Generic Preventive Measures - Checklist
To assist States with the implementation of Article 9 and Part 3 of the Technical Annex, in 2009 the then Coordinator on Generic Preventive Measures, Colonel Jean-Christophe Le Roux of France, developed a questionnaire which serves as a checklist for States to consider when they are developing procedures, guidelines or regulations on the implementation of generic preventive measures. The checklist has been reproduced in full below. It can also be found in Protocol V document CCW/P.V/CONF/2010/6/Add.1, 11 November 2010. Essentially the checklist is a tool to facilitate the implementation of generic preventive measures. While it does not have any legal status, it is hoped that the checklist will clarify various issues, establish best practises and serve to monitor and improve the implementation of generic preventive measures at the national level.
1. Specification
2. Concept
3. Development
Reducing UXO sensitivity
Reducing potential civilian casualties from ERW
Qualification work
4. Production
(a) Has the production process been qualified?
(b) Are critical characteristics for safety and UXO rate, defined in safety assessment studies, checked during production?
(c) Have the production process quality assurance methods been validated?
(d) Is there assembly line/configuration management in place during production to record batches of munitions and parts? (e.g.: to permit investigation of defaults found during tests, training and use)?
(e) When some parts of munitions are stored during the manufacturing process, are conditions and limited durations of storage known and applied? Are the parts checked before using?
(f) Is the acceptance test procedure defined in accordance with national or international standards?
5. Utilisation - 5.1 Storage
5.2 Transportation and handling
5.3 Training
5.4 Using
6. Support - 6.1 maintenance of weapon system, munitions and packaging
6.2 In service surveillance
6.3 Documentation
7. Disposal Identification
Procedures
Information to other parties
8. COTS and MOTS
(a) Is the initial specification and qualification report or matrix known to the new customer and is it compliant with his own requirements?
(b) Are there some initial deviations from the initial specification?
(c) Are there some user’s documentations which define recommendation for storage, transport, handling, use, training, monitoring…?
(d) Are these recommendations applied?
(e) In case of modification, is there an analysis with justifications to determine which analysis and trials are necessary for munitions to perform again?
(f) If munitions are already in military storage for a few years, are there some guarantees, justifications (by analysis or trials) about reliability and safety?
9. Others questions for storage related to safety
List of abbreviations
ALARP: As Low As is Reasonably Practicable
AXO: Abandoned explosive Ordnance
BIT: Built In Test
CCW: Certain Conventional Weapons
COTS: Commercial Off The Shelf
EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW: Explosive Remnants of War (see definition in convention on CCW)
HCP: High Contracting Party
MOTS: Modified Off The Shelf
RFID: Radio Frequency Identification Device
UXO: Unexploded Ordnance (see definition in convention on CCW)