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not been pursued on this issue as recommended in paragraph 4 (b) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

9. The Conference welcomes the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcomed. Completion of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority.

10. The Conference also welcomes the significant unilateral reduction measures taken by other nuclear-weapon States, including the close-down and dismantling of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

11. The Conference welcomes the efforts of several States to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular, through initiatives on the verification, management and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes.

12. The Conference reiterates the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their voluntary withdrawal of all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories.

13. The Conference welcomes the signing, in September 1997, by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America of significant agreements relating to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, including a Memorandum of Understanding. The Conference welcomes the ratification of these documents by the Russian Federation. Ratification of these documents by the other countries remains a priority.

14. The Conference notes the nuclear-weapon States' declaration that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty;

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
   - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
   - Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
   - The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
   - Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
   - A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
   - The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

1. The Conference reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

2. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

New York, 24 April-19 May 2000

Systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally: a food for thought paper

Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Introduction

1. The United Kingdom’s goal is the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The present paper is intended to give a preliminary indication of what the United Kingdom believes will be entailed in pursuing systematic and progressive efforts to achieve this.

Key points

2. In progressing towards this goal there are a number of issues that will need to be considered, but three are of key importance:
   - Nuclear arms control issues;
   - Underlying political issues; and
   - Related security issues.

Nuclear issues

3. In the nuclear sphere itself there are three main kinds of State: the nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Each kind of State has an important contribution to play in making progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons globally.

Nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

4. Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty clearly has a key role to play in movement towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But their nuclear forces vary considerably in size. In particular, there is at present a clear distinction in size between, on the one hand, the nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the United States of America and, on the other hand, the nuclear forces of China, France and the United Kingdom.

5. The United Kingdom recognizes that, aware of their particular situation, the Russian Federation (or its predecessor) and the United States have been negotiating bilaterally since the late 1960s to control and reduce their nuclear forces. With the end of the cold war there has been a decisive shift from control to reduction, through various bilateral agreements and a number of unilateral actions. Moreover, in addition to reducing nuclear forces, much effort has also gone into risk reduction and confidence-building measures and into dealing with the fissile materials now surplus to defence needs in both countries.

6. A crucial strand in any systematic and progressive effort to reduce nuclear weapons globally must be a continuation of these efforts by the Russian Federation and the United States. In particular, it is important that:
– START II and its Protocol should enter into force soon, along with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty-related agreements reached in New York in September 1997;
– Both States should pursue to successful conclusions their discussions on a START III Treaty and on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as set out in their Joint Statement of 20 June 1999.

7. The United Kingdom recognizes that the heavy responsibilities which fall to the Russian Federation and the United States as the largest nuclear-weapon States do not in any way diminish the responsibilities that also fall on the smaller nuclear-weapon States (China, France and the United Kingdom). They can each make an important contribution to the overall effort by:

– Keeping their forces at minimum levels;
– Accepting that in due course they will need to join the larger nuclear-weapon States in negotiations about their nuclear weapons.

8. In addition, even before that moment is reached, and preparatory to it, there are clearly steps that all five of the nuclear-weapon States could usefully take to:

– Minimize the risk of any accidental, unauthorized or mistaken use of nuclear weapons (through the maintenance of robust and effective nuclear command-and-control mechanisms and such measures as hotlines, risk reduction centres, prior notification and exchange of information about ballistic-missile launches, and detargeting agreements);
– Address their total holdings of warheads, including short-range (for example, by being more transparent about them and by working on the verification issues that controlling, reducing and eliminating all nuclear warheads will pose, building on the work already undertaken by some nuclear-weapon States);
– Deal with fissile material issues (for example, by being transparent about their current holdings of fissile material and, as far as possible, about the past production of fissile material for all purposes, identifying any fissile material surplus to their defence needs, placing it under international verification as soon as possible and, in the case of surplus weapons-grade fissile material, considering disposition arrangements for it);
– Pursue the consideration of the issue of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.

Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

9. The 182 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have already made an invaluable contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Without their past willingness to foreshow nuclear weapons, that goal would long before now have become a mirage. Its achievement still remains a possibility because of the restraint that they have shown. The United Kingdom gives full recognition to the vital contribution these States have thereby made towards sustaining the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. It follows that their continued commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains vitally important. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, the commitment of these States is not in any doubt. In many cases it has been further reinforced by additional commitments to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and by a willingness to accept additional safeguards obligations through the conclusion of INFCIRC/540 agreements. Developments such as these continue to facilitate movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons globally.

11. There have, however, been some very regrettable instances of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty falling short of the high standard set by most of them. The clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons programme was exposed by inspections after the Gulf conflict, and there are continuing uncertainties about the past activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Dealing with these situations, and any others like them that may arise in the future, represents one of the most difficult challenges which all other States face in maintaining the conditions for further progress towards nuclear disarmament.

12. The United Kingdom does not claim to have easy solutions to such problems, but it is determined to work with others to deal with them as effectively as possible. Specific approaches have been devised in relation to Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
and the United Kingdom strongly supports Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and the Agreed Framework. But there is clearly room for more thought on generic approaches to such problems. Unless the international community as a whole can address them successfully, the prospects for eliminating nuclear weapons globally will be gravely damaged.

States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

13. The problem of the four remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is another serious challenge that all parties to the Treaty face. The United Kingdom recognizes that Cuba has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco on a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone, and has in practice placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The other three non-parties — India, Israel and Pakistan — have yet to undertake similar measures. These States have made clear that they are firmly convinced that their security positions do not yet permit them to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the only way they can, as non-nuclear-weapon States.

14. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom believes that this objective remains of fundamental importance and that in the meantime it is essential that these States exercise the maximum of restraint if there is to be continuing overall progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Resolution on the Middle East, adopted without a vote by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty set out the steps that States in that region should take. Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) of 6 June 1998 sets out the steps which the two non-parties in South Asia should take.

All States

15. In addition to the particular actions which the different kinds of State can take, there are some actions which all States can usefully take. In particular, they can all sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty if they have not already done so, and they can all work for the successful conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty places important constraints on the development of nuclear weapons, and a fissile material cut-off treaty will be essential to place a limit on the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons.

Underlying political issues

16. While it is clear from the above that every kind of State can make important and immediate contributions in the nuclear sphere itself, it is also clear that what happens in the nuclear sphere is not divorced from underlying political realities. There are no easy answers here. The world would be a better place if nuclear weapons were not still judged to be necessary, but the conditions for complete nuclear disarmament do not yet exist.

17. With the end of the cold war, it has proved possible to make rapid strides towards reducing the nuclear forces of the nuclear-weapon States. But plainly, further progress in this sphere will depend on maintaining good relations between all five of these States. For its part the United Kingdom is committed to achieving this, both bilaterally and collectively.

18. Nor is it an accident that the remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are, with one exception, in parts of the world where political tensions are particularly acute. It will therefore be important for them to work at managing and resolving those tensions. For our part we are working hard to bring about a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, which we hope will have a positive impact on the nuclear policy of that region’s remaining non-party. As for South Asia, we stand ready to offer suitable assistance to the non-parties in that region if they would find that helpful in easing the tensions between them.

19. In noting these points about underlying political issues, the United Kingdom is not trying to make excuses for any State not making progress on the nuclear issues themselves. It is simply drawing attention to the reality that progress on these issues is likely in practice to be very dependent on progress in the wider political sphere, and that therefore this dimension must not be neglected in any systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. Ultimately, to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons it will be necessary to create the conditions in which no State believes them necessary for its security.

Related security issues

20. There are a number of related security issues that will be important in pursuing this goal.
21. One is what happens in relation to other weapons of mass destruction — biological and chemical weapons. Progress towards eliminating nuclear weapons is clearly going to be easier if the Chemical Weapons Convention secures universal adherence and compliance, and if an effective protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is rapidly concluded, adhered to by all and complied with by all. Securing these objectives must therefore be another important dimension in any overall approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons. And implementation of rigorous verification provisions will give added confidence that eventual nuclear disarmament can be properly verified. The United Kingdom is working hard to ensure that both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention demonstrate that a global arms control regime can be made an effective reality.

22. Another complicating factor in the search for nuclear elimination is the developing capability of some countries in the ballistic missile field. By multiplying the potential threats to other countries, this potentially increases the risk of proliferation. So continued efforts to control and reduce the spread of ballistic-missile capabilities must be another crucial element in systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.

23. The best solution would be to achieve a world in which the underlying political tensions that give rise to a sense of insecurity on the part of States have disappeared. In such a world, all States would need to be fully committed to the rule of international law. International rules of law go hand in hand with impartial, non-political arms-control compliance systems. We need to continue building confidence in both. Our efforts in biological and chemical weapons, in verifying conventional arms levels and in pursuing collective security arrangements are all an essential backdrop to creating the conditions for complete nuclear disarmament.

Key tasks

24. It is the United Kingdom’s preliminary view, therefore, that any truly systematic and progressive effort to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with a view to the goal of eliminating them, will have to comprise three key tasks:

- Making progress on the nuclear issues themselves, along the lines set out in paragraphs 3 to 15 above;
- Addressing the underlying political issues along the lines set out in paragraphs 16 to 19 above; and
- Dealing with related security issues along the lines set out in paragraphs 20 to 23 above.

Conclusion

25. The United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to nuclear disarmament. It offers this paper on what pursuing that goal will entail, in the hope that it will provide food for thought by all concerned States.
Further measures to be taken for the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by Japan and Australia

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference is a major achievement in the efforts to realize the goal of the Treaty.

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their commitments to the above-mentioned “Principles and Objectives” and stress that the following further measures should be taken for the implementation of the Treaty:

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

1. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty.

2. The immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament in 1995 and the mandate contained therein and their conclusion preferably before 2003, but not later than 2005, and, pending the entry into force of the treaty, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

3. The immediate entry into force and the full implementation of START II, the early commencement and completion of the negotiations on START III, and continuation of the process beyond START III.

4. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, and the commencement of negotiations involving the nuclear-weapon States for the reduction of nuclear weapons at an appropriate stage.

5. Multilateral discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on possible future steps on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
Nuclear-weapon-free zone

6. The early completion of the negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

Safeguards

7. Universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (corrected)) and early establishment of the “Integrated Safeguards” for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system.

8. The disposition of fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes and placement of such materials and civil fissile materials under appropriate international safeguards with a view to ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.
Implementation of additional measures to help promote nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, through the efforts of the Office of the Atomic Agency for Peace

Submitted by Thailand

1. Thailand has played a key role in helping realize the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) and, in this connection, has organized meetings to promote the development of guidelines on safeguards.

2. The Office of the Atomic Energy Agency for Peace (OAEP) is presently studying the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol and the import and export controls for the Protocol on dual-use equipment/materials, with a view to participating in the said Protocols.

3. An informal inter-agency working group, comprising the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, OEAP and other concerned agencies, has been established to promote greater understanding among concerned Thai agencies and with other countries on issues such as the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction and the security of the State and the region.

4. OAEP has undertaken measures to help ensure implementation of existing obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has participated in the International Monitoring System. In this connection, OAEP is in the process of studying the details regarding the establishment of a radionuclide monitoring station (RN65) in Kampangsaen, Nakorn Pathom Province. Furthermore, OAEP has established two subcommittees to facilitate implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty which have been tasked with the following: (a) finalizing the translation of the Treaty into Thai, and (b) finalizing discussions with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on the draft Facility Agreement with a view to seeking cabinet approval and ratification.
Nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war

Working paper submitted by China

1. The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons must be realized, thus establishing a world free of nuclear weapons. This will fundamentally remove the threat of nuclear weapons to mankind and greatly enhance world peace and security.

2. To achieve the above objectives, all States parties should respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations as well as other basic norms governing international relations, and avoid the use or threat of use of force as a means to pursue national objectives.

3. All States parties should pursue a new security concept based upon mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, commit themselves to the establishment of a just and equitable new international political and economic order so as to ensure common security for all, and create a favourable international environment for progress in nuclear disarmament.

4. Countries should refrain from introducing weapons into outer space and conclude international treaties in this regard through negotiations, so as to maintain global strategic balance and stability and to promote nuclear disarmament.

5. The Treaty of the Limitation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is a cornerstone of global strategic balance and stability. Any damage to or violation of it will have a negative impact on global strategic balance and stability and run counter to the efforts of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

6. Any nuclear disarmament measures, including various interim measures, should follow the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all in a way that is conducive to enhancing international peace and security.

7. The nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in reducing their nuclear arsenals drastically in a legally binding form. The nuclear weapons reduced
should be destroyed. This will create conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join in the nuclear disarmament process.

8. The reduction of nuclear weapons should be carried out according to the principles of being effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally binding.

9. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances and, on that basis, conclude international legal instruments in this regard.

10. The nuclear-weapon States should undertake to withdraw and return home all the nuclear weapons deployed outside of their own territories.

11. The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States offering and receiving “nuclear protection” should forgo their policy of a “nuclear umbrella” and “nuclear-sharing”.

12. No State should research and develop low-yield and more-easily-used nuclear weapons.

13. The nuclear-weapon States should take all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.

14. Countries that have not yet signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should do so as soon as possible so that the Treaty may enter into force at an early date according to its provisions. Nuclear-weapon States should continue their moratoriums on nuclear testing.

15. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should, on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, begin at an early date negotiations on nuclear disarmament and a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

16. Countries that have not yet done so should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at an early date.

17. The above-mentioned measures having been taken, a treaty on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be concluded through negotiations, thus realizing a world free of nuclear weapons.
Steps taken by the People’s Republic of China to further the Middle East peace process and to promote the establishment in the Middle East region of a nuclear-weapon-free zone: national report submitted by China

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to promoting the Middle East peace process and actively supports efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the People’s Republic of China is currently taking the following steps to promote the Middle East peace process and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

I. Urgently appealing to all the parties involved to endeavour to promote the Middle East peace process in a spirit of reconciliation

In dealing with the Middle East question, China upholds the principle of fairness and pursues no self-interest; it has always determined its own position in accordance with the rights and wrongs of any given situation. Acting from the standpoint of fairness, China has always maintained that the spirit of reconciliation should be followed in dealing with Middle East issues, in the belief that “harmony is precious”, and it holds that the negotiation of peace is the only viable option for resolving the Middle East question.

In this spirit, China has all along followed developments in the Middle East with close attention: it sincerely hopes to see progress in the Middle East and does not want the achievements of 10 years’ of Middle East peace negotiations to be set at nought. China voices its serious concern and dismay at the unending violent conflict between Israel and Palestine, which is bringing an increasingly heavy loss of life. China opposes the conduct of any terrorist activities or extreme violence against civilians and supports all mediation efforts by the international community designed to bring about a relaxation of the tensions in the area. China appeals to both the Israeli and Palestinian sides to exercise restraint and remain calm and urges them to adopt practical measures conducive to relaxing the tensions between them, so as to create the necessary conditions at the earliest possible stage for the revival of peace talks.
This spirit of reconciliation lies at the heart of China’s position on how the Middle East question should be tackled. Guided by this spirit, China has made extensive efforts to promote a solution to the Middle East question. The leaders of countries throughout the Middle East have all expressed appreciation for its efforts to calm the dispute between Israel and Palestine and their hopes that China will deploy even greater efforts with a view to relaxing tensions in the area and resuscitating the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

In this spirit, China supports the Arab peace proposal agreed by the Arab League at its fourteenth summit conference in March 2003, and commends Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on his contribution to this initiative.

II. Promoting resolution of the Middle East question through a wide range of mediation efforts at the bilateral level

With a view to helping all the parties concerned reach a peaceful solution to the Middle East question, China has conducted extensive mediation efforts of different kinds in its bilateral contacts with all these countries, as described below.

1. Bilateral mediation efforts with Israel and the Arab countries, through bilateral summit meetings and exchange visits

China has had numerous exchange visits with all the countries of the Middle East. President Arafat of Palestine has visited China 14 times, President Mubarak of Egypt 8 times, the new King of Jordan has also visited China twice since his accession to the throne. High-level government officials from Israel have also made frequent visits to China. Senior Chinese State officials have also visited all the countries of the Middle East on many occasions. Thus, in April 2000, Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin visited Palestine, Israel, Egypt and other Middle East countries. In April 2002, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Egypt, and the Prime Minister of Lebanon visited China. In January 2003, Chinese State councillor Ismail Amat visited Jordan. In June and December 2002, Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang visited Israel, Palestine and Syria. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has conducted separate political consultations with the foreign ministries of Egypt, Israel and Syria.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to the opportunity afforded by bilateral summit meetings and bilateral visits in promoting mediation efforts with all parties of the Middle East. China appreciates the efforts made by all sides in carrying forward the Middle East peace process and encourages them to continue their efforts, to ensure the further deepening of that process. Whenever tensions arise in the Middle East, China consistently advises the parties concerned, pointing out that replacing one form of violence by another form of violence can only deepen mutual hatred and that peace negotiations offer the only legitimate means of resolving the conflict; it appeals to both the Arab and the Israeli sides actively to coordinate the mediation efforts by the international community, to calm the conflict and to return to the path of peace talks.
2. Efforts to relieve tensions in the Middle East through telephone conversations, exchanges of letters and other modalities

In response to developments in the Middle East, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan has frequently made telephone calls, either on request or on his own initiative, to the leaders of Palestine and Israel. He has explained the views held by China with regard to the given situation in the Middle East and urged all the parties involved to exercise restraint, to make every effort to prevent any further escalation of the conflict and to maintain stability in the region, so as to set in place an atmosphere conducive to the early resumption of peace talks. Chinese leaders have often exchanged letters with the leaders of countries in the Middle East, setting forth the Chinese position and actively pursuing mediation efforts with all parties.

3. Appealing for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict, through the issuance of statements by spokesmen setting forth the Chinese position

The Chinese Foreign Ministry pays very close attention to developments in the Middle East situation and, through the medium of statements issued at the appropriate time by its spokesmen, it sets forth the Chinese Government’s position on any given situation in the Middle East, condemns any abusive use of force, appeals to all parties involved to renounce the use of force and to seek a resolution to the Middle East question through peaceful negotiations.

III. Appointment of a special envoy on Middle East issues, and his active participation in international efforts to promote peace

In September 2002, in response to appeals by the countries concerned in the Middle East region, in particular the Arab States, China established a post of special envoy on Middle East issues and appointed an official to that post. In November, the Chinese special envoy on Middle East issues visited Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestine and also held separate meetings with the special representatives of the United States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United Nations, the “quadripartite” group, who were in the Middle East at that time. In these meetings, the special envoy explained China’s position on ways of promoting the Middle East peace process and indicated its support for and readiness to participate in all international efforts designed to restore peace and stability to the Middle East region and its willingness to play an active role in the international conference convened for that purpose. China’s efforts have been welcomed and are highly valued by all the parties involved. The Chinese special envoy on Middle East issues is currently maintaining close contacts and pursuing consultations with both the Arab and the Israeli sides and with other members of the international community concerned with the issue, and will make further visits to the Middle East as and when necessary.
IV. Using the framework of the United Nations as a means of calming the violence in Israel and Palestine and of promoting the Middle East peace process

China has always advocated and supported active use of the United Nations and, in particular, its Security Council as the means of solving the Middle East question and, in fulfilment of its responsibility under the United Nations Charter, calming the violence between Israel and Palestine and preserving peace and security in the Middle East region. China advocates a political solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict through peace negotiations, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the principle of “land for peace” decided upon at the Madrid Conference. Only if all the parties involved conscientiously implement the agreements and understandings already reached will it be possible to establish trust and stabilize the situation, thereby bringing closer fulfilment of an important precondition for long-term peace.

The Chinese Government has undertaken its own efforts to promote the peace process in the Middle East and to put an end to the violent conflict between Israel and Palestine. When, at successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the issue of the Middle East has been debated and when the Security Council considered the draft resolution sponsored by the Non-Aligned Movement on the deployment of United Nations military observers, China has always given its active support and participated in consultations to reach unanimity or voted in favour. China has always supported and actively participated in efforts by the United Nations to resolve the Middle East question. For many years, China has regularly contributed to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and has done everything in its power to help Palestinian refugees. On 12 March 2002, when the Security Council adopted its resolution 1397 (2002) on the situation in the Middle East, China actively participated in the adoption process and voted in support of the resolution.

V. Support for efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

China has long since undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones and has always supported efforts by the countries of the regions concerned, on the basis of voluntary consultations, to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 1992, in its statement upon accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, China made the following solemn appeal: “All nuclear-weapon States should undertake to support the proposed establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, should respect the status of such zones and should enter into corresponding obligations.” We continue to advocate that those States in the Middle East region which are not yet members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should urgently and unconditionally accede to the Treaty and accept the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system.

China fully endorses the provisions of article 7 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” It also supports resolution 49/71 of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted in 1994, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and the relevant stipulations regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East contained in
the resolution on the Middle East question adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. China is of the view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is conducive to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is also fully aware that the risk of nuclear proliferation is all the greater in areas of tension. China has always maintained that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East will be conducive to relaxing tension in that region and promoting the resolution of the Middle East question and, for that reason, from the very outset, it has unequivocally supported the proposed establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The United Nations has adopted numerous resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and on each occasion China has always supported the resolution by voting in its favour. At the same time, China is also taking active steps at the bilateral level to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In high-level meetings between China and the leaders of all the Middle East countries, China invariably conveys its appreciation for the efforts made by all countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and at all times has consistently maintained a very clear position on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It is China’s intention, together with the international community, to continue its efforts and its contribution to the attainment of peace in the Middle East region and, at the earliest possible stage, the establishment in that region of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Working paper on nuclear disarmament and reducing the danger of nuclear war, submitted by China

1. The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons must be accomplished, thereby ushering in a world free of nuclear weapons. This will ultimately remove the threat posed by nuclear weapons to humankind and greatly enhance world peace and security.

2. To achieve the above objective, all States parties should respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and other basic norms governing international relations, settle international disputes by political means and refrain from the resorting at the slightest provocation to the use or threat of force.

3. All States parties should pursue a concept of security based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, should commit themselves to the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is just and equitable so as to ensure common security for all, and should create a positive international environment conducive to progress in nuclear disarmament.

4. Efforts to preserve multilateralism and to combat unilateralism are important means of safeguarding and promoting the international arms control and disarmament process, in particular nuclear disarmament.

5. It is a matter for regret that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has been allowed to lapse. The maintenance of global strategic stability and the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation system is crucial for nuclear disarmament, and also responds to the essential interests of all countries. Missile defence programmes should not upset the global strategic balance and stability, nor undermine international and regional peace and stability.
6. Preserving the weapon-free status of outer space is in the common interest of all countries. To that end, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should undertake negotiations to conclude, at the earliest possible stage, a relevant international legal instrument designed to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and to promote nuclear disarmament.

7. Any nuclear disarmament measures, including all interim measures, should follow the principles of “maintaining global strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all” in a way that is conducive to enhancing international peace and security.

8. The nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals and ensuring that such reductions are made in a legally binding manner. The decommissioned nuclear weapons should be destroyed. This will create conditions enabling other nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear disarmament process.

9. The reduction of nuclear weapons should be carried out in accordance with the principle that it should, among other things, be effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally binding.

10. The role assigned to nuclear weapons in national security policies should be diminished and the policy whereby nuclear attacks may be launched against other countries and the threshold lowered for the use of nuclear weapons should be abandoned.

11. Each nuclear-weapon State must undertake not to aim its nuclear weapons against any other country or to designate any other country as a nuclear strike target.

12. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances and should conclude international legal instruments for that purpose.

13. Nuclear-weapon States that deploy nuclear weapons outside their borders should undertake to withdraw all such weapons and bring them back to their own territory.

14. No research and development work should be conducted on low-yield nuclear weapons, which are more likely to be used.

15. The nuclear-weapon States should take all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.
16. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) marks an important step in the nuclear disarmament process. Countries that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty should do so as soon as possible, so that the Treaty may enter into force at the earliest possible date, in accordance with its provisions. Nuclear-weapon States should maintain their moratoriums on nuclear testing.

17. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should, at the earliest possible date and on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament and a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

18. We welcome and appreciate the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by Cuba. Countries that have not yet done so are urged to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

19. Once the above-mentioned measures have been conducted, a treaty on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be negotiated and concluded, thus bringing into existence a world free of nuclear weapons.
New York, 2-27 May 2005

Working paper on nuclear disarmament for Main Committee I

Recommendations submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition

In the pursuit of the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference, including the unequivocal undertaking and the practical steps on nuclear disarmament, and at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the resolution on the Middle East, as integral parts of that Conference, the New Agenda Coalition reaffirms and augments its positions and recommendations (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/11, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/16, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/9, NPTCONF.2005/PC.I/WP.1, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.10 and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.13), to Main Committee I of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons through the following recommendations:

1. To agree that all States should spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. To call upon all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference.

3. To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.

4. To call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
5. To welcome the importance of maintaining the momentum towards the early establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to build the verification regime.

6. To agree to urgently strengthen efforts towards both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the resumption in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

7. Pending the conclusions of such negotiations to call for the upholding and maintenance of a moratorium on fissile material production for military purposes and the establishment of a regime for transparency and accountability and an appropriate experts group.

8. To stress the need for all five nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

9. To call for the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.

10. To underline the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification capabilities.

11. To agree that the nuclear-weapon States take further measures to de-alert and deactivate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of these weapons.

12. To agree that the nuclear-weapon States take further action towards increasing their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapon arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures and in this context to recall the obligation to report as agreed in step 12.

13. To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear weapon States parties, which could either be in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or as a protocol to the Treaty.
concrete decisions and initiatives by nuclear-weapons States. The nuclear disarmament efforts of the United States and the Russian Federation, including the broad nuclear stockpile reductions by the United States, are continuing. They are also continuing to develop a legally binding arrangement to succeed START I, as agreed to in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration on 6 April this year. The United Kingdom in collaboration with Norway is developing verification technologies for nuclear disarmament. France announced an action plan for the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference in addition to a significant cut in its nuclear arsenal. NPT States Parties should take advantage of these developments to promote constructive discussions on nuclear disarmament at the second session of the Preparatory Committee.

III. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps

3. With a view to contributing to such discussions, firstly Japan would like to emphasize the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the maintenance of existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending its entry into force. Japan also emphasizes the importance of immediately commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion. Furthermore, pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

4. Japan would like to present the following practical nuclear disarmament measures to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States:

   (A) To further reduce their nuclear weapons with transparency.

   (a) Further reduction of nuclear weapons with transparency will serve to promote nuclear disarmament, as well as general and complete disarmament. One of the agreed 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference consists of several sub-steps to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States. Included among these sub-steps is, "increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament."
(b) Despite differences in the interpretation of "nuclear weapons capabilities" as well as in the depth and level of detail, nuclear-weapon States have exercised transparency in their statements and reports on the implementation of Article VI. Nuclear disarmament will further strengthen the trust among NPT States Parties if it is accompanied by transparency measures. Examples of information to be disclosed for increased transparency, although not exhaustive, could include:

(i) extent of reduction in nuclear stockpiles,
(ii) number of reduced nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
(iii) number of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems, as well as the pace of dismantlement, including the types of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
(iv) aggregate number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or those deployed,
(v) extent of reduction in nuclear weapons complex, including reduction in the square footage and the number of personnel,
(vi) years in which the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was ceased,
(vii) amount of fissile material declared excess to and removed from nuclear explosive purposes or national security requirements, and plans for its disposition,
(viii) activities to assist in the removal of fissile material from dismantled weapons,
(ix) efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrine,
(x) plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament measures.

(c) During the 2010 NPT review process, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to provide transparency on the above-mentioned items.

(B) To reaffirm the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility for nuclear disarmament as agreed to as one of the practical steps at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear disarmament with the application of irreversibility will pave the way
towards a world free from nuclear weapons. Exemplary measures on irreversibility that nuclear-weapon States have taken so far are the following:

(i) dismantling nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
(ii) dismantling nuclear testing sites,
(iii) shutting down and dismantling its facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes,
(iv) disposing fissile material declared as excess to national security requirements,
(v) confirming that fissile material voluntarily declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament have not been reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes.

(C) To apply verifiability to nuclear disarmament.
(D) To further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.
(E) To diminish the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
(F) To keep the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons as high as possible.

IV. Conclusion

5. Japan hopes that this working paper on nuclear disarmament will facilitate constructive discussions in the 2010 NPT Review process, leading to an agreement on nuclear disarmament measures to be incorporated into the Final Document or any agreed document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Eleven benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by Japan

I. Introduction

1. Japan has consistently been playing a leading role in the efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, and thus would like to contribute to further strengthening the current momentum towards that goal. The international community should put forward realistic and concrete steps for nuclear disarmament that will maintain international security and stability both in the process leading to the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons and when the goal has been reached.

2. Besides the existing nuclear arsenals that should be significantly reduced by all five nuclear-weapon States that are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and States that have yet to accede to the Treaty and that hold nuclear weapons as mentioned in paragraph 5 below, there are pressing issues, and Japan has the following views on such issues.

   (a) The nuclear programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pose a serious threat to the international community. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should take concrete actions to fully implement the obligations stipulated in relevant Security Council resolutions and agreements reached at the six-party talks.

   (b) The Islamic Republic of Iran needs to clear the concerns of the international community about the nature of its nuclear programme, including activities related to uranium enrichment.

   (c) International cooperation needs to be strengthened to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world, which otherwise might fall into the hands of terrorists.

3. The international community should also continue to seek accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States that have yet to do so. Establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be an integral part of efforts to bring peace and security to this unstable region.
II. Key benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament

4. Japan’s Foreign Minister, Hirofumi Nakasone, presented the following 11 key benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament towards a world free of nuclear weapons on 27 April 2009. They cover three basic areas: (1) steps by all States that hold nuclear weapons; (2) steps by the entire international community; and (3) steps to support States promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan hopes that these benchmarks will facilitate agreement on recommendations at the third session of the Preparatory Committee and will contribute to the success of the 2010 Review Conference.

Steps by all States that hold nuclear weapons

5. Under the first basic area, all States holding nuclear weapons should take concrete measures to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals.

(a) The launching of negotiations on a new nuclear reductions treaty by the United States of America and the Russian Federation has added to the momentum and has set the stage for future efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. Deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals in a transparent manner and nurturing mutual confidence on missile defence in Europe will revitalize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. (Benchmark 1)

(b) All the other States that hold nuclear weapons should contribute to the momentum by also undertaking nuclear reductions in a transparent manner. They should refrain from any build-up of their nuclear arsenals that is contrary to the disarmament efforts by the United States and the Russian Federation. Disarmament steps by China, in particular, are key to making the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world more realistic than ever. Furthermore, it is important that the nuclear disarmament efforts made by the United Kingdom and France over the past several years are further enhanced. (Benchmark 2)

(c) Nurturing a “culture of disclosure” among all the States that possess nuclear weapons is imperative in order to enhance greater mutual confidence for deeper cuts. Japan proposed practical transparency measures to be taken by all States holding nuclear weapons in its working paper submitted in 2008 (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.10). In particular, the information to be disclosed includes “aggregate number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or those deployed”, “extent of reduction in nuclear stockpiles” and “amount of fissile material declared as excess to and removed from nuclear explosive purposes or national security requirements, and plans for its disposition”. Such information should be disclosed sufficiently and on a regular basis. (Benchmark 3)

(d) Japan also stresses the importance of the principle of irreversibility for nuclear disarmament, as agreed to as one of the practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference. This principle should be reaffirmed by all States holding nuclear weapons. Exemplary measures on irreversibility include “dismantling nuclear warheads and delivery systems”, “dismantling nuclear testing sites” and “shutting down and dismantling facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes” (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.10). (Benchmark 4)
(e) More accurate verification will be required as disarmament advances. Studies on the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement such as the initiative of the United Kingdom and Norway are welcomed. (Benchmark 5)

Steps by the entire international community

6. The second basic area consists of measures to be taken by the entire international community, namely multilateral measures. In order to realize a world free of nuclear weapons, it is necessary that, while all States holding nuclear weapons engage in nuclear disarmament, the entire international community adopts and complies with universal norms for disarmament and non-proliferation.

   (a) The testing of nuclear weapons must be banned. In addition to the moratorium on nuclear testing by those States that have declared one, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be promoted, in particular through the ratifications by States that have not yet done so, in particular the United States, China and the three States not signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Benchmark 6)

   (b) The production of fissile material for weapons purposes must be ceased. This will quantitatively restrict the development of nuclear weapons capabilities. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should be commenced immediately. Pending the creation of such a treaty, declarations of a moratorium on the production of fissile materials by all the States that possess nuclear weapons would improve the atmosphere of negotiations. (Benchmark 7)

   (c) The development of missile capabilities, combined with nuclear capabilities, is the source of tension and mistrust in various regions. In order to stop the missile development race, Japan supports the proposal to globalize the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Higher priority needs to be accorded to the consideration of this issue. (Benchmark 8)

Steps to support States promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy

7. In recent years, an increasing number of countries have shown interest in introducing or expanding nuclear power generation from the viewpoint of energy security and the fight against global warming. The third basic area is for the international community to adopt measures to meet such needs of countries promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the following ways.

   (a) Acknowledging the needs of those States promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Japan advocates that it should be the common interest for the international community to assist countries concerned in introducing nuclear power generation in a manner consistent with the principles of nuclear non-proliferation/safeguards, security against terrorism, and safety (3S). Japan has been supporting human resource development and capacity-building, in particular in Asian countries newly introducing nuclear plants. Japan, in cooperation with IAEA, plans to host an international conference in Tokyo late in 2009 on nuclear security related to Asian countries, particularly those introducing nuclear power plants. This will be the second such conference, after the one in 2006, also in Tokyo, whose outcome was highly appreciated. (Benchmark 9)

   (b) Japan believes that it is important to enhance transparency over the nuclear activities of individual countries by ensuring that all countries promoting
peaceful uses of nuclear energy implement the highest level of the IAEA safeguards, specifically, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Model Additional Protocol, and Japan has been actively working towards their universalization. (Benchmark 10)

(c) The threat of nuclear terrorism needs to be countered. To prevent nuclear terrorism, it is imperative to strengthen the security and management of not only nuclear and radiological materials in nuclear power plants and related facilities but also the control of all nuclear and radioactive materials. Japan supports the proposal made by the President of the United States to hold a “global summit on nuclear security” in 2010. (Benchmark 11)
Following that reduction, France’s total arsenal will comprise fewer than 300 nuclear warheads, that is, half the maximum number of warheads that it had during the cold war. In providing this information, France is completely transparent, as it has no other weapons besides those in its operational stocks.

4. As another demonstration of a desire for transparency, the President of the Republic decided to invite international experts to observe the dismantlement of the Pierrelatte and Marcoule facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. France organized this visit on 16 September 2008 for representatives of more than 40 member States of the Conference on Disarmament, and on 16 March 2009 for non-governmental experts. This was the first time a nuclear-weapon State had opened the doors of its former military nuclear facilities.

5. In addition, France has consistently and explicitly worked towards disarmament at the international level. During its Presidency of the European Union in 2008, France was firmly committed to enabling Europe to develop for the first time ambitious initiatives in this field.

III. What France and its European partners propose

6. On the basis of the proposals made by its head of State in Cherbourg, France, together with its European partners, presented a disarmament plan of action with a view to the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, which was endorsed by the European Union’s 27 heads of State and Government in December 2008:

- Universal ratification of the CTBT and completion of its verification regime, and dismantling, as soon as possible, of all nuclear testing facilities, in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community
- Immediate opening, without preconditions, of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and observance of an immediate moratorium on the production of such materials
- Development of confidence-building and transparency measures by the nuclear Powers
- Further progress in the discussions under way between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the development of a legally binding post-START arrangement (negotiations on the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), and overall reduction of global nuclear-weapon stockpiles pursuant to article VI of the NPT, in particular by the States with the biggest arsenals
- Inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those States that have them, in general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination
- Opening of consultations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles
- Universal subscription to and implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct
- Mobilization in all other areas of disarmament.
Annex

Nuclear disarmament: France's practical commitment

Action taken by France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of measure</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scaling down of deterrent forces since the end of</td>
<td>• Complete dismantling of ground-to-ground component</td>
<td>“France applies a principle of strict sufficiency. It maintains its arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context” (Cherbourg speech, 21 March 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the cold war</td>
<td>• Scaling down of naval component: reduction in the number of active ballistic</td>
<td>Of the nuclear-weapon-States that have deployed ground-to-ground nuclear-weapon systems, France is the only one to have eliminated the latter completely.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>missile submarines from six to four</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Scaling down of airborne component:</td>
<td>Taking into account the measures announced by the President of the Republic on 21 March 2008, the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles has been reduced by more than half since 1985.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Early withdrawal of the AN52 nuclear bombs carried by Jaguar and Mirage III aircraft</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Removal of strategic Mirage IV aircraft from nuclear missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• As announced in 2008, reduction by one third of the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft in the airborne component, bringing France's total arsenal to fewer than 300 nuclear warheads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification of the operational characteristics of</td>
<td>• De-targeting announced in 1997 subsequently reaffirmed on several occasions, most recently in 2008</td>
<td>We propose opening consultations on a treaty prohibiting short- and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear forces</td>
<td>• Reduction of alert status of the two components in 1992 and 1996. These alert level reductions affected both the response times of forces and the number of weapons systems</td>
<td>“When international security improves, France acts accordingly [...] I can confirm that none of our weapons are targeted against anyone” (Cherbourg speech).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessation of production of fissile materials for</td>
<td>• Cessation of plutonium production in 1992, and of highly enriched uranium in 1996</td>
<td>France is the only State that has decided to dismantle the facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and has implemented that decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear weapons</td>
<td>• Decision to decommission and dismantle the relevant installations at Pierrelatte and Marcoule. The dismantling process is currently being implemented and entails a cost of €6.1 billion, €1.6 billion of which have already been invested</td>
<td>We call for the immediate opening of negotiations without preconditions on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. We also call upon all concerned States to dismantle their production capabilities.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>We call for the establishment of a moratorium on the production of such materials with immediate effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of measure</td>
<td>Action taken</td>
<td>Comments</td>
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| Cessation of nuclear testing | • Definitive cessation of nuclear testing announced on 20 January 1996  
• Dismantling of the facilities at its Pacific testing centre announced in 1996 and completed in late July 1998  
• Support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by France on 24 September 1996 and ratified on 6 April 1998. Active technical and financial support to the CTBT Provisional Technical Secretariat | The only nuclear-weapon State which has closed and dismantled its nuclear testing centre. France today no longer has facilities allowing it to carry out nuclear tests. We call for the dismantling of all nuclear testing sites, in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community. We call for the universal ratification of the CTBT as well as for the completion of its verification regime. |
| Transparency          | • Doctrine: speech by the President of France delivered on 21 March 2008 explaining the French deterrence doctrine  
• Capacities: the total French arsenal will contain fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. Announcement that France has no nuclear arms in reserve  
• Unprecedented visit by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament (16 September 2008) and non-governmental experts (16 March 2009) to the former Pierrelatte and Marcoule facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons | “I have also decided that France could and should be more transparent with respect to its nuclear arsenal than anyone ever has been. After this reduction, our arsenal will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half of the maximum number of warheads that we had during the cold war. In giving this information, France is being completely transparent because it has no other weapons besides those in its operational stockpile” (Cherbourg speech). France is observing the rules of transparency, which builds confidence. We hope that others will join us on this path. The pursuit of disarmament is based on trust, transparency and reciprocity. We call upon the nuclear powers to agree upon measures of transparency and trust. |
2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan
from the Final Document adopted by 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

I. Nuclear disarmament

• **Action 1**: All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

• **Action 2**: All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

• **Action 3**: In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

• **Action 4**: The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

• **Action 5**: The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:
  
  (a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;
  (b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;
  (c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
  (d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
  (e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
  (f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and
  (g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the above undertakings to the Preparatory Committee at 2014. The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.

- **Action 6**: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

- **Action 7**: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

- **Action 8**: All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

- **Action 9**: The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

- **Action 10**: All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapons States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapons States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

- **Action 11**: Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.
• **Action 12**: All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.

• **Action 13**: All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.

• **Action 14**: The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.

• **Action 15**: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

• **Action 16**: The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

• **Action 17**: In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

• **Action 18**: All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

• **Action 19**: All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil
society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

• **Action 20**: States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

• **Action 21**: As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

• **Action 22**: All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

• **Action 23**: The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

• **Action 24**: The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.

• **Action 25**: The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

• **Action 26**: The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.

• **Action 27**: The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.
• **Action 28**: The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

• **Action 29**: The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.

• **Action 30**: The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

• **Action 31**: The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

• **Action 32**: The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

• **Action 33**: The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

• **Action 34**: The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.

• **Action 35**: The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

• **Action 36**: The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.
• **Action 37**: The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

• **Action 38**: The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

• **Action 39**: States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

• **Action 40**: The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

• **Action 41**: The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

• **Action 42**: The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

• **Action 43**: The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

• **Action 44**: The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

• **Action 45**: The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.
• **Action 46**: The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.

### III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

• **Action 47**: Respect each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

• **Action 48**: Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

• **Action 49**: Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

• **Action 50**: Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

• **Action 51**: Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

• **Action 52**: Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.

• **Action 53**: Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

• **Action 54**: Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.

• **Action 55**: Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.

• **Action 56**: Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

• **Action 57**: Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing
implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

- **Action 58**: Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

- **Action 59**: Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.

- **Action 60**: Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

- **Action 61**: Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.

- **Action 62**: Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

- **Action 63**: Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

- **Action 64**: The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.
20. In taking measures to halt the nuclear arms race, the parties should agree to make the necessary efforts to establish a ban on developing new types of nuclear weapons and producing new nuclear weapons systems. Measures to be taken in this context include the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the conclusion of a multilateral internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; the imposition of a ban on developing new weapons or manufacturing new nuclear weapons systems; and the submission of nuclear-weapons plants to a verification regime.

21. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only effective guarantee against the danger they pose. Pending the achievement of this goal, States parties must take measures to create a climate conducive to promoting détente and trust, fostering non-proliferation and facilitating disarmament. To that end, nuclear-weapon States should review their nuclear doctrine with a view to reducing and eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in their defence and security strategies.

22. In that context, nuclear-weapon States should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defence policies, provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, de-alert nuclear weapons and provide for measures to ensure transparency, irreversibility and verification in the disarmament process.

23. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake to progressively reduce the number of nuclear weapons they possess and ultimately eliminate them completely in accordance with legal instruments upholding the criteria of transparency, irreversibility and verification in order to give effect to the principle of "strict and effective international control".

24. In that connection, the Conference should recommend the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with this question and to consider the possibility of negotiating a specific timetable that would help bring about the total elimination of nuclear weapons, including a treaty imposing a total ban on nuclear weapons.

III. Proposals and recommendations

Based on the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular article VI thereof, and the resolutions and decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, including the 13 practical steps on nuclear disarmament, Algeria is submitting the following recommendations for consideration by the Review Conference:

Principles and objectives of the Treaty

Recommendation 1

Reaffirm that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and provides a framework for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving their complete elimination.
Recommendation 2

Reaffirm that the Treaty includes commitments and mutual rights that rest on three fundamental, complementary and mutually reinforcing pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Recommendation 3

Stress that balanced and full implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty is essential to its credibility and authority. To that end, it is essential for all States parties, regardless of their status, to fulfil all their agreed obligations and all the commitments assumed within the framework of the Treaty and the Review Conferences.

Recommendation 4

Reaffirm the need to achieve balanced results in respect of the three pillars of the Treaty and take practical measures capable of ensuring full compliance with all the obligations and commitments arising therefrom, including the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and the universality of the Treaty.

Cessation of the arms race and disarmament

Recommendation 5

Reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to take action with a view to fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty and, in particular, under article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Recommendation 6

Reaffirm the validity of the commitments undertaken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the measures adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, including the 13 practical steps, in particular, an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, and urge nuclear-weapon States to fulfil them effectively.

Recommendation 7

Urge nuclear-weapon States to provide for other practical measures within the framework of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 8

Emphasize the multilateral approach to the issue of nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should be requested to establish, as part of a programme of work to be agreed by Member States, a subsidiary body that will consider such disarmament.
Recommendation 9

Reaffirm the need to open negotiations over a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, pursuant to report CD/1299 and the mandate that it contains. To that end, the Conference on Disarmament should be requested to put in place, as part of a programme of work to be agreed by Member States, a subsidiary body that will initiate negotiations over that treaty.

Recommendation 10

The urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be underlined, and those Annex 2 States that have not yet ratified the Treaty should be called upon to do so.

Recommendation 11

Emphasize the importance of prohibiting the development of, new nuclear weapons or the production of new nuclear-weapon systems, in conformity with article VI of the Treaty; all nuclear-weapon States should be called upon to take measures to that end.

Recommendation 12

Call upon nuclear-weapon States to make progressive reductions in the number of the nuclear weapons they possess, with a view to the eventual complete elimination of such weapons, in the context of relevant legal instruments.

Reduction of nuclear danger and creation of a climate of trust

Recommendation 13

Underline the importance of the revision by nuclear-weapon States of their doctrines of nuclear deterrence, with a view to creating a climate of trust between States parties that would support the non-proliferation regime and promote nuclear disarmament.

Recommendation 14

Call upon nuclear-weapon States to moderate the role of nuclear arms in their security policies by reducing, inter alia, the operational status of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from high-alert status.

Recommendation 15

Reaffirm the importance of security guarantees whereby non-nuclear-weapon States are assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 16

Call upon nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm undertakings in respect of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, and urge States parties to put in place the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument whereby nuclear-weapon
States undertake, in all circumstances and whatever the conditions, not to use or threaten to use nuclear arms against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Recommendation 17

Reaffirm the importance of the principles of irreversibility, transparency and the verification of nuclear disarmament, in order to create a climate of trust between States parties and give effect to the principle of strict and effective international control. Nuclear-weapon States should be called upon to adhere to those principles in respect of the disarmament measures that they undertake.

Recommendation 18

Reiterate the importance of reporting to States parties on implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States should be called upon to submit reports on that matter.
Annex

Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons

Working paper submitted by the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

Introduction

1. Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

2. To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

3. The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

* Previously issued as document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47.
Plan of action

First phase — 2010 to 2015

A. Measures aimed at reducing the nuclear threat

4. Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;

(b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:

(i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;

(ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;

(c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;

(d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);

(g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;

(h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;

(i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weaponsusable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;

(j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.
B. Measures aimed at nuclear disarmament

5. Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI; and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

6. Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

7. Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

8. Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

9. Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives.

Second phase — 2015 to 2020

Measures aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals and promoting confidence among States

10. Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the:

   (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles;

   (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;

   (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.

11. Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.


13. Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

Third phase — 2020 to 2025 and beyond

Measures aimed at the consolidation of a nuclear-weapon-free world

14. Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the:

   (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons;

   (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”;

   (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.
disarmament regime, raising the threshold for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, preventing a qualitative arms race and reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons in national security strategies. The entry into force of the Treaty would also strengthen confidence in the international security system through the establishment of an effective verification mechanism. In this regard, all Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertakings listed in the 2010 Review Conference action plan should be duly fulfilled. Some positive progress has been made towards the entry into force of the Treaty with the ratification by Indonesia, the first Annex 2 State to ratify since the 2010 Review Conference.

18. In terms of nuclear disarmament verification measures, besides the agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to update the 2000 Agreement concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes and Related Cooperation, no further progress has been made in the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material, particularly weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, designated as no longer required for military purposes, in accordance with actions 16 and 17 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan.

19. Notwithstanding the reaffirmation of the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the call for States parties to make all efforts to promote universal adherence, and not to undertake any actions that could negatively affect the prospects for its universality, no progress has been made in this regard.

The way forward: the 2015 Treaty review cycle

20. Despite the gains made in the implementation of some of the concrete steps agreed at consecutive conferences since the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including through the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and increased transparency measures by some nuclear-weapon States, the threat posed by nuclear weapons remains and the objectives of article VI of the Treaty have not yet been met. The continued existence of nuclear weapons and the threat of their proliferation 43 years after the entry into force of the Treaty and more than 20 years after the end of the cold war contradict commitments made under the Treaty. Accordingly, the 2015 Treaty review cycle must decisively tackle these challenges and address the confidence deficit among States parties to the Treaty. The implementation of disarmament commitments aimed at achieving and sustaining a world free from nuclear weapons should not be postponed.

21. Neither the pursuit nor the retention of nuclear weapons can enhance regional or international security. The nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are a violation of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should fulfil its commitments under the six-party talks, including those set out in the September 2005 joint statement, abandon all nuclear weapons programmes, and return, without delay, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place all of its
nuclear facilities under IAEA verification, with a view to achieving the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

22. This review cycle should be devoted to concrete action, as reflected in the
conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions set out in the Final
Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Accordingly, the nuclear-weapon States
must, without further delay, fulfil their obligations flowing from article VI through
systematic and progressive efforts.

23. As part of this process, it is particularly important that the nuclear-weapon
States engender confidence in their undertakings to implement their commitments,
including through enhanced transparency measures. In this context, the 2010
Review Conference reaffirmed the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to
implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final
Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Accordingly, the nuclear-weapon States
are expected to promptly engage, with a view to accelerating concrete progress on
these steps, including through the measures outlined in action 5. The nuclear
weapon States are urged to report regularly and substantively on progress made in
the implementation of action 5 and, indeed, on the other elements of the action plan.

24. Regarding nuclear arms reductions, it is imperative that the follow-on
measures relating to New START aimed at achieving deeper reductions in the
nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States should address all
deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic.

25. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give effect to action 21 of the
2010 action plan by agreeing as a matter of priority on a standard reporting format
and reporting intervals. Annual reporting would cover an appropriate interval. This
would also be consistent with action 20, which notes that States should submit
regular reports.

26. Furthermore, all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon
States and the States in the region, are called upon to report on the steps taken to
implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, through the United Nations
Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chair
of the Preparatory Committee whose sessions are to be held in advance of that
Conference.

27. The convening of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone
free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction is an essential
element of the 2015 Treaty review cycle. The Secretary-General and depository
States are thus called upon to continue to make all efforts to assist the facilitator in
convening the Conference without further delay. As mandated, the facilitator will
also assist in the implementation of the follow-on steps to be agreed to by the
participating regional States at the Conference towards the full implementation of
the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and will submit reports thereon to the 2015
Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

28. All nuclear-weapon States must initiate or accelerate the development of
multilateral arrangements for placing fissile material no longer required for military
purposes, including weapons-grade plutonium and weapons-grade uranium, under
IAEA verification and make arrangements for the disposition of such material for
peaceful purposes, ensuring that this material remains permanently outside military
programmes in a verifiable manner. In this respect, there is an urgent need to
develop adequate and efficient nuclear disarmament verification capabilities and legally binding verification arrangements.

29. Beyond the requisite actions and reporting set out in the 2010 Review Conference action plan, nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to take additional measures aimed at instilling confidence in the implementation of their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI, and their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and their agreement to apply the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility to nuclear disarmament measures. In addition, all States that are part of military alliances that include nuclear-weapon States should report, as a significant transparency and confidence-building measure, on steps taken or future steps planned to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in collective security doctrines.

30. Building on the agreements reached at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, further concrete measures must be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high-alert status.

31. Since the 2010 Review Conference, awareness has been growing about the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation, as most recently illustrated by the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which was held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March 2013. Given the indiscriminate and disproportionate effects of nuclear weapons, the humanitarian concerns should inform actions and decisions during the 2015 review cycle and beyond.

32. Furthermore, the 2015 Review Conference should work towards the construction of a comprehensive framework of mutually reinforcing instruments for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. In order to be transparent, efficient and credible, such a legally binding framework for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons must include clearly defined benchmarks and timelines, backed by a strong system of verification.

33. State parties to the Treaty should take into account that each unfulfilled agreement and undertaking reached at Review Conferences diminishes the credibility of the Treaty and adds to the confidence deficit among them. The onus is on all States parties to the Treaty to ensure the full and effective implementation of the action plan without delay.
Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Nuclear disarmament forms one of the fundamental pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the course of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty, an integrated and balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place their facilities under the safeguards agreements. In return, the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover, all States parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States parties to peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner. In addition, universality of the Treaty has been assumed as a common international commitment of all States parties.

2. Since 1978, when the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in the disarmament agenda, the international community has had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long-sought goal, as contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 2005 Review Conference was a sad setback in this direction. As reaffirmed in the agreed action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference still constitute the basis of our deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the 2015 Review Conference.

3. With the adoption of the practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty, hopes for the implementation of the disarmament pillar of the Treaty were renewed. The implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty has become instrumental towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. In its action plan, the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to
implement practical steps to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

4. The 2015 Review Conference shall consider national reports of the nuclear-weapon States, to be furnished in accordance with actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan, with respect to their obligations to implement article VI of the Treaty, including measures adopted by them to implement the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

5. The continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads by the nuclear-weapon States still threaten international peace and security. Despite the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as their commitment made at the 2010 Review Conference to accelerate progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising.

6. The non-entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are among the serious setbacks to the implementation of the agreements of the 2000 Review Conference. Moreover, the Moscow Treaty and the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) do not go beyond merely decommissioning nuclear weapons, and their parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons covered under those treaties. They therefore do not abide by the principle of irreversibility, which was agreed by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference and reaffirmed in action 2 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan.

7. During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process. In actions 3 and 5 of the 2010 Review Conference’s action plan, the nuclear-weapon States also reaffirmed their commitment to this end. In spite of that commitment, no practical steps by the nuclear-weapon States have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons.

8. Moreover, in the absence of any mechanism to verify the implementation of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations made or agreements reached regarding the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, and in order to assure the international community of the real reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination, the 2015 Review Conference should establish a standing committee to ensure the implementation of the commitments made with regard to article VI obligations.

9. It should also be highlighted that any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be conducted in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner. Needless to say, such reduction in nuclear
weapons can never be a substitute for the main obligation of the nuclear-weapon States, namely, the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As a first step, a real change is needed regarding the aggressive Nuclear Posture Review of the United States and a removal of the emphasis on the old doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

10. The international community rightly expects that statements on the reduction of nuclear weapons will be materialized and implemented in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Despite these pledges, a review of the new developments in the nuclear policy of the United States shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis of the new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States on maintaining nuclear weapons and the obsolete deterrence policy, the plan to spend an estimated $700 billion on the modernization of American nuclear arsenals, the construction of a new facility for the production of new nuclear weapons, the lack of movement towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the raising of new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the new Nuclear Posture Review are clear indications of the continued policy of this State to evade its nuclear disarmament obligation.

11. The new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States and the Trident plan of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which provide for the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and the targeting of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, are in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its indefinite extension. More worrisome are announcements by France. It has recently announced the addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals. The President of that country was quoted as saying, “French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe’s security”. It appears that this country, in defiance of its international obligations, is seeking new roles for its nuclear forces in order to justify their continued retention. In so doing, it even resorts to irresponsible methods such as the manipulation of intelligence and frightening people to promote programmes that their people would otherwise not support. It is regrettable that, despite the high expectations of the international community regarding the realization of the pledges of the United States on nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, a new extraordinary budget of tens of billions of dollars has been allocated to modernize American nuclear arsenals. The bill was a blow to all hopes created by the rhetoric of the new Administration and a big setback to the Treaty. The Nuclear Posture Review provides for using conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile systems by the United States, while this country has been claiming for a long time that the ballistic missile has no use other than as a means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

12. The Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference have the task of addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of alleviating these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nuclear weapons, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and in foreign countries.
13. Moreover, real concerns of the international community remain over the horizontal proliferation of nuclear-weapons transfers to other countries and the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the danger of using such inhumane weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Ironically, not only do some nuclear-weapon States not take steps towards the total elimination of their arsenals and give no real and unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, but they also threaten to use their weapons against States parties to the Treaty.

14. In accordance with article I of the Treaty, each nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries, and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train in the delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. The new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States has clearly confessed such violations, namely, the deployment of American nuclear weapons in the territories of the European Union, and the Review Conference must seriously address this case of non-compliance. In the same context, the nuclear-sharing between the nuclear-weapon States and between the nuclear-weapon States and non-parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for States parties to the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliance.

15. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its article III (2), states that all States are to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

16. Accordingly, the Review Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty, without exception and with particular regard to the Israeli regime, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continued programme for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries of the Middle East and to international peace and security. The United States is a non-compliant Party in its undertakings under the provisions of the Treaty by continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime of Israel and by strongly supporting this regime by keeping silent in respect of the acknowledgement by the former Prime Minister of Israel of its nuclear arsenal. The policy of inaction of the United States and some other nuclear-weapon States regarding the real threats of the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant forums constitutes an act of horizontal proliferation, adding to their vertical one.

17. The agreement signed by the Director of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and the Chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States, enabling the Zionist regime to access most of the available nuclear data and technology of the United States, is another example of non-compliance by the United States with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It seems that the United States is not shy about supporting that regime’s
nuclear weapon programme, and the disclosed “top secret document dated 23 August 1974” clearly shows the role of the United States in equipping the Zionist regime with nuclear weapons.

18. Although the moratorium on nuclear testing (but not testing using simulations) has been maintained since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, some efforts had been under way in the United States to allocate millions of dollars to the goal of reducing to 18 months the time necessary to resume a nuclear test. This puts into question its commitment to the so-called moratorium. The international community has high expectations that the United States, as a major nuclear-weapon State, will implement its commitments under the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and the agreed action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as one of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.

19. While new issues such as terrorism, threats to non-proliferation and the possible role of terrorist groups in proliferation should be duly dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of preserving nuclear weapons and ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations by certain nuclear-weapon States. Specific threats may not be resolved by resorting to more dangerous weapons that would have catastrophic consequences well beyond any other threats in scope and effects. The main responsibility for nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorist groups from having access to the nuclear weapons or materials within the territory of a nuclear-weapon State or under its jurisdiction or control rests entirely with that State. Pending the total elimination of such weapons, they should take necessary measures to protect their arsenals from any theft and incident.

20. The Treaty review process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and it must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

21. The parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should engage in good faith in the substantive work of the 2015 Review Conference for the prompt and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty, including article VI, and the commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

22. The international community cannot wait forever to witness the total elimination of nuclear weapons. To that end, the 2015 Review Conference should adopt a clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI, namely 2025, as proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

23. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran is also of the firm belief that early negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention should be started in the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to the legal prohibition, once and for all,
of the possession, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons. In this context, it welcomes the convening of a high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which will be held in New York on 26 September 2013, as a concrete contribution to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. It encourages all States to actively participate in that important meeting at the highest level. Until the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and their unequivocal commitments undertaken at the successive Review Conferences and refrain from:

(a) Any kind of development of and research on nuclear weapons;
(b) Any threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty;
(c) Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities;
(d) The deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries;
(e) Maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

24. Continued lack of transparency regarding the nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States is a matter of serious concern to the States parties to the Treaty. The few pieces of news on submarine accidents leaked to the media show the scale of the dangers to international peace and security, as well as the great challenges created by the existing nuclear arsenals to the survival of mankind and the environment. Since 2000, the collisions and failures of nuclear submarines of the United Kingdom, including HMS Superb in May 2008, have been a great source of concern for the international community and posed an immense risk to the marine environment. During this period, HMS Triumph, HMS Trafalgar and HMS Tireless had similar catastrophic incidents. In particular, in February 2009, the incident between the British nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard and the French nuclear submarine Le Triomphant in the Atlantic Ocean was of serious concern to the international community. Such cases of accidents involving nuclear weapons proved once more the righteousness of the international calls for the immediate realization of a world free from nuclear arsenals through the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

25. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the Treaty. The final document of the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed, in the second paragraph of its section on article VII, the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding and unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the Review Conference. In the light of that agreement, the 2015 Review Conference should prepare recommendations on unqualified negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

26. The failure of past Review Conferences to produce recommendations on the security assurances necessitates a concrete measure to be taken by the 2015 Review Conference to revitalize international efforts in this regard.
27. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to firmly believe that the Review Conference should establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

28. As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use or threat of use and negative security assurances, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to believe that, as suggested by the non-governmental organization community, the Review Conference should adopt a decision by which the Conference decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty shall be prohibited.

29. The General Assembly, at its sixty-sixth session, adopted resolution 66/28, entitled “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in which it called for, inter alia, practical steps to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promoted international stability and, based upon the principle of undiminished security for all:

(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

30. These required measures by the international community could be considered as a basis for the 2015 Review Conference for further elaboration.

31. In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that maintaining the established delicate balance between the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital to preserving the credibility and integrity of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligations pending the full implementation of outstanding nuclear disarmament undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States.