

INFORMAL ADVANCE REPORT OF THE MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

Introduction

1. The Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.VI/6), in the Decisions and Recommendations section, contained the following decision:

“The Conference decides:

(a) To hold four annual meetings of the States Parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2007, prior to the Seventh Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2011, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:

(i) Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions;

(ii) Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation of the Convention;

(iii) National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins;

(iv) Oversight, education, awareness raising and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention;

(v) With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields;

(vi) Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems.

(b) Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a one week meeting of experts. The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of States Parties will be as follows: items (i) and (ii) will be considered in 2007; items (iii) and (iv) in 2008; item (v) in 2009; and item (vi) in 2010. The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, the second by a representative of the Eastern

European Group, the third by a representative of the Western Group, and the fourth by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States.

- (c) The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work;
- (d) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or results by consensus;
- (e) The Seventh Review Conference will consider the work and outcome of these meetings and decide on any further action.”

2. The 2007 Meeting of States Parties decided that the 2008 Meeting of Experts would be held in Geneva from 18 to 22 August 2008, and that the 2008 Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva from 1 to 5 December 2008, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.

3. By resolution 62/60, adopted without a vote on 5 December 2007, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences including all assistance to the annual meetings of the States parties and the meetings of experts.

4. The 2008 Meeting of Experts convened in Geneva from 18 to 22 August 2008. At its closing meeting on 22 August 2008, the Meeting of Experts adopted its Report by consensus (BWC/MSP/2008/MX/3).

Organization of the Meeting of States Parties

5. In accordance with the decision of the 2007 Meeting of States Parties, the 2008 Meeting of States Parties was convened at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 1 to 5 December 2008, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Georgi Avramchev of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

6. At its first meeting, on 1 December 2008, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its agenda (BWC/MSP/2008/1) and programme of work (BWC/MSP/2008/2) as proposed by the Chairman. The Chairman also drew the attention of delegations to two reports: the report of the Implementation Support Unit (BWC/MSP/2008/3) and a report on universalization activities prepared by the Chairman (BWC/MSP/2008/4).

7. At the same meeting, following a suggestion by the Chairman, the Meeting of States Parties adopted as its rules of procedure, *mutatis mutandis*, the rules of procedure of the Sixth Review Conference, as contained in Annex II of the Final Document of the Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6).

8. Mr. Richard Lennane, Head of the Implementation Support Unit, served as Secretary of the Meeting of States Parties. Mr. Piers Millett, Political Affairs Officer, Implementation Support Unit, served as Deputy Secretary. Ms. Ngoc Phuong Huynh, Associate Political Affairs Officer, Implementation Support Unit, and Ms. Tiffany Limtanakool served in the Secretariat.

Participation at the Meeting of States Parties

9. Ninety seven States Parties to the Convention participated in the Meeting of States Parties as follows: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

10. In addition, five states that had signed the Convention but had not yet ratified it participated in the Meeting of States Parties without taking part in the making of decisions, as provided for in rule 44, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure: Burundi, Egypt, Haiti, Nepal, and the Syrian Arab Republic.

11. One state, Israel, neither party nor signatory to the Convention, participated in the Meeting of States Parties as an observer, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 (a).

12. The United Nations, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), attended the Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 3.

13. The European Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross, INTERPOL, the World Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) were granted observer status to participate in the Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 4.

14. Seventeen non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the Meeting of States Parties under rule 44, paragraph 5.

15. A list of all participants in the Meeting of States Parties is contained in document BWC/MSP/2008/INF.2.

Work of the Meeting of States Parties

16. In accordance with the programme of work (BWC/MSP/2008/2), the Meeting of States Parties heard a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations and held a general debate in which the following 23 States Parties made statements: Algeria, Australia (on behalf of the Western Group), Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba (on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States), France (on behalf of the European Union), Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian

Federation, South Africa, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America. One international organisation also participated in the general debate.

17. Between 1 and 3 December, the Meeting of States Parties held a number of working sessions devoted to national, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins (agenda item 6) and to oversight, education, awareness raising and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention (agenda item 7). On 4 December, one working session was devoted to reports from the Chairman and States Parties on universalization activities (agenda item 8) and the report of the Implementation Support Unit (agenda item 9).

18. In the course of its work, the Meeting of States Parties was able to draw on a number of working papers submitted by States Parties, as well as on statements and presentations made by States Parties, international organizations and the Implementation Support Unit, which were circulated in the Meeting.

19. With respect to both topics of the Meeting, States Parties recognised the need for proportional measures, for carefully assessing risks, for balancing security concerns against the need to avoid hampering the peaceful development of biological science and technology, and for taking national and local circumstances into account.

20. Having considered national, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, and recognising the need to take into account respective national circumstances and legal and regulatory processes, States Parties noted their common understanding that in the context of the Convention, *biosafety* refers to principles, technologies, practices and measures implemented to prevent the accidental release of, or unintentional exposure to, biological agents and toxins, and *biosecurity* refers to the protection, control and accountability measures implemented to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of biological agents and toxins and related resources as well as unauthorized access to, retention or transfer of such material.¹

21. Recognising that biosafety and biosecurity measures contribute to preventing the development, acquisition or use of biological and toxin weapons and are an appropriate means of implementing the Convention, States Parties agreed on the value of:

- (i) National authorities defining and implementing biosafety and biosecurity concepts in accordance with relevant national laws, regulations and policies, consistent with the provisions of the Convention and taking advantage of relevant guidance and standards, such as those produced by the FAO, OIE and WHO;
- (ii) National governments taking the leading role, including by nominating a lead agency (or focal point), specifying mandates for participating departments or agencies, ensuring effective enforcement and regular review of relevant measures, and

¹ This constitutes an understanding and is not a definition of biosafety and biosecurity. It is not binding on States Parties.

integrating such measures into relevant existing arrangements at the national, regional and international level;

- (iii) National governments, supported by other relevant organisations as appropriate, using tools such as: accreditation, certification, audit or licensing for facilities, organizations or individuals; requirements for staff members to have appropriate training in biosafety and biosecurity; mechanisms to check qualifications, expertise and training of individuals; national criteria for relevant activities; and national lists of relevant agents, equipment and other resources.
- (iv) Ensuring measures adopted are practical, sustainable, enforceable, are readily understood and are developed in concert with national stakeholders², avoid unduly restricting the pursuit of the biological sciences for peaceful purposes, are adapted for local needs, and appropriate for the agents being handled and the work being undertaken, including through applying appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies.
- (v) Building networks between scientific communities and academic institutions and increasing interaction with professional associations and working groups at the national regional and international level, including through dedicated workshops, seminars, meetings and other events, as well as using modern information technologies and appropriate risk communication strategies and tools;
- (vi) International cooperation on biosafety and biosecurity at the bilateral, regional and international levels, in particular to overcome difficulties encountered by some States Parties where additional resources, improved infrastructure, additional technical expertise, appropriate equipment and increased financial resources are needed to build capacity.
- (vii) The Implementation Support Unit, in accordance with its mandate, facilitating networking activities, maintaining lists of relevant contacts, and acting as a clearing house for opportunities for international cooperation and assistance on biosafety and biosecurity, including through tools such as a database containing information on such opportunities for international cooperation and assistance.

22. States Parties noted that pursuing biosafety and biosecurity measures could also contribute to the fulfilment of their other respective international obligations and agreements, such as the revised International Health Regulations of the WHO, and relevant codes of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). The States Parties recalled United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) that places obligations on all states and is consistent with the provisions of the Convention³.

² In this report, the term “stakeholders” refers, as appropriate according to national circumstances, to relevant actors such as scientists, researchers and other professionals in the life sciences; editors and publishers of life science publications and websites; and organizations, institutions, government agencies, and private companies acting in life sciences research or education, and any other legal entity that is involved in the stockpiling, transport or use of biological agents, toxins or other resources relevant to the Convention.

³ See BWC/CONF.VI/6, Part II, paragraph 17.

23. Recalling that the Sixth Review Conference stressed the legal obligation to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, States Parties recognised the value of cooperation and assistance to build biosafety and biosecurity capacity, particularly in States Parties in need of assistance in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases and related research.

24. States Parties encouraged those States Parties in a position to do so to provide assistance, upon request, to other States Parties to enact and improve national legislation to implement biosafety and biosecurity; to strengthen laboratory infrastructure, technology, security and management; to conduct courses and provide training; and to help incorporate biosafety and biosecurity in existing efforts to address emerging or re-emerging diseases. States Parties noted that where relevant assistance is currently available bilaterally and regionally, as well as through international organisations, those seeking assistance are encouraged, as appropriate, to make use of existing offers to the fullest extent possible.

25. Having considered the oversight of science, States Parties recognised the value of developing national frameworks to prohibit and prevent the possibility of biological agents or toxins being used as weapons, including measures to oversee relevant people, materials, knowledge and information, in the private and public sectors and throughout the scientific life cycle. Recognising the need to ensure that such measures are proportional to risk, do not cause unnecessary burdens, are practical and usable and do not unduly restrict permitted biological activities, States Parties agreed on the importance of involving national stakeholders in all stages of the design and implementation of oversight frameworks. States Parties also noted the value of harmonizing, where possible and appropriate, national, regional and international oversight efforts.

26. States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines, have a clear understanding of the content, purpose and foreseeable social, environmental, health and security consequences of their activities, and are encouraged to take an active role in addressing the threats posed by the potential misuse of biological agents and toxins as weapons, including for bioterrorism. States Parties noted that formal requirements for seminars, modules or courses, including possible mandatory components, in relevant scientific and engineering training programmes and continuing professional education could assist in raising awareness and in implementing the Convention.

27. States Parties agreed on the value of education and awareness programmes:

- (i) Explaining the risks associated with the potential misuse of the biological sciences and biotechnology;
- (ii) Covering the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on those using the biological sciences;
- (iii) Providing guidance on the types of activities which could be contrary to the aims of the Convention and relevant national laws and regulations and international law;

- (iv) Being supported by accessible teaching materials, train-the-trainer programmes, seminars, workshops, publications, and audio-visual materials;
- (v) Addressing leading scientists and those with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications at a senior level, as well as future generations of scientists, with the aim of building a culture of responsibility;
- (vi) Being integrated into existing efforts at the international, regional and national levels.

28. Having considered codes of conduct, States Parties agreed that such codes can complement national legislative, regulatory and oversight frameworks and help guide science so that it is not misused for prohibited purposes. States Parties recognised the need to further develop strategies to encourage national stakeholders to voluntarily develop, adopt and promulgate codes of conduct in line with the common understandings reached by the 2005 Meeting of States Parties and taking into account discussions at the 2008 Meeting of Experts.

29. States Parties noted the importance of balancing "top-down" government or institutional controls with "bottom-up" oversight by scientific establishments and scientists themselves. Within the framework of oversight, States Parties recognised the value of being informed about advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention and the necessity of strengthening ties with the scientific community. States Parties welcomed the important contributions made to their work by the scientific community and academia, including national and international academies of science and professional associations, as well as industry-led initiatives to address recent developments in science and technology, and encouraged greater cooperation between scientific bodies in various States Parties.

30. The States Parties further considered that in pursuing the above understandings and actions, States Parties could, according to their respective circumstances and constitutional and legal processes, take into account the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions made by delegations on the topic under discussion at the Meeting of Experts, as contained in Annex I of the Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWC/MSP/2008/MX/3), as well as the synthesis of these considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals contained in BWC/MSP/2008/L.1, which is attached to this report as Annex I. This annex was not proposed for adoption as an outcome of the Meeting, and therefore was not discussed with that aim. Thus, the annex was not agreed upon and consequently has no status.

31. States Parties are encouraged to inform the Seventh Review Conference of, *inter alia*, any actions, measures or other steps that they may have taken on the basis of the discussions at the 2008 Meeting of Experts and the outcome of the 2008 Meeting of States Parties, in order to facilitate the Seventh Review Conference's consideration of the work and outcome of these meetings and its decision on any further action, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6, Part III, paragraph 7 (e)).

32. The Meeting of States Parties reviewed progress towards obtaining universality for the Convention and considered the Report from the Chairman on Universalization Activities (BWC/MSP/2008/4), as well as reports from States Parties on their activities to promote

universalization. The States Parties reaffirmed the particular importance of the ratification of the Convention by signatory states and accession to the Convention without delay by those which have not signed the Convention, contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. In this context, the Meeting took note of the reports, and called on all States Parties to continue to promote universalization, and to support the universalization activities of the Chairman and the Implementation Support Unit, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.

33. The Meeting of States Parties also considered the Report of the Implementation Support Unit (BWC/MSP/2008/3), including the report on participation in the confidence-building measures (CBMs). The Meeting took note of the Report, and expressed its satisfaction with the work of the Implementation Support Unit. The Meeting noted with concern that participation in the confidence-building measures had fallen slightly since 2007, and encouraged all States Parties to make an annual CBM submission in accordance with the decisions of the respective Review Conferences, seeking assistance through the Implementation Support Unit where required. The Meeting called on States Parties to continue working closely with the Implementation Support Unit in fulfilling its mandate, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.

Documentation

34. A list of official documents of the Meeting of States Parties, including the working papers submitted by States Parties, is contained in Annex II to this Report. All documents on this list are available on the Implementation Support Unit website at <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> and through the United Nations Official Document System (ODS), at <http://documents.un.org>.

Conclusion of the Meeting of States Parties

35. At its closing meeting on 5 December 2008, the Meeting of States Parties approved the nomination by the Western Group of Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada to be Chairman of the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties in 2009. The Meeting decided that the Meeting of Experts would be held in Geneva from 24 to 28 August 2009, and that the Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva from 7 to 11 December 2009, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.

36. At the same meeting, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its Report by consensus, as contained in document BWC/MSP/2008/CRP.1, as orally amended, to be issued as document BWC/MSP/2008/5.

Annex I

SYNTHESIS OF CONSIDERATIONS, LESSONS, PERSPECTIVES, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS DRAWN FROM THE PRESENTATIONS, STATEMENTS, WORKING PAPERS AND INTERVENTIONS ON THE TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING OF EXPERTS

I. National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins

Concepts and approaches

1. In the context of the Convention, States Parties use the terms:
 - (i) *Biosafety* to refer to the principles, technologies, practices and measures implemented to prevent the accidental release of, or unintentional exposure to, biological agents and toxins, and to protect people and the environment from the effects of such release or exposure; and
 - (ii) *Biosecurity* to refer to the protection, control and accountability measures implemented to prevent the unauthorized access, retention, loss, theft, misuse, transfer, diversion or intentional release of biological agents and toxins.

2. Recognising that effective biosafety and biosecurity measures can contribute to efforts to prevent the development, acquisition or use of biological weapons and are an important means of implementing the provisions of the Convention, States Parties should develop and implement biosafety and biosecurity measures that:
 - (i) Are based on existing guidance and standards, such as those provided by relevant international and regional organizations (including WHO, OIE and OECD) and professional and scientific bodies (such as the regional biosafety associations);
 - (ii) Are practical, sustainable and enforceable, tailored to the specific circumstances, regulatory systems, resources and requirements of the State Party concerned, and readily understood by the relevant personnel;
 - (iii) Involve all relevant stakeholders, including government, the scientific community, commercial industry and academia;
 - (iv) Address resources relevant to humans, animals and plants;
 - (v) Make use of risk management techniques and approaches;
 - (vi) Avoid unduly restricting the pursuit of the biological sciences for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

3. As appropriate according to their respective national circumstances, when developing and implementing biosafety and biosecurity measures, States Parties should:

- (i) Create and regularly review a national framework for the supervision and oversight of relevant resources, including by identifying a lead agency or focal point and clearly specifying the mandates of each participating department or agency;
- (ii) Establish effective and efficient accreditation and certification systems for organizations, facilities and individuals engaged in relevant biological research and development;
- (iii) Develop lists of relevant agents, equipment and other resources to be covered by regulation and accreditation;
- (iv) Tailor access control, physical security measures, personnel security, material control and accountability as well as transport and information security to the needs of individual facilities, depending upon the organisms being handled and the work being carried out;
- (v) Cover the full cycle of relevant activities, including production, use, storage, transport, and transfer;
- (vi) Develop compulsory or certified curricula and associated training programmes for relevant personnel, such as biosafety and biosecurity officers;
- (vii) Ensure that adequate preparedness and response capacity exists in case of failures in biosafety or biosecurity, possibly through the use of emergency planning.

4. In addition, depending on their national circumstances and legal and constitutional processes, States Parties should consider means to ensure that individual facilities:

- (i) Certify the qualifications, expertise and training of individuals involved in relevant activities, where appropriate through formal security vetting procedures;
- (ii) Require institutional biosafety and biosecurity officers to be responsible for meeting relevant legislation, regulations and guidance;
- (iii) Require senior managers to regularly review safety and security measures and check that all staff are trained in safety and security practices and maintain scrupulous adherence to the relevant procedures.

5. In order to develop relationships with and cooperation among relevant stakeholders, and in the interests of national, regional and international coordination and harmonization, States Parties should:

- (i) Establish and support national and regional biosafety associations or working groups;
- (ii) Develop standing arrangements, using modern communication tools, to inform stakeholders of any changes in legislation, regulations, or guidance;
- (iii) Use relevant regional forums to build networks between stakeholders and support national efforts to improve biosafety and biosecurity measures;
- (iv) Actively engage the private sector, including through the institutional management of facilities involved in relevant activities, as well as technical visits;
- (v) Hold biosafety and biosecurity workshops and seminars, especially at the regional level.

Building capacity

6. In order to build their biosafety and biosecurity capacity and improve laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins, States Parties should:

- (i) Work with the relevant international organisations such as WHO, FAO and OIE, in particular through their relevant laboratory capacity building programmes, to strengthen the ability and capacity of national public health, veterinary and agricultural services;
- (ii) Facilitate the exchange and sharing of relevant resources by harmonizing national legislative and regulatory regimes dealing with the full spectrum of biological risks, and improving cooperation between government departments and agencies, including those not traditionally involved in arms control;
- (iii) Encourage networking among biosafety and biosecurity professionals both nationally and internationally;
- (iv) Assist in the development and sharing of biosafety and biosecurity training programmes during all stages of education and employment;
- (v) Identify channels and partners to assist in the implementation of efforts to enhance biosafety and biosecurity capacity, including through the relevant professional and scientific organisations.

7. As part of efforts to strengthen implementation of the Convention and promote international cooperation in the biological sciences for peaceful purposes, States Parties in a position to do so should provide, upon request, assistance to other States Parties to build capacity in biosafety and biosecurity, including through:

- (i) Tailoring capacity-building efforts to specific national requirements to help States Parties develop or strengthen relevant capacities according to their needs and priorities;
- (ii) Strengthening laboratory infrastructure, technology, security and management;
- (iii) Developing curricula for primary, secondary and tertiary education and providing ongoing professional training for relevant technical personnel.
- (iv) Adapting efforts to enhance national capabilities in addressing challenges such as emerging and re-emerging diseases to also address biosafety and biosecurity;
- (v) Ensuring that efforts to deal with biosafety and biosecurity also address issues such as building quality, maintenance, sustainability and intangible resources.

Risk management

8. Recognising the value of using a risk management approach to developing and implementing effective biosafety and biosecurity measures, States Parties should:

- (i) Base risk assessments on common elements and guidance developed at the international level, implemented nationally and tailored to their specific domestic requirements.
- (ii) Ensure biosafety and biosecurity risk assessments cover risks to humans, animals and plants.
- (iii) Take advantage, where appropriate, of guidance and assistance provided by relevant international organizations, and involve key stakeholders from the scientific and technology communities;
- (iv) Decide on what levels of risk are to be considered acceptable, as zero risk is often unachievable;
- (v) Consider risk management options for people (including personnel, visitors, incident response plan, staff training and developing a biosecurity-conscious culture), material (including supply, control, accountability, and transport security) and information;
- (vi) Develop risk communication strategies to improve communications with stakeholders and the general public.

II. Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention

Oversight of science

9. Recognizing the value of developing national frameworks for the oversight of science as part of their efforts to exclude the possibility of biological agents or toxins being used as weapons, States Parties should:

- (i) Ensure that oversight measures are balanced and proportional to the risk, to avoid creating undue restrictions on scientific research, development, publication and biotechnology;
- (ii) Balance "top-down" government or institutional controls, such as licensing, with "bottom-up" oversight by scientific establishments and scientists themselves, such as peer-review;
- (iii) Involve the relevant stakeholders in all stages of the design and implementation of oversight frameworks, including experts from across government, regulatory authorities, funding bodies, academia (both administrators and practitioners), industry, publishing, social science and ethics, as well as civil society;
- (iv) Ensure that oversight mechanisms do not cause unnecessary burdens, are practical and useable, have meaning for those that will need to use them, and engender a sense of ownership among stakeholders;
- (v) Ensure that oversight mechanisms cover people, resources and knowledge, in both the public and private sectors, throughout the scientific life cycle, including during the proposal, funding, execution and dissemination stages;
- (vi) Adopt measures to protect scientists who raise concerns over activities that might violate the Convention or relevant national legislation or regulations (whistleblowers);
- (vii) Where possible and appropriate, harmonize national, regional and international oversight mechanisms;
- (viii) Regularly review scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, and consider creating an international scientific advisory panel to independently analyze such developments.

Education and awareness-raising

10. Recognizing the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines, have a clear understanding of the content, purpose and foreseeable social, environmental, health and security consequences of their activities, and take a more active role in addressing the threats posed by biological weapons, States Parties should develop, implement and support education and awareness-raising programmes that:

- (i) Involve, and are developed in collaboration with, all relevant stakeholders from both public and private institutions and associations, as well as managers and

administrators of universities, research institutions and commercial companies, and individual scientists;

- (ii) Explain the risks associated with the malign use of the biological sciences and biotechnology and the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on those using the biological sciences;
- (iii) Provide guidance on the types of activities which could be contrary to the aims of the Convention and relevant national and international laws and regulations, including on the export and import of biological resources;
- (iv) Are tailored to the target audiences – not all stakeholders need to receive the same message.

11. Depending on their national circumstances, in pursuing such programmes States Parties should:

- (i) Establish formal requirements in relevant scientific and engineering training programmes and continuing professional education, such as mandatory seminars, modules or courses;
- (ii) Create accessible teaching materials which address the Convention, relevant national laws and guidelines, and related issues;
- (iii) Use train-the-trainer programmes to ensure that there are sufficient properly-qualified individuals to run education and awareness-raising activities;
- (iv) Make use of, and provide the resources for, seminars, workshops, publications, and audio-visual materials;
- (v) Develop targeted outreach strategies for senior scientists with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications;
- (vi) Coordinate outreach activities on the Convention with parallel initiatives in other settings, such as those undertaken on biosafety and biosecurity by WHO, efforts by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, etc;
- (vii) Support regional and international education and awareness-raising activities, and assist and cooperate with other States Parties.

Codes of conduct

12. Recognizing that codes of conduct can complement national legislative and regulatory frameworks and help guide scientific research so that it is not misused for prohibited purposes, States Parties should develop strategies to encourage stakeholders – including researchers and other professionals in the life sciences; editors and publishers of life science publications and websites; and organizations, institutions, government agencies, and private companies that conduct, license, fund, facilitate, inspect or evaluate life sciences research or education, or that

are involved in the stockpile or transport of dual-use biological agents or toxins – to develop, adopt and promulgate codes of conduct that:

- (i) Cover ethical and moral obligations throughout the scientific life cycle, including during the proposal, funding, execution and dissemination stages;
- (ii) Refer to the Convention and relevant international and national legislation and regulations;
- (iii) Wherever possible, are built on existing arrangements and practices and/or derived from general overarching principles, tailored to precise national or institutional requirements taking into account relevant cultural and social backgrounds.
- (iv) Avoid impeding scientific discovery or placing constraints on research or international cooperation and exchanges for peaceful purposes;
- (v) Provide concise, practical guidelines, including criteria to define sensitive research and identify areas of greatest risk;
- (vi) Include a mechanism for investigating and dealing with possible violations of the code;
- (vii) Continue to be discussed and reviewed at international, regional and national scientific conferences and workshops, as well as in relevant publications.

13. States Parties should encourage stakeholders to ensure that codes of conduct require those to whom they apply to:

- (i) Comply with relevant international and national legislation and regulations, and follow existing basic guidelines and best practices, including in areas such as awareness, safety and security, shipment and transport, education and information, accountability, publication policy, internal and external communication, and oversight;
- (ii) Be alert to potential misuse of research, and assess their own research for dual-use potential;
- (iii) Seek to stay informed of literature, guidance, and requirements related to dual-use research;
- (iv) Educate others, and serve as role models of responsible behaviour;
- (v) Report concerns and possible violations as appropriate.

Annex II

LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

BWC/MSP/2008/1	Provisional Agenda Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2008/2	Provisional Programme of Work Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2008/3	Report of the Implementation Support Unit Submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2008/4	Report of the Chairman on Universalization Activities Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2008/5	Report of the Meeting of States Parties
BWC/MSP/2008/INF.1 [ENGLISH ONLY]	Background Information on Scientific and Technological Developments that may be Relevant to the Convention
BWC/MSP/2008/INF.2 [ENGLISH/FRENCH/SPANISH ONLY]	List of Participants
BWC/MSP/2008/INF.3	List of States Parties
BWC/MSP/2008/L.1	Synthesis of Considerations, Lessons, Perspectives, Recommendations, Conclusions and Proposals Drawn from the Presentations, Statements, Working Papers and Interventions on the Topics under Discussion at the Meeting of Experts Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2008/CRP.1 [ENGLISH ONLY]	Draft Report of the Meeting of States Parties

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Provisional List of Participants

BWC/MSP/2008/WP.1
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Dual-Use Awareness and Oversight under the
Seventh Framework Programme of the European
Community for Research, Technological
Development and Demonstration Activities
(2007-2013)
Submitted by Austria and Germany on behalf of
the European Union

BWC/MSP/2008/WP.2
[ENGLISH ONLY]

Capacity Building and Promotion of
International Cooperation in the Field of
Biosafety and Biosecurity
Submitted by Cuba on behalf of the Group of
Non-aligned Movement and Other States

BWC/MSP/2008/WP.3
[ENGLISH ONLY]

IASB Code of Conduct (Draft)
Submitted by Germany

BWC/MSP/2008/WP.4
[FRENCH ONLY]

Les Initiatives de l'Union Européenne en Soutien
a la Mise en Ouvre et a l'Universalisation de la
Convention Sur l'Interdiction des Armes
Biologiques (CIAB), Y Compris les Aspects de
Bio-Sécurité et Bio-Sureté
Présenté par la France au nom de l'Union
Européenne

BWC/MSP/2008/WP.5
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Perspective on Oversight, Codes of Conduct,
Education and Awareness Raising
Submitted by Pakistan

BWC/MSP/2008/WP.6
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Preparing the Ground for the CBM Content
Debate: What Information Builds Confidence?
Submitted by Switzerland
