verification and compliance arrangements, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation International Monitoring System and bilateral agreements between Russia and the United States. In some cases the NWC may add to the functions and activities of such regimes and arrangements. In other cases, the NWC would establish additional complementary arrangements.
Financing

Nuclear weapon states are obliged to cover the costs of the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. However, an international fund will be established to assist states that may have financial difficulties in meeting their obligations.

Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance

The Convention does not prohibit the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, it includes an optional protocol which would establish a program of energy assistance for States parties choosing not to develop nuclear energy or to phase out existing nuclear energy programs.

Preamble

We the people of the Earth, through the States Parties to this Convention:

Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all the creatures of this Earth;

Noting that the destructive effects of nuclear weapons upon life on earth are uncontrollable whether in time or space;

Aware that amongst weapons of mass destruction, the abolition of which is recognized as being in the collective security interest of all people and States, nuclear weapons are unprecedented and unequalled in destructive potential;

Affirming that the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family include the right to life, liberty, peace and the security of person;

Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on Earth;

Recognizing that numerous regions, including Antarctica, Outer Space, Latin America, the Sea Bed, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia have already been established as nuclear weapon free zones, where possession, production, development, deployment, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are forever prohibited, and desiring to extend this benefit to the entire planet for the good of all life;

Determined to eliminate the risks of environmental pollution by radioactive waste and other radioactive matter associated with nuclear weapons and to ensure that the bounty and beauty of the Earth shall remain the common heritage of all of us and our descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;
Recognizing the universal need for environmentally safe, sustainable energy;

Gravely concerned that the use of nuclear weapons may be brought about not only intentionally by war or terrorism, but also through human or mechanical error or failure, and that the very existence and gravity of these threats of nuclear weapons use generates a climate of suspicion and fear which is antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Convinced of the serious threats posed to the environment by nuclear arsenals, the economic and social costs and waste of intellectual talent occasioned by these arsenals and the efforts required to prevent their use, the dangers inherent in the existence of the materials used to make nuclear weapons and the attendant problems of proliferation, the medically and psychologically catastrophic effects of any use of a nuclear weapon, the potential effects of mutations on the genetic pool and numerous other risks associated with nuclear weapons;

Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as indications of a progression toward the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction;

Recognizing that all life is sacred and that there is a moral imperative to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction;

Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as an indication of progress towards the prohibition and elimination of weapons which are indiscriminate and cause unnecessary suffering;

Welcoming also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in particular the recognition of individual responsibility for crimes involved in employing weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate;

Believing that the threat and use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with civilized norms, standards of morality and humanitarian law which prohibit the use of inhumane weapons and those with indiscriminate effects;

Recalling Resolution 1(I), adopted unanimously on January 24, 1946 at the First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the many subsequent resolutions of the United Nations which call for the elimination of atomic weapons;

Recalling also the Final Document of the United Nations First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament 1978, which calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons;
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States made in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and achieve nuclear disarmament, and to further commitments on specific steps to achieve nuclear disarmament in the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” agreed in 1995, and the “Practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” agreed in 2000;

Convinced that the elimination of nuclear weapons is an important step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament;

Welcoming the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1996, which concluded “that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”, and concluded unanimously that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”;


Convinced that a convention prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination is required to abolish these weapons from the Earth;

Have agreed as follows:
I. General Obligations

A. State Obligations

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

   a. To use or threaten to use nuclear weapons;

   b. To engage in any military or other preparations to use nuclear weapons;

   c. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons except as specified under paragraph 4 of this Article;

   d. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer or use proscribed nuclear material except as specified under paragraph 4 of this Article;

   e. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;

   f. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapon components or equipment as specified in this Convention;

   g. To fund [or conduct] nuclear weapons research, with the exception of nuclear disarmament research;

   h. To assist, encourage, induce or permit, in any way, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes:

   a. To destroy all nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention;

   b. To destroy all nuclear weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention;

   c. To submit all nuclear facilities to preventive controls;

   d. To destroy all nuclear weapons facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or to convert such facilities to weapons destruction facilities or other facilities not prohibited by this Convention;
e. [To disable or destroy all facilities, systems or sub-systems designed or used in the command or control of nuclear weapons, or convert such facilities, systems or sub-systems to purposes not prohibited under this Convention;]

f. To destroy or convert for purposes not prohibited under this Convention all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear weapon components;

g. To place all special nuclear material under preventive controls as specified in this Convention;

h. To participate in good faith in activities aimed at the promotion of transparency with respect to nuclear weapons and related technologies and the promotion of education for the purposes of detecting and preventing activities prohibited under this Convention;

i. To report violations of this Convention to the Agency [and to cooperate to the fullest with the Agency’s investigative, monitoring and verification functions;] [and to provide to the Agency all information requested by the Agency for the purposes of implementing this Convention, except such information as may be withheld for legitimate international or national security or trade secret concerns;]

j. To enact all domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of this Convention.

3. These obligations shall apply equally to nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes.

4. These obligations shall not be interpreted to prohibit activities consistent with the application and implementation of the provisions of this Convention [including but not limited to transfer of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles for the purpose of their destruction or disposal, and nuclear disarmament research and verification thereof].

B. Obligations of Persons

5. The following acts are crimes for which persons shall be held responsible regardless of their position, residence, citizenship or country of incorporation:

a. To engage or attempt to engage in any acts listed in subparagraphs 1.a through 1.g, inclusive, of this Article;

b. To aid, abet, or otherwise assist, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Convention.

6. The fact that the present Convention provides criminal responsibility for individuals does not affect the responsibility of States under international law.
II. Definitions

A. States and Persons

1. "Nuclear Weapons State" means a state which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

2. "Nuclear Capable State" means a State which has developed or has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and which is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. "Person" means a natural or legal person.

B. Nuclear Weapons

4. "Nuclear Weapon" means:
   a. Any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes;
   b. Any nuclear explosive device;
   c. Any radiological weapon; or
   d. Any weapon which is designed to include a nuclear explosive device as a trigger or other component.

5. "Nuclear Weapon Component" means any constituent part of a nuclear weapon [excluding the special nuclear material when separated from other components].

6. "Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle" means any vehicle designed for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapons delivery vehicle that has been constructed, developed, flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle.

7. "Plutonium Pit" means the core element of a nuclear weapon’s primary or fission component.

8. "Radiological Weapon" means any weapon that disperses radioactive material or uses radioactive material as a primary material in its construction.

9. "Warhead" means the explosive part of a nuclear weapons system. Warheads consist of nuclear materials, conventional high explosives, related firing mechanisms and containment structure.
C. Nuclear Energy, Explosion, and Explosive Device

10. "Nuclear Energy" means energy released from the nucleus of an atom either spontaneously or through interaction with other particles and/or electromagnetic radiation.

11. "Nuclear Explosion" means the release of significant amounts of nuclear energy on a time-scale faster than or comparable to chemical explosives [including micro-fission, micro-fusion or miniaturized devices of any yield].

12. "Nuclear Explosive Device" means any device capable of undergoing a nuclear explosion, irrespective of its purpose. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, as well as devices or assemblies which belong to a nuclear explosive device or are a modification of such suitable for development and testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.

13. "Significant Amount of Nuclear Energy" means more than the energy released by radioactive decay and spontaneous fission and may be much smaller than the maximum energy yield of the largest chemical explosions.

D. Nuclear Material

14. "Nuclear Material" means any source or fissionable or fusionable material as defined in this Convention.

15. "Exemption Quantities" mean quantities of nuclear material not prohibited under the provisions of this Convention [and preventive controls].

16. "Fissionable Material" means any isotope which may undergo either spontaneous fission or fission induced by neutrons of any energy, as well as any compound or mixture including such isotopes.

17. "Fusionable Material" means any isotope capable of undergoing fusion with the same kind of nuclide or with any other nuclide by applying sufficient conditions (pressure, temperature and inclusion time) with technical means.

18. "Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)" means uranium in which the naturally occurring U-235 isotope (0.7% in natural uranium) is increased to 20% U-235 or above.

19. "Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)" means uranium enriched in the isotopic content of U-235 but to less than 20% of the total mass.
20. "Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX fuel)" means nuclear reactor fuel composed of plutonium and uranium oxides.

21. ["Other Special Nuclear Material" means special nuclear material other than plutonium and uranium enriched to 20% or more U-235 or U-233.]

22. "Proscribed fissionable material" means any fissionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons without transmutation, chemical reprocessing or further enrichment, and includes any isotopic mixture of separated and unirradiated plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 to 20% or more, uranium-233.

23. "Proscribed fusionable material" means any fusionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons without transmutation, redoxation or further enrichment.

24. "Proscribed nuclear material" means any proscribed fissionable or any proscribed fusionable material.

25. "Significant quantity" means the approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.

26. "Source Material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope U-235, thorium, lithium beyond naturally occurring concentration, deuterium, helium-3, or any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound or concentrate.

27. "Special Fissionable Material" means fissionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

28. "Special Fusionable Material" means any fusionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and includes deuterium, tritium, helium-3, and lithium-6.

29. "Special Nuclear Material" means any special fissionable or any special fusionable material.

E. Nuclear Facilities

30. "Nuclear Facility" means any facility for the research, testing, production, extraction, enrichment, processing, reprocessing, or storage of nuclear material; any facility for the production of nuclear energy; any facility for the research, development, testing, production, storage, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, modification, deployment, or delivery of nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapon components; or any facility deemed
a nuclear facility by the Technical Secretariat. The term "Nuclear Facility" includes [but is not limited to] the following:

31. "Command, Control or Communication Facility", means [any facility designed or used for the purpose of launching, targeting, directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or assisting in any of these purposes.]

32. "Deployment Site" means the location where a nuclear weapon is or has been deployed, or a location which is equipped for the deployment of nuclear weapons.

33. "Nuclear Enrichment Facility" means a facility capable of increasing the ratio of the isotope uranium-235 in natural uranium.

34. "Nuclear Material Storage Facility" means a facility for the interim or long-term storage of nuclear material.

35. "Nuclear Reactor" means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can be maintained or in which a controlled fission chain is maintained partly by an external source of neutrons.

36. "Nuclear Reprocessing Facility" means a facility to separate irradiated nuclear material and fission products in whole or in part, and includes the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and analytical sections.

37. "Nuclear Weapons Destruction Facility" means any facility for disassembly or destruction of nuclear weapons or for rendering them permanently inoperable.

38. "Nuclear Weapons Facility" means any facility for the design, research, development, testing, production, storage, assembly, maintenance, modification, deployment, delivery, command, or control of nuclear weapons or Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 nuclear weapon components.

39. "Nuclear Weapons Production Facility" means any nuclear facility which produces materials which have been or may be used for military purposes, including such a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material, a plant for the construction or assembly of nuclear weapon components, or a facility or plant of such other type as may be deemed a Nuclear Weapons Production Facility by the Technical Secretariat.

40. "Nuclear Weapons Research Facility" means any facility in which nuclear weapons research, development, testing or computer simulation is conducted.
41. "Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility" means a facility for the storage of nuclear weapons but does not include such a facility located on a deployment site.

42. "Nuclear Weapons Testing Facility" means a facility or prepared site for conducting nuclear weapons testing.

F. Nuclear Activities

43. "Nuclear Activity" means:

a. Any construction or use of a nuclear reactor or component parts thereof;

b. Any production, use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon;

c. Any research, development or testing of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons;

d. Any production, separation, treatment or handling of nuclear material;

e. Any dismantling, disabling or destruction of nuclear weapons;

f. Any decommissioning of nuclear reactors and power plants;

g. Any application of radiation and isotopes in food, agriculture, medicine, engineering, geology or other industrial processes; or

h. Any other activity listed below or deemed a nuclear activity by the Agency.

44. "Convert" means modify to a use not prohibited under this Convention.

45. "De-alert" means reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons by eliminating launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack alert readiness postures, e.g., by removing key trigger mechanisms, decoupling warheads from nuclear weapons delivery vehicles or other means.

46. "Deployment of a nuclear weapon" means prepare or maintain a nuclear weapon for possible use by any of the following:

a. placing it on, in or near a delivery system;

b. moving it to or maintaining it at a location suitable for delivery to a target.

47. "Destroy" means, with regard to a nuclear weapon, to remove the warhead from its delivery vehicle, dismantle and irreversibly disable the warhead and its components,
and dismantle and disable or convert the delivery vehicle to non-nuclear use, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

48. "Disable" means:

a. with regard to a nuclear weapon, to render the weapon unable to be detonated by such means as disengaging or removing the arming fuse and firing mechanisms;

b. with regard to a plutonium pit, to render it unable to be used in a nuclear weapon, e.g., by disfiguring, quenching, squeezing, dilution, mixing with highly radioactive waste, immobilization and disposition, transmutation or other means;

c. with regard to command and control systems for nuclear weapons, to render such systems incapable of initiating or directing the launch of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;

d. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to render such vehicle unable to launch a nuclear weapon including such means as removing essential components and removing the delivery vehicle from the launch facilities.

49. "Disassemble" or "Dismantle" means:

a. with regard to nuclear weapons, to take apart the warhead and remove the subassemblies, components, and individual parts;

b. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to separate the essential component parts, such as warheads, propulsion and guidance units.

50. "Immobilization" means the process of putting nuclear material into non-weapons usable form without irradiation, e.g., by mixing with highly radioactive isotopes and encasing into a matrix of another material in order to render separation of the nuclear material from the matrix technically difficult. Immobilization includes vitrification and encasing nuclear material in ceramic.

51. "Nuclear Disarmament Research" means research intended to further the purposes of this Convention.

52. "Nuclear Weapons Research" means experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge going beyond publicly available information of phenomena and observable facts directed toward understanding, development, improvement, testing, production, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons.

53. "Nuclear Weapons Testing" means nuclear explosions, computer simulations, hydrodynamic tests, hydronuclear tests designed to simulate behavior of nuclear
materials, nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons or their components, under nuclear explosive conditions, and subcritical testing using nuclear materials.

54. "Reprocessing" means the separation of irradiated nuclear material and fission products in whole or in part.

55. "Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" means any act, whether physical or verbal, including the maintenance of a previously stated policy that creates or is intended to create a perception that a nuclear weapon may or will be used.

56. "Uranium Enrichment" means the process of increasing the percentage of U-235 isotopes so that the uranium can be used as reactor fuel or in nuclear weapons.

57. "Use of Nuclear Weapons" means the detonation of a nuclear weapon.

G. Verification

58. "Verification" means a comprehensive system for ensuring the compliance with and implementation of this Convention. Verification measures include obtaining, providing, and assuring the accuracy of information on nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including information in archives, data bases, and transportation systems, through declarations, monitoring, agreements on sharing information, consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, confidence-building measures, reporting and protection, preventive controls, and any other measures deemed necessary by the Agency.

59. "Abuse of the Right of Verification" means obtaining information, or attempting to obtain information, through verification activities, for purposes not relating to the verification or implementation of and compliance with this Convention.

60. "Confidence-Building Measures" means voluntary measures by States Parties to supply information, additional to that required, to the Technical Secretariat or to other States Parties in order to develop greater confidence in compliance with the Convention. These could include bilateral or multilateral agreements on monitoring and information sharing between States Parties.

61. "Dual-access" means access to nuclear weapons, nuclear material, or nuclear facilities that requires authorization of a State Party and another State Party or the Agency.

62. "Reconstruction" means undertaking good faith scientifically sound efforts to produce or reproduce data that is not readily available regarding past production of nuclear material. Reconstruction measures include gathering and reviewing past data records, analyzing production capacity and estimating the range of quantity of nuclear material
produced, and interviewing individuals with knowledge of the operation of a nuclear facility under review.

63. "Preventive Controls" mean provisions adopted by the Agency to ensure that nuclear material and nuclear facilities are not used for any military or other purpose prohibited under this Convention.

a. The goals of preventive controls include:

i. Timely detection of diversion of nuclear material to allow a response before the material can be fabricated into a nuclear weapon;

ii. Deterring clandestine activities through the possibility of detection;

iii. Prevention of diversion through physical safety procedures and transfer of national access to dual-access.

b. Preventive controls encompass safeguards of the IAEA (including all provisions of the 93+2 Programme), EURATOM, ABACC or other bodies; agreements among States; and agreements between States and the Agency.

c. Preventive controls apply to all nuclear weapons, nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The degree of restrictiveness, accountability and accessibility vary according to the risks posed by these weapons, materials or facilities to the purposes of this Convention. Preventive controls may include:

i. Accountancy and surveillance of nuclear material in any form;

ii. Containment of special nuclear material in any form;

iii. Guidelines for the transport, treatment, handling, storage and disposition of nuclear material;

iv. Environmental guidelines;

v. Dual-access agreements for all nuclear weapons facilities and nuclear storage facilities for proscribed nuclear material.

64. "Technical Means" means the independent gathering or analysis of information which may have relevance to verification of the Convention, without physically accessing the territory being inspected.

65. “National Technical Means” (NTM) comprise nationally-owned and -operated technologies and techniques used to monitor the activities of other states, including
their compliance with treaty obligations. [NTM include satellites, aircraft, remote monitoring, signals intelligence (SIGINT) and open source information.]


H. Delivery Vehicles

67. "Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle" means any vehicle designed for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon delivery vehicle which has been constructed, developed, flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle.

68. "Ballistic Missile" means a missile that

   a. consists of single or multiple stage(s) whose sole means of propulsion is an internal rocket engine that is functional over all or a portion of the flight path;
   b. follows a ballistic trajectory over the remaining unpowered portion of a flight path;
   and
   c. is devoid of active aerodynamic surfaces.

69. "Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM)" means a ballistic missile that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft.

70. "Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

71. "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)" means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

72. "Submarine [Sea] Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)" means a ballistic missile designed to be launched from a submarine or other naval vessel.

73. "Cruise Missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled weapon delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. Cruise Missiles include:

   a. Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM);
   b. Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM);
   c. Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM).
74. "Intermediate-Range Missile" means a ballistic or cruise missile having a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

75. "Shorter-Range Missile" means a ballistic or cruise missile having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers.

76. "Bomber" means an airplane which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.

77. "Heavy Bomber" means a bomber which satisfies either of the following criteria:
   a. its range is greater than 8,000 kilometers; or
   b. it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

78. "Nuclear-Capable" in relation to delivery vehicles means able to deliver and activate a nuclear weapon.

79. "Nuclear-Capable Missile" means a missile able to deliver any payload over 300 kilometers.

80. "Nuclear-Capable Submarines" includes ballistic missile submarines, cruise missile submarines and attack submarines capable of delivery of nuclear weapons.
III. Declarations

A. Nuclear Weapons

Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [30] days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:

1. Declare whether it owns or possesses or has owned or possessed any nuclear weapons, or whether there are any nuclear weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

3. Report any nuclear weapons on its territory that are owned or possessed by another State or under the jurisdiction or control of another State, whether or not that State is a Party to this Convention.

4. Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons.

5. Provide its general plan for destruction of nuclear weapons that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

B. Nuclear Material

Each State Party shall submit to the Registry the following declarations, in which it shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:

6. Not later than [60] days after this Convention enters into force for it, declare an inventory of all special nuclear material it owns or possesses or that is located within its jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or military use.

7. Not later than [90] days after this Convention enters into force for it, declare an inventory of all other nuclear material it owns or possesses or that is located within its jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or military use.

8. Not later than [120] days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit a report on the availability of data with respect to nuclear material produced in the past, including estimates regarding missing data and extent of uncertainty, and its plans for the reconstruction of such data.
C. Nuclear Facilities

Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [180] days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:

9. With respect to nuclear weapons facilities:
   a. Declare whether it has or has had any nuclear weapons facility under its ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time.
   b. Declare any nuclear weapons facility it has or has had under its ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time.
   c. Declare any nuclear weapons facility on its territory that another State has or has had under its ownership or possession and that is or has been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State at any time.
   d. Declare the precise location and production and storage capacities of any facility reported under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.
   e. Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of nuclear weapons, and provide a detailed account thereof.
   f. Specify actions to be taken for the closure of any facility reported under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.
   g. Provide its general plan for conversion of any facility reported under subparagraphs a, b, or c into a nuclear weapons destruction facility.

10. With respect to other nuclear facilities, declare the precise location, nature and scope of activities of any nuclear facility under its ownership or possession, or located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. Such declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites as well as any other facility, site, or installation in which nuclear activities of any kind have been or are carried out, or which are suitable for carrying out such activities.

D. Delivery Vehicles

Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [210] days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
11. Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, including all those in production, storage or under repair.

12. Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable submarines, naval crafts, and aircraft, including all those in production, storage or under repair.
IV. Phases for Implementation

A. General Requirements

1. Each phase indicates the deadline for completion of specific implementation activity. Any phase can begin at any time, and does not require the completion of previous phases before initiation.

2. Implementation activities shall be conducted in accordance with the Verification Annex.

B. Extension of Deadlines

3. If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phase One within the deadline, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension. Such a request must be made at least [four] months prior to the deadline, and no extension may exceed [six] months.

4. If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phase Two within the deadline, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension. Such a request must be made at least [six] months prior to the deadline, and no extension may exceed [one] year[s].

5. If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phases Three, Four, or Five within the deadlines, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension of the deadline. Such a request must be made at least [one] year[s] prior to the deadline for that phase, and no extension may exceed [one] year[s].

C. Reciprocity in Extensions

6. If any State Party makes a request for an extension of any deadline, any other State Party may request a similar extension within [one month] of the original State’s request.

D. Phases

7. Phase One. Not later than [one year] after entry into force of this Convention:

a. All States Parties shall have complied with the requirements of Article III {Declarations}. 
b. Targeting coordinates and navigational information for all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be removed.

c. All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be disabled and de-alerted.

d. Activities listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities shall have ceased.

e. Production of nuclear weapon components and equipment listed in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Weapons Components and Equipment shall have ceased.

f. All nuclear weapons testing facilities, nuclear weapons research facilities and nuclear weapons production facilities shall be designated for decommissioning and closure or for conversion.

g. Production of proscribed nuclear material shall have ceased, with the exception of exemption quantities.

h. [Funding for] nuclear weapons research of any sort not consistent with the purposes and obligations of this Convention shall have ceased.

i. Plans for the implementation of all obligations under this Convention shall have been submitted to the Agency.

8. Phase Two. Not later than [two] years after entry into force of this Convention:

a. All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be removed from deployment sites.

b. All warheads shall be removed from their delivery vehicles and either placed into nuclear weapons storage facilities or dismantled.

c. Agreements shall be negotiated to subject all nuclear weapons, nuclear material and nuclear facilities to preventive controls.

9. Phase Three. Not later than [five] years after entry into force of this Convention:

a. All nuclear weapons shall be dismantled.

b. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed, except:

i. no more than [1000] warheads in each of the stockpiles of Russia and the United States; and
ii. no more than [100] warheads in each of the stockpiles of China, France, and the United Kingdom.

c. All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

d. All nuclear weapons facilities shall be designated for decommissioning and closure or for conversion.

10. Phase Four. Not later than [10] years after entry into force of this Convention:

a. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed, except:

i. no more than [50] warheads in each of the stockpiles of Russia and the United States, and

ii. no more than [10] warheads in each of the stockpiles of China, France, and the United Kingdom.

b. All reactors using highly enriched uranium shall be closed or converted to low enriched uranium use.

c. [All reactors using plutonium as fuel shall be closed or converted to reactors that do not use any special nuclear material.]

d. All special nuclear material in any form shall be under strict, effective and exclusive preventive controls.

11. Phase Five. Not later than [15] years after entry into force of this Convention:

a. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed.

b. [The powers and functions of the Agency shall be reviewed and adjusted to preserve its role in carrying out the objectives of this Convention.]

E. Special Provision

12. The Executive Council may make special provision for temporary retention of small and diminishing quantities of nuclear weapons or proscribed nuclear materials by Nuclear Capable States.
13. States meeting the criteria of this Special Provision shall follow the requirements, guidelines and phases outlined in this Article. They shall not be expected to implement the provisions of this Convention in advance of other States Parties, nor shall they be exempted from the requirements of each phase.
V. Verification

A. Elements of Verification Regime

In order to verify compliance with this Convention, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements:

1. Agreements on sharing data and verification activities among States, UN organs and with existing agencies,
2. A Registry,
3. An International Monitoring System,
4. Reporting of information gathered by National Technical Means,
5. Open Skies,
6. Preventive controls,
7. Consultation and clarification,
8. On-site inspections, including challenge inspections,
9. Confidence-building measures, including additional voluntary measures,
10. Citizen and non-governmental reporting and protection,
11. Any other measures deemed necessary by the Agency.

B. Activities, Facilities, and Materials Subject to Verification

12. All obligations of States Parties and persons as defined, inter alia, in Article I {General Obligations}, Article III {Declarations} and Article IV, Section D {Phases} shall be subject to verification in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention and its Verification Annex.

C. Rights and Obligations of States Parties with Respect to Verification

13. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Convention, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the
effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.

14. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Convention to cooperate through its National Authority established pursuant to Article VI (National Implementation Measures) of this Convention, with the Agency, with other States Parties and with other agencies as stipulated in this Convention and in separate agreements to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Convention by, inter alia:

   a. Establishing the necessary facilities, or providing necessary modifications to existing facilities, to participate in these verification measures, and establishing the necessary communication;

   b. Providing all relevant data obtained by technical means and by national systems that are part of the International Monitoring System as agreed among States;

   c. Participating, as necessary, in a consultation and clarification process;

   d. Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections;

   e. Participating in confidence-building measures; and

   f. To the extent possible, internationalizing elements of its National Technical Means and incorporating them into the International Monitoring System.

15. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures not contrary to the provisions of this Convention to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Convention.

16. Subject to paragraph 15, information obtained by the Agency through the verification regime established by this Convention shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention.

17. The provisions of this Convention shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes not prohibited by this Convention.

18. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime and in the examination of additional monitoring technologies. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in amendments to this Convention or changes to the Annexes or, where appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals of the Technical Secretariat.
D. Confidence-Building Measures

19. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other States Parties in implementing various measures additional to those explicitly required under this Convention in order to:

a. Develop greater confidence regarding compliance with the obligations under this Convention, and

b. Assist in the compilation of detailed information by the International Monitoring System.

E. Relation to Other Verification Arrangements

20. The Technical Secretariat may enter into cooperative verification arrangements in accordance with the provisions of Article XIV {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement} para. 3 and the provisions of Article XVIII, Section A {Relation to Other International Agreements} para. 2.

21. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the verification arrangements assumed by either State under the Treaties Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles {INF}.

22. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the verification arrangements assumed by Argentina and Brazil under the Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.

23. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the verification arrangements, assumed by any State under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or under safeguards agreements and additional protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency [or under the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty].

F. Implementation

24. Prior to entry into force of this Convention, nothing shall preclude any signatory State from implementing, individually or in agreement with other States, the verification measures of this Convention which are applicable to them. Such measures may include public declarations as detailed in Article III {Declarations}, negotiations with other States for the purposes of verifying bilateral or multilateral reductions of nuclear weapons, and the verification of plans
for the destruction of nuclear weapons, disposition of special nuclear material, and destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons facilities or nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

25. Verification measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 23 may include the formation of a provisional authority for the purpose of overseeing verification activities, including assistance in the development of national implementation plans pursuant to Article VI (National Implementation Measures) of this Convention.
VI. National Implementation Measures

A. Legislative Implementation

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary legislative measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shall:
   
   a. Extend its penal legislation to provide, in accordance with Article VII, Section A, for the trial, extradition and punishment of persons who commit crimes as defined in Article I, Section B.
   
   b. Provide all necessary protection for persons who report violations of this Convention, in accordance with Article VII, Section C.

2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties in affording legal assistance toward fulfilling the obligations under paragraph 1.

3. Each State Party, in the implementation of its obligations under this Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.

B. Relations Between the State Party and the Agency

4. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Agency and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Agency of its National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into force for it. The responsibilities of the National Authority include:
   
   a. The preparations and submission of declarations in the registry;
   
   b. The enactment of new legislation or the revision of existing legislation to facilitate the enforcement of the Convention;
   
   c. Preparations for receiving inspections, including, inter alia, approval of the list of inspectors, issuing of multiple entry visas for inspectors, providing aircraft clearances, and designating points of entry and exit.

5. Each State Party shall inform the Agency of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.

6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat. This includes cooperation
in carrying out any investigation which the Agency may initiate, and to provide or support assistance with investigations of non-complying State Parties and with Parties exposed to danger as a result of violation of this Convention.

7. Each State Party shall disseminate information regarding the requirements of this Convention and shall ensure the inclusion of such information in the training of relevant personnel regarding obligations under this Convention.


C. Confidentiality

9. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Agency. Information subject to confidentiality shall include data used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and state and military technology for dual use vehicles, components and computers.

D. Relation to implementation measures assumed or required under other arrangements

VII. Rights and Obligations of Persons

A. Criminal Procedure

1. Any person accused of committing a crime under this Convention within the jurisdiction of a State Party of which such person is a citizen or resident shall be
   a. tried according to the legal process of such State if found within such State, or
   b. surrendered to the International Criminal Court if the crime alleged is within the jurisdiction of such Court and the State concerned is unable or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.

2. If found within another State Party, such person shall be
   a. tried within such State, or
   b. extradited to the State within the jurisdiction of which the crime is alleged to have been committed, or
   c. surrendered to the International Criminal Court if the crime alleged is within the jurisdiction of such Court and the States concerned are unable or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.

3. Any person accused of a crime under this Convention shall be assumed to be innocent until proven guilty and have the right to a fair trial and humane treatment, as prescribed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other conventions and agreements which have acquired the status of customary international law.

B. Responsibility to Report Violations

4. Persons shall report any violations of this Convention to the Agency. This responsibility takes precedence over any obligation not to disclose information which may exist under national security laws or employment contracts.

5. [Information received by the Agency under the preceding paragraph shall be held in confidence until formal charges are lodged, except to the extent necessary for investigative purposes.]
C. Protection for Persons Providing Information

Intra-state protection

6. Any person reporting a suspected violation of this Convention, either by a person or a State, shall be guaranteed full civil and political rights including the right to liberty and security of person.

7. States Parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure that no person reporting a suspected violation of this Convention shall have any rights diminished or privileges withdrawn as a result.

8. Any individual who [in good faith] provides the Agency or a National Authority with information regarding a known or suspected violation of this Convention cannot be arrested, prosecuted or tried on account thereof.

9. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because such person has opposed any practice as a suspected violation of this Convention, reported such violation to the Agency or a National Authority, or testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under this Convention.

10. Any person against whom a national decision is rendered on account of information furnished by such person to the Agency about a suspected violation of this Convention may appeal such decision to the Agency within [...] months of being notified of such decision. The decision of the Agency in the matter shall be final.

Inter-State Protection

11. Any person reporting a violation of this Convention to the Agency shall be afforded protection by the Agency and by all States Parties, including, in the case of natural persons, the right of asylum in all other States Parties if their safety or security is endangered in the State Party in which they permanently or temporarily reside.

Additional Provisions

12. [The Executive Council may decide to award monetary compensation to persons providing important information to the Agency concerning violations of this Convention.]

13. Any person who voluntarily admits to the Agency having committed a violation of this Convention, prior to the receipt by the Agency of information concerning such violation from another source, may be exempt from punishment. In deciding whether to grant such exemption, the Agency shall consider the gravity of the violation involved as well as whether its consequences have not yet occurred or can be reversed as a result of the admission made.
VIII. Agency

A. General Provisions

1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter “the Agency”) to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Agency. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Agency.

3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Agency shall be _____.

4. The organs of the Agency are the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall oversee the Registry and the International Monitoring System.

5. The Agency shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Convention.

6. In undertaking its verification activities the Agency shall consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology.

7. The costs of the Agency’s activities shall be paid by States Parties in accordance with Article XVI [Financing]. The budget of the Agency shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs.

8. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payments of its financial contribution to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
B. Conference of the States Parties

Composition, procedures and decision-making

9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") shall be composed of all members of this Agency. Each member shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisors.

10. The first session of the conference shall be convened by the depositary not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.

11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually unless it decides otherwise.

12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
   a. When decided by the Conference;
   b. When requested by the Executive Council;
   c. When requested by any member and supported by one third of the members;
   d. In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.

Except in the case of subparagraph (d) the special session shall be convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, unless specified otherwise in the request.

13. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference in accordance with Article XVII (Amendments).

14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Agency unless the Conference decides otherwise.

15. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairperson and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairperson and other officers are elected at the next regular session.

16. A majority of the members of the Agency shall constitute a quorum for the Conference.

17. Each member of the Agency shall have one vote in the Conference.
18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairperson shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, the question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and functions

19. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Agency. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.

20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Convention, and act in order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with this Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.

21. The Conference shall:

a. Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report, program and budget of the Agency, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;

b. Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;

c. Elect the members of the Executive Council;

d. Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Director-General");

e. Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;

f. Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention;
g. Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;

h. Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention, in accordance with Article XIV {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}.

22. The Conference shall, not later than one year after the expiration of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at such other times within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with the same objective.

C. The Executive Council

Composition, procedure and decision-making

23. The Executive Council shall consist of 44 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference for a term of four years. In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Convention, due regard being paid to equitable geographic distribution, to representation by nuclear-capable states and to the interests of all states to be free from the threat of nuclear devastation, the Executive Council shall be composed as follows:

a. All Nuclear Weapons States Parties; and

b. Six States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;

c. Seven States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;

d. Six States Parties from Eastern Europe;

e. Seven States Parties from Africa;

f. Six States Parties from among North America and Western Europe;
g. Six States Parties from South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East;

h. Up to two additional States Parties that have special interest or expertise in implementing the aims of this Convention to be elected if required.

24. For the first election of the Executive Council 21 members shall be elected for a term of two years, and 21 members for a term of four years.

25. The Conference may, on its motion or upon the request of a majority of the members of the Executive Council, review the composition of the Executive Council taking into account developments related to the principles specified in paragraph 23.

26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.

27. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairperson from among its members.

28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfillment of its powers and functions.

29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. Unless otherwise specified in this Convention, the Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members. When an issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Executive Council by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and Functions

30. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Agency. It shall be responsible to the Conference. The Executive council shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and assure their proper and continuous implementation.

31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties at their request.

32. The Executive Council shall:
a. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft program and budget of the Agency;

b. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the Agency on the implementation of this Convention, the report on the performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems necessary or which the Conference may request;

c. Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference including the preparation of the draft agenda.

33. The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the Conference.

34. The Executive Council shall:

a. Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and international organizations on behalf of the Agency, subject to prior approval by the Conference;

b. Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties.

35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or matter within its competence affecting this Convention and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and request compliance within a specified time.

36. If the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures in accordance with Article XIV (Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement):

a. Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;

b. Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;

c. Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.

d. The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. It shall at the same time inform all States Parties of this step.

D. The Technical Secretariat

37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification
measures provided for in this Convention. It shall carry out the other functions entrusted to it under this Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference and the Executive Council.

38. With respect to the verification of and compliance with this Convention, the Technical Secretariat shall:

a. Maintain the Registry and other information databases in accordance with Section F below;

b. Maintain and coordinate the operation of the International Monitoring System;

c. Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring systems;

d. Assist the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;

e. Receive requests for on-site inspections and process them, facilitate the Executive Council consideration of such requests, carry out the preparation for, and provide technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and report to the Executive Council;

f. Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties, subject to approval by the Executive Council;

h. Assist the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Convention.

39. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of various components of the verification regime, in accordance with the Verification Annex. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Convention or the Annexes, and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.

40. With respect to administrative matters the Technical Secretariat shall:

a. Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft program and budget of the Agency;
b. Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the Agency on the implementation of this Convention and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;

c. Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and subsidiary organs;

d. Address and receive communications on behalf of the Agency to and from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Convention;

e. Upon approval by the Executive Council and the Conference, submit the report of the Agency to the United Nations Secretary-General.

41. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Agency shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of the United Nations. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.

42. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities or through confidential or non-governmental sources and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned.

43. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.

44. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical Secretariat and shall act under the supervision of the Director-General.

45. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The appointment of the Director-General shall be considered a matter of substance governed by paragraph 18.

46. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.

47. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph 21.g The Director-General shall, in consultation with States Parties and non-governmental sources, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Convention. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties and non-governmental sources may submit lists of experts to the Director-General. The Scientific Advisory Board may be called upon to review nuclear or other research and determine whether it is of a nature prohibited under this Convention or of a nature that may contribute to verification of nuclear disarmament.

48. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Agency. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Conference and the Executive Council.

49. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

E. Privileges and Immunities

50. The Agency shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are appropriate for the exercise of its functions.

51. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Agency shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.

52. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Agency and the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the Agency and the State in which the headquarters of the Agency is seated.
53. Notwithstanding paragraphs 50 and 51, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Verification Annex.

F. Registry and Other Databases

54. The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a Registry of the following:

a. All nuclear weapons;

b. All nuclear material;

c. All nuclear facilities;

d. All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;

e. Any other facilities or materials as determined by the Technical Secretariat.

55. The Technical Secretariat shall obtain information from the following sources:

a. Declarations by States in accordance with the provisions of Article III {Declarations};

b. Reports by States on progress in implementing their obligations under this Convention;

c. The International Monitoring System;

d. National Technical Means;

e. Systematic inspections;

f. Challenge inspections;

g. Other organizations with which the Agency has concluded agreements on sharing information in accordance with Article XVIII, Section A {Relation to Other International Agreements};

h. Other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that collect and submit such information;

i. Publicly available sources;

j. Any other sources which the Technical Secretariat deems appropriate.
56. The Technical Secretariat shall make available to the Registry information obtained from the above sources with the exception of information which may remain confidential because of legitimate national and international security concerns or trade secret concerns.

57. Information in the Registry shall be available to all States parties and to the public according to criteria established by separate agreements [among States].

G. International Monitoring System

58. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities and systems for monitoring by satellite, on-site sensors, remote sensors, radionuclide sampling, respective means of communication, aircraft and other systems developed as deemed necessary by the Agency.

59. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat.

60. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them except for those systems or facilities which may be owned or operated by another agency or by the United Nations, or constructed or acquired by the Agency in accordance with paragraph 64.

61. The Technical Secretariat shall acquire equipment necessary for collating and analyzing data provided by the International Monitoring System.

62. Any State Party may, if it so decides and upon agreement with the Technical Secretariat, give a monitoring facility to the Agency.

63. The Technical Secretariat may, upon agreement of the Conference and in accordance with its funding guidelines, construct or otherwise acquire a monitoring system or facility if it determines that such a facility or system is necessary for verification of obligations of States under this Convention, and if no State is able or willing to provide such a system or facility or information from such a system or facility to the International Monitoring System.

64. Each State shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the Registry.

65. The Agency shall conclude agreements with other agencies or organizations using international monitoring systems relating to the sharing of information obtained through such systems relevant to the verification of this Convention in accordance with Article XVIII, Section A [Relation to Other International Agreements].

66. Data obtained by the International Monitoring System not directly relevant to verification of this Convention shall be treated as confidential, except where such information is relevant to
the verification of another international agreement [and there is an agreement on sharing such information between the Agency and the organization responsible for implementation of that agreement].

67. Data obtained from the International Monitoring System shall first be analyzed, processed and verified by the Technical Secretariat before being compiled as part of the Registry, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 57.
IX. Nuclear Weapons

A. General Requirements

1. All nuclear weapons [with corresponding delivery vehicles] shall be taken off alert status, disabled, removed from deployment, declared, and destroyed in accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article III {Declarations}, Article IV {Phases for Implementation}, the Verification Annex, and the provisions set forth below:

B. Procedures for Destroying Nuclear Weapons

2. Each State Party shall take the following measures with respect to all nuclear weapons that it owns or possesses or that are under its jurisdiction or control:

a. All warheads shall be bar-coded, registered, and tagged for identification using secure visual tags.

b. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed or moved to nuclear weapons storage facilities subject to international preventive controls. No exclusive national access to the repositories is allowed. Weapons may be removed from the nuclear weapons storage facilities only for the purposes of destruction.

c. All core elements from newly dismantled warheads shall be quenched or otherwise deformed and placed in storage under international preventive controls until final disposal of the proscribed nuclear material, in accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article X {Nuclear Material}.

C. Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons

3. All nuclear [weapons] facilities and deployment sites shall be subject to verification, including challenge inspections at any time and non-destructive detection of hidden warheads, to ensure compliance with obligations under this Convention not to develop, produce, or deploy nuclear weapons.
X. Nuclear Material

A. Reconstruction and Documentation

1. All military and civilian nuclear material shall be documented and declared according to the guidelines and standards set forth in Article III {Declarations} and the Verification Annex.

2. Special Nuclear Material
   a. Records of production and use of special nuclear material produced in the past shall be reconstructed to the extent possible through analysis of past records, measures of transparency including national legislation aimed at disclosure of information, interviews, and any other appropriate means.
   b. All special nuclear material storage sites and related nuclear facilities usable for production of special nuclear material shall be subject to preventive controls, including inventory verification as set forth in the Verification Annex.

B. Control of Special Nuclear Material

3. Subject to Section C below, production and use of proscribed nuclear material is prohibited. Existing inventories of special nuclear material shall be subject to preventive controls and storage and disposal in accordance with the guidelines and standards set forth below and in separate verification agreements.

4. All treatment of nuclear material that improves its quality to the level of proscribed nuclear material or improves the accessibility of proscribed nuclear material is prohibited, including, inter alia, separation of plutonium from spent fuel, enrichment of uranium in U-235 beyond unavoidable civilian requirements or beyond 20%, or extraction of tritium from heavy water, with the exception of exemption quantities.

5. All existing stocks of special nuclear material shall be placed under preventive controls until a safe method of final disposal is found and approved by the Agency. All handling of proscribed nuclear material except for such handling as necessary for the purposes of this Convention shall be prohibited.

6. [Burning of special fissionable material is prohibited unless the net amount of fissionable material resulting from such burning is reduced.]

7. Facilities for the production, research and testing of special nuclear material may be converted to uses consistent with the purposes and obligations of this Convention. Conversion of such facilities may include research and development for methods of demilitarization and disposal of proscribed nuclear material, including immobilization and final disposition of plutonium.
C. Licensing Requirements

8. The Agency shall establish a licensing process for civilian use of proscribed nuclear material which is not prohibited.

D. Relation to other International Agreements

9. Nothing in this Section shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the verification arrangements assumed by any State under safeguards agreements and additional protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency [or under the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty].
XI. Nuclear Facilities

A. Nuclear Weapons Facilities

1. All nuclear weapons production facilities shall cease operations prohibited under this Convention and shall be closed or converted to purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

2. All nuclear weapons testing facilities shall cease operations and shall be permanently closed [or converted to purposes not prohibited under this Convention].

3. All nuclear weapons research facilities shall be closed or converted to research in accordance with paragraph 4.

4. Funding of research for the purposes of designing, modernizing, constructing, modifying or maintaining reliability of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Funding of research for the purpose of developing knowledge in the physics of nuclear explosions is prohibited. Funding of research in safety mechanisms for existing nuclear weapons is permitted only until all nuclear weapons are dismantled. Funding of research for the purposes of safe dismantling and destroying of nuclear weapons and for safe disposal of special nuclear material is permitted.

5. [All nuclear reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and shall be permanently closed.]

6. All nuclear facilities shall be subject to preventive controls.

7. All plans for the destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons [production, research and testing facilities and principal nuclear] facilities, submitted in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation}, shall include provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees of such facilities in positions of employment consistent with their experience and expertise and with the object and purpose of this Convention. Such positions and recommendations may include employment within a converted facility, employment for the destruction of a nuclear facility, employment for the destruction of nuclear weapons or disposition of special nuclear material, or employment within the Agency for the purposes of verification.

B. Command, Control, and Communications Facilities and Deployment Sites

8. Each State Party shall make the following changes to nuclear targeting commands and command systems in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation}:

   a. Rescind alert status on all nuclear weapons;

   b. Remove targeting coordinates from all command and control systems; and
c. Remove navigational information for all nuclear armed missiles from the navigational systems.

9. Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, destroy any facility, system or sub-system designed or used solely for the purpose of launching, targeting, directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or assisting in any of these purposes.

10. Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, and in order to prevent use for purposes prohibited under this Convention, destroy or convert any facility, system or sub-system which is used for the purpose of launching, targeting, directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or assisting in any of these purposes, and which is also used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

11. Any facility, system or sub-system designed and used for detection of activities prohibited under this Convention is permitted.

12. All plans for the destruction or conversion of command, control, and communications facilities and deployment sites submitted in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, shall include provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees of such facilities in positions of employment consistent with their experience and expertise and with the object and purpose of this Convention. Such positions and recommendations may include employment within a converted facility, employment for the destruction of a nuclear facility, employment for the purpose of gathering information, including National Technical Means, and employment within the Agency for the purposes of inspection or other methods of verification.

C. Nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities

13. All States shall declare the precise location, nature and scope of nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear laboratories, nuclear materials storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities.

14. All plutonium reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and be permanently closed.

15. All States shall conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency [or International Atomic Energy Agency] to verify that nuclear facilities are operated consistent with obligations under this convention including obligations under Section X (Nuclear Material).
D. Activities at nuclear facilities

16. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities shall be prohibited.

17. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the Conference of States Parties in accordance with Articles XIV (Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement).

18. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 3 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities are permitted.
XII. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles

1. All deployment, development, testing, production, or acquisition of delivery vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons {Schedule 1} is prohibited.

2. All delivery vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons shall be destroyed according to Article IV {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex.

3. All delivery vehicles capable of use for the delivery of nuclear weapons or non-nuclear weapons {Schedule 2} shall be destroyed according to Article IV {Phases for Implementation} or converted for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

Schedule 1 - Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles to Be Destroyed

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
Heavy Bombers
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Ground Launched Cruise Missile

Schedule 2 - Delivery Vehicles To be Destroyed or Converted

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles
Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles
Air Launched Cruise Missile
Sea Launched Cruise Missile
Nuclear-capable fighter bombers
Cruise Missile Submarines
Attack Submarines
Warships

[Schedule 3 - Transport Vehicles Not Designed for Nuclear Weapons to be Subject to Preventive Controls]
XIII. Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention

1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention [and other agreements and regulations relating to nuclear material] to the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that research, development and use of nuclear energy within its territory or under its control is undertaken only for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall subject nuclear facilities and nuclear material listed in the Annex on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment of this Convention, or any other activities so declared by the Agency, to control and verification measures as provided in Sections V (Verification), VI (National Implementation Measures), VIII (Agency), X (Nuclear Material), XI (Nuclear Facilities) [and the Verification Annex].

3. Each State Party has the right to the research, development, production, acquisition and deployment of weapons-delivery systems for security purposes. This right is subject to the provisions of this Convention, other agreements and regulations relating to weapons and weapons systems, the United Nations Charter and other international law relating to the threat or use of force.

4. In the exercise of military activities not prohibited under this Convention, each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that [weapons and] weapons delivery systems are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, tested or deployed in a manner consistent with this Convention. To this end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall subject weapons delivery systems including command, communication, control and production facilities to control and verification measures as provided in Section XII (Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles) [and the Verification Annex].
XIV. Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement

A. Consultation, Cooperation, and Fact-finding

1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or through the Agency or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification, destruction and conversion regimes, with a view to developing specific measures to enhance the efficient, safe and cost-effective verification, destruction and conversion procedures and methods of this Convention.

3. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request from another State Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than [48] hours after the receipt of a request to clarify a possible threat of use of nuclear weapons or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify any other matter, with information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubt about compliance or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party with this Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information in its possession relevant to such a concern.

5. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about its possible non-compliance with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:
a. The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than [24] hours after its receipt;

b. The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later than [48] hours after the receipt of a request to clarify possible threat or use of nuclear weapons or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify any other matter;

c. The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party not later than [24] hours after its receipt;

d. If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification;

e. For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under subparagraph d, the Executive Council may call on the Director-General to establish a group of experts from the Technical Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the concern. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings;

f. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under subparagraphs d and e to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article VIII {Agency}. At such a special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.

6. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise to a concern about its possible non-compliance with this Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

7. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties about any request for clarification provided in this Article.

8. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-compliance has not been resolved within [60] days after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge inspection, it may request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article VIII {Agency}. At such a special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
Procedures for challenge inspections

9. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the Verification Annex.

10. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention as specified in the Verification Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-compliance.

11. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of this Convention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 9.

12. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the inspected State Party shall have:

   a. The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate;

   b. The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-compliance; and

   c. The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this Convention.

13. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:

   a. The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection.

   b. The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in accordance with the Verification Annex.
c. The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report.

14. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for immediate processing.

15. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection request meets the requirements specified in the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfills the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin.

16. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

17. After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director-General’s actions on the request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.

18. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention as described in paragraph 9. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly.

19. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be the inspection request referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 put into operational terms, and shall conform with the inspection request.

20. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Verification Annex. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission.

21. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party proposes, pursuant to the Verification Annex, arrangements to demonstrate compliance with this Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating its compliance.
22. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the inspected States Parties, as well as the views of other States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties.

23. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions, review the final report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, and address any concerns as to:

a. Whether any non-compliance has occurred;

b. Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention; and

c. Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused.

24. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 23, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention, including specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspection.

25. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the right to participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the process.

26. If the Executive Council has made specific recommendations to the Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Section B.

B. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions

27. The Conference, taking into account the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention.

28. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfill the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State
Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Convention until the Conference decides otherwise.

29. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Convention, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law. Such measures may include restrictions or suspensions of all assistance in nuclear activities outlined in Schedule 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment. If the State concerned continues in its failure to comply with the request, further sanctions may be imposed.

30. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information, conclusions and recommendations, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.

31. The threat or use of nuclear weapons shall be deemed to be a threat to the peace subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

C. Settlement of Disputes

32. Disputes that may arise concerning the application, implementation or interpretation of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention, including Section B and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

33. When a disputes arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Agency, relating to the application, implementation or interpretation of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation, mediation, arbitration or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.

34. If other peaceful means of settlement are not found, a State Party in dispute with one or more States Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, in conformity with the Statute of the Court [and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes]. The States Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken.

35. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
36. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article VIII {Agency}.

37. The Conference and the Executive Council may recommend to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Agency. An agreement between the Agency and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article VIII {Agency}.

38. This Section is without prejudice to Sections A and B.
XV. Entry Into Force

A. Conditions of Entry Into Force

1. This Convention shall enter into force [180] days after the date on which the following conditions are met:
   
   a. [All] Nuclear Weapons States have deposited their instruments of ratification; and
   
   b. All Nuclear Capable States have deposited their instruments of ratification; and
   
   c. At least [65] States in total have deposited instruments of ratification [including at least [40] States from Annex IV: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors], [or] [including at least [40] States from Annex V: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors or Nuclear Research Reactors].

2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.

B. State Waiver of Entry Into Force Requirements

For States who waive the entry into force requirements, this Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.

XVI. Financing

1. The costs of the Agency’s activities shall be paid by States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and this Agency. The budget of the Agency shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification and compliance costs.

2. Each Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of destruction of weapons, proscribed nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its authority. Each Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of verification of nuclear facilities under its authority, except for instances of challenge inspections which are funded according to the provisions of the Verification Annex.

3. The Agency shall establish a voluntary fund to assist States Parties to comply with paragraph 2 where such compliance imposes undue financial burdens on them.
XVII. Amendments

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any State Party may also propose changes, as specified in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this Convention. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.

2. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Director-General for circulation to all States Parties and to the Depositary. The proposed amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference. Such an Amendment Conference shall be convened if one third or more of the States Parties notify the Director-General [not later than [60 days] after its circulation] that they support further consideration of the proposal. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless the requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 20 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the States Parties referred to under subparagraph b below:
   a. When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of all States Parties [with no State Party casting a negative vote]; and
   b. Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this Convention, provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature.

5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:
   a. The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;
   b. Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Convention and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;
c. The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfills the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

d. If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;

e. If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under subparagraph d, a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfills the requirements of paragraph 4, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;

f. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph;

g. Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.
XVIII. Scope and Application of Convention

A. Relation to other International Agreements

1. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the United Nations Charter; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty; the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty; any other treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and Russia on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, or under agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2. Pursuant to Article VIII {Agency}, the Agency may enter into agreements with the implementing organizations of other international agreements for the purpose of sharing information necessary or applicable to the verification tasks of each organization involved, or for any other purposes that would further the objectives of the international agreements concerned.

B. Status of the Annexes

3. The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to this Convention includes the Annexes.

C. Duration and Withdrawal

4. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

5. Withdrawal from this Convention shall not be permitted [upon ratification by all Nuclear Weapons States].

D. Reservations

6. The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose.
XIX. Conclusion of Convention

A. Signature

1. This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before its entry into force.

B. Ratification

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

C. Accession

3. Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

D. Depository

4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depository of this Convention and shall, inter alia:

   a. Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices;

   b. Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Governments of all signatory and acceding States; and

   c. Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

E. Authentic Texts

5. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes

The States Parties to this Protocol, expressing their wish to resort to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement is provided for in the Convention or has been agreed upon by the Parties within a reasonable period, have agreed as follows:

Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application by any party to the dispute being a Party to this Protocol.

Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance

The States Parties to this Protocol:

Desiring to prevent any threat to the aims and objectives of this Convention from arising due to the proliferation of nuclear technology which could aid or assist in the development of nuclear weapons,

Desiring further to prevent any threat to health and the environment arising from the excessive creation of radionuclides in nuclear reactors,

Affirming the right to the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources,

Have agreed as follows:

1. Not to manufacture, assemble, transfer or otherwise acquire nuclear power reactors.

2. Not to use any existing power reactor, nor the products from the use of any nuclear power reactor.

3. To close any existing nuclear power reactors within [five] years of signing this protocol.

4. To assist other Parties to this protocol in the development and use of non-nuclear, sustainable energy sources.

5. To create a voluntary fund for the purposes of implementing paragraph 4.
Annex I. Nuclear Activities

A. Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities

Guidelines for Schedule 1

1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a nuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 1:

   (a) It is an activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

   (b) It is an activity the purpose of which is to aid or assist in any activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

   (c) It is an activity which poses a grave risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its high potential for aiding and assisting activities specifically prohibited by this Convention.

   (d) It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, or alternatively its use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention can be safely substituted by another activity.

2. Schedule 1 activities are prohibited.

Guidelines for Schedule 2

3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a nuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 2:

   (a) It is an activity not specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

   (b) It is an activity the purpose of which is not to aid or assist in any activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

   (c) It is an activity which poses some risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its potential to aid and assist activities specifically prohibited by this Convention.

4. Schedule 2 activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the Conference in accordance with Articles [Agency, Technical Secretariat] and [compliance].
Guidelines for Schedule 3

5. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a nuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 3:

(a) It is an activity not specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

(b) It is an activity the purpose of which is not to aid or assist in any activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

(c) It is an activity which poses no risk to the object and purpose of this Convention.

6. Schedule 3 activities are permitted.

B. Schedules of Nuclear Activities

Schedule 1

(1) Production of nuclear weapons

(2) Use of nuclear weapons

(3) Threat of use of nuclear weapons

(4) Production and any use of special nuclear material

(5) Production of metals or alloys containing plutonium or uranium

(6) Weaponization: This covers the research, development, manufacturing and testing required to make nuclear explosive devices from special fissionable or fusionable material

(7) Nuclear fuel fabrication using plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235

(8) Import, construction or use of research and power reactors of any kind utilizing uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235, uranium-233, plutonium or MOX as a fuel or any reactor designed specifically for plutonium production. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies

(9) Reprocessing of irradiated fuel or irradiation targets containing nuclear-weapons capable material. This includes the use of hot cells and associated equipment
(10) Enrichment of uranium in isotope U-235 beyond 20% and any preparatory steps in this process, including the preparation and storage of UCl4 and UF6 enriched to more than 3% in U-235. {The preparation of UCl4 and UF6 from natural uranium will not be forbidden by the NWC. After enrichment it should not be stored in this form which would be appropriate feeding material for further enrichment beyond 20%.}

(11) Production, separation, and enrichment of the isotope of plutonium-239, hydrogen, tritium and lithium-6

(12) Production of antiprotons, antimatter, nuclear isomers and super-heavy elements in significant quantities

Schedule 2

(1) Import, construction, use of research and power reactors of any type using natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235 as a fuel. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies, but excludes reactors specifically designed for plutonium production

(2) Prospecting, mining or processing of ores containing uranium and/or thorium

(3) Preparation of chemical compounds containing uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235 and thorium; excluding the preparation of UCl4 and UF6 enriched to more than 3% in U-235

(4) Nuclear fuel fabrication using natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235

(5) Production of particle and laser beams of all kind

(6) Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on inertial confinement, including diagnostics

Schedule 3

(1) Application of radiation and isotopes in food and agriculture:
   - soil fertility, irrigation and crop production
   - [plant breeding and genetics]
   - animal production and health
   - insect and pest control
   - [food preservation]
   - other uses upon approval
(2) Applications of radiation and isotopes in medicine
   - diagnostic and therapeutic medicine including dosimetry
   - Radiotherapy by teletherapy and brachytherapy
   - nutrition and health-related environmental studies
   - other uses upon approval

(3) Application of radiation and isotopes in industrial processes
   - Radiography and other non-destructive testing methods
   - Industrial process control and quality control
   - Radiotracer applications in oil, chemical and metallurgical processes
   - Development of water and mineral resources
   - Industrial radiation processing
   - Other uses upon approval

(4) Applications in research with and production and disposal of radioactive isotopes and elementary particles
   - Conditioning and disposal of radioactive wastes
   - Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on magnetic confinement, including diagnostics
   - Production of isotopes both radioactive and stable. The production of the isotope Pu-239, titanium and lithium-6 is prohibited.
   - Import, construction and use of neutron sources, electron accelerators, particle accelerators, heavy ion accelerators
   - Research on radiation physics and chemistry and on the physical and chemical properties of isotopes except in areas relevant to activities not prohibited by or subject to authorization under this Convention
Annex II. Nuclear Weapon Components

Guidelines for Schedule 1

1. A component shall be included in Schedule 1 if it is produced solely for the purpose of incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.

2. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 1 components is prohibited.

Guidelines for Schedule 2

3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a component shall be included in Schedule 2:
   
   (a) The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
   
   (b) The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under this convention, but is not produced in large commercial quantities for such purposes.
   
   (c) There exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph (b).

4. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 2 components is prohibited.

Guidelines for Schedule 3

5. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a component shall be included in Schedule 3:
   
   (a) The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
   
   (b) The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under this convention, but is not produced in large commercial quantities for such purposes.
   
   (c) There do not exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph (b).

6. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 3 components is permitted only in accordance with the provisions established by the Agency.
Guidelines for Schedule 4

7. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a component shall be included in Schedule 4:

(a) The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.

(b) The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under this convention, and is produced in large commercial quantities for such purposes.

[(c) There do not exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph (b).]

8. Manufacture of Schedule 4 components is permitted only in accordance with the provisions established by the Agency.
Annex III. List of countries and geographical regions for the purpose of Article VIII.C.23

Africa

Eastern Europe
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.

Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

North America and Western Europe
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.
### Annex IV. List of countries with nuclear power reactors

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<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Russia</th>
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<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>USA</td>
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### Annex V. List of countries and geographical regions with nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
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<th>Peru</th>
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<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Taiwan (Province of China)</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>European Union*</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>USA</td>
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Sixty-sixth session
First Committee
Agenda item 98 (b)
General and complete disarmament: follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Islamic Republic of Iran: draft resolution

Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its various resolutions in the field of nuclear disarmament, including its most recent, resolutions 64/31 of 2 December 2009 and 65/56, 65/76 and 65/80 of 8 December 2010,

Bearing in mind its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex to which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty regarding the convening of review conferences at five-year intervals,

Recalling its resolution 50/70 Q of 12 December 1995, in which the General Assembly noted that the States parties to the Treaty affirmed the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopted a set of principles and objectives,

Recalling also that, on 11 May 1995, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted three decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty,

¹ See also United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and extension of the Treaty.  

Reaffirming the resolution on the Middle East adopted on 11 May 1995 by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, in which the Conference reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Reaffirming also its resolution 55/33 D of 20 November 2000, in which the General Assembly welcomed the adoption by consensus on 19 May 2000 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including, in particular, the documents entitled “Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference” and “Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty”.

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,

Welcoming the adoption by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of a substantive Final Document containing conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions relating to nuclear disarmament,

1. Recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty;

2. Determines to pursue practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

3. Calls for practical steps, as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States, which would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and, based on the principle of undiminished security for all:


(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

4. *Notes* that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

5. *Urges* the States parties to the Treaty to follow up on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty within the framework of Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty and their Preparatory Committees;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session the item entitled “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.

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United Nations

General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
14 October 2011
Original: English

Sixty-sixth session
First Committee
Agenda item 98 (w)
General and complete disarmament: united action towards
the total elimination of nuclear weapons

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile,
Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia,
Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Mexico,
Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Nepal, Netherlands, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Tonga, Ukraine, United States of America and Zambia: draft resolution

United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the need for all States to take further practical steps and effective
measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with a view to achieving
a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons, and in this regard confirming
the determination of Member States to take united action,

Noting that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament
process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control,

Recalling its resolution 65/72 of 8 December 2010,

Expressing deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any
use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirming the need for all States at all times to
comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law,
while convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war and nuclear
terrorism,

Reaffirming that the enhancement of international peace and security and the
promotion of nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing,

* Reissued for technical reasons on 24 October 2011.
Reaffirming also that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, which is, inter alia, essential to international peace and security,

Reaffirming further the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of the Treaty’s three pillars, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Recalling the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty,

Welcoming the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held from 3 to 28 May 2010, in the year of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, and reaffirming the necessity of fully implementing the action plan adopted at the Conference,

Noting the high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, convened by the Secretary-General on 24 September 2010, and the plenary meeting of the General Assembly to follow up on the high-level meeting, held from 27 to 29 July 2011,

Welcoming the entry into force on 5 February 2011 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Welcoming also the recent announcements on overall stockpiles of nuclear warheads by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as the update of the Russian Federation on its nuclear arsenals, which further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence,

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, nuclear weapons, including that caused by proliferation networks,

Recognizing the importance of the objective of nuclear security, along with the shared goals of Member States of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, welcoming the Nuclear Security Summit held on 12 and 13 April 2010, and looking forward to the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in 2012,

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5 Ibid., vol. I (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Part I)).
Recognizing also the importance of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 and 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009 urging the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and immediately cease all related activities, expressing concern regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s claimed uranium enrichment programme and light water reactor construction, and declaring that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under any circumstances,

1. **Reaffirms** the importance of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\(^1\) complying with their obligations under all the articles of the Treaty;

2. **Also reaffirms** the vital importance of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and take practical steps in support of the Treaty;

3. **Further reaffirms** the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are committed under article VI thereof;

4. **Calls upon** nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;

5. **Emphasizes** the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

6. **Recognizes** that nuclear disarmament and achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons require openness and cooperation, affirms the importance of enhanced confidence through increased transparency and effective verification, emphasizes the importance of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference,\(^3\) in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security, and the call upon the nuclear-weapon States to report their undertakings to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2014, and welcomes in this regard the convening in Paris on 30 June and 1 July 2011 of the first follow-up meeting to the 2010 Review Conference of the five nuclear-weapon States as a transparency and confidence-building measure among them;

7. **Welcomes** the ongoing implementation by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and encourages them to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals;
8. Urges all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty⁶ at the earliest opportunity, with a view to its early entry into force and universalization, stresses the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty, and reaffirms the importance of the continued development of the Treaty verification regime, which will be a significant contribution to providing assurance of compliance with the Treaty;

9. Reiterates its call for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion, regrets that negotiations have not yet started, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare and maintain moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices pending the entry into force of the treaty;

10. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to take measures to further reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons in ways that promote international stability and security, while welcoming the measures already taken by several nuclear-weapon States in this regard;

11. Also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to promptly engage with a view to further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

12. Recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, recalls Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances;

13. Encourages the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned and in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission,⁷ and recognizes that, by signing and ratifying relevant protocols that contain negative security assurances, nuclear-weapon States would undertake individual legally binding commitments with respect to the status of such zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to such treaties;

14. Calls upon all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to fully respect and comply with obligations undertaken to forswear nuclear weapons;

15. Stresses the importance of the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency to include States which have not yet adopted and implemented such an agreement, while also strongly reaffirming the follow-on action of the 2010 Review Conference encouraging all States which have not done so to conclude and bring into force as soon as possible the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between

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⁶ See resolution 50/245.
State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997,\(^8\) and the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004;

16. *Encourages* every effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear and radiological material, and calls upon all States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, while requesting and providing assistance, including in the field of capacity-building, as necessary;

17. *Encourages* all States to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education,\(^9\) in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking to that end;

18. *Commends and further encourages* the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and encourages all States to promote, in cooperation with civil society, disarmament and non-proliferation education which, inter alia, contributes to raising public awareness of the tragic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and strengthens the momentum of international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

19. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-seventh session an item entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

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\(^8\) International Atomic Energy Agency, document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

\(^9\) A/57/124.
Sixty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 94 (x)
General and complete disarmament: towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden: draft resolution

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 66/40 of 2 December 2011,

Reiterating its grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used,

Recalling the expression of deep concern by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons,¹

Reaffirming that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts,

Recalling the decisions entitled “Strengthening the review process for the Treaty”, “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and “Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” and the resolution on the Middle East, all of which were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,² and the Final Document of the 2000³ and the 2010⁴ Review

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Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments made under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference and reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference,

Reaffirming the commitment of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations,

Recalling that the 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing the continued vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the advancement of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, and welcoming the recent ratifications of the Treaty by Guatemala and Indonesia, the latter being listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, as well as its signature by Niue,

Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment and maintenance of nuclear-weapon-free zones enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament, encouraging further progress towards strengthening all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including through the withdrawal of any reservations or interpretative declarations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties establishing these zones, and recognizing the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in Vienna on 27 April 2012,

Recognizing efforts towards strengthening existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the ratification by the Russian Federation of Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the steps taken by the United States of America towards the ratification of the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga, and discussions between the States parties to the Treaty of Bangkok and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to that Treaty, as well as the recent declaration by the nuclear-weapon States in which they affirmed the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, and urging the successful conclusion of all outstanding issues as a matter of priority,

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6 See resolution 50/245.
7 See A/50/426, annex.
8 See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 10: 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.7), appendix VII.
Recalling the encouragement expressed at the 2010 Review Conference for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and expressing the hope that this will be followed by concerted international efforts to create such zones in areas where they do not currently exist, especially in the Middle East,

Noting with satisfaction the agreement at the 2010 Review Conference on practical steps to fully implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East,

Acknowledging the ongoing efforts towards the full implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, while re-emphasizing the encouragement of the 2010 Review Conference to both States to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals, addressing deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, regardless of their location,

Deeply disappointed at the continued absence of progress towards multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament, despite efforts during 2012 to agree on a programme of work, and underlining the importance of multilateralism in relation to nuclear disarmament, while recognizing the value also of bilateral and regional initiatives,

Welcoming the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2012, and emphasizing the importance of a constructive and successful preparatory process leading to the 2015 Review Conference, which should contribute to strengthening the Treaty and make progress towards achieving its full implementation and universality and the monitoring of the commitments made and actions agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences,

1. Reiterates that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that all States parties should be held fully accountable with respect to strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and calls upon all States parties to comply fully with all decisions, resolutions and commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences;

2. Recalls with satisfaction the adoption by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of a substantive final document containing conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions relating to nuclear disarmament, including concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; \(^5\)

3. Welcomes, in particular, the resolve of the 2010 Review Conference to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. Reiterates the deep concern expressed by the 2010 Review Conference at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and the
need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law;

5. **Recalls** the reaffirmation of the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference,\(^\text{10}\) including the specific reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty;

6. **Also recalls** the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;

7. **Underlines** the recognition by the 2010 Review Conference of the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in the constraining by the nuclear-weapon States of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, and calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to take steps in this regard;

8. **Encourages** further steps by all nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference,\(^4\) to ensure the irreversible removal of all fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes, urges the nuclear-weapon States to initiate and accelerate the development of multilateral arrangements for placing such material, including weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, under verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, and calls upon all States to support, within the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the development of appropriate nuclear disarmament verification capabilities and legally binding verification arrangements, thereby ensuring that such material remains permanently outside military programmes in a verifiable manner;

9. **Calls upon** all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,\(^2\) recognizes the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the region, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction;

10. **Calls upon** the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in close consultation and cooperation with the States of the region, to undertake all necessary preparations for the convening of the 2012 conference, and in this regard fully supports the work of the facilitator, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy of Finland, Jaakko Laajava;

11. Continues to emphasize the fundamental role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and calls upon all States parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty, and in this regard urges India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions and to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

12. Urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fulfil its commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including those in the September 2005 joint statement, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to adherence to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, with a view to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, and reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party Talks;

13. Urges all States to work together to overcome obstacles within the international disarmament machinery that are inhibiting efforts to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament in a multilateral context, and to immediately implement the three specific recommendations of the 2010 Review Conference action plan addressed to the Conference on Disarmament;

14. Recalls that the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament as envisaged in action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan is:

(a) To rapidly move towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3 of the action plan;

(b) To address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;

(c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

(d) To discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;

(e) To consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear-weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

(f) To reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons;

(g) To further enhance transparency and mutual confidence;

15. Stresses the importance of the nuclear-weapon States fulfilling their commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference,³ welcomes the meeting of the nuclear-weapon States held in Washington, D.C., from 27 to 29 June 2012 to consider progress to date in this regard, and calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to take all necessary steps to accelerate the fulfilment of their commitments with a view to reporting substantive progress to the Preparatory Committee in 2014;
16. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to implement their nuclear disarmament commitments in a manner that enables the States parties to regularly monitor progress, and to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting format to facilitate reporting;

17. *Welcomes* the announcements made by some nuclear-weapon States providing information about their nuclear arsenals, policies and disarmament efforts, and urges those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so also to provide this information;

18. *Calls upon* all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to implement all elements of the 2010 Review Conference action plan in a faithful and timely manner so that progress across all of the pillars of the Treaty can be realized;

19. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session the item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.
Sixty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 94 (ee)
General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament

Indonesia: draft resolution

High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Emphasizing the importance of seeking a safer world for all and achieving peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling the resolve by the Heads of State and Government, as contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,¹

Reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

1. Decides to convene a high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament that will be held as a one-day plenary meeting on 26 September 2013, to contribute to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament;

2. Encourages Member States to participate in the meeting at the highest level;

3. Requests the President of the General Assembly, in collaboration with Member States, to make all the necessary arrangements for the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament;

¹ See resolution 55/2, para. 9.
4. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to draw up a list of representatives of non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council which will participate in the high-level meeting;

5. *Also requests* the President of the General Assembly to prepare a summary as the outcome of the high-level meeting, which will be issued as a document of the General Assembly.
Sixty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 94
General and complete disarmament

Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay:
draft resolution

Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling the Declaration of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,¹ which states, inter alia, that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations, and that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations,

Mindful of the role and functions of the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration,² which states, inter alia, that responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally and that, as the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role,

Welcoming the efforts by Member States to secure progress in multilateral disarmament and the support of the Secretary-General for such efforts, and noting in this regard the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament,

¹ See resolution S-10/2, sect. II.
² See resolution 55/2.
Recalling the outcome, including the action points, of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^3\)

Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations,

Recognizing the absence of concrete outcomes of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations within the United Nations framework for more than a decade,

Recognizing also the increased political attention to disarmament and non-proliferation issues and that the international political climate is more conducive to the promotion of multilateral disarmament and moving towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing the importance and urgency of substantive progress on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues,

Recognizing the important contribution that civil society makes to multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control processes,

Mindful of Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the functions and powers of the General Assembly to consider and make recommendations, inter alia recommendations with regard to disarmament,

1. Decides to establish an open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons;

2. Also decides that the working group will convene in Geneva in 2013 for up to three weeks, with the contribution of international organizations and civil society, in accordance with established practice, and will hold its organizational session as soon as possible;

3. Further decides that the working group shall submit a report on its work, reflecting discussions held and proposals made, to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session, which will assess its work, taking into account developments in other relevant forums;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, within available resources, the support necessary to convene the aforementioned working group;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session an item entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”.

Sixty-seventh session
First Committee
Agenda item 94 (h)
General and complete disarmament: convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Indonesia: * draft resolution

**Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament**

The General Assembly, recalling its resolution 65/66 of 8 December 2010, decides to:

(a) Hold, at a later date, an organizational session of the Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament for the purpose of setting a date for its substantive sessions in 2013 and 2014, and submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly;

(b) Include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, a sub-item entitled “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament”.

* On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.